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Will Griffin with Father Moon Kyoo Hyeon at an anti-THAAD rally in Seongju, July 2017 By Paul Liem | Interviewed on August 20, 2017 | September 20, 2017 This is the third in a series of interviews with the five member U.S. Solidarity Peace Delegation, to South Korea, July 23 – July 28, 2017, of whom delegation coordinator, Juyeon Rhee, was denied entry to South Korea under a travel ban imposed by the Park Geun Hye administration, and remaining in force under the new administration of President Moon Jae In. The delegates met with South Korean peace and labor activists, with Shim Jae Kwon, Chair of the National Assembly Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, and with villagers of Seongju, Gimcheon and Soseongri who are waging a struggle against the deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system in their communities. The delegation was sponsored by the Taskforce to Stop THAAD in Korea and Militarism in Asia and the Pacific and the Channing and Popai Liem Education Foundation, and was hosted in South Korea by the National People’s Action to Stop the Deployment of THAAD in South Korea (NPA), a coalition of 100 civil society organizations. Delegates Medea Benjamin of Code Pink, Reece Chenault of U.S. Labor Against the War, Will Griffin of Veterans for Peace, delegation coordinator Juyeon Rhee, Jill Stein of Green Party USA, have since spear headed an international petition campaign calling upon presidents Moon Jae-in and Donald Trump to pull back from the brink of war in Korea, by halting the war games and negotiating a freeze on missile and nuclear weapons testing with North Korea. Following the delegates’ return to the United States, Paul Liem, KPI Board Chairperson, interviewed the delegates about their experiences in Korea and their reflections on how to strengthen solidarity between peace activists there and in the United States.   His interview with Will Griffin follows. ____________________________________________________ PL:  Will, I understand that when you were a youngster, you spent part of your childhood in Korea. When was that and were you old enough to remember what that was like and is that part of your character as Will Griffin today? WG:  Both my parents were in the Army so I’m an Army brat, raised in an army family. I was born in West Germany in ‘84. Then by 1987 I moved to South Korea and I lived there for just over four years. I lived, of course, just outside of an army base, Camp Humphreys, in Pyongtaek. So I was an American who had never been to America for the first eight years of my life. I don’t remember West Germany, but I do remember South Korea, and I think it had a really big impact on me. I didn’t realize the impact until I moved to the states when I was eight years old.  I encountered a lot of cultural issues I wasn’t accustomed to.  For example I remember people making fun of me in the third grade because I didn’t know who Madonna was. But in South Korea being, being with other military brats I think the culture was a lot different – not as harsh. We all depended on each other. There was a stronger unity between families. Of course, the downside of it is was that I was raised on the pro America, pro-military side, in Korea. I was a kid back then. I didn’t know what was going on, really, but I was taught certain values – that the U.S. military in South Korea was a good thing, that they were there to protect the South Korean people, that there was no other way that this should be; that there should be a huge U.S. military posture on the Korean Peninsula, that North Korea was just evil no matter what it did, it was just evil, and it had to be surrounded by the military. But after growing up and learning the history in the region, my views have definitely changed. But I still remember South Korea and, you know, I’m half Korean, so it will always be a part of me. PL:  How did your parents adjust to your transition? Do you talk about politics around the table at Thanksgiving? How does that go? WG:  My mother is Korean, and she even did five years in the U.S. Army. My father, a white guy from Georgia, he did 22 years in the army. Neither had ever been in a combat zone. They never went to war.  My dad’s been to the DMZ, but not in actual in direct conflict.  On the other hand, I did five and a half years, went to both Iraq and Afghanistan. I got out in 2010.  I had been questioning the war personally. In the immediate four years after I got out of the military I went to college and studied U.S. foreign policy. That’s really where I began to change, beginning with questions and then finding answers, more so through anti-war organizations like Veterans for Peace. I got into serious arguments with my father. Through my four years of college, he generally thought the U.S. should be in Iraq. He thought the U.S. should be in Afghanistan. He thought terrorism was a huge threat. You know he’s living in South Georgia. He’s from South Georgia. He has that southern culture in him that’s super patriotic. He did 22 years in the military so you can never question what the military does, and everything the military does is correct and right and moral and just. So we got into serious arguments and a … where we had to take a break from talking to each other. Eventually I converted him. He’s an anti-war activist today and he’s a local organizer with Veterans for Peace. We went to the National Convention together, a week ago in Chicago. Going to these conventions helps energize you. He went to his first Veterans for Peace Convention in 2015. And I think that’s what changed him because he looks up to Vietnam veterans. He was too young. He wanted to go to Vietnam. He joined maybe a year after the war ended. And so he looks up to Vietnam veterans, and Veterans for Peace has a lot of Vietnam veterans. At the Veterans for Peace Convention all these Vietnam veterans are anti-war, they’re all about peace and they’re exposing the corruption in the military and the Pentagon and the government. That had a huge influence on my father for sure. For my mother, we don’t talk about politics, that’s just how it is. PL:  You mentioned you had started having questions. Could you could share those with us and also how did you get your father to go that Vets for Peace Conference? WG:  So the military is supposed to be this really great jobs program, a way to get education, the typical thing you hear about joining the military. In my experience it wasn’t that. You got treated really badly. Your value was only as high as your rank, so the hierarchy in the system was horrible. You were dehumanized while being taught to dehumanize other people. I signed up for four and a half years but ended up having to do five and a half years because I was under the Stop-Loss Program which meant that at the end of my four and a half year contract I was already two months in Afghanistan; you can’t just separate from the military, you have to finish it out. Also when we were in Iraq I was supposed to do a 12 month deployment. We ended up doing a 15 month deployment because that’s when Bush announced the surge in Iraq. So we got extended. I admitted to myself that I didn’t know anything about U.S. foreign policy despite my whole life being U.S. foreign policy, being born overseas on a military base, going to different wars, living in military bases around the world, being half Korean and an American. I didn’t know anything and I realized and that’s one of the reasons I studied U.S. foreign policy went I went to college. Well there’s a longer story to it but I’ll go onto the next question you asked which was how did I convert my dad, my father. Well … we got into a lot of arguments, to say the least.  I pointed out a lot of different things to him and I may have said some horrible things.  But, I would argue truthful things. I said things like, you know, I would question his parenting skills. A lot of military parents are proud that their kids are in the military service. Even if I had died in Iraq in 2006, 2007, ultimately my father at that time would have been proud that I had died for my country. But what kind of a parent would want, you know, would even be proud of such a thing, that I died not for the country but really making defense contractors rich? I would use my situation to my advantage. I was the only child and it really got to the point where I said, either you start at least thinking about some of the things that I’m saying to you, or we cannot talk anymore. Another thing is that my dad, my father, had never been to a combat zone and I’ve been to both Iraq and Afghanistan. And I had been a paratrooper and he was a regular soldier. In the military paratroopers, Rangers, Special Forces, they’re all looked up to as the ideal soldier. You want to be as good as them and they seem to have more authority with certain cases. So he looked up to me. That worked to my advantage, eventually I got him to go to a few Veterans for Peace events, and that changed him. Will Griffin (left) with father Tommy Griffin (center) at Vets for Peace National Conference, August 2017, Chicago, IL. PL:  That’s an amazing story all by itself. But getting back to the topic of your work as a board member of Veterans for Peace I know that you’ve been to South Korea several times. Can you tell us about those occasions and also explain why you thought it was important to go to Korea last July as part of the Solidarity Peace Delegation? WG:  So I lived in South Korea for four years in the 80s. One of the first places I visited after I got out of the military in 2010 was South Korea to see some family. In 2014 I joined Veterans for Peace. And since then I’ve been to South Korea on three separate delegations. What got me interested in Korea was that two months before I started my first foreign policy college class, Obama announced the pivot to Asia which some people are now calling the rebalance of Asia. And that’s essentially the U.S. military sending 60 percent of its forces to the Asia-Pacific region, mainly using North Korea as an excuse. So North Korea had been on the Pentagon’s radar for the past several years and that was also the time I was questioning, or at least admitting to myself, that I didn’t know much about foreign policy. I chose to study U.S. foreign policy specifically in the Asia Pacific region. I learned some Chinese history, U.S. foreign policy in Korea, a little bit about Japan, and by the time I graduated in 2014 I found Veterans for Peace, and the very next year they were sending a delegation to Jeju Island. I went and learned so much about Korea and I said I gotta … and I noticed that I knew a little bit more about Asia Pacific issues than most people, even in Veterans for Peace organizations and peace organizations in the U.S. in general. So I decided that I was going to buckle down and learn even more. It’s been so difficult to get Americans, and even the U.S. peace groups here to focus on issues in the Asia-Pacific region. The past 16 years we’ve been tied up in bombing the Middle East and destabilizing that area. So trying to get people to focus on other areas like Asia or even Africa is very difficult. But these delegations to Korea have definitely helped not only me to focus on Asia Pacific issues and Korean issues but also organizations like Veterans for Peace, Code Pink and other organizations in the U.S., as well. PL:  When you were in Korea, what were the key points that you and your fellow delegates trying to communicate to the people you met? WG:  I think being a former soldier had a big impact on the South Korean people and the organizers there. They have little interaction with the soldiers.  And when they do it’s not with the type of veteran that I am.  It’s not the anti-war veterans. It’s with the pro U.S. military, very young, very naive type of soldier that they interact with. So having veterans come there, especially who have been stationed there, and even myself who’s half Korean, and that we can come out and starting exposing some of the really horrible things that the military does was really appreciated. There’s so many things that we never hear in the mainstream media or it’s very hard to learn about the impacts of militarism on South Korea and its people, the displacement of entire villages, how it actually ruins employment rates, and the economy, how it destroys the environment, how it infringes on their democratic processes, so on and so forth. But you know every time I go to Korea I learn something new. It’s not about me telling South Korean people what I do or anything about me, it’s about me going over there sitting down, shutting up and just listening to them. PL:  What did the villagers want you to share with your fellow veterans for peace, and just in general to the American peace movement, as their messenger? WG:  I think the main message is that South Korea wants to be South Korea. They don’t want the U.S. military to control their country. At the same time they still want to have good relations with America and the American people. And I think that’s super important. They definitely know the distinction between the American people and the American government or the American people in the military. They want to keep connections with us. They just don’t want us to overrun their country and they want us to admit the horrible things that the military has done, such as destroying their environment, polluting their environment, acknowledging some of the crimes that have been committed, whether it was intentional or not by soldiers. And South Korean people want us to know they want the U.S. government and the American people to listen to them. They want to have one voice because they’ve been shut out and shut down so many times for so long. I think that’s the main message that we need to convey; like I said sit down, shut up, listen to the South Korean people and figure out what’s best for all of us. PL:  As an activist for the Vets for Peace do you see any possibility of connecting with vets in Korea who as both the U.S. and South Korean soldiers have in common the experience of fighting in Vietnam. Is there any kind of a similar organization in Korea for vets as there is your organization here? WG:  Veterans For Peace actually has a South Korean chapter that is essentially independent from our whole organization. Just to remind people Veterans for Peace is an international organization. We do have chapters in Mexico, the United Kingdom, Japan, Okinawa, Vietnam, and of course South Korea. And every time I go, they find out and they always meet me somewhere at some event whenever I’m in South Korea. They usually buy me lunch or dinner and we can spend some time together and talk and catch up. Also every time I go to any type of event whether it’s the peace march on Jeju Island or traveling the bases on mainland South Korea, within various organizations there’s always an ex-soldier or ex-police who is now trying to organize against some of the… against U.S. military but also you know in fighting for peace, usually in some type of peace organization.  In South Korea almost every male is a former soldier because they have to be in the military for at least a year and a half to two years. They can definitely relate. PL:  You mentioned that in Vets for Peace there are a lot of veterans of the Vietnam War and obviously now from wars in the Middle East. Within Vets for Peace what is the understanding of the Korean War or discussion about it? The Korean War is sometimes called the “forgotten war” in the United States. Is the Korean War part of the culture of the Vets for Peace in terms of their understanding of U.S. history abroad? WG:  The idea of the Korean War being the forgotten war still remains in America and even in anti-war and peace organizations here. It’s very difficult to get people to focus on issues in the Asia Pacific. It’s not only a forgotten war, it’s a forgotten issue, despite us having such a huge military presence in the Asia Pacific; 83 bases in South Korea alone, tens of thousands of troops in South Korea alone. We have hundreds of thousands more in the entire region. North Korea being in the mainstream media as of late this past one to three months has really helped people refocus and shift some of their attention. So there’s been an attention pivot to Asia where people are going outside of the Middle East and actually trying to learn about these issues. Veterans for Peace just had a national convention in Chicago. And the very final panel which included retired Colonel Ann Wright, Phyllis Bennis, and myself covered three key regions of the world where militarism is a problem. I covered of course the Asia-Pacific region. The feedback that I got was very positive. A lot of people came up to me and wanted to know about the history there, how broad the U.S. military is there. I’m trying to provide some of the historical background and what we can learn from it and move forward and how we can fight back against it. PL:  U.S. and South Korea are getting ready to launch the next round of war games starting Monday, the Ulchi Freedom Guardian war games. The North Koreans have been blasting Trump, telling him he better watch out. And Trump has been threatening North Korea with fire and fury. All kinds of chilling threats are being made. We also have this defense system in South Korea, THAAD which the Chinese are angry about. What do you see as being the way out of this situation? How do we avert war in this kind of scenario? WG:  I think people just don’t know what’s going on. I think the majority of Americans don’t really even know about the annual war games that happen on the Korean Peninsula. And even if they do they don’t understand the impacts. So I think trying to educate them but also providing ways that they can actively participate in our political system to try to stop these things. Petitions, providing Congress phone numbers and e-mails, organizing events, protests, marches, rallies providing other organizations that they can join to learn more about these issues. And just being there ready to accept people whenever they come in whether it’s slowly or fast. When we relate to the American people we have to relate to them in their own terms. So one of the examples I always use is to point out that we’re so U.S.-centric here that it’s hard for us to conceive of the vice versa situation. The U.S. has 83 bases in South Korea. What if North Korea had a single base in Mexico? What if they were doing surveillance off the coast of California? What if they did a nuclear bomb dropping drill off the coast of Maine, which is what the U.S. has been doing to North Korea? When you put it in those terms l think people can really understand, wow, that is a provocation – that is dangerous. We wouldn’t want that to be done to us. And how would the Pentagon react in such a scenario? And then the second question you asked me, what was the second question? PL:  How do you think we can get out of this mess? WG:  Our governments need to speak with each other. When we speak about Korea issues we can’t speak about it with just Korea. It’s a regional issue. It involves China, Russia, Japan, the US, South Korea, North Korea. We need to take every one’s and every government’s side into consideration and when we look at what China and Russia and even North Korea have been offering  – they want to sit down and talk. North Korea has already said to the international community that it doesn’t want to continue developing its nuclear program, but that it’s doing so as a survival method to protect itself from invasion or regime change. But the U.S. is constantly threatening them. So I think the main goal especially for U.S. citizens, is to get our government to stop being so aggressive in the region and to sit down and talk. Part of that is addressing what North Korea’s been saying, what China’s been saying, Russia’s been saying, what people of Okinawa have been saying, what people of Jeju Island have been saying for so long – that we need to stop the aggression which is really a continuation of  the Korean War, which is escalating the tensions in the region. Once we do that I think people will understand it’s not as bad as it looks. PL:  Do you see a role for Vets for Peace in terms of opening up dialogue with North Korea? Has Vets for Peace ever considered sending a delegation there. Aside from the fact that there’s a travel ban, putting that aside, is this a possible agenda item for vets? WG:  We veterans for peace and veterans in general recognize that we have a special voice here in the States and we try to use that to highlight voices that aren’t necessarily heard. Generally Americans don’t listen to Koreans, they don’t listen to indigenous people, they don’t listen to the black and brown communities, and they don’t listen to women. But a way to bridge that gap is for veterans to stand up because many Americans respect veterans. As far as getting Veterans for Peace into North Korea, there hasn’t been talk about doing that. That would take a lot of organizing. But I do know there are some veterans who would be more than willing to go. There’s been several veterans who’ve been to South Korea and I think there’s a lot of veterans in our organization that care about Korean issues and some have joked about going to North Korea. But I think if we do go it would probably be an event that’s co-organized with other organizations in the U.S. It wouldn’t be just be a Veterans for Peace event. PL:  We’ve covered a lot this morning. I don’t want to take up too much of your time. I wanted to ask, what do you think will be the work of Vets for Peace on the Korean solidarity issues in the near future. And also anything that we haven’t covered you would like to mention, please do. WG:  Veterans for Peace for several years has engaged in what we call the Korea Peace Campaign. It’s been members like Ann Wright and John Kim who have been trying to highlight the issues around Korea. Veterans for Peace is an anti-war organization and we do recognize that war is still technically and legally going on in the Korean peninsula. The Korean War hasn’t ended. And that’s an issue that we need to shine more light on. At the same time it’s been incredibly difficult because the U.S. has been dropping bombs on seven countries last year and even a now in the Philippines this year. The U.S. war machine is so big and so vast that it’s really been difficult. But we have members who are very involved with getting Veterans for Peace focused on the Asia-Pacific, especially since the pivot to Asia was announced in 2011. The pivot to Asia is going to dominate U.S. foreign policy for the next few decades. And that’s something that Veterans for Peace needs to get a hold on. Vets for Peace just recently issued out a statement about North Korea and the tensions, not about North Korea, but the Korean Peninsula and the tensions surrounding the region. And I think Veterans for Peace will do will do as much as it can in the near future to stop this escalation, especially with this crazy guy, Trump, in office who’s just not making things any better. PL:  Well I have to say that the Vets for Peace has historically had a tremendous presence in the Bay Area and all the peace movement activities here and also on Korea. I want to thank you for your time, and I look forward to hearing more about your work and wish you the best in everything you do. WG: Thank you. ________________________________ *Will Griffin is a former U.S. Army Paratrooper who deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Will now focuses on anti-war activism and is on the Board of Directors of Veterans For Peace, the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space and the steering committee of the Taskforce to Stop THAAD in Korea and Militarism in Asia and the Pacific. He is also the creator of The Peace Report, a social media organization focusing on anti-war media for peace & justice. *Paul Liem is the Chair of the Korea Policy Institute Board of Directors. #VetsforPeace #KoreanWar #SouthKorea #peacetreaty #THAAD #WillGriffin

