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The U.S. Congress last week gave final approval to a South Korean-U.S. trade agreement (KORUS) despite strong opposition from the labor movement and a handful of organizations on the political left. The pact was approved along with treaties with Panama and Columbia — but those agreements pale against KORUS, which is the largest trade deal passed since NAFTA was signed by President Clinton in 1994. It so enthralled South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, a former top executive with Hyundai and the country’s most conservative leader in a decade, that he proclaimed the beginning of a new “economic alliance” during his visit to Washington. An excited President Obama told Korean reporters it was a “win accord” that will create jobs, expand opportunity “and give benefits to both countries.” Yadda yadda yadda – we’ve heard it all before. In fact, KORUS represents a major victory for U.S. multinational corporations, banks and financial institutions, which have lobbied intensively for the pact for more than half a decade. It’s also a major setback for Korean and American unions. Both (with the exception of the U.S. United Auto Workers) saw that KORUS, like NAFTA, was above and beyond an investment agreement designed to improve conditions and decrease risk for foreign capital while doing nothing to improve labor rights (dismal in both South Korea and the United States, as recognized by the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions) or lift the general conditions of workers and consumers in either country. Now that the AFL-CIO has failed to convince a Democratic president and Senate to oppose it, it remains to be seen if South Korea’s labor-led opposition can muster the strength to defeat the treaty in Seoul. We shall see. Over the next fews days we’ll be hearing a lot about the potential impact of the Korean agreement on U.S. employment, some of it exaggerated, some of it downright mendacious. At the same time, the opposition to KORUS from elements of the so-called left was — with few exceptions — based on shrill, dogmatic nationalism and filled with terrible caricatures of Korea, North and South. While “leftist” talk show hosts such as MSNBC’s Dylan Ratigan spewed falsehoods about the introduction of North Korean “slaves” into global trade, he and other opponents of the agreement portrayed South Korean workers as enemies of America who are out to steal our jobs. You’d never know from their literature that South Korean workers too opposed KORUS, for many of the same reasons as their American counterparts. That absence of solidarity from the discussion is a very sad commentary on the U.S. left. But what you won’t hear much about, from either right or left, is how this treaty is the culmination of decades of efforts by the U.S. government and its corporate sector to force open the South Korean market, all the while maintaining an enormous military and security presence in that country. This essay, published in 2007 by Foreign Policy In Focus, seeks to tell that story — which dates back to the earliest days of the Cold War — by focusing on four key moments in recent history (KORUS being the last) when the United States used its enormous political and economic clout to intervene in South Korea on behalf of U.S. corporate and financial interests and their Korean (and sometimes Japanese) allies in business. It’s the hidden history of KORUS, and will be elaborated upon in greater depth over the next few weeks on this blog. It’s based upon a lifetime of reporting from and writing about Korea, where I lived as a child and visited often as a journalist and as a labor and human rights activist during the 1980s. My conclusion is simple: solidarity, and not crude nationalism, should define our opposition to US-Korea free trade and any other NAFTA-like agreement. Raw Deal Between Washington and Seoul The South Korean-U.S. free trade agreement (KORUS) cannot be seen apart from U.S.-South Korean security ties, the presence in South Korea of more than 30,000 U.S. troops and a 50-year economic relationship that has been heavily weighted towards American interests. From this perspective, KORUS is the fourth attempt by the United States to force its economic will on South Korea over the past half-century. First U.S. Intervention The first U.S. attempt to alter the Korean economic landscape began in the late 1950s, when three U.S. administrations sought to wean South Korea from US economic aid and push the Korean government back into an economic alliance with Japan. The arrogance of the policy was stunning. Japan had not only colonized Korea, it had rebuilt its own economy by supplying U.S. forces with steel, munitions, and automobiles during the Korean War. The war left the two Koreas divided roughly where they had been when the country was split in 1945, with heavy industry in the North and agriculture in the South. The North, however, quickly recovered, and under the Stalinist policies of Kim Il Sung, rebuilt an industrial economy that remained ahead of the South’s until the early 1970s. In South Korea, under the autocratic rule of the U.S.-backed Syngman Rhee, the economy stagnated. Unwilling to accept permanent division, Rhee continually called for a “march north” to unify Korea under his rule and refused to consider any economic plan that would solidify the division. By the late 1950s, having tired of Rhee, the U.S. government began to apply strong pressures on his government to cut U.S. aid and accept foreign — particularly Japanese — investment. In 1961, Park Chung Hee, a general who had been trained by the Japanese Imperial Army, seized power in Seoul. Over the next few years, as the United States escalated the war in Vietnam, the pressure on Park to liberalize the economy increased. The pivotal move came in 1965, when Park’s government, under immense pressure from Washington, signed a normalization treaty with Japan. Washington saw the treaty as a way for Japan to support South Korea — and the U.S. strategic position in Asia — at a time when the United States was pouring aid and military forces into Vietnam. But Koreans were outraged, and Park had to declare martial law and keep the opposition out of parliament to get it passed. The normalization treaty became the cornerstone for South Korea’s entry into the world market. As part of the deal, Japan pledged over $800 million in reparation payments to Seoul. Most of that money came in the form of direct Japanese investments and loans, which financed the first phase of the South Korean export-led economy. Japanese corporations invested heavily in South Korean electronics, textiles and steel, thus transferring many of their labor-intensive production to Korea while keeping the high-tech industries in Japan. The Korean companies that entered these industries grew rapidly into conglomerates, called chaebol (like their Japanese counterparts, they too profited from U.S. military orders – this time in Southeast Asia). By the mid-1980s, seven chaebol controlled nearly 80% of the value of the country’s exports. The Korean economy was also a very profitable market for U.S. multinationals. U.S. electronics, clothing, and plywood companies established plants in Korean export-processing zones. And during the period of rapid growth, South Korea became a bonanza for U.S. corporations selling oil, nuclear technology, weapons, and farm products. Companies such as Bechtel, Westinghouse, General Motors, and Gulf Oil created lucrative joint ventures with Hyundai, Samsung, and other chaebol. The so-called Korean “export miracle” was born. But the miracle had a significant weak spot: repression. To keep wages low and Korean exports competitive, the Park government imposed draconian controls on unions and labor organizing. Workers who protested conditions were physically abused and often jailed. Students and intellectuals who criticized the government were subjected to harsh treatment, including torture and long prison sentences. By the late 1970s, political unrest reached a peak. In 1979, hundreds of garment workers occupied the headquarters of the opposition party to protest working conditions and the suppression of union rights. The protests soon spread to other cities, and were joined by students, intellectuals and ordinary citizens sick of dictatorship. That triggered a political crisis for the ruling elite. In October 1979, believing that Park’s death would head off violent revolution, the head of the Korean intelligence service assassinated the Korean president. The Carter administration, fearful that South Korea was in danger of becoming “another Iran,” tried to broker a compromise between the dissident movement and the Korean military. But that attempt failed, and in May 1980, another general, Chun Doo Hwan, seized power in a violent military coup. That set the stage for America’s second intervention in the Korean economy. Second Intervention: The NICs Under Chun’s iron rule, South Korea’s industries were reorganized to improve their competitiveness, and chaebol were forced to concentrate on only one or two industries. Hyundai, for example, focused on automobiles and ships, while Samsung put its energies into electronics. Labor unions were placed under even tighter control, and industrial unions were banned altogether. By the mid-1980s, Korean exports were growing rapidly again. But with U.S. manufacturing in deep decline and textile and steel mills closing throughout the industrial heartland, Asian imports became a serious political problem in Washington. Democrats in Congress were especially angry over the trade imbalance with the four newly industrialized countries (NICs) in Asia that had embraced export-led development: South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. By 1986, nearly 25% of the US trade deficit was with those four economies. To force the NICs to open their doors to American imports, the Democrats threatened protectionist measures, such as a 25% surcharge on imports championed by Rep. Richard Gephardt (D-MO). Fearing that a working class backlash could help Democrats win the White House in 1988, the Reagan administration, led by Treasury Secretary James Baker, stepped in. “I will not stand by and watch American businesses fail because of unfair trading practices abroad,” declared Reagan. In 1986, just a few years after the Reagan administration was hailing South Korea as a model Third World nation, Baker led an aggressive campaign against South Korea and the Asian NICs. At one point, David Mulford, one of Baker’s top aides, launched a blistering attack on the NICs as wild “tigers” who were upsetting the peace and stability of the global economy. “Tigers live in the jungle and by the law of the jungle,” he said. To “tame” the voracious NICs, the Reagan administration imposed quotas on South Korean steel exports and cancelled tariff-free entry for many of its products. In another unilateral move, Baker also began using Section 301 trade powers, which gave the president discretionary authority to investigate foreign trade practices, against Korean imports. By 1987, the Reagan administration was negotiating with South Korea to lift its barriers to US telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, agricultural goods, tobacco, and services. Within a few years, South Korea had diverted many of its exports toward Europe and other Asian countries. Inside South Korea, where anti-American feeling was high because of Reagan’s support for the dictatorial Chun regime, these actions smacked of arrogance and hypocrisy. For one thing, they seemed to violate the Cold War agreement between the U.S. and its Asian allies, which allowed the United States to retain troops on their territory in return for unimpeded access to the U.S. market. For decades, U.S. exporters of chemicals, nuclear power, oil and grain had enjoyed monopoly access to the Korean market. The United States had used its military leverage to keep those markets open and looked aside at human rights violations to keep trade flowing. The most egregious incident occurred in 1980, after hundreds of Koreans were killed during an uprising against Chun’s military rule in the southwestern city of Kwangju. Within a month of this massacre, the Carter administration, fearing that the unrest could upset the