Photo by David Stanley | CC BY 2.0 By Gregory Elich | September 20, 2017 Originally published in Counterpunch. Amid renewed talk by the Trump administration of a military option against North Korea, one salient fact goes unnoticed. The United States is already at war with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK – the formal name for North Korea). It is doing so through non-military means, with the aim of inducing economic collapse. In a sense, the policy is a continuation of the Obama administration’s ‘strategic patience’ on steroids, in that it couples a refusal to engage in diplomacy with the piling on of sanctions that constitute collective punishment of the entire North Korean population. We are told that UN Security Council resolution 2375, passed on September 11, was “watered down” so as to obtain Chinese and Russian agreement. In relative terms, this is true, in that the original draft as submitted by the United States called for extreme measures such as a total oil embargo. However, Western media give the impression that the resolution as passed is mild or mainly symbolic. Nothing could be further from the truth. The resolution, in tandem with previous sanction votes and in particular resolution 2371 from August 5, is aimed squarely at inflicting economic misery. Among other things, the August sanctions prohibit North Korea from exporting coal, iron, iron ore, lead, lead ore, and seafood, all key commodities in the nation’s international trade.  The resolution also banned countries from opening new or expanding existing joint ventures with the DPRK. [1] September’s resolution further constrains North Korea’s ability to engage in regular international trade by barring the export of textiles. It is estimated that together, the sanctions eliminate 90 percent of the DPRK’s export earnings. [2] Foreign exchange is essential for the smooth operation of any modern economy, and U.S. officials hope that by blocking North Korea’s ability to earn sufficient foreign exchange, the resolutions will deal a crippling blow to the economy. For North Korea’s estimated 100,000 to 200,000 textile workers the impact will be immediate, plunging most of them into unemployment. “If the goal of the sanctions is to create difficulties for ordinary workers and their ability to make a livelihood, then a ban on textiles will work,” specialist Paul Tija wryly notes. [3] With around eighty percent of its land comprising mountainous terrain, North Korea has a limited amount of arable land, and the nation typically fills its food gap through imports. Sharply reduced rainfall during the April-June planting season this year reduced the amount of water available for irrigation and hampered sowing activities. Satellite monitoring indicates that crop yields are likely to fall well below the norm. [4] To make up for the shortfall, the DPRK has significantly boosted imports. [5] How much longer it can continue to do so remains to be seen, in the face of dwindling reserves of foreign exchange. In effect, by blocking North Korea’s ability to engage in international trade, the United States has succeeded in weaponizing food by denying North Korea the means of providing an adequate supply to its people. The September resolution also adversely impacts the livelihoods of North Korea’s overseas workers, who will not be allowed to renew their contracts once they expire. They can only look forward to being forced from their jobs and expelled from their homes. [6] International partnership is discouraged, as the resolution bans “the opening, maintenance, and operation of all joint ventures or cooperative entities, new and existing,” which in effect permanently kills off any prospect of the reopening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. With only two exceptions, all current operations are ordered to shut down within four months. [7] A cap is imposed on the amount of oil North Korea is allowed to import, amounting to about a thirty percent reduction from current levels, along with a total ban on the import of natural gas and condensates. [8] Many factories and manufacturing plants could be forced to close down when they can no longer operate machinery. For the average person, hardship lies ahead as winter approaches, when many homes and offices will no longer be able to be heated. What has any of this to do with North Korea’s nuclear program? Nothing. The sanctions are an expression of pure malevolence. Vengeance is hitting every citizen of North Korea to further the U.S. goal of geopolitical domination of the Asia-Pacific. Like North Korea, India, Pakistan, and Israel are non-signatories to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and have nuclear and missile arsenals. India and Pakistan launched ICBMs earlier in the year. North Korea is singled out for punishment, while the others receive U.S. aid. There is no principle at stake here. For that matter, there is something unseemly in the United States, with over one thousand nuclear tests, denouncing North Korea for its six. The U.S., having launched four ICBMs this year, condemns the DPRK for launching half that many. Is it not absurd that the United States, with its long record in recent years of bombing, invading, threatening, and overthrowing other nations, accuses North Korea, which has been at peace for several decades, of being an international threat? North Korea observed the fate of Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya, and concluded that only a nuclear deterrent could stop the United States from attacking. It is the “threat” of North Korea being able to defend itself that has aroused U.S. ire on a spectacular scale. The U.S. war on the North Korean people does not stop with UN sanctions. In a recent hearing, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Ed Royce called for Chinese banks that do ordinary business with North Korea to be targeted: “We can designate Chinese banks and companies unilaterally, giving them a choice between doing business with North Korea or the United States…It’s not just China. We should go after banks and companies in other countries that do business with North Korea in the same way…We should press countries to end all trade with North Korea.” [9] At the same hearing, the Treasury Assistant Secretary Marshall Billingslea mentioned that his department had worked with the Justice Department to blacklist Russia’s Independent Petroleum Company in June, along with associated individuals and companies, for having shipped oil to North Korea. Despite the fact that there was no UN resolution at that time which forbade such trade, the U.S. seized nearly $7 million belonging to the company and its partners. [10] Acting Assistant Secretary of State Susan Thornton was, if anything, more aggressive in her rhetoric than her colleagues, announcing that “we continue to call for all countries to cut trade ties with Pyongyang to increase North Korea’s financial isolation and choke off revenue sources.” She cautioned China and Russia that they must acquiesce to U.S. demands, warning them that if they “do not act, we will use the tools we have at our disposal. Just last month we rolled out new sanctions targeting Russian and Chinese individuals and entities supporting the DPRK.” [11] Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin had threats to deliver, as well, warning China that if its actions against North Korea fail to live up to U.S. expectations, “we will put additional sanctions on them and prevent them from accessing the U.S. and international dollar system.” [12] Since all international financial transactions process through the U.S. banking system, this threat is tantamount to shutting down Beijing’s ability to conduct trade with any nation. It was a rather extravagant threat, and undoubtedly a difficult one to pull off, but one which the Trump administration is just reckless enough to consider undertaking. There is nothing illegal or forbidden in a nation trading with North Korea in non-prohibited commodities. Yet, a total trade blockade is what Washington is after. U.S. officials are preparing sanctions against foreign banks and companies that do business with North Korea. “We intend to deny the regime its last remaining sources of revenue, unless and until it reverses course and denuclearizes,” Billingslea darkly warns. “Those who collaborate with them are exposing themselves to enormous jeopardy.” [13] In essence, Washington is running an international protection racket: give us what we demand, or we will hurt you. This is gangsterism as foreign policy. China opposed the UN sanctions that the Trump administration presented at the UN Security Council in September. However, according to U.S. and UN officials, the United States managed to extort China’s acquiescence by threatening to hit Chinese businesses with secondary sanctions. [14] Before the August UN vote, similar threats were conveyed to Chinese diplomats at the U.S.-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue, as U.S. officials indicated that ten businesses and individuals would be sanctioned if China did not vote in favor of sanctions. [15] As a shot across the bow, the U.S. sanctioned the Chinese Bank of Dandong back in June, leading to Western firms severing contacts with the institution. [16] Washington’s threats prompted China to implement steps in the financial realm that exceed what is called for by the UN Security Council resolutions. China’s largest banks have banned North Korean individuals and entities from opening new accounts, and some firms are not allowing deposits in existing accounts. [17] There is no UN prohibition on North Koreans opening accounts abroad, so the action is regarded as a proactive measure by Chinese banks to avoid becoming the target of U.S. sanctions. [18] The demands never cease, no matter how much China gives way. U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson recently insisted that China impose a total oil embargo on North Korea. [19] China refused to go along, but it can expect be subjected to mounting pressure from the U.S. in the weeks ahead. U.S. officials are fanning out across the globe, seeking to cajole or threaten other nations to join the anti-DPRK crusade. Since most nations stand to lose far more by displeasing the U.S. than in ending a longstanding relationship with the DPRK, the campaign is having an effect. In April, India banned all trade with North Korea, with the exception of food and medicine. This action failed to satisfy the Trump administration, which sent officials to New Delhi to ask for the curtailing of diplomatic contacts with the DPRK and help in monitoring North Korean economic activities in the region.[20] The Philippines, for its part, responded to U.S. demands by suspending all trade activity with North Korea. [21] Mexico and Peru are among the nations that are expelling North Korean diplomats, on the arbitrary basis of responding to U.S. directives. [22] In addition to announcing that it would reduce North Korea’s diplomatic staff, Kuwait also said it would no longer issue visas to North Korean citizens. [23] Many African nations have warm relations with the DPRK, dating back to the period of the continent’s liberation struggles. U.S. officials are focusing particular attention on Africa, and several nations are currently under investigation by the United Nations for their trade with North Korea. [24] The demand to cut relations with North Korea is not an easy sell for Washington, as Africans remember the U.S. for having backed apartheid regimes, while the DPRK had supported African liberation. “Our world outlook was determined by who was on our side during the most crucial time of our struggle, and North Korea was there for us,” says Tuliameni Kalomoh, an official in Namibia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [25] This is not the kind of language Washington likes to hear. U.S. economic power is sufficient to ruin any small nation, and with little choice in the matter, Namibia cancelled all contracts with North Korean firms. [26] Egypt and Uganda are among the nations that have cut ties with the DPRK, and more nations are expected to follow suit, as the United States turns up the heat. Outside of the United Nations, the Trump administration is systematically erecting a total trade blockade against North Korea. Through this means, the U.S. hopes that North Korea will capitulate. That aim is premised on a serious misjudgment of the North Korean character. The Trump administration claims that UN sanctions and its policy of maximum pressure are intended to bring North Korea to the negotiating table. But it is not the DPRK that needs to be persuaded to talk. President Trump has tweeted, “Talking is not the answer!”  U.S. State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert laid down a stringent condition for negotiations: “For us to engage in talks with the DPRK, they would have to denuclearize.” [27] The demand for North Korea to give the United States everything it wants upfront, without receiving anything in return, as a precondition for talks is such an obvious nonstarter that it has to be regarded as a recipe for avoiding diplomacy. North Korea contacted the Obama administration on several occasions and requested talks, only to be rebuffed each time and told it needed to denuclearize. This sad disconnect continues under Trump. In May, the DPRK informed the United States that it would stop nuclear testing and missile launches if the U.S. would drop its hostile policy and sanctions, as well as sign a peace treaty ending the Korean War. [28] The U.S. may not have cared for the conditions, but it could have suggested adjustments, had it been so inclined. Certainly, it was an opening that could have led to dialogue. It is not diplomacy that the Trump administration seeks, but to crush North Korea. If the ostensible reason for UN sanctions is to persuade a reluctant party to negotiate, then one can only conclude that the wrong nation is being sanctioned. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying was scathing in her criticism of American and British leaders: “They are the loudest when it comes to sanctions, but nowhere to be found when it comes to making efforts to promote peace talks. They want nothing to do with responsibility.” [29] The months ahead look bleak. Unless China and Russia can find a way to oppose U.S. designs without becoming targets themselves, the North Korean people will stand alone and bear the burden of Trump’s malice. It says something for their character that they refuse to be cowed. Notes. [1] SC/12945, “Security Council Toughens Sanctions Against Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2371 (2017), United Nations Security Council, August 5, 2017. [2] “UN Security Council Toughens Sanctions on North Korea,” Radio Free Europe, September 12, 2017. [3] Sue-Lin Wong, Richa Naidu, “U.N. Ban on North Korean Textiles Will Disrupt Industry and Ordinary Lives, Experts Say,” Reuters, September 12, 2017. [4] “Prolonged Dry Weather Threatens the 2017 Main Season Food Crop Production,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, July 20, 2017. [5] “North Korean Food Imports Climb in June: KITA,” NK News, August 18, 2017. [6] “Fact Sheet: Resolution 2375 (2017) Strengthening Sanctions on North Korea,” United States Mission to the United Nations, September 11, 2017. [7] SC/12983, “Security Council Imposes Fresh Sanctions on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Including Bans on Natural Gas Sales, Worth Authorizations for its Nationals,” United Nations Security Council, September 11, 2017. [8] “Fact Sheet: Resolution 2375 (2017) Strengthening Sanctions on North Korea,” United States Mission to the United Nations, September 11, 2017. [9] Opening Statement of the Honorable Ed Royce (R-CA), “Sanctions, Diplomacy, and Information: Pressuring North Korea,” House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, September 12, 2017. [10] “Testimony of Assistant Secretary Marshall S. Billingslea,” House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, September 12, 2017. “Treasury Sanctions Suppliers of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Programs,” U.S. Department of Treasury, June 1, 2017. [11] “Statement of Susan Thornton, Acting Secretary of State,” House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, September 12, 2017. [12] Ian Talley, “U.S. Threatens China Over North Korea Sanctions,” Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2017. [13] Ian Talley, “U.S. Threatens China Over North Korea Sanctions,” Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2017. [14] “Clear and Present Blackmail: US Coaxes China to Back Anti-N Korea UN Resolution,” Sputnik News, September 12, 2017. [15] Yi Yong-in, “US Pledges to Sanction Ten More Chinese Entities if China Doesn’t Cooperate in NK UNSC Resolution,” Hankyoreh, July 22, 2017. [16] Matthew Pennington, “US Blacklists China Bank, Revving Up Pressure Over NKorea,” Associated Press, June 30, 2017. Joel Schectman and David Brunnstrom, “U.S. targets Chinese Bank, Company, Two Individuals Over North Korea,” Reuters, June 20, 2017. [17] “China’s Biggest Banks Ban New North Korean Accounts,” Financial Times, September 12, 2017. [18] Stephen McDonell, “China Banks Fear US North Korea Sanctions,” BBC News, September 12, 2017. [19] Nick Wadhams, “China Rebuffs U.S. Demand to Cut Off Oil Exports to North Korea,” September 15, 2017. [20] Indrani Bagchi, “Scale Back Engagement with North Korea, US Tells India,” The Times of India, July 30, 2017. [21] “Philippines Suspends Trade with N. Korea,” Yonhap, September 9, 2017. [22] “North Korea-U.S. Te4nsions Are Not Mexico’s Business: Diplomat,” Reuters, September 8, 2017. “Peru Says Expelling North Korean Ambassador Over Nuclear Program,” Reuters, September 11, 2017. [23] “Kuwait Decides to Reduce N.K. Diplomatic Staff, Stops Issuing Visas for N. Koreans,” Yonhap, September 16, 2017. [24] Kevin J. Kelley, “UN Probes Tanzania and Uganda Deals with North Korea,” East African, September 13, 2017. [25] Kevin Sieff, “North Korea’s Surprising, Lucrative Relationship with Africa,” Washington Post, July 10, 2017. [26] George Hendricks, “North Korean Contracts Terminated,” The Namibian, September 15, 2017. [27] Heather Nauert, “Department Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of State, June 15, 2017. [28] Jeong Yong-soo, “In May, North Offered to End Testing if Washington Backs Off,” JoongAng Ilbo, September 5, 2017. [29] “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on August 30, 2017,” (China) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 30, 2017. Join the debate on Facebook More articles by:Gregory Elich Gregory Elich is on the Board of Directors of the Jasenovac Research Institute and the Advisory Board of the Korea Policy Institute. He is a member of the Solidarity Committee for Democracy and Peace in Korea, a columnist for Voice of the People, and one of the co-authors of Killing Democracy: CIA and Pentagon Operations in the Post-Soviet Period, published in the Russian language. He is also a member of the Task Force to Stop THAAD in Korea and Militarism in Asia and the Pacific. His website is https://gregoryelich.org Follow him on Twitter at @GregoryElich #GregoryElich #Nuclearweapons #Asia #Sanctions #NorthKorea

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un provides guidance on a nuclear weapons program in an undated photo released by North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency. (Korean Central News Agency) By Tim Shorrock | September 26, 2017 Originally published in the Nation.com August 2017 was a reminder of the scariest, and riskiest, days of the Cold War. All month long, Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un engaged in a bitter war of words that escalated into tit-for-tat displays of military might and ended with mutual threats of mass destruction. The tensions peaked on September 3 with Pyongyang’s stunning announcement that it had conducted its sixth, and largest, nuclear test—this time of a powerful hydrogen bomb—and had the capability to place the bomb onto an intercontinental ballistic missile. With the crisis spinning out of control, the opportunity for the diplomacy and negotiations promised by Trump’s foreign-policy team in recent months seemed to fade with each passing day. Ironically, the spiral of events began with a hopeful sign on August 15, when Kim uncharacteristically backed down from a highly publicized plan to launch ballistic missiles toward the United States garrison island of Guam. His surprise decision drew approving comments from Trump as well as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who has been at the forefront of US proposals for diplomacy. He offered that Kim’s “restraint” might be enough to meet the US conditions for talks—a halt to nuclear and missile tests—that he recently laid out in a Wall Street Journal op-ed co-authored with Defense Secretary James Mattis. But Kim, who has said he will negotiate only if the United States ends its “hostile policy and nuclear threats,” had warned that he would reconsider his missile tests “if the Yankees persist in their extremely dangerous reckless actions.” He was speaking of the US–South Korean military exercises launched on August 21 that, according to press reports, included training runs for a preemptive strike against the North as well as a computerized nuclear war game. To counter this show of force, Pyongyang test-fired three short-range rockets and followed up with a medium-range missile shot over the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. Predictably, Kim’s moves sparked a US counter-action—a practice bombing run over Korean skies by Guam-based supersonic B1-B Lancer bombers, aided by four stealth F-35B advanced fighter jets flown from the US Marine base in Iwakuni, Japan. Days later, the North announced that it had developed a hydrogen bomb that could be placed on an ICBM—and, as mentioned, promptly tested the device in a massive underground explosion. Trump responded with a tweet denouncing the North as a “rogue” nation. He then insulted South Korea by calling President Moon Jae-in’s preference for engagement “appeasement,” apparently ruling out the diplomacy sought by his top advisers. Mattis, who had told reporters the week before that “we’re never out of diplomatic solutions,” quickly assured the public that the administration was in lockstep on Korea. After an emergency meeting at the White House on Sunday, he went on camera to say that Trump would meet more threats with a “massive military response” that would be both “effective and overwhelming.” The United States, he added ominously, is “not looking for the total annihilation” of North Korea but only to end its nuclear program. United Nations Ambassador Nikki Haley followed up on Monday, telling the UN Security Council that North Korea was “begging for war” and should be met with the “strongest possible sanctions.” But she left the door open for talks, saying “the time has come for us to exhaust all of our diplomatic means before it’s too late.” As the gravity of the situation dawned on Washington, the thin reeds of reassurance from Mattis and Haley seemed to suggest that the path of diplomacy and negotiation remains open—barely. “I don’t think that this administration is ideologically opposed to negotiations,” Victor Cha, a former Bush administration official who is about to be named US ambassador to Seoul, told The Nation on Tuesday. But therein lies a major dilemma. Talking to North Korea is a hard sell in Washington. The predominant view is that direct negotiations are a bad idea because, in the opinion of many officials and pundits, Pyongyang can’t be trusted. Exhibit One for these naysayers is the much-maligned “Agreed Framework” between President Bill Clinton and Kim’s father, Kim Jong-il, which ended the first nuclear crisis with Pyongyang in 1994 and was cited by 64 Democrats in a recent letter to Tillerson as a model for future talks. “The Clinton administration negotiated that deal, and the North Korean government immediately violated it,” CNN’s John King confidently informed his viewers on July 5, just after the North test-fired an ICBM that could hit the United States. King’s view, which he repeated several times that day without providing a single shred of evidence, became the standard line on CNN and the rest of network television, which consistently blocks voices saying that engagement has worked in the past. This take has also become a mantra for advocates of tough sanctions and regime change. “Engagement? I’ve been there, done that, and got the T-shirts—all of them failed,” Bruce Klinger, a former CIA official and senior research fellow for northeast Asia at the right-wing Heritage Foundation, told a Washington forum last month of his brief contacts with North Korean officials. Even Christopher Hill, a former US ambassador to Seoul who negotiated the “Six-Party Talks” in 2007 and 2008 for the Bush administration, has jumped into the no-talks camp, proclaiming that further negotiations would only “strengthen a rogue regime’s hand.” Similar arguments were made by three former US officials in interviews with The New York Times last week. But what if these calculations aren’t true, and the official story is wrong? What exactly did the Agreed Framework do, and how and why did it come apart? Did President Clinton’s agreement really give North Korea the bomb, as many Republicans now claim? What did those 64 Democrats mean when they urged Tillerson to “make a good faith effort to replicate” its successes? A careful review of the 1994 agreement and interviews with former US officials with extensive experience negotiating with Pyongyang reveals that blame for its demise should be equally shared by the United States and North Korea. Because that’s not a popular view, and the risks are so high, it’s important to get the story straight. The 1994 agreement was the United States’ response to a regional political crisis that began that year when North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which requires non-nuclear states to agree never to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. Although it had no nuclear weapon, North Korea was producing plutonium, an action that almost led the United States to launch a preemptive strike against its plutonium facility. That war was averted when Jimmy Carter made a surprise trip to Pyongyang and met with North Korea’s founder and leader at the time, Kim Il-sung (he died a few months later, and his power was inherited by his son, Kim Jong-il). The framework was signed in October 1994, ending “three years of on and off vilification, stalemates, brinkmanship, saber-rattling, threats of force, and intense negotiations,” Park Kun-young, a professor of international relations at Korea Catholic University, wrote in a 2009 history of the negotiations. In addition to shutting its one operating reactor, Yongbyon, the North also stopped construction of two large reactors “that together were capable of generating 30 bombs’ worth of plutonium a year,” according to Leon V. Sigal, a former State Department official who helped negotiate the 1994 framework and directs a Northeast Asia security project at the Social Science Research Council in New York. Most important for the United States, it remained in the NPT. In exchange for North Korea’s concessions, the United States agreed to provide 500,000 tons a year of heavy fuel oil to North Korea as well two commercial light-water reactors considered more “proliferation resistant” than the Soviet-era heavy-water facility the North was using. The new reactors were to be built in 2003 by a US/Japanese/South Korean consortium called the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, or KEDO. (The reactors, however, were never completed). For Pyongyang, which had been in the economic wilderness since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the biggest prize was the US promise to stop treating the North like an enemy state. Specifically, the two sides agreed to move as rapidly as possible to full diplomatic and economic normalization. Here’s how it played out. First, the Agreed Framework led North Korea to halt its plutonium-based nuclear-weapons program for over a decade, forgoing enough enrichment to make over 100 nuclear bombs. “What people don’t know is that North Korea made no fissible material whatsoever from 1991 to 2003,” says Sigal. (The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed in 1994 that the North had ceased production of plutonium three years earlier.) “A lot of this history” about North Korea, Sigal adds with a sigh, “is in the land of make-believe.” Second, the framework remained in effect well into the Bush administration. In 1998, the State Department’s Rust Deming testified to Congress that  “there is no fundamental violation of any aspect of the framework agreement”; four years later, a similar pledge was made by Bush’s then–Secretary of State Colin Powell. “I get really aggravated when I hear people in Congress say the agreement wasn’t worth the paper it was printed on,” says James Pierce, who was on the State Department team led by Robert Gallucci that negotiated the framework. “The bottom line is, there was a lot in the 1994 agreement that worked and continued for quite some years. The assertion, now gospel, that the North Koreans broke it right away is simply not true.” “There was a lot in the 1994 agreement that worked and continued for quite some years. The assertion, now gospel, that the North Koreans broke it right away is simply not true.” — James Pierce Third, the framework and the ongoing engagement that resulted allowed the Clinton administration, led by Secretary of Defense William Perry, to launch a remarkable set of talks that nearly led to a final breakthrough with Pyongyang. As the negotiations unfolded, Kim Jong-il made a startling offer: In return for an end to enmity, Pyongyang was prepared to shut down its development, testing, and deployment of all medium- and long-range missiles. But the agreement was never completed. (Wendy Sherman, the top deputy to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, later wrote that the two sides were “tantalizingly close.”) “In effect, they were willing to trade their missile program for a better relationship” with Washington, Sigal told me. “And this was before they had the nukes!” Fourth, the United States itself may have violated the framework by delaying the most important part of the agreement for Pyongyang—US oil shipments and the full normalization of political and economic relations. By 1997, Sigal recalls, the North Koreans were complaining bitterly that the United States was slow to deliver its promised oil and stalling on its pledge to end its hostile policies—the very reason Kim Jong-il had signed in the first place. In a House hearing in 1998, Gallucci warned of failure unless the US government did “what it said it would do, which is to take responsibility” for delivery of the oil. “It was against this backdrop—Pyongyang’s growing conviction the US was not living up to its commitments—that the North in 1998 began to explore” other military options, Mike Chinoy, a former CNN reporter and the author of Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis, wrote recently in an incisive article in The Cipher Brief. Finally, the framework collapsed in 2003 after the Bush administration—which had come to office with grave doubts about the agreement—dredged up US intelligence from the 1990s to accuse the North of starting a highly enriched uranium program as a second avenue to the bomb. (It hadn’t yet, though it was scouting the world for enrichment machinery to use later.) Bush tore up the framework agreement, exacerbating the deterioration in relations he had sparked a year earlier when he named North Korea part of his “axis of evil” in January 2002. In response, the North kicked out the IAEA inspectors and began building what would become its first bomb, in 2006, triggering a second nuclear crisis that continues to this day. “I think they were [cheating] to hedge their bets because we were cheating too,” Lawrence Wilkerson, the chief of staff to Colin Powell in 2002, recently told The Real News. In other words, the full story is complicated, and blame can easily be cast on both sides. But the results were disastrous, as Sigal summarized in his masterful history of US–North Korean negotiations published last year by the Korean Institute for National Unification and Columbia Law School. “When President Bush took office, North Korea, thanks to diplomacy, had stopped testing longer-range missiles,” he wrote. “It had less than a bomb’s worth of plutonium and was verifiably not making more. Six years later, as a result of Washington’s broken promises and financial sanctions, it had seven to nine bombs’ worth [of plutonium], had resumed longer-range test launches, and felt free to test nuclear weapons.” Since then, he noted in a recent commentary, “any achievements have been temporary” because “neither side kept its commitments or sustained negotiations.” In fact, the situation worsened during the Obama administration, which never got negotiations back on track despite Obama’s promises during his 2008 campaign that he would talk to North Korea’s leaders. Trump is dealing with the residue of these failed policies, and seemed to grasp that when he reluctantly endorsed the idea of direct talks on August 9. “They’ve been negotiating now for 25 years,” he told reporters. “Look at Clinton. He folded on the negotiations. He was weak and ineffective. You look what happened with Bush, you look what happened with Obama. Obama, he didn’t even want to talk about it. But I talk. It’s about time. Somebody has to do it.” Trump’s facts, as usual, are off the mark—but his conclusion that talks are necessary is sound. To conduct them, however, his administration will have to deal with the same political attacks that helped sink the Agreed Framework. And then, as now, the opposition is likely to come from foreign policy hardliners who don’t believe that diplomacy has ever worked with North Korea. Most histories of the Agreed Framework overlook a critical fact: one month after it was signed, the GOP captured Congress for the first time in four decades. “No sooner had the agreement been concluded than the Republicans took control of the House and Senate, putting it in jeopardy,” Sigal wrote in his history. Even before the ink was dry, Newt Gingrich and other party leaders, notably Senator John McCain, were attacking the framework as a sellout that would essentially bribe North Korea to follow international law on nuclear proliferation and put the United States at further risk. “We’re going back to the days of President Carter, of appeasement,” McCain told The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour in October 1994. Over the course of the agreement, the GOP delayed critical funding for KEDO and the fuel oil, forcing the Clinton administration to seek funds elsewhere and significantly delaying shipments—“in some cases for years,” says Chinoy. That created difficulties for the US diplomats who were directly involved with the North Koreans in implementing its terms, recalls Pierce, who spent many days in Pyongyang working with North Korean officials to monitor where the fuel oil was flowing after it reached the North. “We scraped [the funds] together, because we knew we weren’t going to get any more money from Congress,” he says. “But we had to deliver on our side.” The North Korean government, well aware that Congress and the executive had equal power, viewed these delays as an abrogation of the agreements made in 1994. Yet despite its anger, the government of Kim Jong-il, who consolidated power shortly after his father’s death, made no attempt to reprocess the spent fuel that was stored under IAEA inspection at Yongbyon or to restart the reactor. But as a defensive measure, Pyongyang started to build medium- and long-range missiles, which had never been part of the negotiations. By 1997 it had tested two of them, causing shivers of fear at the Pentagon. In 1998, in a desperate attempt to persuade the United States to end its hostile policy, North Korea offered to put its missile program on the table for negotiations. When Clinton demurred, Pyongyang launched a three-stage rocket called the Taepodong in a botched attempt to put a satellite into space. This led Clinton to appoint Defense Secretary Perry his envoy to Pyongyang to begin the missile negotiations that came close to ending the standoff. A key factor in Kim Jong-il’s decision to re-enter negotiations was the progress he had made in lowering tensions with South Korea’s president, Kim Dae-jung. Since winning office in 1996, the South’s former opposition leader had championed a new “Sunshine Policy” toward the North that sought to end the country’s division through economic, political, and cultural engagement. In 2000, in an extraordinary scene that gave hope to millions of Koreans on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the two Kims met for the first intra-Korea summit meeting in history and declared that their peninsula would be nuclear-free. Those developments gave impetus to the US–North Korean talks. Not long after the North-South summit, Marshal Jo Myong-rok, a high-ranking North Korean who was Kim’s second-in-command, visited Washington, DC, and met President Clinton and other top US officials at the White House. They signed a joint communiqué designed to end US–North Korean tensions once and for all, and pledged to begin talks to “formally improve” bilateral relations, including replacing the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War with “permanent peace arrangements,” according to Sigal. Soon after, Albright flew to Pyongyang to meet with Kim. The missile deal—including Kim’s commitment to end all production and testing—was to be capped with a visit to Pyongyang by Clinton himself. But he never made the trip, largely because his advisers kept him in Washington during the legal imbroglio that shook America over the disputed 2000 election between Democrat Al Gore and Republican George W. Bush. The agreement was never signed, although North Korea’s missile moratorium lasted until 2007. “That was the moment when everything could have gone differently,” Perry told The New York Times in a recent podcast about the 1999 talks. Then came the neocons, and talks went out the window. “Under President Bush, the clock was turned back, the [Agreed Framework] became a Clinton mistake, something to be voided and then abolished,” wrote Park, the professor of international relations at Korea Catholic University. Chief among the framework opponents was Donald Rumsfeld, Bush’s defense secretary. During the Clinton years, he had chaired a national commission on missile defense that identified North Korea and Iran as dangerous “rogue states” that necessitated tough policies and, of course, a robust missile-defense system. Meanwhile, at