flow of U.S. exports, agreed to provide $600 million in export credits to the Chun government so it could buy a set of reactors from Bechtel and Westinghouse. And during the summer of 1980, as Chun intensified his police state, U.S. diplomats scurried around New York literally begging U.S. banks to continue lending to South Korea. By the end of the 1980s, the Reagan administration’s pressures on South Korea had deepened Korean anger at the United States. But this time, government officials and businessmen shared the sentiment. The 1997 Financial Crisis In 1988, after weeks of pro-democracy demonstrations that brought millions of people into the streets, Chun agreed to step down from the presidency and allow direct elections for the first time in nearly 20 years. With the military now on the sidelines, South Korea finally became a democracy. Unions, repressed for decades, began organizing like wildfire, and soon South Korea had one of the most dynamic labor movements in the world. In 1997, the democratic movement reached its pinnacle of success when Kim Dae Jung, the longtime leader of its opposition movement, was elected president. But Kim soon faced another economic crisis that sparked the third U.S. intervention in the Korean economy. Starting in the early 1990s, the United States and the World Bank embarked on a global campaign to urge developing countries, particularly the fast-growing economies of Asia, to quicken the opening of their capital markets and scrap rules that had previously closed their financial sectors to full participation by U.S. and European banks. During the Clinton administration, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, the former CEO of Goldman Sachs, pushed for freer movements of capital while simultaneously pressing to win opportunities to U.S. banks, investment funds, and insurance companies. Encouraged by the U.S. Treasury and the IMF, Asian governments enticed foreign investors with high interest rates and a fixed rate of exchange, which protected investors against the risk of devaluations that could erode the value of their investments. By the late 1990s, billions of dollars from overseas investors and mutual funds were pouring into the region. The Asian countries, however, weren’t prepared to regulate the flow of foreign capital. In Southeast Asia, much of the money went into badly planned real estate projects; in South Korea it was directed into automobile, steel, and semiconductor factories built just as global markets were contracting. In 1996, prices for key Asian exports began to fall precipitously. In Korea, the price for semiconductor chips, which were responsible at one point for half of the country’s exports, dropped by 50%. The bubble was about to burst. The Asian financial crisis began in Thailand when the government devalued its currency to protect the economy against speculators. Panicked foreign investors began to convert their investments into dollars, precipitating a crash in the stock market. Global confidence in the region plummeted as investors fled the entire region. Both Thailand and South Korea ran out of cash to pay interest owed to foreign banks. Fearing that the “contagion” would spread to Brazil and other countries and seriously erode U.S. exports, the U.S. Treasury and the IMF intervened in Asia with the largest bailouts in world history — more than $100 billion. In Korea, the U.S. Treasury used the bailout as leverage to press for an end to all barriers on foreign banks and investment funds. For the first time in Korean history, foreign banks were allowed to buy 100% control of Korean financial institutions. The IMF intervention thus allowed the United States to force changes that it had been unable to complete in four decades of trade negotiations. Bankrupt Korean companies were forced to sell assets at fire-sale prices to foreign, mostly U.S., banks and investment funds. Under the new policies, large U.S. banks and investment funds, such as Texas Pacific and the Carlyle Group, became major investors in the Korean economy. As hundreds of thousands of Korean workers lost their jobs in mass layoffs, US banks and investment funds counted their profits. Among the funds making a killing were several union-controlled pension funds. The Latest Intervention Now, under KORUS, U.S. corporations backed by the U.S. government want to launch their fourth intervention in South Korea’s economy. Currently, U.S.-Korean trade, which totaled $78.3 billion in 2006, runs heavily in Seoul’s favor, with the United States running a $14 billion deficit with its partner, mostly in automobiles, auto parts and electronics. U.S. proponents of the FTA say the pact will rectify that imbalance by expanding auto, beef, and film exports to South Korea and creating a “stable” legal framework for U.S. investors operating in Korea. Free-traders also argue that, with China beginning to dominate East Asia, an FTA with South Korea will help the United States maintain US influence in the region. Charlene Barshefsky, Clinton’s former trade representative, wrote recently that the US-Korean FTA is “one of the steps necessary to respond to a transformed landscape” in Asia. “Robust engagement with Asia is critical if we are to retain unencumbered economic access to the region and if we are to reinvigorate our central role in the Pacific, our network of relationships and American influence there,” she said. South Korean economists who favor the treaty believe an FTA will solidify a security alliance weakened by recent disputes between Bush and Roh over North Korea’s nuclear program and the future of U.S. troops in Korea. “I am very sure that the enhancement of the economic partnership and the deepening of economic integration between the two countries will contribute towards strengthening their security alliance,” Il Sakong, the CEO of the Institute for Global Economics and a former adviser to the Chun government, said recently. Mickey Kantor, who preceded Barshefsky as trade representative and is himself an investor in South Korea, believes that U.S.-Korean strategic ties guarantee that the FTA will be approved. “The idea that we would turn down a trade agreement with Korea on any basis, given the sensitive political arrangements in that area, and their neighbors to the north, is somewhat daunting,” he told The New York Times. “There’ll be legitimate pressure to try and get something done here, regardless of the provisions of the agreement.” The security relationship between Seoul and Washington, as well as the sheer size of the proposed FTA, has placed the deal at the top of the U.S. trade agenda. The leadership in South Korea, too, has placed a high priority on the FTA, despite what had been strong links between the ruling party and civil movements, including unions. In this fourth attempt by the United States to reshape the South Korean economy, however, Seoul is in a much stronger position. It was able to extract important concessions such as keeping rice and educational services out of the agreement. This relative strength gives the leadership in Seoul the illusion that it is getting a good deal. Despite these push factors, the FTA faces considerable obstacles, not least the skepticism of the U.S. Congress, which has passed free trade agreements over the years by ever-narrowing margins. Congressional opponents are worried about insufficient labor and environmental provisions in the pact. Free-trade opponents, both in Korea and the United States, realize that the pact is not so much between two countries as between two sets of multinational corporations. It would also deepen South Korea’s dependence on the United States at a time when it is just beginning to find its own way in East Asia. After 50 years of U.S. intervention in Korean affairs, it’s time for the citizens of both countries to reject the policies of corporate globalization by creating a new relationship based on a mutual interest in global justice, democracy, economic stability, and human rights. To make that happen, let’s let our leaders know that U.S. national security interests can no longer be the dominant factor in U.S.-Korean relations. *Tim Shorrock is a KPI Advisor and an investigative journalist based in Washington DC.

On Saturday, December 17, 2011, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, 69 years old, passed away while traveling on a train to a field visit. According to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), North Korea’s official international news organ, Kim suffered a fatal heart attack. A period of national mourning has been declared, and the official funeral is set for December 28. Although his death was sudden, speculation around Kim Jong Il’s mortality in international media commentary has dogged the North Korean leader since he suffered an apparent stroke in 2008. Within North Korea, succession plans for Kim Jong Il’s youngest son, Kim Jong Un, believed to be in his late 20s, have been in place for at least the past three years. For the past two years, Kim Jong Un accompanied his father to all major official gatherings, including a visit to China last year where he is said to have received the support of the government there. Despite conjecture that Kim Jong Il’s passing will lead to political instability, what is clear is that the succession plan has strong internal and Chinese sanction. Signs of the changing of leadership, including endorsement of experienced leaders from the Workers’ Party and the military, were clear at the Workers’ Party conference in September 2010. Kim Jong Un also appears to have support from within the Kim family. Kim Jong Il’s sister, Kim Kyung Hee, and brother-in-law, Jang Song Taek, are expected to help mentor the younger Kim as he assumes leadership. Kim Kyung Hee heads North Korea’s light industries and has helped spearhead the country’s economic reforms. Jang Song Taek is Vice-chair of the National Defense Commission. Both are high-ranking members of the Workers’ Party of Korea. Although Kim Jong Il was selected as Kim Il Sung’s successor in the mid-1970s, he did not officially assume power until three years after the death and mourning of his father in 1994. Kim Jong Il’s leadership coincided with the most difficult times North Korea has faced since the Korean War, including the collapse of the socialist bloc in the early 1990s, the depletion of its energy reserves, and the great famine known in the North as the “arduous march” in which some 600,000 to 2 million North Koreans died in the mid-1990s. In 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush labeled North Korea part of an “axis of evil” and identified that country as a possible target for pre-emptive nuclear strike, setting U.S.-North Korea relations on a downward spiral from which it has yet to recover. While there is no doubt that North Korea has experienced serial setbacks in realizing its ambitious goal of achieving prosperity by 2012, public support of Kim Jong Il’s pursuit of normalization of relations with the U.S. as an integral part of denuclearization negotiations appears to be unshaken. While there are reports of disillusionment within the society over economic reforms or lack thereof, there has been no visible discord with regard to the issue of maintaining the country’s sovereignty. This task now falls to Kim Jong Un and the upcoming generation of North Koreans. The critical issue for North Korea—one that defined Kim Jong Il’s leadership—has been maintaining sovereignty while breaking out of its diplomatic isolation from the West. Relative to that task, Kim Jong Il, as the late South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun remarked upon meeting him in Pyongyang in 2007, was “the most flexible man in North Korea.” Kim Jong Il’s death comes just as tensions in U.S.-North Korea relations appear to be easing. Agreements between the two countries were reached this past weekend in Beijing. It is expected that the United States will soon announce that it will send 240,000 tons of food aid to North Korea in exchange for North Korea’s agreement to suspend work on its nuclear enrichment program. This is the first significant diplomatic breakthrough in four years, a welcome sign of engagement between the two countries that could lead to improved relations between the U.S. and North Korea as well as North and South Korea.