the State Department, John Bolton, also a die-hard opponent, sharply criticized the terms of the framework as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control. (Today he says that the United States can only eliminate North Korea’s nuclear program by “eliminating North Korea.”) Early on in his administration, Bush signaled his displeasure with Clinton’s Korea diplomacy when he met at the White House with Kim Dae-jung. Kim, still basking in the glow of his 2000 summit with Kim Jong-il, hoped to convince Bush that negotiations should continue. But he was humiliated when the president told him, on live television, that he did not trust North Korea and would not endorse Kim’s “Sunshine Policy.” A few months later, when pragmatists at State under Colin Powell decided after a review to restart talks with Pyongyang, the hard-liners—led by Bolton—seized on the uranium “discovery” from 1998 to scuttle the framework. “I wanted a decisive conclusion that the Agreed Framework was dead,” Bolton later explained. In October 2002, Bush sent James Kelly, a deputy assistant secretary of state, to Pyongyang to deliver an ultimatum to North Korea. He had strict orders from Vice President Dick Cheney and Bolton not to negotiate in any way—a dictate he followed even after his North Korean interlocutors denied that they had a uranium program in place but offered to discuss the accusations. “Kelly had minders from both the VP’s office and John Bolton’s staff,” recalls John Merrill, the former chief of the northeast Asia division of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department. “He had absolutely no room too explore the issue. Instead, he took what they said as an admission that they had a program and went home.” According to this account, the North Koreans told Kelly that the country had a “right” to a uranium program but was willing to discuss the issue as part of the broader negotiations over missiles. But the hard-liners in the administration rejected the offer and decided to terminate the framework. Within months, Pyongyang had thrown out the IAEA inspectors, withdrawn from the NPT, restarted Yongbyon, and was on its way to its first bomb. Condoleezza Rice, in her memoirs about her experience in Bush’s government, described the US refusal to talk to the North Koreans about the highly enriched uranium program, or HEU, as a huge mistake. “Because [Kelly’s] instructions were so constraining, Jim couldn’t fully explore what might have been an opening to put the [nuclear] program on the table,” she wrote. Later, when she ran for president in 2008, Hillary Clinton picked up on this theme, blasting the Bush administration for using the HEU program as an excuse to abrogate the Agreed Framework. “There is no debate that, once the [framework] was torn up, the North Koreans began to process plutonium with a vengeance because all bets were off,” she told The Washington Post. Since then, many analysts have cast doubt on whether North Korea actually had a full-fledged uranium-based nuclear weapons program in 2002, suggesting instead that what it really had was a pilot program for uranium enrichment that “thus posed no serious and imminent threat to the security of the United States,” according to Park, the international-relations scholar. In 2007, a senior US intelligence official seemed to confirm that when he told Congress that the CIA only had “mid-confidence” that a uranium program existed. (The North eventually developed one, and displayed its facilities in 2010 to US scientists.) Still, Pyongyang hung on: In October 2003, it offered to abandon its nuclear-weapons program if the United States would sign a non-aggression pact similar to the language worked out with Clinton and Perry. But this was a bridge too far for Bush. “We will not have a treaty,” he said. “That’s off the table.” By 2006, North Korea had processed enough plutonium to make a bomb, and it exploded its first nuclear device that same year. (For a detailed timeline of US–North Korean talks, see this chronology published by the Arms Control Association.) Yet despite the enormous influence of the neocons under Bush, talks continued between Washington and the North, as well with China, Russia, Japan and South Korea, under the Six-Party Talks. Amazingly, in 2006, three weeks after North Korea tested its bomb—the “red line” that the United States had been trying to head off since the 1980s—Bush agreed to open direct talks with Pyongyang as part of the Six-Party process. These talks were a result of North Korea’s declaration in 2005 that it would be willing, if certain conditions were met, to abandon its nuclear weapons and return to the NPT. In February 2007, after the stalemate and crisis that led to the 2006 test, the North suspended its nuclear testing and shut down its reactor; a few months later, it agreed to disable its plutonium facilities at Yongbyon. In return, the United States promised to ease sanctions and take North Korea off the list of countries sponsoring terrorism. But the agreement soon fell apart over the issue of verification of Pyongyang’s enrichment and plutonium activities. As with Clinton’s 2000 agreement, Bush’s negotiations were eased by developments inside Korea, including the second North-South summit in October 2007. But soon after that meeting, South Korea’s progressive president Roh Moo-hyun was succeeded by Lee Myung-bak, a right-winger dead set against the Sunshine Policy. Backed by a new conservative government in Japan, which also rejected engagement, Lee demanded a system of written verification that Bush quickly agreed to. North Korea, however, bitterly opposed the demand as a violation of the 2005 accords signed by the Roh government. In response, both South Korea and Japan cut off their energy assistance to the North, leaving the Six-Party Talks in limbo. (Lee’s hard-line policies, which were also adopted by his successor, Park Geun-hye, greatly heightened tensions with the North and helped bring on the current crisis, current President Moon Jae-in told me in an interview with The Nation in May.) The Six-Party Talks, however, didn’t fall apart until the first months of the Obama administration. According to Sigal’s detailed history, President Obama and Jeff Bader, his top adviser on Asia, decided in 2009 to adopt President Lee’s proposals to use the suspension of energy aid as pressure to force North Korea to accept the verification plans they were now demanding. Lee also had the advantage of a close, friendly relationship with President Obama, which The New York Times characterized as “a presidential man-crush.” The idea of direct talks with the North, championed during Obama’s 2008 campaign, was abandoned. Washington’s policy, according to Sigal, became “pure pressure without negotiations.” Officially, the doctrine was known as “strategic patience,” but behind it was an assumption that North Korea was headed for collapse. The Obama-Lee pressure tactics only increased tensions, leading to further North Korean nuclear and missile tests, as well as a shelling incident in 2010 that almost caused a military confrontation. As the situation deteriorated, Obama embarked on a series of military exercises with South Korea that increased in size and tempo over the course of his administration and are now at the heart of the tension with Kim Jong-un. Still, dialogue continued sporadically, particularly through a channel of former US officials that has included Sigal. At some point, the United States is going to have to sit down with Kim’s representatives and seek to hammer something out that will put the North on the path to denuclearization—or accept it as a nuclear power and seek to temper its program. In 2010, the North proposed through this channel to ship out its nuclear fuel rods, the key ingredient for producing weapons-grade plutonium, to a third country in exchange for a US commitment to pledge that it had “no hostile intent” toward the North. But the Obama administration “didn’t even listen,” according to Joel Wit, a former negotiator who participated in the meeting. In 2015, Pyongyang made a sweeping proposal for a peace treaty that would end the enmity; this, too, was rejected out of hand. By the end of 2016, as David Sanger chronicled in the Times, Obama had decided on an aggressive cyber strategy that used electronic attacks to “sabotage” North Korea’s missiles and its supply chains. As Obama left the scene and Trump arrived at the White House, relations were frayed almost beyond repair. In April of this year, following a series of missile tests, Trump turned up the heat, and tensions since then have gone through the roof. Yet, as I reported in The Nation, North Korea clings to the idea that negotiations will be possible only if the United States ends the “hostile policy” that Pyongyang thought Washington had jettisoned with the Agreed Framework 1994. Today the Trump administration is trying to combine sanctions against Pyongyang with pressure on China to bring the North to the table. That may have worked to a certain degree: Kim Jong-un’s pullback on August 14 came hours after Beijing said it would immediately ban imports of North Korean coal, iron, and seafood. This decision followed China’s extraordinary August vote in favor of the tough sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. But at some point, the United States is going to have to sit down with Kim’s representatives and seek to hammer something out that will put the North on the path to denuclearization—or accept it as a nuclear power and seek to temper its program, as James Clapper, the former director of National Intelligence, and other former US officials have proposed. (Some past negotiators disagree.) Last week, CNN’s Will Ripley reported, Pyongyang told him that a US acknowledgement of its nuclear program would clear the way for diplomacy. At the UN this week, China and Russia argued again that the best way to start those talks is a “freeze for freeze,” in which the North suspends its nuclear and missile testing in exchange for a moratorium or scaling back of the massive US-South Korean military exercises that have so inflamed the North. While this exchange has been rejected by the Trump administration (Haley called it “insulting”), a former US negotiator recently reminded a group of Korea watchers in a confidential conference call that Clinton’s suspension of the US “Team Spirit” exercises in South Korea were “critical” to getting the Agreed Framework passed. Meanwhile, a recent poll suggests that 60 percent of Americans favor a negotiated settlement with North Korea. As in 1994, the trade-off will have to come between ending the enmity and finding the peace. Somewhere in the history of those negotiations, Tillerson and his president may find the key to resolving a conflict that dates back to 1945 and the dawn of the Cold War. But they will have to do it with the full cooperation of South Korea, as President Moon has frequently reminded Trump. “No one should be allowed to decide on a military action on the Korean Peninsula without South Korean agreement,” Moon declared in an unusually blunt statement on August 15. The purpose of sanctions and pressure, he added, “is to bring North Korea to the negotiating table, not to raise military tensions.” Yoon Young-kwan, who worked with President Moon as South Korea’s foreign minister in the Roh Moo-hyun administration, reinforced those comments on September 5 at a Washington conference on US-South Korean relations. During these tense times, he said, “we must keep our diplomatic channels open and explore what is possible.” He pointed to the clause in the 1994 framework on normalizing US-North Korean political and economic relations. “North Korea had high expectations of that,” he said. “We must provide them with some kind of incentive” to negotiate. As the historian Bruce Cumings reminded us a few weeks back, another war of “fire and fury,” as Trump famously threatened on August 9, is out of the question. Tim Shorrock is a Washington, DC–based journalist and the author of Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing. He is a Korea Policy Institute Associate. #Trump #AgreedFramework #Nuclearweapons #TimShorrock #NorthKorea

In loving memory of Jo Young Sam By Jo Young Sam |  September 24, 2017 Korea peace and reunification activist, and ardent supporter of President Moon Jae In,  Jo Young Sam died early Wednesday morning, September 20, 2017, after setting himself on fire on Tuesday to protest the deployment of THAAD in South Korea. In a four page letter to President Moon Jae-in Jo wrote: “I am a person who genuinely, honestly hoped for the success of the Moon Jae-In administration. Through the success of the Moon Jae-In administration, we could have seen a future for North-South Korean economic partnerships, peace & reunification,  work done to achieve balance in Northeast Asia, and a future for us [Corean] descendants.” The English language translation of his letter to President Moon Jae In follows.* __________________________ Our country only has a future via the success of the Moon Jae-In Administration President Moon Jae-In, long ago, when I was in Germany, I was the one who has always supported and respected you. President Moon Jae-In, Let me get to the point right away. THAAD cannot happen. Mr. President, you also know that THAAD will not bring peace, but the tension and the dangers of war. I have tried to think that you were taking one step back to go two steps forward or you might have a bigger picture planned in your mind. However, by all means, this is not the way to go. Playing hard to get with the all mighty U.S. can never be easy. I understand that. But if you get pushed back from the beginning like this, how will you be able to get back on your feet later? I am a person who genuinely and honestly hoped for the success of the Moon Jae-In administration. Through the success of the Moon Jae-In administration, we could have seen the future for North-South Korean economic partnerships, peace & reunification, the balance in Northeast Asia, and the future for our [Corean] descendants. THAAD, for all intents and purposes, will not be a war deterrent nor a protective arm for peace. Having the lowest rate to “match bullet for bullet”, with the THAAD installation, it is more significant that North Korea and China will be placed under the X-Band security radar as an effect of THAAD installation. It is therefore so obvious that the location of THAAD and the neighboring area will be the prime target of China and North Korea from the moment of its installation. North Korea’s ICBMs’ potential for destruction is not limited to the Korean Peninsula but exceeds the continent with its long-distance capabilities. Specifically, this ICBM is targeting for the United States. Mr. President, you too know this well. Regardless that you used the term, “temporary installation,” you still proceeded with the installation of THAAD because you knew that you have hit the wall of reality in the current international politics. Of course, North Korea has the primary responsibility for this immediate installation by practicing nuclear experiments in response to your suggestion to communicate. Whether you truly meant it or not, the hostile relation between North Korea and the U.S. has escalated as a result of the installation of THAAD, casting dark clouds over our future. This childish game like “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” can result in the devastative destruction of both north and south Korea. The ever vigilant Japan (with one eye always open) also comes into my vision. For those who are responsible in the North, I ask you for a favor.  Once, I used to work for Lee In Mo who had been a war correspondent for the People’s Army, (Lee, In Mo, at the time, wasn’t able to walk on his own and was under my care due to post traumatic stress disorder after the separation of Korea). To the Party, in accordance with the “by the people” rhetoric you often use, don’t simply say “people”, “people”, but truly lay everything down in front of the people. The destiny of the people is to work together, with a mindset of carrying on and sharing. So, therefore, before the U.S. and its divisionary “coveted interest” rhetoric comes into play, let’s set out to take an action on forming the next chapter of North and South Korean relations. After saying “By the people” rhetorically, but in fact bypassing South Korea is not acceptable. Currently, Korea is not under Lee, Myung Bak’s administration, nor Park, Geun Hye’s. The current administration is the outcome of the candle light movement which left the greatest mark in the world history. We must succeed. We have a proverb that says, “Lifting together is always better, even when it’s just a blank sheet of paper”. You never know that we might come up with an idea that can stop the U.S. as a result of communication between North and South Korea. I think I have the right to ask you for this as a person who had assisted Lee, In Mo, the highly respected person in North Korea. President Moon Jae-In, I have respected and loved you. Even after I finish this journey of my life I will continue to believe in you. I feel honored if my death brings the hope of a THAAD withdrawal, and if through this moment of difficult breathing, negotiations with the US lead to a good result, this will be remembered as a glorious moment. I, as an unknown pacifist who has desired  to live as a man of the wind unfettered by the net, would like to wish for the peace on this land and say not to underestimate Korea as the last leaf of my life falls into the ground. I want to be remembered as a person among the million participating in the candlelight revolution that our Korean government was born out of. Mr. President, I pray and hope that you stand strong and state sternly to the U.S. that your administration is the product of the candlelight revolution and, as it initially was, push ahead with the strength that comes with success and set a path for the world to remember. I hope for your health. Sincerely, A single field flower, Jo Young Sam P.S. My actions will be argued about and understood in many ways. I do not care. I said I lived as “the free person of the wind unfettered by the net”, so what more words are necessary for those that couldn’t experience that life? For those for whom the trip of life is not yet over, I please ask that you give my regards to my wife and my young son. _____________________________ *Initial English translation courtesy of William Rhee, final translation courtesy of Misuk Nam. #SouthKorea #THAAD #MoonJaein #JoYoungSam #ICBM #NorthKorea

Donald Trump shakes hands with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during the United Nations General Assembly, September 21, 2017. (AP Photo / Evan Vucci) By Tim Shorrock | September 29, 2017 Published originally in The Nation.com In a speech that will long be remembered for its ugly belligerence, President Trump told the UN General Assembly last week that “if it is forced to defend itself,” the United States was prepared to “totally destroy” North Korea: not just its military, or its leaders, but the entire population. To many heads of state, a threat evoking the destruction of both World War II and the Korean War violated the very idea of the UN as a body dedicated to resolving global tensions with peaceful means. “This was a bombastic, nationalist speech,” declared Margot Wallstrom, the foreign minister of Sweden, who grimly watched Trump’s outburst with folded arms. “I must say that we consider any type of military solution absolutely inappropriate,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel told a German newspaper. Experts on North Korea, meanwhile, argued that the speech played right into Kim Jong-un’s hands by proving his claim that the United States is North Korea’s mortal enemy. “President Trump has handed the North Koreans the sound bite of the century,” wrote Marcus Noland, an economist at the Peterson Institute for International Economics who is well-known for his critical analyses of North Korea. “That footage will be used time and time and time again on North Korea’s state television channel.” Sure enough, Kim followed Trump’s speech with what might be called the insult of the century. In an unprecedented move that sent the Internet into a miasma of laughter and shock, he responded personally to Trump’s threat by calling him a “dotard” and a “frightened dog” that “has rendered the world restless through threats and blackmail against all countries in the world.” “I will make the man holding the prerogative of the supreme command in the U.S. pay dearly for his speech.” —North Korean leader Kim Jong-un “On behalf of the dignity and honor of my state and people and on my own,” Kim said, “I will make the man holding the prerogative of the supreme command in the U.S. pay dearly for his speech.” He told Trump to expect “the highest level of hard-line countermeasure in history.” Later, his foreign minister, Ri Yong-ho, suggested that might include a hydrogen bomb test over the Pacific Ocean—and then upped the ante by accusing Trump of making a unilateral “declaration of war” against North Korea. Clearly, Trump’s threat to obliterate a country with 25 million people, many of them with family and relatives in South Korea, had struck a chord. Trump, naturally, struck back on Twitter by calling Kim a “madman,” and announced at the UN that the United States, South Korea, and Japan had agreed on a new set of US sanctions aimed at punishing any company or country that does business with the North Korean regime. Then, as if tensions weren’t high enough, on the night of September 23 the Pentagon sent B-1B Lancer bombers, nicknamed “the swan of death,” to fly over international airspace just off the coast of North Korea—“the first time since the Korean War that a U.S. bomber flew over North Korea’s east coast,” according to the Kyunghyang Shinmun, a major daily in Seoul. Two days later, after Trump tweeted that if Ri and Kim kept up their threats, they “may not be around much longer,” the foreign minister called his bluff. Standing before television cameras in front of his New York hotel, Foreign Minister Ri said that if a state of war existed, North Korea reserved the right to “make countermeasures, including the right to shoot down United States strategic bombers even when they are not inside the airspace border of our country.” That worried longtime US negotiators with North Korea. “That’s not the Ri Yong-ho I know,” Joseph DeTrani, a former CIA proliferation expert who met with Ri many times as a special envoy to the Six-Party Talks, told The Nation on Monday. But the escalating rhetoric did not meet the approval of the US public: That afternoon, CBS News put out a new poll showing that 53 percent of Americans were concerned that Trump might act too quickly “and start an unneeded war in Korea.” This week, as pundits debated what the next step would be in this global spectacle, few were asking how the standoff got to this point. Nor was it clear why the Trump administration abandoned the path of diplomacy that its top officials, led by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, have defined for months as their objective, one strongly embraced by South Korean President Moon Jae-in. Amazingly, on Monday the administration continued to insist this was the case, with a State Department spokesperson telling reporters (despite the president’s words at the UN) that the “United States has not ‘declared war’ on North Korea,” and that “We continue to seek a peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” But a review of recent events and US government statements shows, in fact, that the “military option” against North Korea has eclipsed negotiations as the strategy of choice and become almost conventional thinking in Washington. More darkly, it suggests that the key influence on US policy during this period may have been Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, one of the most obsequious, pro-American leaders in modern Asian history. Just a month ago, things seemed to be looking up in Korea. In mid-August, Kim—derisively dubbed “Rocket Man” in Trump’s UN speech—canceled plans to shoot missiles toward the US military base on Guam, where the B1-Bs that would lead a military attack on North Korea are based. Possibly in response, the Pentagon quietly reduced the number of US troops involved in the upcoming US-South Korean “Ulchi Freedom Guardian” war games, from 25,000 in 2016 to 17,500 this year. They lasted from August 21 to 31. But the key elements of the exercises so feared by the North, including training in nuclear warfare and “decapitation strikes,” remained. That apparently triggered its decisions to go ahead with another series of missile tests, including two shots fired over the Japanese island of Hokkaido. Then, on September 3, Pyongyang tested its sixth—and largest—nuclear bomb. Even before that, H.R. McMaster, Trump’s national security adviser, had signaled a shift in US policy by speaking openly of a “preventive war” aimed at stopping North Korea’s weapons programs. In the weeks that followed Pyongyang’s early September test, Trump and his advisers launched a campaign to convince the American public that such a war might succeed. From Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis to UN ambassador Nikki Haley, the idea of a “military option” that could “annihilate” the North became a mantra. Mattis even suggested that the Pentagon was seriously considering an option that could avoid damage to South Korea and other US allies—a claim scoffed at by many analysts, who believe that any US attack on the North would be met with catastrophic retaliation by the North. For Trump personally, Pyongyang’s latest nuclear test appeared to be the final straw. A few hours after he learned of the explosion, he insulted President Moon by tweeting that South Korea’s “talk of appeasement with North Korea will not work,” and declaring that “talking is not the answer!” Mattis escalated the rhetoric by saying that any “aggression” from North Korea would end with its “total annihilation.” Although the United States is “not looking” for that, he added, “we have many options to do so.” But North Korea’s actions alone don’t account for this new hard-line posture. Rather, it appears to be the result of the influence of Japan’s Abe, who has become Trump’s most faithful fan and ally on the world stage. Two years ago in this magazine, I chronicled Abe’s imperialist heritage and his attempts to “transform Japan—with its surprisingly large, tech-driven military-industrial complex—into America’s new proxy army.” Since Trump took office, Abe has become his closest confidant on North Korea and the man he inevitably calls first during every crisis. Their alliance has deepened since the North Korean missile shots over Japan. Frightened by the possibility of a strike on their island nation, Abe and his supporters have rallied behind Trump’s militant policy toward Pyongyang. On September 17, right before Trump’s UN speech, Abe published an unusual op-ed in The New York Times endorsing the idea of a military attack if sanctions fail to dissuade North Korea. “I firmly support the United States position that all options are on the table,” he wrote. As Abe well knows, a key element in any US attack, along with the B1 bombers in Guam, would be the advanced stealth F-35 fighter jets stationed at the US Marine base in Iwakuni, Japan. Japanese speakers made similar assertions the following day at a forum in Washington on “past diplomacy with North Korea.” Although it took place at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, it was conceived and sponsored by the US-Japan Research Institute, a Tokyo think tank sponsored by several major universities and financed by Nissan, Toyota, Sony, and other large Japanese multinationals. The basic message was that Japan’s interests must be front and center in any US negotiations with Pyongyang. Mitoji Yabunaka, the former Japanese negotiator at the Six-Party Talks with North Korea, noted that he has heard many Americans argue that it’s “not realistic” to think North Korea will denuclearize, and that Washington should thus concentrate on managing Pyongyang’s arsenal. That “might suffice US interests,” but it is unacceptable to Japan, he said. “We are already being [threatened], so that doesn’t work for Japan.” The objective of any negotiations “must be clear—denuclearization,” Yabunaka said. “In that sense, I’m encouraged that Trump is sticking to that.” On September 20, Abe followed Trump’s speech with an aggressive call for a naval blockade on North Korea that would block its access to “the goods, funds, people and technology” necessary for its military programs. Abe also repeated arguments that past negotiations with the North had failed because they had allowed Pyongyang to “deceive” the global community, and said the time for diplomacy was over. What’s needed to force North Korea’s denuclearization is “not dialogue, but pressure,” he said. On September 22, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force joined the US Navy in drills designed to counter the North Korean threat. Finally, on Monday the 25th, Abe made his intentions clear: He was dissolving Japan’s powerful lower house and calling for a snap election in late October. “By holding an election at a time like this, I would like to test our public mandate on actions against North Korea,” he said. To many South Koreans, Abe’s intervention has effectively sidelined President Moon. While he tacitly endorsed Trump’s rhetoric in a meeting with the US delegation during the UN session, Moon laid out a very different approach in his address to the General Assembly. “We do not desire the collapse of North Korea,” he said. “If North Korea makes a decision even now to stand on the right side of history, we are ready to assist North Korea together with the international community.” Korean media have also reported that Abe’s government opposed Moon’s recent decision to provide $8 million in humanitarian aid to the North despite its missile and weapons tests. Japan’s growing influence on Trump was noted last week by Choe Sang-hun, The New York Times’s Seoul bureau chief. The day of Moon’s speech, he reported that the South Korean president is viewed by Koreans as “the odd man out,” and quoted Lee Won-deog, an academic expert on Korean-Japan relations. “There is a suspicion that Prime Minister Abe is using his close personal chemistry with President Trump to help shape the American leader’s views on South Korea.” Abe’s loyalty to Trump was also noted last month by The Wall Street Journal. “The Japanese leader’s refusal to let any daylight come between him and Mr. Trump contrasts with other leaders who have hinted at unease with Mr. Trump’s language, including his [recent] threat to bring ‘fire and fury’ on North Korea,” it reported from Tokyo. Moon himself has downplayed the idea of any splits, telling reporters on his plane back to Seoul, “I do not think the international community has any other option but to pressure North Korea with one voice.” But the tension between the Abe government and Moon’s was palpable upon the latter’s return from New York. In an unusual public display of anger reported by The Hankyoreh, senior South Korea officials complained bitterly to the White House that Japanese reporters, apparently with the support of their government, had “repeatedly printed distorted reports about South Korea-US-Japan summit remarks” last week as a way to weaken Moon’s position with Trump. Outside of the obvious attempt to sideline Moon, one of the problems with the Abe-Trump alliance, according to some peace activists, is that Japan and the United States are by far the largest financial contributors to the UN and could use that clout to pressure other nations into supporting military action against North Korea. In any case, peace groups hope to persuade the UN to intervene and press for a stronger diplomatic approach. Last Friday, Women Cross DMZ, a coalition of dozens of women’s organizations that made a peace vigil to North and South Korea in 2015, in a letter signed by nearly 300 women and over 40 major women’s organizations, wrote to UN Secretary General António Guterres urging him to “immediately appoint a Special Envoy” to de-escalate the conflict and “encourage dialogue, compromise and the peaceful resolution of tensions.” And after Trump’s appearance at the UN, three US peace organizations—CREDO Action, Win Without War, and MoveOn—condemned his threats and issued an urgent call for action. “We need to stop this slow roll toward a catastrophic war, and work towards defusing the North Korean crisis diplomatically,” they asserted. But there might be light at the end of the tunnel. At some point during the tumultuous week, a reporter asked Trump if negotiations were still an option. “Why not?” he shot back. That’s a good sign, said DeTrani, the former intelligence officer. “Negotiations are the only way out.” Tim Shorrock is a Washington, DC–based journalist and the author of Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing. He is a Korea Policy Institute Associate. #Trump #KimJongUn #SouthKorea #Japanmilitary #MoonJaein #TimShorrock #NorthKorea

By Tim Shorrock | October 10, 2017 Originally published in 38North. Recently declassified information on the responses of the South Korean and US governments to the uprising in the southwestern city of Gwangju in 1980 and North Korea’s reaction to those events underscore two critical lessons that the Trump administration is hopefully learning during the nuclear standoff with Kim Jong Un. First, when it comes to its internal affairs, the DPRK’s animosity to Chinese influence can be intense, and goes back decades. That’s especially important to remember at a time when the Trump administration is trying to persuade China to exert economic, political and even military pressure on Kim to force him to stop his weapons testing and move towards disarmament. And it underscores why so many experts scoff at the idea of outsourcing US policy to China and instead urge direct talks and negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang. Second, as a result of this information, a spotlight is now shining on the Carter administration’s decision in 1980 to support the ROK Army’s decision to end the Gwangju Uprising with troops from the US-South Korean Joint Command. This was a giant setback to US-South Korean relations and stirred up a deep sense of betrayal and anti-Americanism in the South that could easily resurface if the Trump administration is seen by the Korean public as bullying the Moon government into accepting its approach to dealing with the North Korean crisis. ******* On May 28, 1980, American and North Korean military officials met at the Panmunjom Truce Village on the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The timing was propitious: just 24 hours earlier, the ROK Army, with full US approval, had rolled into Gwangju to end the first violent rebellion in South Korea since 1953. Dozens of citizens who had taken up arms against the martial law forces of Lt. General Chun Doo-hwan had been killed in the assault, adding to a death toll of several hundred. Because of the intense press controls imposed by Chun’s martial law command at the time, few in South Korea had any inkling about what had happened. But the North Koreans knew, and they had plenty to say about it, according to a declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) summary of the meeting that was sent to Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and other senior US officials. “Don’t you think it is about time for the US government to reevaluate its aid policy to South Korea?” the North Koreans asked their American counterparts. The United States, they insisted, “should have prohibited” Chun from using troops in Gwangju “so as to prevent needless bloodshed.” Apparently taken aback, one of the US officials asked if they “were aware” of recent comments made by Chinese Prime Minister Hua Guofeng about the situation in South Korea. The initial response is blacked out in the cable, one of several thousand documents I obtained about the US role in Gwangju under the Freedom of Information Act. But the rest of his answer is clear. Talking in “an irritated manner,” the North Korean officer seemed to spit out his words. “Hua can say whatever he likes to say, but it does not matter to us (KN),” he said. “We do not care one iota for his or any other foreigner’s personal opinions about our Republic.” Discussion over. The CIA cable, along with several other documents that analyze North Korean policy and actions in the crucial year of 1980, is now relevant because Gwangju has suddenly been thrust back into South Korean consciousness in a major way. The most popular movie today in South Korea is “A Taxi Driver,” the true story of Jurgen Hinzpeter, the late German photo-journalist who captured the first images of Chun’s attack on the citizens of Gwangju with help from a Seoul taxi driver. The film has been seen by over 12 million people, making it the nation’s 10th most popular film, and got a major boost on August 13 after a public showing for President Moon Jae-in and Edeltraut Brahmstaedt, Hinzpeter’s widow (he died in 2016). It will be South Korea’s nomination for best foreign film at next year’s Oscars and has brought the story of Gwangju to a global audience. With the film’s recounting of the massacre seared into the public’s mind, Moon recently ordered a government investigation into who ordered Chun’s martial law army to shoot protesters in Gwangju. His announcement had been expected since May 18, when the president spoke movingly at the national commemorations of the uprising at Gwangju’s cemetery in the hilly outskirts of the city (I was in the audience as a guest of the city). “The truth of Gwangju is a rage I cannot ignore,” he declared. As he did in his early campaign stops in the city, Moon joined local citizens in singing the “March of the Beloved,” the famous tribute to the fallen democratic fighters of Gwangju. Under the probe he ordered, the Ministry of Defense said this week it will investigate reports that soldiers were ordered to fire on protestors from helicopters and that Chun and the martial law command had readied fighter jets to Gwangju to support their crackdown. The North Korean connection to Gwangju is crucial because, under the conservative administrations of Moon’s predecessors, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, right-wingers have attempted to diminish the uprising’s significance. These groups, and Chun himself, charge that the rebellion was secretly organized by North Korean military officers and was therefore a communist-backed uprising that deserved to be put down with force. This theory is spread by rightist groups who claim to have photographic evidence of North Korean military officers who infiltrated the citizen’s army that fought Chun’s martial law forces (this claim has been debunked by reporters and researchers who have identified the “North Koreans” as locals). Another ludicrous claim is that the Anthem, which is sung with such gusto in Gwangju, is a pro-North Korean tribute to Kim Il Sung (by embracing the song, President Moon has effectively put that one to rest). Even though these smears have largely been debunked, they remain a painful reminder to Gwangju of the divisions that wracked the country in 1980. In this context, the US documents of this period are important—and may even help resolve some of the issues being raised in the government’s investigation of one of the great tragedies of Korean history. One of the more intriguing documents in my FOIA collection is a CIA report about a “secret meeting” chaired by North Korean leader Kim Il Sung at his presidential mansion in Pyongyang on May 19, 1980, the second day of the uprising in Gwangju. Its purpose, according to the CIA, was to discuss “KN actions” in connection with the rebellion—in other words, to debate whether the Korean People’s Army should intervene or not. Unless the CIA had a human source within Kim’s inner circle (unlikely), the intelligence was probably obtained from electronic intercepts. That conclusion is strengthened by notations on the cable showing it was sent by the US Army’s Intelligence and Security Command—which operated many of the National Security Agency’s listening posts around the world—and received by INSCOM’s famous Arlington Hill Station in northern Virginia. At the meeting, which was said to include the “KN Minister of [the] People’s Armed Forces Chin-U and other KN leaders,” Kim and his advisers allegedly decided “not to refrain from invading KS, if the Kwangju riot developed into a nationwide popular revolt.” That is, they would enter the fight if South Korea was engulfed in revolution, but otherwise would remain neutral. “However,” the cable adds, “no unusual, significant activities indicating KN readiness to attack KS have been noted by KS.” These claims would seem to repudiate any notion that the uprising was “organized” by North Korea, as claimed today by Chun and his right-wing allies; but if true, they indicate an intent by the DPRK to intervene later if the Gwangju rebellion turned into a full-fledged insurrection of national proportions (which it decidedly did not). The fact that US officials understood that Gwangju was an indigenous uprising is strengthened by the notes of a high-level meeting held at CIA headquarters on May 23, 1980, and described in a declassified report the agency included in its “CREST” database of intelligence reports brought on line earlier this year. The meeting was chaired by Frank Carlucci, the CIA’s deputy director, and begins with an analysis of North Korean intentions from Richard Lehman, who was famous inside the CIA for developing and delivering daily intelligence briefings to presidents from JFK to Reagan. Undoubtedly aware of the SIGINT (signals intelligence) on Kim Il Sung and his “secret meeting” in Pyongyang, Lehman reminded Carlucci that he