With the passing of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, KPI Executive Director Christine Ahn sat down for a phone interview with Han S. Park. Professor Park is Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Center for the Study of Global Issues (GLOBIS) at the University of Georgia. Born in China (Manchuria) to immigrant Korean parents, Dr. Park received his education in China, Korea, and the United States, with advanced degrees in Political Science from Seoul National University (B.A.), the American University (M.A.) and the University of Minnesota (Ph.D.). [Ahn]: Professor Park, can you start by briefly sharing your background and experience traveling back and forth from North Korea? [Park]: I was born in China during the Chinese civil war struggle for independence. My family moved down to what is now currently South Korea via Pyongyang when I was eight years old. We lived in Pyongyang for a year or so before the partition of the country. My family was fed up with the gruesome scene of the Chinese civil war and sought to avoid it, though when we returned home, we found ourselves in the middle of the Korean War, which was even nastier because of the massive air assaults, which wasn’t evident during the Chinese civil war. I finished my undergraduate education from Seoul National University in Political Science and came to the United States in 1965 to further my education. Because I was trained as a political philosopher, I was intrigued by the Juche ideology of North Korea. In 1980, I wrote several letters inquiring of my interest in studying Juche to many people who made my first trip possible to North Korea in 1981. Ever since then, I have been looking into the evolution into that system of ideas. After all this time, I have a pretty complete grasp of the ideology and the social political context in which it was born and operates. I visited North Korea for the second time in 1990, nearly 10 years later. Ever since then, I have not missed a single year, traveling sometimes four times per year. I have seen the country over time, examining the culture, language and reading between the lines. I think I know North Korea quite intimately, and as a scholar, I have been able to make inferences from simple matters and facts. My lifelong passion is how to help people live together without killing each other. Since Korea is my country of my origin and fatherland, I have great care for Korea. Over the years, I have witnessed US policies towards Korea, including times when we were very close to military confrontation. In 1994, I was directly involved in having Jimmy Carter visit that year to de-escalate growing tensions [with the US], and again last year helped urge him to visit North Korea. I believe that peacemaking is possible by enhancing mutual understanding. Disagreement is a very healthy thing in human society. Being able to accommodate diversity is what peace is all about. If you have uniformity, you don’t need peace. My goal has been for North and South Korea and the US to develop a relationship of peace rather than an alliance, which is predicated on a paradigm of security, which in turn is founded on a culture of mutual fear. In contrast, a peace paradigm is an accommodation of differences. The greater the difference, the greater the potential for peace. There are major differences between North and South Korea, but it’s how we use the differences in the process of integration. The grave mistake is not being able to communicate. It’s so important for the United States and South Korea to understand North Korea and vice versa, which is why I have devoted so much towards organizing high-level delegations to exchange views. [Ahn]: You’ve been to North Korea for the past 30 years. Can you remark on the different legacies between Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il? [Park]: When you look at the three generations, you have to look at both the domestic and the regional/global context. North Korea is such a small country, which has meant that it has had to basically react to external forces because of its lack of resources. Actually, the fate of the Korean people as a whole and its regimes, in the north and south, have been reactive versus proactive. North Korea has to be sensitive to external surroundings, which have largely been hostile to its sovereign state. Kim Il Sung was a very legitimate national hero. I developed an early interest in him, in part because my father was born the same year in 1912. Both lived in northeast China. Kim Il Sung had a great deal of footing in northeast China where he waged guerilla warfare against Japan. Although they were not friends, they had many mutual friends in common, many that I met and interviewed. After hearing their stories, I concluded that Kim Il Sung was indeed a remarkable young man. In South Korea, many say that Kim Il Sung is fake, when in fact, as soon as the North Korean government was formally erected in 1948, he became a hero. Naturally, there were power struggles, but most of Kim Il Sung’s opponents were eliminated by the end of the Korean War. Kim Il Sung developed enormous respect from the people of North Korea. He maneuvered between the Soviets and the Chinese, long before maneuvering between the United States and the global communist bloc. He was quite skillful at maintaining North Korean sovereignty; he never paid tribute to Stalin or Mao Tse Tung, who even lost his son in the Korean War. Kim Il Sung was not an ordinary head of state for North Korea. Naturally, within a political system, his lieutenants wanted to dramatize that and sometimes wrote comical descriptions suggesting that it was Kim Il Sung who brought Korean independence from Japan. They did this to further dramatize the superman quality of Kim Il Sung, which is also what happens in other political systems, such as in South Korea with Rhee Syngman or in the US case with George Washington. Kim Il Sung’s reign coincided largely with the Cold War international world order. He had to navigate the tensions between superpowers within the communist bloc, maneuvering quite skillfully and maintaining North Korean sovereignty and self-reliance, which in fact prompted him to develop the Juche ideology. Kim Il Sung was a very autocratic, centrist, and authoritarian ruler. People followed him because he was very well-versed in many things, ranging from techniques in agriculture to industry to foreign policy to ideology. The world was much more simplistic in the sense that it was either communism or democracy, and domestic challenges weren’t very complicated. There was no disagreement within power circles as to what to do. He had enough intellect and ideas to manage the polity the way he wanted to. Kim Il Sung’s passing in 1994 coincided with the post cold war era with the virtual overnight disappearance of the Soviet Union and communist support system. We didn’t have a polarized system anymore; instead it was a world dominated by the US as the sole superpower. As a result, Kim Jong Il had to face American domination, and unfortunately for him, the United States had a tripartite security alliance with South Korea and Japan. All three countries were economically and militarily superior to North Korea, so Kim Jong Il had to make sure that his country wouldn’t be forcefully undermined. That was a formidable challenge for him. In order to demonstrate his country’s ability to self-defend, he had to show off his capability in the form of testing two nuclear weapons. He had to promote not just military weapons, but militarism, which prompted the Songun (‘military first’) politics. To clarify, Songun isn’t a mandate to follow the military blindly; it was that the military is charged to do a lot more than national defense, such as domestic construction. Unlike his father, Kim Jong Il had to navigate difficult domestic politics, which was challenged by the degraded economic situation [created by US sanctions] and successive inclement weather in the 1990s, which led to major food shortages. These were the challenging circumstances under which Kim Jong Il had to reign. Kim Il Sung was referred to as the “Great Leader,” the highest level of possible leadership. When people ask me who the real leader of North Korea is, I say Kim Il Sung is the real leader because his policy directives are still very alive. Kim Jong Il was called the “Dear Leader,” which was an important title to ensure that his leadership will be accepted broadly by the people, and in the process he would have total control over the military. When Kim Jong Il assumed power, he tried to establish his own legacy. He was able to extend the Juche ideology to include Songun, and was beloved by the people, as we see with the outpouring of grief upon his death. Today the young Kim Jong Un has been very skillfully called the “Great Successor.” That is a fascinating label because a successor doesn’t have to create new things; rather he is expected to carry out the legacy of his father and grandfather. Between Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, there are already directives, principles and ruling philosophies established. The third generation is to carry out the policies. Meanwhile, in the international context, not only are we out of the cold war, we are quickly leaving the era of US global domination. It’s an entirely different global era. During the second Kim Jong Il era, decision making was largely collective. Although the decision makers may not have been collectively recognized, the center of the party was the worker’s party. Kim Jong Il became synonymous with the center of the party, which made decisions. In North Korea, there are 12-13 people who make decisions, and all these individuals are intact. Kim Jong Un’s job is to succeed these policies, so things will remain the same, not just in Pyongyang, but also in foreign policy as well. [Ahn]: Professor Park, with regards to Kim Jong Il’s legacy, many so-called Korea experts say that under his leadership, the military gained more power than worker’s party. What do you think about this analysis? [Park]: In any system, you will have military-civil tension. However, in North Korea, the civil isn’t separate from the military. I would agree that the Military Commission by design gained a lot of authority and power, and Kim Jong Il was chairman of the Military Commission. But this was not necessarily against the political party, the Worker’s Party, but rather in concert. There is no distinction between military leaders and party members; there is a lot of mixing and overlapping. A lot of people speculate that there might be a military junta since Kim Jong Il’s passing. A military coup is unthinkable for many reasons, as is the prospect of an Arab Spring-type of uprising against the North Korean leadership. [Ahn]: Professor Park, my worry is that the Obama administration will fall into the same trap that Clinton did in the period following the death of Kim Il Sung where everyone anticipated the end of North Korea, which led to the United States reneging on the Agreed Framework and a shift in U.S. policy towards regime change. [Park]: Frankly, what is driving U.S. policy towards North Korea are the interests of the military industrial complex. They want North Korea to be militarily strong, stronger than it is. North Korea is not a threat to the United States, but they perpetuate the myth that it is. Secondly, these interests like to perpetuate the myth that North Korea is evil and has the intention to strike the United States, which is just what they need to justify the costly missile defense system. The only thing that can override this is political opinion, which is a real challenge since decision makers have their own agenda, which is to protect their military and economic interests at all costs. [Ahn]: Professor Park, as an expert on Juche ideology, how do you explain North Korea’s reliance on foreign aid while maintaining an image of self-sufficiency? [Park]: It is a misreading of self reliance. Juche is not isolationism, and certainly not about excluding foreign elements. Self-reliance, politically speaking, is a principle. It means that a sovereign North Korea assumes all initiative, the course of its policy. They are sitting in the driver’s seat. Self reliance doesn’t mean that they don’t import food because they don’t have enough land to cultivate food to feed everyone. It’s more a principle of not wanting to be controlled by others. North Korea and South Korea have been waging a legitimacy war, so much so that North Korea wanted to establish its own course uniquely different from the south. As we know, South Korea is anything but sovereign, especially militarily and in making foreign policy decisions. [Ahn]: How do you respond to allegations that Kim Jong Il was a dictator who starved his own people? [Park]: As a political scientist and analyst, I always say that you have to understand that Kim Jong Il is a political leader whose job is to maintain his political system first and foremost. If that country is under a security threat, that regime will do anything and everything, even at the expense of economic setbacks. To North Koreans, their national security is not for sale. Economic incentives and aid will never buy a shred of national security. And this is the case for every country, the United States included. There are multiple causes of crop failure during Kim Jong Il’s reign. In the name of self-sufficient agriculture and expanding productivity, during the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea significantly clear cut trees, which led to the removal of top soil and then the recurrences of flooding. [Ahn]: So how do we use this opportunity to shift the paradigm within the Obama administration? [Park]: Both South Korean President Lee Myung Bak and President Obama developed a personal hatred of Kim Jong Il, but because this young man is a new face, it is an opportune time because it is the opening of a new chapter. What is unfortunate is that the State Department has said that they would wait until after the funeral to send a new year’s message, which is foolish. You have to make decisions, especially since it is clear that the continuity will be there despite the change in the symbolic head of leadership. [Ahn]: If you had the ear of president Obama, what would you advise him to do? [Park]: In the area of foreign policy, the second term president is more interested in long term solutions, so I expect more from a second term Obama, including direct negotiations with North Korea. I hope that Washington will no longer be a hostage of Seoul, which with the recent election of Seoul, will likely lead to something else. I am very hopeful about that because the conservative base is being disintegrated.

The incomplete and distorted reporting about North Korean leader Kim Jong Il is not fair to him, the people of North and South Korea who long for peace and reconciliation, or to the American people. Instead of talking about Kim’s eating with silver chopsticks while the people of North Korea are starving, we need to be reminded that in 1995, the year after Kim Jong Il came to power, North Korea suffered a massive natural disaster that wiped out cropland, schools, homes, and infrastructure on a scale comparable to Katrina. They have never been able to recover because they have had floods and drought almost every year since then. After last year’s harsh winter, heavy rainfall and subsequent floods in October 2011 damaged about 134,000 hectares of agricultural land leaving many children in North Korean countryside severely malnourished, with little chance of survival without access to proper nutrition and medical treatment. As in the past, Kim Jong Il requested foreign assistance. North Korea has allowed monitoring which shows that the aid reaches the people in need. Before the death of Kim Jong Il the U.S. was poised to resume food aid. Will we now delay food aid for political purposes? Before we accuse Kim Jong Il of “starving his people”, we need to remember the size of our own military budget, when we have so many people who are homeless, hungry and without health care in our own country. Kim Jong Il held summits with South Korea’s two “sunshine policy” presidents. As a result, during ten of the seventeen years Kim Jong Il was in power, there was unprecedented inter-Korean cooperation, including the Kaesong Industrial Park just across the border in North Korea. There 120 South Korean firms hire 48,000 workers to manufacture products which in 2010 produced $323 million in output. Of this amount there is a revenue stream of about $20 million that goes to the North Korean government from the salaries paid to the North Korean workers. This kind of economic cooperation can help maintain stability on the Korean peninsula and expose tens of thousands of North Koreans to outside influences. During this time a railway opened from South Korea to North Korea. In 2002 the North and South agreed that private South Korean companies could run tours to Mount Kumgang. Thousands of South Korean tourists visited Mount Kumgang every year bringing profit to both North and South Korea. In July 2005 the North and South agreed to open up more areas to tourism, including Baekdu Mountain and Kaesong. In 2007 Kim Jung Il and South Korean President Rho Moo Hyun signed an agreement to work on a peace treaty to replace the 1953 armistice. They even talked about cooperation in the disputed waters of the Western Sea. Unfortunately, South Korean President Lee Myong Bak announced at his inauguration that he would “get tough on North Korea”. He refused to honor the agreements made by his predecessors. Except for the Kaesong Industrial Park, most of the cooperative projects have ended. As a result Kim Jong Il kicked out the international inspectors and resumed his nuclear program. If the “sunshine policy” had continued, the tensions of 2010 could have been avoided. South Korean peace activists remind us that the military budget of South Korea is comparable to North Korea’s entire GNP. North Korea has no way of matching the military might of the South Korea. Now what would you do if you were the president of North Korea? While North Korea has a policy of Juche, self-reliance, the failed U.S. policy of sixty years of sanctions has pushed North Korea further into being the most isolated country of the world. South Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s vision for “constructive engagement” offered the most hope of bringing peace and prosperity to all Koreans and to the world. Instead of making Kim Jong Il look like an idiot, we must remember that Secretary of State Madeline Albright characterized Kim Jong Il as intelligent and well-informed, saying the two had wide-range discussions during her visits to Pyongyang when Bill Clinton was U.S. president. The division of Korea was not the fault of the Korean people. Their country was divided by the U.S. and the Soviet Union at the end of WWII. The suffering of the Korean people has continued for 66 years. Ten million family members were permanently separated; people in the north and south live in fear of war; the resources of their country are used for military buildup. On both sides of the division, repression has been used in the name of national security. Only in 1987 was there a revolution which replaced South Korea’s military dictatorship with a democratic government. The same people who worked so hard for democracy and human rights in South Korea are the ones who are the voices for peace in Korea. At this time of great uncertainty, when the North Korean people have lost their leader, how we respond, or don’t respond will set the tone for the possibility of important negotiations with North Korea. It is very important that the United States and South Korea send a sign that we desire peace. Putting the troops on alert is not very comforting, especially when we have just been conducting military exercises right off the North Korean coast. We should remember that Bill Clinton sent condolences to North Korea when Kim Il Sung died, even though South Korea’s President Kim Young Sam did not, and in fact made it illegal for South Koreans to send condolences. That set the stage for Clinton to get agreements that kept North Korea’s nuclear program under the control of international inspectors for eight more years until President George Bush refused to support South Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s policy of constructive engagement, and called North Korea part of the “Axis of Evil” at a time when he was invading Iraq. Military might and sanctions will not work. The only way to end the suffering on both sides is to consider the economic and security needs of both sides, and to negotiate a peace treaty to end the Korean War. *Dorothy Ogle is a former missionary to South Korea, visitor to North Korea in 1984, and Legislative Affairs Coordinator, in 1987 and 1988, for the National Council of Churches Policy Statement: Peace and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula.