had advised CIA in the fall of 1979 that, if the ROK government lost control, “chances are better than even that North Korea will intervene.” But regarding the current situation, he insisted: “there are no signs of anything untoward underway in North Korea” while noting that the CIA is “remaining alert to the situation.” (I cited this document in an interview last April for a South Korean documentary produced by the Seoul Broadcasting System on the North Korean connection). Other cables further repudiate Chun’s claims of North Korean involvement. A Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report dated June 5, 1980, and based on unnamed sources within the South Korean military, made the startling claim that some 2,000 people in the Gwangju area had “secured arms and made their way into the wilds” after the uprising was put down on May 27. While participants in the rebellion have denied any such movement in Gwangju’s nearby mountains, which were heavily patrolled by the ROK Army, they point with pride to the DIA’s observations that “the motivation to go into the hills was not communist inspired,” and that “the rebels…are truly representatives of the people of Cholla Namdo.” Moreover, US military intelligence openly scoffed at Chun’s claims of North Korean involvement. That can be seen in a secret DIA cable (dated June 2, 1980) about an official ROK Ministry of Defense report claiming that a North Korean agent had been captured in Seoul after “agitating demonstrators” in Gwangju. “The data is one-sided and somewhat distorts” the picture, DIA concluded about what it called the “alleged communist infiltration.” The analyst added, somewhat sarcastically: “The ROKG would have it believed that because of these aggitations (sic)…extended ML [martial law] was the will of the people.” It is also notable that the detailed reports sent to Washington from US Ambassador William Gleysteen during and after the uprising mention nothing of North Korean involvement except in the context of US determination to prevent it. A famous cable he sent at the height of the rebellion, for example, states that General John Wickham, the commander of US Forces Korea at the time, had “agreed to a high internal alert status against infiltration.” Wickham, Gleysteen added, might consider additional US forces “if we become increasingly concerned about the potential for North Korean exploitation.” But this was only speculation: the cable also calls the “massive insurrection” in Gwangju an “internal threat” to the Chun group within the ROK military, which he noted “obviously feel threatened by the whole affair.” Gleysteen was well-briefed: the Korea country team he headed with Wickham also included the CIA Station Chief, whose reports (which are heavily redacted) don’t include any references to North Korean involvement in the “insurrection.” As I’ve told audiences in South Korea, the Korean peninsula was, and is, one of the most surveilled spots on earth. If the combination of US SIGINT and human intelligence had picked up any evidence whatsoever of North Korea infiltration into Gwangju or the Cholla area where the rebellion took place, Gleysteen’s team would have made this information immediately known to the US government and most likely made it public. But sadly, despite the lack of North Korean involvement, the Carter administration agreed to support the ROK Army’s decision to end the Gwangju Uprising with troops from the US-South Korean Joint Command. This decision was made for national security reasons at a high-level meeting at the White House on May 22, 1980, one day after the ROK army’s massacre of civilians on May 21 that was captured by Hitzpeter and shown in graphic detail in “A Taxi Driver.” As I reported in my story on the FOIA documents in 1996, the minutes state that, after a full discussion,” there was general agreement that the first priority is the restoration of order in Kwangju by the Korean authorities with the minimum use of force necessary without laying the seeds for wide disorders later.” As we know, the Carter administration’s decision was a giant setback to US-South Korean relations, and stirred up a deep sense of betrayal and anti-Americanism in the South. The new film about Gwangju and the Moon government’s investigation into the massacre and uprising could open the door for greater scrutiny into the US role in South Korea in the crucial year of 1980. That might complicate bilateral relations at a time of severe tension with North Korea, yet could also help heal wounds that in the 1980s came close to tearing the US-South Korean alliance apart. Tim Shorrock is a Washington, DC–based journalist and the author of Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing. He is a Korea Policy Institute Associate. #Gwangju #NorthKorea #SouthKorea #TimShorrock

Jill Stein with Rev. Sounghey Kim in Seongju village By Paul Liem, August 26, 2017 | October 12, 2017 This is the fourth in a series of interviews with the five member U.S. Solidarity Peace Delegation, to South Korea, July 23 – July 28, 2017, of whom delegation coordinator, Juyeon Rhee, was denied entry to South Korea under a travel ban imposed by the Park Geun Hye administration, and remaining in force under the new administration of President Moon Jae In. The delegates met with South Korean peace and labor activists, with Shim Jae Kwon, Chair of the National Assembly Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, and with villagers of Seongju, Gimcheon and Soseongri who are waging a struggle against the deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system in their communities. The delegation was sponsored by the Taskforce to Stop THAAD in Korea and Militarism in Asia and the Pacific and the Channing and Popai Liem Education Foundation, and was hosted in South Korea by the National People’s Action to Stop the Deployment of THAAD in South Korea (NPA), a coalition of 100 civil society organizations. Delegates Medea Benjamin of Code Pink, Reece Chenault of U.S. Labor Against the War, Will Griffin of Veterans for Peace, delegation coordinator Juyeon Rhee, Jill Stein of Green Party USA, have since spear headed an international petition campaign calling upon presidents Moon Jae In and Donald Trump to pull back from the brink of war in Korea, by halting the war games and negotiating a freeze on missile and nuclear weapons testing with North Korea. Following the delegates’ return to the United States, Paul Liem, KPI Board Chairperson, interviewed the delegates about their experiences in Korea and their reflections on how to strengthen solidarity between peace activists there and in the United States.   His interview with Jill Stein follows. ___________________________________________ PL:  Since we don’t often interview presidential candidates, I thought our readers might like to know how you came to be the Green Party candidate in 2016.  How was it that you made your transition from medicine to social justice activism, and eventually to the Green Party and your candidacy? JS: I grew up in the sixties, the era of civil rights, the movement against the war in Vietnam and the women’s movement. I was an activist but not predominantly an activist. I was part of the weekly vigils against the war in Vietnam when I was in high school before it became a major issue embraced by our generation. It made sense to me that the world should run according to justice, not according to who’s most powerful. I’d say that realization was brought home to my generation by Martin Luther King.  King really framed my life as an activist. I became a full-time activist in roughly 2006. At that time, I transitioned from clinical medicine to political medicine, to address the “mother of all illnesses,” our sick political system.  I stopped my clinical practice at that point because activism became a full-time proposition. That is the short story. PL:  Did you go directly into the Green Party at that point or were you doing other things? JS:  While I was still practicing medicine, I became very involved in fighting environmental racism, helping communities shut down polluting incinerators and coal plants. I had been recruited as a doctor who was sympathetic to those issues. I was the go-to doc who would come out to help explain the health impacts of these facilities and the impacts on local communities and broader regional and global impacts of incineration and coal and air pollution and toxic chemicals moving their way up the food chain and so on. I began that work on behalf of communities that were on the frontlines of those struggles. At that point, I began to realize that the power really lay in the community, not in talking to elected officials who are on the payroll of the powers-that-be. I’d say it’s next to impossible to make change through the current system. We could waste ten years working on a bill and the legislators would change one sentence as it was being passed, then there went ten years of work. I began to realize that the real power and the real commitment and the real justice lay in the communities that were struggling.  At that point, I got recruited to run for office for the Green Party. I didn’t go looking for it. I worked my fingers to the bone, as so many of us do, thinking that we can work within the current system. I was part of a campaign finance reform movement here in my home state in Massachusetts. We were successful. We passed public financing for political campaigns. We passed it by a 2-to-1 margin as a referendum. And then the legislature here in my home state of Massachusetts, in all of its wisdom, repealed this referendum that the people had supported for clean politics. It was a Democratic legislature. It could have passed any bill and overridden any veto. They repealed it on a voice vote, no less. That convinced me that if real work was going to get done we would have to do it outside of the political system. That was back in the year 2000. PL:  Of all the candidates in the last election, only the Green Party took the position that the United States should talk to North Korea. Everybody else’s position was that China should talk to North Korea which is still resonating today. How did you get interested in Korean issues and how did you form your views about them? JS:  I started to pay a lot of attention to Korea during the 2016 campaign. It was clearly a hot spot. The whole pivot to Asia was creating a serious question about where U.S. foreign policy was going. A foreign policy dominated by militarism was proving itself, without any qualification, to be an unmitigated disaster in the Middle East. And now we are in the process of pivoting that policy to Asia, a foreign policy based on economic and military domination. Given what a disaster it’s been in the Middle East, now add nuclear weapons to the picture, add China and add Russia, and you have, I think, a microcosm of what’s wrong with U.S. foreign policy. And on the Korean peninsula, our foreign policy is undergoing a reality check. We’re up against the limits of… PL:  [Technical glitch in recording] Please go back a few sentences because I lost you. JS:  The point I was making was that during the campaign, I was forced to develop positions about major issues in U.S. foreign policy and this demanded that our campaign have a clear position on the pivot to Asia. Looking at the Middle East, the problems with a foreign policy based on military domination were catastrophic everywhere that we’ve practiced it starting with Iran, going back to the 1950s. It led to the overthrow and the installation of the Islamic regime in Iran and with all the outfall from that. More recently our practice of regime change in Iraq and in Libya—unbelievable disasters. It’s become clear that regime change is part of the pivot to Asia. There is a real intention to inflict regime change in Asia, with North Korea in the cross-hairs. You can see the regime change playbook being rolled out right now. So it became very important to develop a positive set of solutions during the campaign. The conflict on the Korean peninsula is begging for a solution based on the principles of democracy, justice, and peace. I had the opportunity to meet the Korean Green Party last spring.  It was at the global Greens meeting in Liverpool. It turned out that the U.S. Green Party had been in touch with the Korean Green Party and they had put out joint statements and developed joint policies. It was clear when I met the Korean Greens that the solutions they have for South Korea are those we need right here. All we need to do in the U.S. is allow democracy to take its course. Let’s allow South Korea to guide the U.S. forward on how this should be done. Koreans have been thinking about this for 60 or 70 years. Korea has a very mature and principled approach to how to deal with North Korea. And a lot of that entails the U.S. getting out of the way because we have been fanning the flames of conflict on that peninsula for 70 or so years, ever since the Second World War. PL:  Is the Green Party gaining momentum in South Korean politics? We don’t often hear about the Greens in South Korea. JS:  The Greens are new in South Korea. They were founded in 2014 so they are a very new party. They’re gaining ground, as I understand. They have several candidates. They face the typical issues of an independent third party. It’s difficult to get on the ballot. It’s very expensive. So they’re fighting a steep uphill battle just like we are in the U.S. But they are gaining recognition. I was introduced as a former Green Party presidential candidate during our visit with the villagers in Gimcheon and Seongju. I was astonished at how interested people were in the Green Party presidential campaign and then even more so when the village activists began introducing themselves saying they were already members of the Korean Green Party. The South Koreans have discovered Green Party’s principles of demilitarization, of a nuclear-free world, of conflict resolution based on dialogue, of democracy and sovereignty, and of getting rid of U.S. bases around the world, including in South Korea.  Korea has paid the price for decades for being in the cross-hairs of U.S. militarism. So it’s no surprise that the people of Korea are very much in tune with the Green Party agenda. PL:  The communities in Seongju and Gimcheon were traditionally conservative. How did the villagers make the transition to political activism, calling for the removal of THAAD? JS:  As I understand it, for the villagers, it was a matter of becoming a victim of this system of occupation and militarization, and that it was the movement of the THAAD missile system into their communities that alarmed and alerted people. The people of Seongju and Gimcheon are well aware that that THAAD radar system is provoking China. It is the THAAD radar system which can detect China’s missiles that is believed to be the actual mission of the THAAD anti-missile system. THAAD is not strategically located order to protect Seoul, the major population area. And there are serious questions about the ability of these missiles to find targets under actual battlefield conditions. The villagers are well aware that they are caught in the cross-hairs of North Korea and China and the U.S. by having this radar system in their backyard. They don’t want any part of it. They are not afraid of North Korea. They’ve dealt with North Korea’s leaders for some time. They understand how North Korea has been provoked into taking this, you know, offensive position, because the best defense is an offense. Korea has been threatened with nuclear attack for decades. The U.S. has been rehearsing attacks, nuclear attacks, once or twice a year for decades against North Korea, so it’s no surprise when we have negotiated with North Korea, it has been productive. Had the U.S. not retrenched from its commitments, we might not have the problem that we have right now. But we’ve been threatening attack, we’ve been rehearsing attack. The people of South Korea have a much better understanding of what dialogue has occurred with North Korea. The public here has little understanding of that in this country. We read only inflammatory headlines. Yet those high up in U.S. intelligence are well aware that there have been many opportunities for negotiation. If we would just engage in the freeze-freeze negotiations right now, we could begin to build trust. As South Korea knows there are opportunities for cooperative economic development. There are many ways forward. The people of South Korea need to be setting the pace here and setting the policy. It was so reassuring to see that the people of South Korea are not afraid of North Korea, they are not afraid of China. They’re afraid of Donald Trump, though, and the irrational and hostile things that he might do. We need to allow democracy and justice to guide our way forward here, and that means giving the people of South Korea the sovereignty that they deserve. That is their right. They should be sovereign over South Korea and sovereign in deciding how to proceed in putting an end to this conflict that doesn’t need to be there. PL:  What is the freeze-freeze proposal that you mentioned? JS:  The freeze-freeze proposal calls for the U.S. to freeze the war games in exchange for North Korea freezing its missile and nuclear weapons development. They pause and we pause. There is absolutely nothing to lose here for anyone, particularly for the U.S. We have a huge advantage here in every way imaginable considering that we have thousands of nuclear bombs. North Korea may have 20 or 30, something like that. Freezing things where they are right now and beginning negotiations is a no-lose proposition on both sides. It’s a win-win. At worst we go back to where we were before. But at best we actually then begin to roll back the nuclear crisis which is on a hair-trigger alert right now. I believe it was Senator Lindsey Graham who said if a war is going to happen. it’s going to happen over there. That’s false, there’s no such thing as a limited nuclear war. Nuclear winter comes from all the debris that’s thrown into the atmosphere. It would cause a massive global reduction in food production which will last for years. It’s predicted that this would kill hundreds of millions of people all around the world. It’s essentially the unmaking of civilization as we know it. There’s no way the world will survive the massive consequences of even a limited nuclear exchange. It’s not just the Korean peninsula that’s at risk. What’s going on in Korea is a microcosm of a foreign policy based on economic and military domination at a time when we are no longer unipolar world. Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, was the author of this unipolar view of the world and foresaw a century of American domination. This generated the policies of regime change in the Middle East. Even Brzezinski had moved on from this view before he died recently. He said it was no longer possible to have a world based on U.S. military domination anymore, that we needed to develop a new approach based on collaboration and cooperation. This is what we need to do. PL:  When Obama was elected president, there was a hope that things would change on many fronts, domestic and also foreign affairs. And he did make some overtures that indicated that he would try to bury the hatchet with some of United States’ adversaries. Why did we end up in such a difficult situation with U.S. policy towards Korea where there’s virtually no diplomacy going on back and forth? He was supposedly the president that was going to change that or bring something new to the table. JS:  He did do some good things including negotiating with Iran. But in so many ways Obama did not, I’d say, generally did not, fulfill expectations of a kinder, gentler policy. There was kinder, gentler rhetoric. But beneath the rhetoric we generally moved backwards, even economically in the U.S. in the way the banks got bailed out. Larry Summers the architect of the Wall Street meltdown was reappointed. The recovery was a recovery for Wall Street. And in the realm of foreign policy we went on to expand the wars and we surged into Afghanistan. We brought the troops out of Iraq. But no real peace was made. Obama was the architect of the pivot to Asia. The rhetoric made it seem as if we were going to cool our jets in the Middle East and stand up against the bully China in Asia. This was a very misguided policy. We didn’t make amends in the Middle East. We continued expanding our drone war, ground wars, and we had regime change in Libya. The Middle East under Obama was largely a disaster. The policy towards Korea, towards North Korea, called “strategic patience” was neither strategic nor patient. It essentially continued the squeeze of economic sanctions, isolation and threats. It didn’t go down the pathway of engagement and negotiations. It was a misnamed policy and it was a missed opportunity. To my mind, it has been a bipartisan problem. The Democratic Party, like the Republican Party, is funded by the dollars of the military-industrial complex and they don’t exercise independent policymaking in the world of foreign relations any more than they do in health care where the leading figures in the Democratic Party, the chair of the DNC, as well as Nancy Pelosi and Chuck Schumer, remain fans of health insurance as we know it. They keep putting the brakes on movement towards a Medicare for all policy, even at a time when people are clamoring for it. The opportunity has never been greater. This is the time to move forward and yet the Democrats are not capable of doing the right thing. So what’s going on in Korea is a reality check. It’s an opportunity for people to say, “Hey is this working?” It’s clearly not, even though there’s a solution within arm’s reach if we just do the right thing. PL:   The delegation to Korea was called the Solidarity Peace delegation and the purpose was to build solidarity with the grassroots struggle that is going on in Korea along with the struggles that are going on in the U.S. for social justice. From your interaction with the villagers in Seongju and Gimcheon, what is the key message from the villagers to the peace movement here for working together, trying to achieve common goals? [L-R] Jill Stein, Will Griffin, Reece Chenault, Medea Benjamin and delegation hosts Wolsan Liem and Hosu Kim JS:  I think the villagers were delighted and surprised to see that our goals were their goals, and that we understood their leadership, and that they are taking the lead. We want to support them and help raise their voices so that their voices are heard around the world. My own feeling about the direction we need to go in is very much based on that strategy. It is the human struggle, their rights to democracy, to sovereignty, to justice, to freedom from occupation, to freedom from this missile system that makes them a target. The fact that they are camping out in the streets waiting for the next shipment of THAAD missiles to come in, the fact that the Won Buddhists have set up their tent and are there 24/7—that’s their human rights struggle. The heroism and courage of the villagers standing up to confront the military coming in, that they’ve been unbelievably heroic and courageous in their struggle—that to me is the real engine of the global fight here. The villagers are the face of that struggle. There is a global crisis in the making on the Korean peninsula. It’s going to take a global effort, a global peace movement, I think, to reverse that crisis. This crisis is instructive because if we can establish the ground rules on the Korean peninsula we’ve established ground rules globally, that it is time to end the militarization, that it’s time to end occupation, that it’s time to support local democracy and local sovereignty. It is time also to demilitarize our foreign policies, to shift our resources to supporting human needs, militarism which is half of our budget in the U.S. But it’s the face of the villagers who are compelling. When you put this together with the faces of other human rights struggles for peace, for democracy, for environmental and economic justice and racial justice, that’s when we really get to critical mass, by bringing those local struggles together. The role of the villagers is critical in igniting this new global movement. There’s a global force for war and that’s called Lockheed Martin and the like, the incredible economic powers that are pushing for war all over the world. And it’s the regimes that the U.S. is supporting, dictatorships all over the world that are based on consumption of the U.S. military weapons. That global force for war needs a global counterweight for democracy, human rights, and peace. It is by unifying those struggles that I think we engage the imagination of the public around the world and especially the U.S. public which is riveted right now on the fight against fascism and the fight against racism. Fascism and militarism are two sides of the same coin. Martin Luther King Jr. pointed out that the three evils of militarism, racism, and materialism go hand-in-hand. Looking at fascism and militarism as flip sides of the same monster, it helps people in this country understand that they’re not taking away from the fight against fascism by supporting the peace movement in Korea. This is a crisis that all of us need to weigh in on right now, and for people to understand that this is the same movement as fighting fascism in Charlottesville and throughout the U.S. I think that’s the way we need to go forward, understanding that this is a win-win domestically and a win-win in terms of foreign policy. You cannot separate them. PL:  It’s tremendous that the delegation went there and took this step forward connecting the struggle in Asia and in Korea with struggles here in the United States. On that note I want to ask if there is anything else that we should cover this morning, anything else that you would like to address. JS:  Only that this is not a long term goal. We need to build the common cause between these struggles, share the love and share the fight and understand that we’re one unified community. I was in Flint, Michigan, recently where people are struggling for clean water, for housing and for human rights. So many stepped up to send their good wishes and signed the petition. The same thing in Detroit where similar struggles are going on. Miko Peled, who is one of the leaders of the Palestinian Human Rights Movement, signed the petition. Alice Walker, Cornell West who was in Charlottesville also took time out to sign our petition, understanding that militarism and fascism are one and the same. There are many steps we can take right now to capitalize on this surge of resistance. There is a rising up of these forces for democracy and justice and we can unify the peace movement with that fight as we build solidarity. The moment this becomes a unified human rights struggle, the quicker we get to critical mass and the faster we build a global force for peace to counter the global force for war. The potential for the breakout of nuclear and other wars right now and the potential for fascism are equally devastating threats. PL:  It’s inspiring that these progressive leaders have signed the petition to avert war in Korea especially as they are so involved in the actions that occurring now in the U.S. JS:  Exactly, and I think we need to bring the people of Guam in on this too because they are also in the target-hairs. The more we can bring the hotspots together to say we’re going to be a global force for peace, the more that global force for peace can be exercised in a variety of hotspots around the world.  That includes Asia, South America and the regime change that is about to be practiced against Venezuela, and real peace and human rights in Israel and Palestine. The more we come together as a global force for peace, the stronger we’ll be. PL:  I want to thank you for sharing and spending the time with me this morning and let’s continue the work. JS:  Yes absolutely. ______________________________________ *Dr. Jill Stein was the Green Party’s U.S. presidential candidate in 2016 and 2012 and a co-founder of the Global Climate Convergence for People, Planet and Peace over Profit.  She has helped fight for workers’ rights, to stop environmental racism and injustice, promote green economies and democracy, and is currently working to build support for Green Party candidates who are campaigning for progressive, sustainable solutions that are critical for our future. #GreenParty #SouthKorea #peacetreaty #THAAD #Nuclearweapons #JillStein #FreezeforFreeze #NorthKorea

By Tim Beal | November 2, 2017 Originally published in Zoom in Korea. Japanese Prime Minister’s gamble in calling a snap election to harness anxiety and hysteria over the much-publicized ‘threat from North Korea’ has succeeded, as it was widely predicted. The political achievement is considerable. Only a couple of months back, things were not looking good for Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party. The New York Times described the ‘Abe conundrum’: Mr. Abe’s public approval ratings dipped below 30 percent over the summer as he was dogged by a series of scandals, and opinion polls taken during the campaign found that more voters disapproved of Mr. Abe’s hawkish strategy toward North Korea than approved of it.“There is an Abe conundrum,” Professor Kingston [the director of Asian studies at Temple University in Tokyo] said. “How does a guy who is basically unpopular with voters, whose policies are not particularly popular, who doesn’t get high marks for leadership, and yet he keeps winning in elections?” He had a little bit of luck – a typhoon kept some voters away, and the opposition was fractured– but his winning card was the hysteria over North Korea after the recent tests of the Hwasong-12 missile that overflew Japan. Electors might not have approved of Abe’s North Korea policy or his plans for remilitarization, but it appears that he frightened a sufficient number. The Japanese government and the media made a big fuss over the Hwasong-12 tests of 28 August and 15 September. They were portrayed as a deliberate threat to Japan, and the authorities heightened the hysteria by sending emergency alerts through cellphones and over loudspeakers. Presumed flight path of Hwasong-12 on 28 August 2017 The reality was that the tests were actually about developing a deterrent against the US and the flight over Japan was primarily a matter of geography. If North Korea is to test a long-range missile on a standard (rather than lofted) trajectory that will end up in the unpopulated northern Pacific, then it has to go over Japan. David Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists explained: Yesterday’s launch was the first time North Korea flew a ballistic missile over Japanese territory, although in 1998 and 2009 it launched rockets that overflew Japan on failed attempts to put satellites into orbit. It has gone to some lengths to avoid flying over Japan, by launching its missile tests on highly lofted trajectories so they will land in the Sea of Japan. In addition, it has directed its more recent satellite launches to the south, even though it is preferable to launch to the east—over Japan—since it allows the rocket to gain speed from the rotation of the earth. After its threats of firing Hwasong-12 missiles near Guam, it is interesting that North Korea fired this missile to the east rather than in the direction of Guam, which might have been interpreted as an attack despite the short range. The missile also appears to have flown in a direction that did not pass over highly populated parts of Japan. As the picture shows, it appears that the missile was routed over the Straits of Tsugaru between Honshu and Hokkaido, and the second missile is thought to have done the same. Both were well above Japanese airspace, higher than many satellites, when they passed over Japanese territory. Basically, long range missiles are designed for distant targets, so neither IRBMs such as Hwasong-12 nor ICBMs, such as Hwasong-14, pose any particular danger to Japan. But perceptions count more than reality, and Abe swept to victory and towards a renewed drive for constitutional revision and remilitarization: Reuters: Abe to push reform of Japan’s pacifist constitution after election winWashington Post: Abe retains supermajority in Japan’s election, may push to amend constitutionThe Independent: Japan election results: Shinzo Abe scores major victory for ruling coalition and pledges to reform pacifist constitution And that is bad news – for Japan and for the region. Abe family tree — Kishi Nobusuke, ‘America’s favorite war criminal’ Political dexterity runs in Abe’s family. Politics at the top is his natural habitat: ‘Abe hails from one of Japan’s most famous political dynasties: his father and grandfather both held top jobs.’ Both grandfathers did, in fact, but it is the maternal one, Kishi Nobusuke, that is the one to note. Kishi was one of the architects of Japan’s war against China in the 1930s and 1940s, which led to the Pacific War against the US, various European countries and finally the Soviet Union. He was particularly notorious for his governing of the puppet state of Manchukuo (Manchuria or currently Northeastern provinces of China) where he was known as 昭和の妖怪 (‘the Shōwa era monster/devil’). One of his underlings in Manchukuo was none other than Park Chung-hee, who served in the puppet army hunting down resisters to Japanese rule, Chinese and Korean; one of the latter was Kim Il Sung though their paths did not cross. He was arraigned as a Class A war criminal by the Americans after the war and held for three years. But times changed; friends became enemies, and enemies became friends. The US was in the process of ‘losing China,’ and Kishi’s killing of Chinese was transformed from an outrageous slaughter of gallant allies to a rather prescient act of defending America against the Red Chinese. Kishi became, in Michael Schaller’s words, America’s Favorite War Criminal. Given President Trump’s predilection for golf, it is interesting to note how Kishi used the sport in his political career. He had developed a friendship with pre-war US ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew. When Grew was held under detention after Pearl Harbor, Kishi arranged for him to be allowed out for a round of golf. The favor was reciprocated when Kishi visited the US in 1957 to arrange some funding from the CIA and played golf with President Eisenhower at an otherwise racially-segregated golf club. By that time, Kishi was Prime Minister, a position he owed to a lobby that included amongst its members, former Ambassador Grew. This lobby was instrumental in overturning America’s war aim of creating a deindustrialized, demilitarized Japan in favor of remilitarization and reindustrialization to counter the Soviet Union and China. That is Abe’s pedigree, and that is how he and remilitarization fit in with US strategy to preserve and expand hegemony. However, history can leave unwelcome legacies behind, and one of those, from Abe’s perspective, is Japan’s ‘Peace Constitution,’ in particular its Article Nine: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. Although details of its provenance are disputed, it is generally considered that it was basically drafted by Americans in the staff of General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, or SCAP. Militarism had brought Japan to devastating defeat in 1945 – counting not merely the casualties of the atomic bombs and the fire bombings of Japanese cities but also the millions of soldiers and civilians evicted from liberated colonies (such as Korea)–that the ideals of peace and the renunciation of war had widespread popular support in Japan then as they do now. Not everyone saw it in this light of course–not the Kishi’s and the Abe’s nor the US strategists who wanted to harness Japan’s military potential against the Soviet Union and China. Fortunately for them, god created lawyers, who argued that Article Nine did not really mean what it seemed to mean to the untutored eye. To start with, the ‘land, sea and air forces’ that were ‘never to be maintained’ were renamed; the Japanese Imperial Army and its constituents became the Japanese Self Defense Forces. This process, called ‘reinterpretation,’ alternates with another–constitution revision. In other words, you either change the words or change the meaning of the words, and this has been the dominant trend, because it encounters less opposition. Thus, Abe has maintained for some years that the Constitution does not stop Japan from acquiring nuclear arms. Moreover, he argues, increased military expenditure and military operations overseas are nothing to do with ‘right of belligerency’ forbidden by Article Nine but rather an example of ‘proactive pacifism.’ And that is not a misprint. The New York Times on Abe’s ‘Proactive Pacifism’ The ‘North Korean Threat’ as a facilitator of Japanese remilitarization The much-publicized ‘North Korean threat’ and, in a slightly different way, the ‘Chinese threat’ offer an obvious and, at first sight, seemingly heaven-sent justification for Japanese remilitarization. Even proponents admit that ‘The Japanese public, which remains apprehensive of even minimal use of force, is another constraining factor [to remilitarization].’ These threats in fact are not heaven-sent but, in their different ways, largely constructed to serve the purpose. Both are built on a bedrock of racism. Colonialism/imperialism and racism go hand in hand and feed on each other. We rule over a foreign people, because we believe they are inferior, perhaps even sub-human, and our rule over them proves that we are superior. The Korean peninsula and much of China were part of the Japanese empire, and because the past has not been exorcised in the way it was, to quite an extent, in Germany, these attitudes pollute the present. Japan is not alone in this, and we can see variants around the world, in the US, Britain, and wherever there is a present or past colonial relationship. One important aspect of racism is that it distorts and degrades people’s ability to think rationally and realistically about others. By ascribing irrationality – essentially non-human behavior – to others, it leads to a false, if comforting, perception of the situation. The racist becomes a victim of delusion. It gives rise, for instance, to Donald Trump’s assertion that ‘Rocket Man {Kim Jong Un] is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime.’ You can only believe such nonsense by abandoning rationality and embracing fantasy, something to which it is alleged that Trump is prone. On the elite level, these antagonisms towards North Korea and China are exacerbated by chagrin. A century ago, Japan lorded over both. Now Japan is still, as Gavan McCormack puts it, a client state of the US, but China is economically and militarily larger than Japan and a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Even North Korea, while much smaller and poorer, is an independent state. No foreign generals, American or Chinese, there to give ‘guidance.’ Clearly, China is a competitor to Japan in many ways, and it does possess substantial and growing military power. China could, perhaps, pose a threat to Japan in the future. North Korea is clearly different. It has a population 1/5 of Japan’s and an economy much smaller. And despite Japan’s peace constitution, its military budget in 2016, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, was $47 billion. That is about 13 times that of North Korea if we use State Department figures, and 50 times if we use an estimate quoted in the South Korean National Assembly in 2013. North Korea has not the ability to attack Japan nor reason to do so, and does not appear to ever have threatened it. The danger for Japan is that if the US attacks North Korea, then as the country hosting the main forward US bases in Asia, it will become a target of Korean retaliation. Exactly what that would entail is unknown, but for what it is worth, a recent estimate put the possible numbers of dead in a nuclear attack on Seoul and Tokyo at up to 3.8 million. Mr. Abe seems to think such dangers are worthwhile in his pursuit of remilitarization, but it should be remembered that none of this is inevitable. Japan could have turned to a neutralist path in the 1950s (which is why the CIA channeled funds to Kishi Nobusuke) and back in September 2002 when Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi went to Pyongyang. The resulting Japan- DPRK Pyongyang Declaration promised all sorts of good things, but little has come to pass. It appears that the George W. Bush administration was very concerned that a Tokyo-Pyongyang rapprochement would upend its strategy in East Asia and took steps to prevent peace from breaking out. The Agreed Framework signed by the Clinton administration was scuttled, and pressure was put on the Japanese. The very emotional but highly suspicious issue of abductees still continues to bedevil relations despite further negotiations between Pyongyang and Tokyo; perhaps the matter is too much of a crowd-pleaser for Japanese politicians to resolve it. American hostility to detente between Japan and North Korea–as part of its strategy to contain China and strengthen Japan’s client relationship (‘the US-Japan alliance’)–and the populist advantages to Japanese politicians of inciting anti-North Korean–or perhaps just anti-Korean–feelings together suggest that the pious hopes of Japanese liberals that relations will be normalized will be thwarted for the immediate future at least. The dead end road of Japanese remilitarization Remilitarization is clearly a response to Japan’s client state relationship with the US. The Peace Constitution came about as a result of Japan’s defeat, primarily but not exclusively by the United States. One way to exorcise that defeat and its consequences would be to attempt to return to the status quo ante 1945 and become a ‘normal country’ with the same rights to belligerency as the victor nations (and even Germany). This is understandable, but it is taking the wrong direction.  