In 2006, I traveled to North Korea. The “other half” of my ethnic heritage had been a long held fascination. The American media had presented images of laughable authoritarian figures, strange rituals, and helpless suffering. My parents had instilled a fear of “the other” that they were taught as children in South Korea. So I went to find the truth. When I got there I learned that it a lot more complicated. The political tensions between North Korea and United States were front and center. Everywhere we looked ideology was trumpeted with a resounding “me against the world” mentality. But more powerfully, I experienced a sense of warmth and belonging. The people we met spoke to me in the first language I ever knew. They used words that I heard from my mother and the most important people in my life. Their mannerisms and appearance strikingly resembled those of my relatives and friends. And much like my relatives, I understood the pattern of their emotions though I did not necessarily agree. We laughed, we sang, and we danced. Throughout the country, we were surrounded by beautiful landscapes and mountains that convincingly camouflaged the scars from carpet bombings of the Korean War. We also saw the human toll of a deteriorating health system and chronic malnutrition. I went to North Korea to find the truth and I found it in the land and the people. Kim Jong Il has died and North Korea’s next moves, both internally and externally are unclear. The region and the world are anxiously reviewing a menu of military scenarios. And while this event is destabilizing for the country, collapse is no more certain now than it has been for the past 60 years. In the midst of this chaos we can’t lose sight of what is most important. Enlightened leaders must discover an opportunity for engagement and peace. For the sake of the truth they must. *Ricky Y. Choi, MD, MPH, is a Korea Policy Institute Fellow who traveled to North Korea in 2006 with a delegation of Korean Americans delivering humanitarian aid.

As 2011 came to a close, the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il took the world by surprise (including the CIA which, like the rest of us, only learned of his passing 48 hours later). Given the dearth of understanding about North Korea in the West, the media could only speculate about the future of the new regime in Pyongyang. The usual pundits also took the opportunity to renew their calls for regime change. After all, 2011 was the year when the masses rose up to overthrow repressive regimes; could the same fate be in store for North Korea? If anything has become clear in the weeks following Kim Jong Il’s passing, it is that regime collapse is not in the cards for North Korea. In fact, since 2008, the world has known of Kim’s failing health. Furthermore, North Korea has experienced succession before: in 1994,Kim Il Sung passed away during an incredibly tumultuous time, domestically and internationally. Kim Jong Il took over the reins of power at a time when the socialist trading bloc had collapsed, essentially eliminating overnight North Korea’s historic allies and trading partners. Not only did it lack critical imports such as fuel to run tractors, North Korea faced a new world in which its historic enemy—the United States— was the world’s sole superpower. North Korea also endured the difficult period of serial droughts and floods, which contributed to the food crisis where up to one million North Koreans are thought to have perished in the famine during Kim Jong Il’s rule. By all accounts, the current succession is going as planned. On December 30, Kim Jong Il’s son, Kim Jong Un was named the supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army, reflecting the backing of the Military Commission and the Worker’s Party. While Kim Jung Un’s ascendancy won’t likely bring about any significant short-term changes politically, economically, or militarily to North Korea, his reign contains a number of question marks. Little is known about him beyond the fact that he is young, was educated partly outside of North Korea in Switzerland, and didn’t grow up during the Cold War. What happens in North Korea, however, is also clearly influenced by what happens in Seoul, and the winds of change are blowing strong south of the Demilitarized Zone where grassroots movements are challenging the country’s retrograde neo-Cold War leadership. After four long years under President Lee Myung Bak’s repressive and hard-line policies, 2011 marked the revival of democracy in South Korea thanks to three particularly inspiring developments for peace, economic justice, and anti-corruption. Korean Spring South One grassroots movement that is successfully challenging the militarization of South Korea and the ROK-U.S. alliance is the inspiring organizing of farmers, fishermen, and women sea divers of Gangjeong village working relentlessly to stop the construction of a naval base on Jeju Island. If all goes as planned, by 2014, the base will host 20 warships, nuclear aircraft carriers and submarines, and two Aegis destroyers integrated with the U.S. Missile Defense System. And this isn’t just any village on any island. Gangjeong is home to a UNESCO World Heritage site, a UNESCO biosphere reserve, and a government-designated “absolute preservation area” characterized by rare rock formations, abundant and fertile farmlands, pristine fresh and sea waters, and endangered marine life. Although villagers have been waging a nonviolent struggle for nearly five years, 2011 was a turning point in their ability to gain both national and international attention, including major coverage in top-tier media and global peace solidarity. Using direct action tactics, including using their bodies to block construction trucks and dredging ships, Gangjeong villagers delayed base construction by nearly eight months. As international coverage of their struggle grew, so did the repression by the South Korean government and Navy. Dozens of activists and villagers were beaten, fined and arrested, including Gangjeong village mayor Kang Dok-kyun. Undeterred, the activists and villagers—backed by hundreds of religious, peace, and environmental groups throughout South Korea and internationally—continued to stage daily protests at the construction site. Good news finally arrived on December 30 when the National Assembly cut 96 percent of the 2012 budget for the naval base. According to Gangjeong activist Sung-Hee Choi, “such a tremendous defense budget cut is unprecedented in the history of the Republic of Korea.” Although this cut heralds a major victory for Gangjeong villagers, Choi cautions that nearly 75 percent of the 2011 budget of 151.6 billion won was not used due to the delay in construction, which the Navy will likely use for 2012 and to justify more funding for 2013. Labor Protests Another example of inspiring organizing that has sparked a national discussion on the growing inequality in South Korea came from Busan, a port city in the southeast. There, Kim Jin Suk, the country’s first woman welder, staged a one-woman protest against layoffs by Hanjin Heavy Industry and Construction. In January, Kim climbed up a 35-meter high crane after Hanjin announced plans that it would layoff 400 workers. For 309 days, the 51-year old Kim lived in the cab of the crane, surviving typhoons, monsoons, and heat waves. After 100 days when Kim’s spirit began to flag, thousands of citizens from around the country hopped on hundreds of “Hope Buses” to show their support of Kim’s protest. Riot police used water cannons and tear gas to stop the first wave of 7,000 bus riders traveling on 185 buses. On November 10, Kim finally climbed down after the company and the union worked out a temporary agreement to reinstate 94 workers within one year, compensation for dismissed workers, and the withdrawal of lawsuits. Kim’s protest reflected the growing anger among South Korea’s middle and working classes who have felt shafted by the Lee administration’s pro-business policies and the systematic dismantling of the country’s social safety net. Fighting Corruption A third development in South Korea that has become legendary for raising tough issues of corruption by President Lee and other political leaders is the hugely popular weekly online talk show that launched in April. Named after the nickname given to President Lee by his most vocal critics, “NaneunGgomsuda” (“I am a petty-minded creep”)covers corruption within South Korean politics and the dominance of the conservative, pro-business, and pro-government media. NaneunGgomsuda is the nation’s most popular podcast with approximately six million downloads per week. According to New York Times journalist Choe Sang-hun, “NaneunGgomsuda has emerged as an influential channel of anti-government views.” In December, former National Assembly member Chung Bong-ju, one of the four co-hosts of the show was sentenced to one year in prison for allegedly spreading rumors that President Lee had been implicated in a stock market scandal, a transparent attempt by the political elite to censor the show and intimidate its hosts. Not only has the podcast served as an influential medium for expressing the outrage of many South Koreans, it played a major role last November in the outcome of the mayoral re-election in Seoul. NaneunGgomsudawas among the first to highlight an attack by hackers on the national election commission website, later discovered to have been coordinated by a ruling party official and aimed at ruining the chances of independent candidate Park Won-soon. In a landslide victory, Park beat the likely frontrunner Na Kyung-won of the ruling Grand National Party. This was a significant win for many reasons. For one, Park is known as the grandfather of modern South Korean civil society for founding many liberal institutions, such as the nation’s premier watchdog group People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy and the philanthropic organization Beautiful Foundation. He now governs Seoul, the nation’s capital with a population of over 10 million people that commands half of the country’s GDP. Furthermore, the election in Seoul is a bell weather of what’s to come in next year’s national assembly and presidential elections. The changes occurring in South Korea may not only usher in a more progressive regime in 2012 and greater social justice; it will undoubtedly influence the way that Pyongyang chooses to engage with Seoul. It took both North and South Korean leaders to make the sunshine policy possible, though the South Korean leaders got most of the credit. The popular uprisings in the south will no doubt influence prospects for reconciliation, peace, and the reunification of Korea. These changes on the Korean peninsula present a unique opportunity for the Obama administration to take a constructive approach on Korea for a change, instead of blindly following an unpopular South Korean president whose time is up. *Christine Ahn is Executive Director of the Korea Policy Institute, a policy and research analyst with the Global Fund for Women and a Foreign Policy In Focus columnist.

When it comes to China policy, is the Obama administration leaping from the frying pan directly into the fire? In an attempt to turn the page on two disastrous wars in the Greater Middle East, it may have just launched a new Cold War in Asia — once again, viewing oil as the key to global supremacy. The new policy was signaled by President Obama himself on November 17th in an address to the Australian Parliament in which he laid out an audacious — and extremely dangerous — geopolitical vision. Instead of focusing on the Greater Middle East, as has been the case for the last decade, the United States will now concentrate its power in Asia and the Pacific. “My guidance is clear,” he declared in Canberra. “As we plan and budget for the future, we will allocate the resources necessary to maintain our strong military presence in this region.” While administration officials insist that this new policy is not aimed specifically at China, the implication is clear enough: from now on, the primary focus of American military strategy will not be counterterrorism, but the containment of that economically booming land — at whatever risk or cost. The Planet’s New Center of Gravity The new emphasis on Asia and the containment of China is necessary, top officials insist, because the Asia-Pacific region now constitutes the “center of gravity” of world economic activity. While the United States was bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the argument goes, China had the leeway to expand its influence in the region. For the first time since the end of World War II, Washington is no longer the dominant economic actor there. If the United States is to retain its title as the world’s paramount power, it must, this thinking goes, restore its primacy in the region and roll back Chinese influence. In the coming decades, no foreign policy task will, it is claimed, be more important than this. In line with its new strategy, the administration has undertaken a number of moves intended to bolster American power in Asia, and so put China on the defensive. These include a decision to deploy an initial 250 U.S. Marines — someday to be upped to 2,500 — to an Australian air base in Darwin on that country’s north coast, and the adoption on November 18th of “the Manila Declaration,” a pledge of closer U.S. military ties with the Philippines. At the same time, the White House announced the sale of 24 F-16 fighter jets to Indonesia and a visit by Hillary Clinton to isolated Burma, long a Chinese ally — the first there by a secretary of state in 56 years. Clinton has also spoken of increased diplomatic and military ties with Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam — all countries surrounding China or overlooking key trade routes that China relies on for importing raw materials and exporting manufactured goods. As portrayed by administration officials, such moves are intended to maximize America’s advantages in the diplomatic and military realm at a time when China dominates the economic realm regionally. In a recent article in Foreign Policy magazine, Clinton revealingly suggested that an economically weakened United States can no longer hope to prevail in multiple regions simultaneously. It must choose its battlefields carefully and deploy its limited assets — most of them of a military nature — to maximum advantage. Given Asia’s strategic centrality to global power, this means concentrating resources there. “Over the last 10 years,” she writes, “we have allocated immense resources to [Iraq and Afghanistan]. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership [and] secure our interests… One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment — diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise — in the Asia-Pacific region.” Such thinking, with its distinctly military focus, appears dangerously provocative. The steps announced entail an increased military presence in waters bordering China and enhanced military ties with that country’s neighbors — moves certain to arouse alarm in Beijing and strengthen the hand of those in the ruling circle (especially in the Chinese military leadership) who favor a more activist, militarized response to U.S. incursions. Whatever forms that takes, one thing is certain: the leadership of the globe’s number two economic power is not going to let itself appear weak and indecisive in the face of an American buildup on the periphery of its country. This, in turn, means that we may be sowing the seeds of a new Cold War in Asia in 2011. The U.S. military buildup and the potential for a powerful Chinese counter-thrust have already been the subject of discussion in the American and Asian press. But one crucial dimension of this incipient struggle has received no attention at all: the degree to which Washington’s sudden moves have been dictated by a fresh analysis of the global energy equation, revealing (as the Obama administration sees it) increased vulnerabilities for the Chinese side and new advantages for Washington. The New Energy Equation For decades, the United States has been heavily dependent on imported oil, much of it obtained from the Middle East and Africa, while China was largely self-sufficient in oil output. In 2001, the United States consumed 19.6 million barrels of oil per day, while producing only nine million barrels itself. The dependency on foreign suppliers for that 10.6 million-barrel shortfall proved a source of enormous concern for Washington policymakers. They responded by forging ever closer, more militarized ties with Middle Eastern oil producers and going to war on occasion to ensure the safety of U.S. supply lines. In 2001, China, on the other hand, consumed only five million barrels per day and so, with a domestic output of 3.3 million barrels, needed to import only 1.7 million barrels. Those cold, hard numbers made its leadership far less concerned about the reliability of the country’s major overseas providers — and so it did not need to duplicate the same sort of foreign policy entanglements that Washington had long been involved in. Now, so the Obama administration has concluded, the tables are beginning to turn. As a result of China’s booming economy and the emergence of a sizeable and growing middle class (many of whom have already bought their first cars), the country’s oil consumption is exploding. Running at about 7.8 million barrels per day in 2008, it will, according to recent projections by the U.S. Department of Energy, reach 13.6 million barrels in 2020, and 16.9 million in 2035. Domestic oil production, on the other hand, is expected to grow from 4.0 million barrels per day in 2008 to 5.3 million in 2035. Not surprisingly, then, Chinese imports are expected to skyrocket from 3.8 million barrels per day in 2008 to a projected 11.6 million in 2035 — at which time they will exceed those of the United States. The U.S., meanwhile, can look forward to an improved energy situation. Thanks to increased production in “tough oil” areas of the United States, including the Arctic seas off Alaska, the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, and shale formations in Montana, North Dakota, and Texas, future imports are expected to decline, even as energy consumption rises. In addition, more oil is likely to be available from the Western Hemisphere rather than the Middle East or Africa. Again, this will be thanks to the exploitation of yet more “tough oil” areas, including the Athabasca tar sands of Canada, Brazilian oil fields in the deep Atlantic, and increasingly pacified energy-rich regions of previously war-torn Colombia. According to the Department of Energy, combined production in the United States, Canada, and Brazil is expected to climb by 10.6 million barrels per day between 2009 and 2035 — an enormous jump, considering that most areas of the world are expecting declining output. Whose Sea Lanes Are These Anyway? From a geopolitical perspective, all this seems to confer a genuine advantage on the United States, even as China becomes ever more vulnerable to the vagaries of events in, or along, the sea lanes to distant lands. It means Washington will be able to contemplate a gradual loosening of its military and political ties to the Middle Eastern oil states that have dominated its foreign policy for so long and have led to those costly, devastating wars. Indeed, as President Obama said in Canberra, the U.S. is now in a position to begin to refocus its military capabilities elsewhere. “After a decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly,” he declared, “the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia-Pacific region.” For China, all this spells potential strategic impairment. Although some of China’s imported oil will travel overland through pipelines from Kazakhstan and Russia, the great majority of it will still come by tanker from the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America over sea lanes policed by the U.S. Navy. Indeed, almost every tanker bringing oil to China travels across the South China Sea, a body of water the Obama administration is now seeking to place under effective naval control. By securing naval dominance of the South China Sea and adjacent waters, the Obama administration evidently aims to acquire the twenty-first century energy equivalent of twentieth-century nuclear blackmail. Push us too far, the policy implies, and we’ll bring your economy to its knees by blocking your flow of vital energy supplies. Of course, nothing like this will ever be said in public, but it is inconceivable that senior administration officials are not thinking along just these lines, and there is ample evidence that the Chinese are deeply worried about the risk — as indicated, for example, by their frantic efforts to build staggeringly expensive pipelines across the entire expanse of Asia to the Caspian Sea basin. As the underlying nature of the new Obama strategic blueprint becomes clearer, there can be no question that the Chinese leadership will, in response, take steps to ensure the safety of China’s energy lifelines. Some of these moves will undoubtedly be economic and diplomatic, including, for example, efforts to court regional players like Vietnam and Indonesia as well as major oil suppliers like Angola, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia. Make no mistake, however: others will be of a military nature. A significant buildup of the Chinese navy — still small and backward when compared to the fleets of the United States and its principal allies — would seem all but inevitable. Likewise, closer military ties between China and Russia, as well as with the Central Asian member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), are assured. In addition, Washington could now be sparking the beginnings of a genuine Cold-War-style arms race in Asia, which neither country can, in the long run, afford. All of this is likely to lead to greater tension and a heightened risk of inadvertent escalation arising out of future incidents involving U.S., Chinese, and allied vessels — like the one that occurred in March 2009 when a flotilla of Chinese naval vessels surrounded a U.S. anti-submarine warfare surveillance ship, the Impeccable, and almost precipitated a shooting incident. As more warships circulate through these waters in an increasingly provocative fashion, the risk that such an incident will result in something far more explosive can only grow. Nor will the potential risks and costs of such a military-first policy aimed at China be restricted to Asia. In the drive to promote greater U.S. self-sufficiency in energy output, the Obama administration is giving its approval to production techniques — Arctic drilling, deep-offshore drilling, and hydraulic fracturing — that are guaranteed to lead to further Deepwater Horizon-style environmental catastrophe at home. Greater reliance on Canadian tar sands, the “dirtiest” of energies, will result in increased greenhouse gas emissions and a multitude of other environmental hazards, while deep Atlantic oil production off the Brazilian coast and elsewhere has its own set of grim dangers. All of this ensures that, environmentally, militarily, and economically, we will find ourselves in a more, not less, perilous world. The desire to turn away from disastrous land wars in the Greater Middle East to deal with key issues now simmering in Asia is understandable, but choosing a strategy that puts such an emphasis on military dominance and provocation is bound to provoke a response in kind. It is hardly a prudent path to head down, nor will it, in the long run, advance America’s interests at a time when global economic cooperation is crucial. Sacrificing the environment to achieve greater energy independence makes no more sense. A new Cold War in Asia and a hemispheric energy policy that could endanger the planet: it’s a fatal brew that should be reconsidered before the slide toward confrontation and environmental disaster becomes irreversible. You don’t have to be a seer to know that this is not the definition of good statesmanship, but of the march of folly. *Michael T. Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, a TomDispatch regular, and the author, most recently, of Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet. A documentary movie version of his previous book, Blood and Oil, is available from the Media Education Foundation. To listen to Timothy MacBain’s latest Tomcast audio interview in which Klare discusses the American military build-up in the Pacific, click here or download it to your iPod here.

[The inaugural summit of the upcoming global nuclear security meeting was convened last April in Washington DC at the initiative of President Barack Obama, drawing participation of 47 countries. — Editor’s note] We South Korean women believe nuclear weapons and power reactors are a matter of life or death. They threaten our lives, the lives of our families and all living creatures. We Korean women remember the tragic atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945 when some 700,000 people, including 70,000 Koreans, were exposed to atomic radiation. The horror of mushroom clouds, which melted people and buildings and contaminated soil, still lingers today because more than 20,000 nuclear weapons exist on our planet. We Korean women feel an enormous sense of crisis as we witness the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in March 2011. We are shocked once again at the destructive power of radiation seen in the loss of human lives, environmental pollution and contamination of food. We are even more shocked at the foolishness of those who continued to build nuclear reactors even after the danger of nuclear power generation was demonstrated at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. The Seoul Nuclear Security Summit will be held from March 26 — 27, 2012. We South Korean women question the rationale behind this Summit. The North Korean nuclear program and the safety of nuclear power generation, two of the most urgent issues in South Korean society, are not part of the Summit’s agenda. We believe that it is more important for the South Korean government to seek resolution on these issues than to host the Nuclear Security Summit at this time. We South Korean women want to announce our stance before the Sherpa meeting is held from January 16 — 17, 2012 in India to prepare for the coming Summit. This Summit will convene 47 heads of state (including those from nuclear states and nuclear power generating nations) and four leaders of international organizations. We South Korean women call these participants to give us hope by supporting our stance toward a nuclear-free world. 1. Nuclear security must start with the elimination of nuclear weapons. At the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, leaders focused on the security of nuclear materials, but did not discuss the reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons or reactors, which should be the core issues of any nuclear talks. Consequently, participating5 nuclear-weapon states (NWS) were criticized for imposing non-proliferation and nuclear security on non-NWS, while NWS themselves did not carry out their responsibility of eliminating nuclear weapons. Although non-NPT (Nuclear Proliferation Treaty) nuclear weapon states (Israel, India and Pakistan) participated in the 2010 Summit, Iran (a member of the NPT) and North Korea (seceded from the NPT) were not invited. The world witnessed the double standards of the international community during the 2010 Summit where discrimination was seen between NWS and non-NWS and even within the nuclear weapon countries. We South Korean women call all nuclear weapon countries including the US, Russia, the UK, China, France, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea to eliminate their nuclear weapons and to show consistency in principle and position on these weapons at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. We believe this is the only way that nuclear security is possible. 2. Nuclear power generators must be phased out and their export must be suspended. The South Korean government has announced that the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit will promote nuclear energy safety and its peaceful use, and that the Nuclear Industry Summit, preceding the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, will provide a place to formulate measures for safe use of nuclear power. However, we believe that the government sees the Summit as an opportunity to establish nuclear power as the next generation’s power source, despite the risks demonstrated by the Fukushima disaster. The Summit steering committee must understand that many countries around the world are reconsidering their nuclear power generation policy after the Fukushima disaster. The Summit participants must accept the collapse of the nuclear safety myth, agree the policy to abolish nuclear reactors, suspend nuclear reactor exports and eliminate plans for new reactor construction. 3. To build a nuclear-free world, governments must cooperate with the women and civil society. A nuclear-free world is possible only when governments around the world walk in step with their citizens, including women. The South Korean government has announced that it will consult its people in preparation for the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. So far, however, the government as cooperated only with those from industry, academia and social organizations which support nuclear energy. The South Korean government must listen to the voice of all those in society who are interested in a nuclear-free world. We call upon the government to build a mechanism for cooperation with the women and civil society on peace-related issues, including nuclear issues, as called for by the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Furthermore, in preparation for the Summit, we call the international community to take amore thoughtful approach to North Korean nuclear issues, which stem from the Cold War regime still prevailing in Northeast Asia. Resolution of these issues is closely tied to the establishment of a peaceful regime on the Korean Peninsula and the normalization of US-North Korean relations. It is impossible to realize peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia without solving North Korean nuclear issues. Proactive negotiations by the six-party nations, including the U.S. are needed to solve these issues. We Korean women believe that it is crucial to hold the six-party talks as soon as possible. In order to achieve peaceful coexistence of all living things, we must stop producing nuclear materials and begin using renewable energy. By doing so, we can realize a nuclear-free world and resolve the contradiction of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, which claims to seek solutions to nuclear terror even as nuclear materials continue to be produced. We Korean women, in solidarity with women around the world, call for new forms of cooperation with governments in order to realize a nuclear-free world in the near future. *The Organizing Committee of the Northeast Asian Women’s Peace Conference, KoreanWomen’s Association United, Women Making Peace, The Women’s Committee of the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation, Kyunggi Women’s Association United, Korea Church Women United, Korea Differently Abled Women United, Jeju Association for Women’s Rights, Daegu Women’s Association, Daegu Kyungbuk’s Women’s Association United, Korea Women Migrants’ Human Rights Center, Pohang Women’s Association, Korea Women Workers Association, Daejeon Women’s Association for Peace, Korea Women’s Political Solidarity, Korean Association of Women Theologians, Gwanggju Jonnam Women’s Association United, Korean Association of Christian Women for Women Minjung, Jeju Women’s Association, Korea Women’s Studies Institute, Cheonan Women’s Association, Korea Womenlink.

On February 8, the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) raided the Seoul and Incheon offices of the South Korean NGO, Solidarity for Peace and Reunification in Korea (SPARK) for violating the National Security Law (NSL). The NIS also searched the homes of two of SPARK’s leadership, confiscated their notebooks and cell phones, and shut down the server of its website, Jinbo.net. The NIS, famously known as the Korean CIA, alleges that SPARK members violated the NSL because the organization sent a condolence letter to North Korea following Kim Jong Il’s death and that a member was part of a North Korean spy ring. SPARK members counter that they went through the legal and proper channels in sending the letter and that charges of its affiliation with a spy ring is a fabrication. “SPARK always conducts its activities legally and openly,” says Regina Pyon, chairwoman of the Seoul branch. “All the day’s activities are reported on our website, including the most trivial information.” The South Korean government’s targeting of SPARK, however, is clearly politically motivated given the organization’s vital role in supporting the Gangjeong villagers’ resistance to the naval base on Jeju Island. While the raid on SPARK is just one in a long string of arrests by South Korean President Lee Myung Bak using the NSL, it has particular historic significance given that the Cold War law was created to suppress the uprising on Jeju Island in 1948. Cracking Down on Dissent The SPARK raid follows on the heels of the arrest of Park Jung-geun, a 24-year old photographer, blogger and member of the South Korean Socialist Party who re-tweeted messages from the North Korean government’s Twitter account. Park now sits in jail for violating the NSL for “praising and supporting an enemy of the state.” “The NSL has a chilling effect on freedom of expression in South Korea,” says Sam Zarifi, the Asia director at Amnesty International, in a February 1, 2012 statement. “It is used not to address threats to national security, but instead to intimidate people and limit their rights to free speech.” The application of this law increased dramatically under Lee Myung Bak. In 2007, there were 39 cases of individuals violating the NSL; by 2010, there were 151. In 2008, five individuals were prosecuted for activities considered to be pro-North, compared with 82 in 2010. In 2011, the South Korean government deleted 67,300 web postings considered pro-north. While the Park Jung-geun case has received international media attention, less is known about how the South Korean government has used the NSL to crackdown on leftists from trade unionists to peace and reunification activists, particularly those who have visited North Korea. Not only has the Lee administration made it more difficult for South Korean humanitarian aid groups to travel to North Korea, it has also used the NSL to investigate those who have traveled as far back as 2007. It has been used by successive South Korean regimes to use the North Korean threat to torture and arrest political dissidents, such as former president Kim Dae Jung. In 1980, when General Chun Doo-Hwan took power through a coup d’état, he used the NSL to repress pro-democracy activists during the Gwangju uprising. And during the 1997 financial crisis, the NSL was used to arrest more than 400 students and workers challenging IMF-imposed austerity policies and high rates of unemployment. The United Nations and leading human rights organizations have called on the South Korean government to abolish the NSL. Presidents Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun both tried and failed. The Origins of the NSL The NSL was enacted on December 1, 1948 to prevent anti-state acts that threaten the national security of South Korea. The law defines “anti-state acts” as “domestic or foreign organizations or groups whose intentions are to conduct or assist infiltration of the Government or to cause national disturbances.” Under the NSL, the punishment for those who sympathize, voluntarily aid, or cooperate with an anti-state group ranges from several years to life in prison or death. It was initially used to suppress popular uprisings in Jeju and Yosu. Following Korea’s liberation from Japanese rule, Jeju was largely a self-governing province inhabited by islanders used to rugged self-determination, in part due to its geographic distance from the mainland. According to secret U.S. documents, Jeju was “a truly communal area that is peacefully controlled by the peoples’ committee without Comintern influence.” Two-thirds of islanders were considered leftists, so when an extreme rightist was appointed governor by the mainland, tensions started to mount. On March 1, 1948, two years before the Korean War, Jeju islanders protested against the separate elections in North and South Korea. To quell the protests, the police arrested 2,500 islanders, including a young man whose tortured body was later found dead in the river. This sparked the April 3rd rebellion throughout Jeju where islanders attacked police stations, destroyed bridges, and cut phone lines. By month’s end, a 4,000-peasant strong Peoples’ Democratic Army had formed bearing swords, spears, and farm implements. Only 10 percent had firearms. As the uprising progressed on Jeju Island, a second rebellion erupted in the southeastern port city of Yosu. “The Yosu-Sunch’on rebellion was also about Jeju,” Korea historian Bruce Cumings wrote me in an email. “Troops not wanting to go and suppress the island rebels are the ones who caused the uproar.” Because Jeju was labeled a “Red” island, the South Korean government and police unleashed an indiscriminate, state-sponsored killing spree in the name of “national defense.” The entire interior of the island was declared an enemy zone, the target of “scorched earth” bombing raids. Civilians, including women, children, and elderly who were left behind were tortured for information and massacred. By 1949, more than 70 percent of the island’s villages were burned down, an estimated 80,000 people of the island’s 300,000 inhabitants were killed, and over 65,000 left homeless without food. An estimated 1,000 civilians were killed in the course of the military’s suppression in Yosu. Not only did the U.S. military oversee the massacres in Jeju, it helped train counterinsurgent forces, interrogate prisoners, and allowed the use of American spotter planes to ferret out guerillas. In The Korean War: A History, Cumings writes that in Yosu, “The commanders who actually subdued the rebels were Americans, assisted by several young Korean colonels.” To counter the insurgencies spreading throughout southern Korea, the Republic of Korea National Assembly introduced the NSL. As soon as the law was enacted, then President Syngman Rhee immediately arrested 30,000 people accused as communists. Sixty-four years later, the NSL still haunts South Koreans as a form of McCarthyism. Jeju Full Circle The South Korean government has targeted SPARK in part because of its critical support of the Gangjeong village resistance, which has been fighting the South Korean naval base that will stage Aegis destroyers as part of the U.S.-missile defense system. It has organized dozens of solidarity visits from throughout the mainland. Since 1999, SPARK has held monthly demonstrations outside of the U.S. Embassy in Seoul to protest its ongoing military occupation in South Korea. By red baiting SPARK as a communist, pro-North organization, the South Korean government is trying to taint the Jeju naval base resistance and send a message to others that if they are or become involved, they too will be branded and targeted. A SPARK video uploaded on Facebook references a Korean Broadcasting Service (KBS) 60-minute program that disclosed a secret deal made among the NIS, police and Jeju Island government in January 2009 to quash the opposition movement against the naval base by labeling SPARK as pro-North. In the video, the NIS is caught saying that the anti-base groups will be dealt with, and Jeju government officials say that the Navy should just push ahead. (When I tried to hyperlink to the video, I got this automatic response, “This video contains content from KBS Media, who has blocked it in your country on copyright grounds.”) The raid on SPARK is part of this state plan just as the round-ups of Jeju residents 64 years ago were used to suppress people’s movements fighting for representational democracy and social justice. Sadly the NSL is still at work in Jeju Island. *Christine Ahn is the executive director of the Korea Policy Institute, an advisory member of the Global Campaign to Save Jeju Island, and a columnist for Foreign Policy In Focus.

The announcement Wednesday of a diplomatic breakthrough between the United States and North Korea is a welcome surprise at a critical time. Not only are over six million North Koreans facing food shortages this winter, but also the window is quickly closing for the United States to have any leverage over North Korea’s nuclear program, given the changing global balance of power. In exchange for an initial 240,000 tons of U.S. food aid and prospects for improving bilateral relations and returning to six-party talks, North Korea agreed to halt its uranium enrichment program, accept monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and stop testing its long-range missiles. Contrary to some media assertions that U.S. food aid has not been linked to de-nuclearization, Washington has stalled for over a year on sending food to North Korea, despite a direct appeal from Pyongyang, and after several assessments, including by the UN World Food Program, the European Union, and a team of five U.S. non-governmental organizations, all verifying the urgent need. [read full article]

My first time eating Korean-style food in Seoul was a disappointing experience. I went to a well-known barbecue place in the Hongdae neighborhood that many of my adoptee friends recommended. There was nothing wrong with the meat (Canadian not American as the waitress stressed), but there were only a couple panchan (side dishes) that were not very exciting. Perhaps, I thought, I had been spoiled during my other two visits to Korea, visiting my family and touring the East coast and Jeju Island. My family is from rural north Gyeongsang, where they always serve seven to 10 types of homemade panchan, and where some of the specialties include Jeju black pig, fresh seafood from Donghae and Pohang, and locally-raised beef. When I finally made it to Seoul, I did not understand how my friends could rave about the food there. It was nothing like what I had come to associate with Korean food. That this well-known Seoul restaurant seemed unremarkable could be explained by a whole variety of things. However, the more I learned about food economics in Korea, the more I suspected that my mediocre dinner may have been a symptom of something bigger than one chef having an off-night. In recent years the global interest in Korean food has increased significantly. Some examples of this rising popularity can be seen in Youtube phenomenon Maangchi, an amateur Korean chef who created a popular recipe website, and the Kimchi Chronicles, a public television travelogue and Korean cooking show series, about discovering Korean food from an American perspective. The Korean government poured a lot of funding into Kimchi Chronicles, and other efforts to popularize Korean food overseas, and has been successful in introducing the distinct tastes of Korean cuisine to people who only five years ago had never heard of kimchi. For food connoisseurs, Seoul has become the next big thing. But the paradox of this Korean food globalization is that getting a truly Korean meal in Seoul is not easy. In fact much of the food in Korea today is not grown or raised in Korea. The chickens are raised in the Philippines, the beef in Australia or the U.S., the soybeans are from Argentina and the wheat is from Russia. Today, there is very little that is truly Korean about Korean food. In fact today, among the 34 member nations of the economically powerful Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), South Korea ranks among the lowest, with an overall self-sufficiency rate of only around 50 percent. “Self-sufficiency” in this ranking refers to the extent to which the nation can supply its own food. In the case of South Korea, the self-sufficiency level becomes worse if we just look at grains such as rice, wheat and barley. For grains in general the self-sufficiency rate is 26 percent, but if we take away rice, the self-sufficiency rate drops to six percent. Some might not see a problem in such low self-sufficiency rates as long as food can be imported, but the heavy dependence on food imports poses a lot of challenges for South Korean society and its economy. The 2007 global food crisis highlighted Korea’s vulnerable food supply, when there were sharp price increases on basic foodstuffs such as noodles. Food prices contribute significantly to consumer price inflation, which in turn negatively affects Korea’s overall economy and the average household budget. The concern over food security has resulted in the government allocating millions of dollars for securing food supplies overseas in the next decade. But what about Korean agriculture? Why is Korea not able to feed itself despite being one of the wealthiest nations in the world? Are Korean farmers not able to produce enough food or is something else going on? As I researched this topic in my work for my Ph.D. I found that, indeed, there is something else going on. In fact, there are complex global economic forces at work which are together making South Korea an increasingly more expensive and impractical place to be in the farming business. This “modernization” of the economy, in the form of removal of trade and economic barriers, has not benefited rural areas to the same extent as the cities. Many rural communities are suffering from poverty and economic stagnation. Biased development policies and focus on export and trade have left Korean agriculture in a state of crisis. As a response, Korean farmers have not only protested the direction of Korean food and agriculture policy, they have developed a viable alternative that promotes healthy and sustainable food that benefits consumers as well as farmers. Farmers have become advocates and promoters of their own business in Korea in a way they have never been before. They are becoming a voice for food self-sufficiency and consumer protection in addition to advocating for the right to their own survival. It is an unprecedented movement in food economics. To advocate for this movement, I have helped to organize a Food Sovereignty Tour, with Daniel Gray, a food critic and fellow Korean adoptee living in Seoul. It is our hope that the Food Sovereignty Tour and other efforts like it will help give global voice and support to the efforts of Koreans who wish to support and control their own local economies and food sources. Farmers under pressure Korean agriculture has been in perpetual crisis since the 1980s failure of Park Chung Hee’s Rural Infrastructure program the New Community Movement or Saemaeul Undong. By the mid-1980s, many Korean farmers experienced severe debt problems after investing heavily in infrastructure and agricultural inputs. The crisis was exacerbated following the 1997 economic crisis, which led to liberalization of the agricultural sector as part of structural adjustment policies. By the end of the 1990’s Korean farmers began to voice their dissatisfaction with domestic agricultural policies at the international level most notable during the 2003 World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations in Cancun, Mexico. The conference was marked by tragedy when farmer Lee Kyung-hae crawled the fence surrounding the WTO negotiation complex and stabbed himself to death wearing a sign around his neck saying “WTO kills farmers” to raise awareness of the plight of small farmers not only in Korea, but around the world. Lee’s statement has changed little. Farm debt is continually rising, and household incomes remain much lower in rural areas than in the cities. The crisis of Korean farmers and the country’s food security crisis is thus a structural problem related to domestic policies favoring industry and trade over agriculture and food self-sufficiency. This is in turn is related to economic globalization. The continued disregard for Korean agriculture by the government can also be seen in the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the U.S. and Korea that was ratified in November 2011 by the Korean Assembly. The ratification was extremely controversial, and in the end, was only ratified only because the conservative Grand National Party was able to singlehandedly push through the agreement despite heavy protests of the opposition Democratic Party. The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates that the FTA will make Korea the single most important agricultural export market for U.S agriculture. Food producers and farmers in Korea fear, and rightly so, that the FTA will be another nail in the coffin of Korean agriculture. Meanwhile Korean farmers and rural areas continue to experience severe economic distress and the pressure on farmland is continuing from many sources, notably due to the controversial Four Rivers Restoration project that has destroyed thousands of acres of fertile farm land along the river banks. One example of how even “green” policies destroy farm areas is the farming community in Paldang, located an hour’s drive east of Seoul. Sitting on the banks of the Han River and the Paldang reservoir, one of the most important water reservoirs for Seoul, the Paldang community began to farm organic crops in the late 1990’s as part of an agreement to protect the waters of the Han River and the reservoir. As pioneers of organic farming in Korea, Paldang farmers supply up to 80 percent of all organic produce sold in Seoul, but as a consequence of the Four Rivers Restoration Project, farmers are being evicted to make way for construction of recreational areas for city dwellers including a bike path through what was formerly organic farmland. Paldang residents, environmental non-governmental organizations, and religious groups have resisted the evictions. The International Federation of Organic Farming Movements (IFOAM) threatened to move its 2011 world congress away from Korea if the evictions did not stop. But all to no avail. Paldang is not the only example. Over the past 30 years agricultural land has been reduced by almost one million acres in South Korea due to urban and industrial expansion. Interestingly, this number is very close to the 900,000 acres of farm land that the government is planning to develop overseas in developing countries to compensate for the lack of domestic food production. So, while Korean farmers are struggling to find land and compete against cheap subsidized food imports, the government is supporting Korean corporations engaged in buying up farmland overseas to grow and raise food for import to South Korea. Food sovereignty: An alternative to the corporate food system In short, the Korean government is, on the one hand, seeking to secure food supplies overseas, either through farm land investments in distant developing countries or through free trade agreements with the U.S., the European Union (EU) and Australia. On the other hand, it continues to marginalize Korean farmers by eliminating farmland and allowing unfair competition for Korean produce and livestock. For more than a decade now, national farmers’ movements such as the Korean Peasants League (KPL) and the Korean Women’s Peasants Association (KWPA) have taken the struggle against structural injustice to the streets in Korea, to the National Assembly, to various ruling governments and to the international stage at WTO negotiations. But the Korean farmers’ movements are not only protesting. They are also building up an alternative food system within Korea, a system that embraces local, healthy, environmentally-sustainable and socially-just food. Since 2007, the KPL and KWPA have promoted the concept of “food sovereignty,” a concept they hope to establish as the overarching paradigm for Korean food and agriculture policy. Food sovereignty stresses the importance of promoting local and healthy food, and equally, it stresses the importance of redefining the relationship between producers and consumers such that the food economy can again be primarily a local economy and dependence of Korean consumers on the corporate food system and large scale industrial agriculture can be lessened or eliminated. During 2011, as part of my research, I visited some of the many local food projects initiated and supported by KPL and KWPA throughout South Korea, from Gangwon province in the north to Jeju Island in the south. These visits renewed my excitement about Korean food. Meeting farmers, hearing their stories about life in rural Korea, and their efforts to encourage healthy and socially-just food production and consumption in Korea was an eye-opening experience. It is a movement in modern Korea that foreign visitors seldom hear about. In the city of Chuncheon, I met cattle farmers who are selling their products locally through their own cooperatively-owned butcher store and restaurant in that city. While savoring delicious yook hwe (Korean raw beef salad) at the cooperative restaurant, the founder Ki Wan Chun told me why and how he decided to start a farmer-owned cooperative that would control every aspect of meat production, processing and distribution. Chun, who owns about 20 cows at a farm located a few miles outside Chuncheon, said he determined that selling his and other members’ beef would secure stable and fair income for fellow local farmers, while supplying local consumers with the highest quality, most affordable beef. The only way to do this, he explained, is by making sure farmers and consumers are in direct contact with one another, a move that challenges the corporate control of the food system. The Chuncheon cooperative is a big success, which I experienced personally by returning later in the day and encountering a packed restaurant of locals eating local beef dishes and homemade panchan. In North Gyoengsang province, I met women farmers who have formed their own community-supported agriculture project. The business home-delivers fresh organic vegetables, eggs, tofu and kimchi to local consumers in the nearby city of Sangju. The day of my visit, the women were gathered in their new processing facility, packing the weekly boxes that were then picked up by a local shipping company. That same evening, residents in Sangju would receive their weekly shipment. After the packing was completed, we all sat down and shared some delicious local makgeolli (rice liquor), after which I was invited to the home of one farmer, who prepared a fantastic locally-produced meal. On Jeju Island, I spoke to farmers who have begun saving their own seeds, and who have been advocating use of locally-produced food for the provincial school lunch program. With a group of researchers from Jeju National University, this energetic farmers’ group has initiated a local farmers’ market and a certification program for restaurants which agreed to purchase more than 70 percent of their food from local suppliers. Jakyung Kim, a young professor from the university, said she helped start the initiative when she returned to Jeju after studying in Japan, and found that it was difficult to find locally-produced food in restaurants. She explained that, while Jeju Island is one of the regions with the highest proportion of farmers, most of the production and distribution is owned by mainland companies, which leaves only a small proportion of the profits for the local economy. Through the local food initiative, she hopes to help local farmers and restaurateurs to revitalize the local economy and encourage higher-value food processing on the island. These projects were all different, but had in common the effort to put economic power in the hands of local food producers and consumers. They create a sense of empowerment among those involved, and the acknowledgement that food tastes best when grown and raised locally by farmers who know their land and environment. In recent years, efforts like these have demonstrated that Korean farmers and food visionaries, in partnership with consumers, can build a national food system that respects farmers, the environment and maintains the high quality and deliciousness of Korean cuisine. Food Sovereignty Tour Korea: providing a firsthand experience of sustainable Korean cuisine Back in Seoul, I connected with Daniel Gray, a fellow adoptee who co-founded O’ngo Food together with Jia Choi to promote high quality cuisine in Korea. His food tours around Seoul are a major tourist attraction for people who want to experience Korean food culture, and his food blog SeoulEats.com is one of the most popular English language sites for restaurant reviews and food related news in Seoul. Daniel also opened my eyes to all those amazing food places in Seoul where it is possible to actually get good food. You really need to know where to go, but once you find them you will be glad you took the extra time. While sharing homemade makgeolli and kimchi at a little restaurant in Insadong (a former hangout for democracy activists during the military regime), we decided that more people should be able to experience what Korean food tastes like when it is made from local, fresh, organic ingredients. Building on these thoughts, we developed the South Korea Food Sovereignty Tour, a nine-day trip set for May 2012, during which participants would visit the rural areas in Korea where I had met farmers building the unique local markets described above. Organized in collaboration with our new organization Food Sovereignty Tours (Food First Institute for Food and Development Policy in partnership with Global Exchange’s Reality Tours) along with the advocacy groups KPL and KWPA, and Gray’s tour organization O’ngo Food, we hope that this tour will begin to promote a a wider understanding of the forces and reasons behind South Korea’s local food movement. The larger purpose of this tour is to discover locally-produced Korean food and visit sites of importance to the food movement, which will promote understanding of the key role of farmers and peasants to Korean society over the past 100 years, particularly their role in the democracy and sustainability movements. Of course, the tour, which I will coordinate, will also provide great fun and satisfaction for any food aficionado, as we provide some unique dining experiences throughout the nine days to reveal what fresh and local Korean cuisine has to offer. Taking on the corporate food system is a daunting challenge, but Korean farmers have shown their courage and motivation to address the structural injustices of the Korean food system. Through the Korean Food Sovereignty Tours, we want to do our part to promote South Koreans’ basic right to maintain their own local food economy, to the benefit of farmers, producers, distributors, and all South Koreans. We also hope to promote the return of truly delicious and healthy food to South Korea. The first tour will take place from May 10-19, 2012. Please refer to the websites www.foodsovereigntytours.org and www.ongofood.com for more information. *Anders Riel Müller is a Research Fellow with Food First, (a U.S. research organization dedicated to studying and acting on the unjust forces that cause hunger) and the Korea Policy Institute (a U.S. research and educational institute that provides analysis of U.S. policies toward Korea and developments on the Korean peninsula). He is currently living in Denmark where he is writing his PhD at the Danish Institute for International Studies and the Institute for Society and Globalization at Roskilde University. His dissertation is on Korean food and agriculture policy and the Korean government’s role in overseas farmland investments.

Excited about turning 18 during a presidential election year, Jenna Johnson registered to vote with her high school classmates and cast her first ballot. She canvassed her local Minnesota neighborhood as a volunteer signing up voters. Then four years later, while sharing stories with other Korean adoptees who remembered their naturalization ceremonies, Jenna couldn’t recall ever experiencing her own. A few days later, she phoned what was then the Immigration and Naturalization Service to check on her status and was shocked to learn that she was not a U.S. citizen. Her green card, which she kept as a memento from her adoption as a 2-year old, had expired. As a permanent resident, she had unknowingly committed voter fraud, a crime punishable by deportation. The story of Jenna Johnson (name changed at source’s request) might sound unusual. But she’s actually one of thousands of adult adoptees who were not grandfathered into the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 (CCA), which as of February 27, 2001 grants automatic citizenship to children who arrive in the United States on IR-3 visas. Parents whose children travel on IR-4 visas, which in recent years constitute almost half of all inter-country adoptions, finalize procedures by re-adopting their children in their states of residence at which time citizenship attaches. Although an estimated 75,000 adopted children were protected on the bill’s enforcement date, adoptees who had already reached the age of 18 were left vulnerable. In this past decade, the media has reported on about 30 of the most urgent cases in which adult adoptees face removal and forced overseas separation from their families in the United States. Although the CCA exempted adult adoptees like Jenna from losing permanent residency due to voter fraud, it still failed to make her and all other adult adoptees citizens. Why are adult adoptees, who are their parents’ legal children and heirs, any less American than those whose birthdays qualify them for CCA eligibility? Don’t Grow Up The stories of adult adoptees who lack citizenship and for whom adults acted in “the best interests of the child” bring into question adoption’s most fundamental claim- a forever home for an orphaned child. Yet good intentions do not suffice, and adult inadvertence with regard to a child’s rights creates lifelong hardships. “My citizenship status is suspended in limbo,” says Jenna, who is now in her mid-30s and struggles to find work as a consequence of her expired green card status. “Why didn’t my adoptive parents get me naturalized?” Jenna is not alone in asking this question. According to Bert Ballard, critical adoption studies scholar and professor of communications at Pepperdine University, “Hundreds of thousands of children have been adopted to the United States, and if even 1% of those naturalizations never happened under pre-CCA guidelines, then that oversight affects literally thousands of American families.” The State Department and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services could cross-reference the number of children who entered the United States on visas issued for the purpose of adoption and the number of these adopted children who were naturalized. However, there is no categorical means by which to identify and track the number of individuals who have already been removed. Alongside media reports of pending removals, post-adoption service organizations in sending countries like South Korea provide a snapshot of the direst cases. Global Overseas Adoptees’ Link in Seoul, South Korea reports 10 Korean deported adoptees visiting its office for help since 2000. KoRoot, an NGO and guesthouse in Seoul, has brought public attention to three deported Korean adoptees in the past year. One of these adoptees, Tim Yee, was discovered homeless in Itaewon and in need of medical attention. Adopted children do not emigrate to the United States of their own volition. Instead, globally networked agencies identify and refer them for permanent placement with their adoptive parents who, previous to the CCA’s passage, were expected to file naturalization papers before their children’s 21st birthdays. However, a lack of sufficient agency post-adoption follow-up contributed to parental ignorance or outright negligence. Ticking Clock Sometimes parents tried to naturalize their children but ran out of time, stranding their children in a condition of global orphaning. Erlene Shepherd, adoptive mother to eight children, died of breast cancer before she could file her completed application for Kairi’s citizenship. Growing up in Salt Lake City with seven older siblings, Kairi Shepherd, adopted from India when she was three months old, missed CCA eligibility by a matter of months. After her mother passed away, Kairi was raised by her older siblings despite her grandmother suggesting that she be surrendered for adoption again. When Kairi was 17, she was introduced to drugs by a co-worker and later charged with check fraud in a state court, which triggered a removal proceeding per 1996 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Yet the interaction between federal and state laws oftentimes requires navigating a maze of legal definitions, which can be conflicting or unclear in favor of prosecution. The INA offers immigration judges little discretion when considering humanitarian need. Most adult adoptee removal cases, as reported by the press, are non-violent and involve controlled substance use. On May 8, an immigration judge ordered Kairi’s removal to India– a country that she has never visited and in which she is a veritable foreigner lacking both cultural and linguistic knowledge. She has 45 days since the date of judgment to enter an appeal before Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials escort her to the airport. Disabled, she has advanced multiple sclerosis and needs to stay with her family in the United States where she has access to vital care. “It is incomprehensible to me how the United States can deport her,” says Arun Dohle of Against Child Trafficking based in Brussels, “Just recently, a U.S. adoptive mother [Torry Hansen] was heavily fined for sending her child back to Russia and here the United States is doing something similar by deporting Kairi.” According to Tobias Hubinette, a researcher at the Multicultural Institute in Botkyrka, Sweden and an expert on Korean adoption, “In Scandinavia, foreign-born adoptees have received citizenship automatically ever since the 1990s although before that, adoptive parents had to apply for citizenship for their adopted children, but even if some might have forgotten or neglected to do that, any deportation of any adoptee has never to my knowledge happened.” As a signatory to the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption since 2008, the United States is obligated to extend all of its rights and privileges to its adopted children (Article 26) and to ensure that they reside permanently in the U.S. — the receiving state (Article 18). Yet the U.S. government has been largely silent about how it intends to fulfill its responsibilities regardless of its adopted children’s birth dates. By comparison, news media from sending countries have voiced their dismay about adult adoptee removals and have called on the United States as the world’s largest adopter of children to take the lead on the humanitarian treatment of them. At a May 24 regular daily debriefing at the State Department, Tejinder Singh, editor of India America Today, asked spokesperson Victoria Nuland about the State Department’s plan to address Kairi’s case. Spokesperson Nuland repeated the CCA’s age limitation and then referred the matter to the Department of Homeland Security. Breaking silence, Kairi told The Times of India that she was afraid but not hiding or absconding. “The deportation order will force me to part from my physicians and family, and will be a death sentence.” Orphaned Again? Four years after deportation, Joao Herbert’s body was found in the slums of Campinas, north of Sao Paulo, where he had been scraping by as an English instructor. At his funeral in his hometown of Wadsworth, Ohio, his grieving parents, Nancy Saunders and Jim Herbert, remembered their son’s love of soccer and ached for the truth about why their son was murdered. Joao was survived by a young daughter who was born in the U.S. Under UNICEF’s definition, she became an orphan like her father once was before her grandparents adopted him from Brazil. Yet the conditions of her father’s death and her consequent orphaning could have been averted if Congress had not compromised on a special provision to the CCA granting adult adoptees citizenship. While Joao’s family struggled to remain together pending his removal, former Congressman William Delahunt, the provision’s sponsor, spoke of Joao’s case before the House of Representatives to emphasize the urgent need for Congress to naturalize all adoptees. “‘No one condones criminal acts, Mr. Speaker,” Delahunt said, “But the terrible price these young people and their families have paid is out of proportion to their misdeeds. Whatever they did, they should be treated like any other American kid. They are our children, and we are responsible for them.” Yet conceding to anti-immigrant sentiment, members of the House stripped out inclusion of adult adoptees in order to push the bill forward, and in so doing, they compromised adult adoptee lives. “To subject adopted children to deportation, is a gross betrayal of orphaned, abandoned, relinquished children,” says Anjali Pawar, director of Sakhi. “We are aware of cases [similar to Kairi], and as long as children from India adopted by U.S. parents are faced with the threat of deportation, then adoptions from India to the United States, should be halted altogether.” The United States ought to amend its adoption journey. “Child” refers to kinship, not just age. The United States should immediately naturalize all of its children who immigrated for the purpose of adoption and who were 18 and younger before 1940 when The Nationality Act was enacted. In the interim, the Department of Homeland Security should expedite the withdrawal of all adult adoptee removal cases and permit deported adoptees to return home to their families. If an adopted child is born through the heart, or so the story goes, then that heart’s love should not expire once the child becomes an adult. *Jennifer Kwon Dobbs is a critical adoption studies scholar, a Korea Policy Institute fellow, lead policy analyst for Adopsource’s Justice for Adoptees: Stop the Deportation of Russell Green, and co-director of Adoptee Rights and Equality. Caitlin Kee is a Minnesota-based attorney and community organizer. She is a policy research associate for Justice for Adoptees: Stop the Deportation of Russell Green. Kristin R. Pak is a New York City immigrant rights activist, English instructor for adult immigrants, and a policy research associate for Justice for Adoptees: Stop the Deportation of Russell Green. They are all contributors to Foreign Policy In Focus.