Militarism wreaked terrible damage on Japan and its neighbors, and it is that which should be recognized and renounced. To be fair, this is difficult in a world suffused with hypocrisy and double standards; why should the defeated do things that the victors do not. When has the United States, to take the leading example, apologized for its history and renounced belligerency? Besides this difficult ethical issue, however, there are practical reasons why Japan should not remilitarize but rather forge a path as a pioneer of a primarily pacifist country where soft power replaces hard power. Firstly, Japanese remilitarization is gestating within the womb of American strategy in East Asia, which focuses primarily, but not exclusively, on the containment and possible dismemberment of China. If the US goes to war against China, most probably through an attack on North Korea, Japan will almost certainly be drawn in. The consequences would be disastrous for Japan and less severe for the US unless there is an all-out nuclear exchange, and if there were victory over China, the benefits would accrue to the US and not Japan. If there were booty, it is unlikely that the US would share it. Secondly, ethical considerations and long-term consequences for humanity aside, military power may make sense for some countries and not others. It makes sense for countries such as North Korea or China that are threatened by far more powerful adversaries, as a deterrent. It also makes sense for the US, which has a global empire to maintain. It does not make much sense for, say the Netherlands or New Zealand, which face no credible enemies, even less so for Britain where it encourages dangerous imperial nostalgia, and it does not make sense for Japan.  Even without a formal US-Japan alliance (the client relationship), the US would not tolerate an attack on Japan by North Korea or China for pragmatic balance of power reasons. The question of ‘military power making sense’ takes place within history; sometimes it makes sense, and at other times it does not. Take Japan for the three quarters of a century after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. At that time, empires were all the rage, and if you didn’t have one you would almost certainly end up as part of somebody else’s. The British had one, as did the French, the Dutch, and the Russians. Germany was trying to get into the act, as was the United States, which introduced a new style of imperialism, partly based on compellence and threat (what is often misleadingly called ‘diplomacy’) but also by ruthless armed force, as in the Philippines. In these circumstances, it made sense for Japan, too, to carve itself out an empire. The Japanese and American empires had two major intersections. The second was at Pearl Harbor in 1941, but that had been preceded by the Taft-Katsura Agreement of 1905, which, in the words of Bruce Cumings, ‘ acknowledged a trade-off between the Philippines and Korea: Japan would not question American rights in its colony and the United States would not challenge Japan’s new protectorate.’ Neither Taft nor Katsura could know that 40 years later the US would own all of Japan and half of Korea. Japan’s annexation of Korea, its puppet rule over Manchuria and its earlier seizure of Taiwan in 1895 all made economic sense. The colonies provided raw materials, closed markets, labor and a place for Japan’s surplus population and something probably unique to Japan whereby parts of the empire became a blueprint for the future: ‘The planners at the South Manchurian Railroad Research Department, for example, called for an ultra-modern economy in the colonies in order to transcend what they saw as the deeply flawed economy of the homeland.’ Those times are over and cannot be recaptured. Contemporary Japan lies between two behemoths – rising China and declining America. There are no great technological impediments to Japan becoming a major military power with the full range of assets, including nuclear weapons and delivery systems. But what could be done with that military might? China is too big and strong; there can be no more seizures of Taiwan or Manchuria. The US encourages Japanese remilitarization, because it is confident that Japan is a tamed beast that can be used against China. But as Palmerston pointed out back in the 19th century, countries do not have permanent friends and enemies, only permanent interests. Japan and the US could fall out, and Japan might desire to exclude the US from Asia as it tried to do in 1941. But that would be a ridiculous dream. In the short term, Japanese remilitarization exacerbates danger in Northeast Asia. It feeds on crisis on the Korean peninsula and the region to provide it with a proclaimed justification. It enhances US intransigence towards North Korea and makes a peaceful settlement less likely. It sees a war in Korea as an opportunity to intervene, thereby breaking free of the constraints against foreign military adventures. But in the long term, remilitarization leads to a dead end, both for Japan and the region. It offers no prospects nor hope for prosperity or security. Retired New Zealand-based academic Tim Beal has written two books and numerous articles on Korean issues and US global policy. He is an Asia-Pacific Journal contributing editor and writes for NK News and Zoom in Korea amongst others. He maintains the website Asian Geopolitics. #Japanmilitary #KoreaJapanRelations

US and South Korean destroyer ships in the western Pacific Ocean, May 2017. (Reuters / Courtesy of the US Navy) By Tim Shorrock | October 29, 2017 Originally published in The Nation.com “There’s battle lines being drawn,” Stephen Stills sang in the 1960s about the war in Vietnam. Today those same words can be applied to the escalating confrontation between the United States and North Korea over the latter’s nuclear-weapons and missile programs. That conflict will be front and center when President Donald Trump pays his first state visits to Japan and South Korea in November. In Japan, where Prime Minister Shinzo Abe—Trump’s closest friend in the region—just won a smashing reelection victory, Trump will be honored with an audience with the country’s aging emperor and his usual golf game with the hawkish Abe. But in Korea, where there is far more ambivalence about Trump’s policies, antiwar groups and unions—many of which backed President Moon Jae-in’s election campaign last spring—are planning major rallies to greet him. As a precursor to what’s to come, South Korean activists this week in the southern port of Pusan handed out leaflets reading “US Troops Go Home!” to US soldiers arriving for another round of military exercises with the South Korean military. They have good reason to be concerned. Listening carefully to the Trump administration and the government of Kim Jong-un over the last week, it’s becoming increasingly clear that the two sides are trying to signal the limits of their policies—and their patience. Nobody is sure whether these statements are a prelude to the diplomacy long promised by Trump’s national-security team, or the opening salvos of what will be a bloody and destructive war if the situation explodes. Trump, who appears to have stopped tweeting about Kim, is leaving the policy pronouncements to H.R. McMaster, his national-security adviser, and Mike Pompeo, his CIA director. Both men have been warning for weeks about the possibility of a risky “preventive” war that would theoretically destroy North Korea’s nuclear and missile capability and—in a strategy known as “decapitation”—take out Kim and his military leadership team in Pyongyang. (As if to underscore that threat, a team from the Navy’s SEAL Team Six, which assassinated Osama bin Laden, was aboard the nuclear submarine USS Michigan as it participated in recent bilateral maritime drills with South Korea.) Last week, in separate appearances before the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, McMaster and Pompeo made clear that Trump’s endgame is the termination of the North’s nuclear program, by any means necessary. Trump “is not going to accept this regime threatening the United States with a nuclear weapon,” McMaster told the organization, which has supplanted the American Enterprise Institute as the spiritual home of the neocons. McMaster also ruled out the suggestion, made by some former US officials, that Trump should accept the North as a nuclear power, like Pakistan and Israel, and build a system of deterrence similar to the containment policies of the Cold War. “Well, accept and deter is unacceptable,” said McMaster, who first gained his fame as a counterinsurgency innovator in Iraq during the Bush “surge” of 2008. “And so, this puts us in a situation where we are in a race to resolve this short of military action.” He repeated his bottom line twice: “The only acceptable objective is denuclearization.” Pompeo signaled that US intelligence has concluded that the North is closer than ever to building a capability to place a nuclear weapon on an ICBM and lob it great distances. “I expect they will be closer in five months than they are today, absent a global effort to push back against them,” he said, adding that “from a US policy perspective, we ought to behave as if we are on the cusp of them achieving that objective.” He also argued that the United States viewed North Korea as a dangerous threat even if its rockets can’t reach the continental United States. “There are enormous US interests in South Korea and Japan and in Asia, as well,” he said, speaking of the vast string of US Navy, Air Force, and Marine bases that ring North Korea. But, in an odd aside for a man threatening war, he added that “Intelligence isn’t perfect, especially in a place like North Korea,” making it possible that the United States could be “off by months or a couple of years in our understanding.” (“Hell of a thing for anyone in this [administration] to be considering a first strike on North Korea while the CIA director notes intel ‘isn’t perfect,’” Ankit Panda, a senior editor at The Diplomat, tweeted in response.) The intense focus by McMaster and Pompeo on military action has led many observers to wonder whether Trump has decided to abandon the negotiations promised since the beginning of the crisis by his top officials at the Pentagon and the State Department, James Mattis and Rex Tillerson. In August, they co-authored a highly unusual op-ed in The Wall Street Journal in which they essentially offered to open negotiations with Kim without preconditions, including the North’s immediate abandonment of nuclear weapons. Talks were possible, they said, if Kim would “signal his desire to negotiate in good faith” by ceasing North Korea’s tests and missile launches for a period of time. However, it’s unclear that such an offer is on the table any longer, even as both Mattis and Tillerson continue to insist that diplomacy is their chosen route. For its part, the North, which has recently taken to calling Trump “mentally deranged,” has rejected the idea of total denuclearization and instead argued that the United States should make the “right choice” by recognizing it as a nuclear state. That would lead to a “way out” of the current standoff, Choe Son-hui, the director-general of the North American department of North Korea’s foreign ministry, told a recent conference in Moscow attended by several Americans. South Korean officials who were there told the Yonhap wire service that Choe stated that the North “will never give up its nuclear weapons as long as the US’ hostile policy, including military activities, sanctions and pressure, continue.” Further details of her speech were broadcast on the Russian-state media outlet RT. “Our weapons are designed for the protection of our homeland from the constant nuclear threat from the US,” Choe said, adding that her government “won’t supply nuclear weapons to third parties, notwithstanding its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).” Moreover, “despite quitting NPT, we are committed to the idea of non-proliferation of our nuclear weapons.” Choe’s emphasis on the United States’ “hostile policy” offers a ray of hope, says Suzanne DiMaggio, a former United Nations official and a senior fellow at New America who spoke on the same Moscow panel as Choe. In a long string of tweets on October 23, DiMaggio wrote that “there is a ‘way out.’ The US needs to abandon its hostile policies” and “[s]top provocative military exercises & nuclear threats.” The United States’ priority, DiMaggio added, should be to get talks underway by first engaging in bilateral “talks about talks,” without preconditions, so both sides can “clarify positions” and “explore what’s possible.” And “while not abandoning denuclearization as [an] end goal,” the United States “should set it aside” because “it’s currently outside realm of possibility.” Instead, she urged that the Trump administration focus on “achievable” goals, such as deterrence and non-proliferation, and then “pursue talks to address” the policies the North considers hostile. While “this would be a longer, arduous discussion,” involving a peace agreement and security guarantees, it’s better than the alternative, she offered. “We are in dangerous territory,” warned DiMaggio, one of a group of former US officials and intelligence officers who met informally with North Korean officials from time to time, in her Twitter analysis. “In Washington policy making circles, talk of kinetic options is increasingly heard,” she continued (kinetic is a term for lethal military operations). “The longer this course persists [or] intensifies, the greater the chances for spiraling into military conflict by design or miscalculation.” Tim Shorrock is a Washington, DC–based journalist and the author of Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing. He is a Korea Policy Institute Associate. #Trump #KimJongUn #DPRK #peacetreaty #Nuclearweapons #TimShorrock #NorthKorea

Nikki Haley, United States ambassador to the United Nations, during an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council at United Nations headquarters, July 5, 2017 in NYC. The US requested an emergency meeting of the Security Council after North Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile earlier this week. (Photo: Drew Angerer/Getty Images) By Andrea Germanos | July 7, 2017 Originally published in Common Dreams. As tensions continue to rise following Pyongyang’s testing of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and subsequent military exercises carried out by the U.S. and South Korea, anti-war voices are calling de-escalation and restraint, with one advocacy group charging Wednesday that “both sides are acting to escalate the crisis” and that only way forward is through diplomacy. Rising tensions were evident on Wednesday as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley addressed the U.N. Security Council. “Time is short. Action is required,” Haley said as she also threatened possible use of “considerable military forces” to address the situation. The London-based Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), however, pointed to the Iran nuclear deal reached in 2015 as evidence that diplomacy can deliver meaningful results. “We condemn the missile test and we urge the DPRK government to put an end to further missile tests. The U.S. military drills are a reminder that both sides are acting to escalate this crisis,” said CND general secretary Kate Hudson. “We call on the international community to strengthen efforts to seek an end to the growing tensions in the region,” she said. Referring to now-collapsed six-party negotiations aimed at Pyongyang’s nuclear disarmament—which involved the U.S., North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China—Hudson said those talks “need to be resumed as a matter of urgency. The Iran nuclear deal shows what can be achieved through engagement and dialogue.” “Russia and China are promoting a joint freeze on North Korean missile tests and further U.S. and South Korean military drills. The British government should support this initiative, which acknowledges the security fears on both side of the conflict,” Hudson added. As Martin Hart-Landsberg, former economics professor and member of the Board of directors of the Korea Policy Institute, wrote last month, “it is important to realize that what is happening is not new.” He wrote: The U.S. began conducting war games with South Korean forces in 1976 and it was not long before those included simulated nuclear attacks against the North, and that was before North Korea had nuclear weapons. In 1994, President Bill Clinton was close to launching a military attack on North Korea with the aim of destroying its nuclear facilities. In 2002, President Bush talked about seizing North Korean ships as part of a blockade of the country, which is an act of war. In 2013, the U.S. conducted war games which involved planning for preemptive attacks on North Korean military targets and “decapitation” of the North Korean leadership and even a first strike nuclear attack. Given that background Christine Ahn, founder and international coordinator of peace group Women Cross DMZ, told Democracy Now! Wednesday that Pyongyang likely conducted the missile test “as a way to advance their capability to defend in the case of any kind of preemptive strike from the United States.” According to Ahn, the North Koreans “want to put the pressure on the United States, on the Trump administration, to say, ‘We need to negotiate some kind of peace settlement,’ because they feel threatened.” Ahn also pointed to the China- and Russia-backed proposal for a missile test and military drill freeze, saying “it originally came from the North Koreans in 2015,” and called it “the most viable proposal that is on the table.” That proposal, she continued, “is the deal that should be seriously considered, but the Trump administration is not accepting it. And, in fact, you know, I think by virtue of not accepting it and not seriously considering it, the only way that Americans can interpret that is to say that we value the exercises more than we value freezing North Korea’s nuclear program. And so I think that this is North Korea’s message to the United States: ‘We want to negotiate, and we’re going to do what we can to defend our sovereignty and our country from any kind of preemptive strike from the Trump administration.'” Ahn also referenced a letter (pdf) sent last week to President Donald Trump by a group of former U.S. government officials which says “we strongly urge your administration to begin discussions with North Korea in the near future ” as it is “a necessary step to establishing communication to avoid a nuclear catastrophe.” They warned: “There is no guarantee diplomacy will work. But there are no good military options.” Haley, meanwhile, told the U.N. Security Council that past efforts to curtail North Korea’s nuclear and long-range missile capabilities had clearly failed and called on the body to support a much stronger U.S.-back resolution she indicated would soon be forthcoming. “The United States is prepared to use the full range of our capabilities to defend ourselves and our allies. One of our capabilities lies with our considerable military forces. We will use them if we must, but we prefer not to have to go in that direction.” She added: “We will not look exclusively at North Korea. We will look at any country that chooses to do business with this outlaw regime. We will not have patience for stalling or talking our way down to a watered down resolution. Yesterday’s ICBM escalation requires an escalated diplomatic and economic response.” Those calling for calm, however, suggest a different path. “To be clear: peaceful alternatives are at hand,” Christine Hong, an associate professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and an executive board member of the Korea Policy Institute, recently wrote. The U.S., says Hart-Landsberg, can “accept North Korean offers of direct negotiations between the two countries, with all issues on the table.” Andrea Germanos is a staff writer for Common Dreams. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 License #KoreanWar #peacetreaty #Nuclearweapons #Sanctions #NorthKorea

Leaders of national peace organizations meet with Rep. John Conyers before delivering petitions to South Korean Embassy. (Photo provided by Christine Ahn) By Christine Ahn | July 6, 2017 Originally published in Foreign Policy in Focus and Common Dreams As the newly elected South Korean President Moon Jae-in meets President Donald Trump for his first White House visit, the South Korean leader should stay focused on his calls for diplomatic, economic, and cultural engagement with Pyongyang. The Trump administration will undoubtedly try to steer Moon in the opposite direction, towards “maximum pressure” on North Korea. However, while the United States may have heavily influenced South Korea’s economy and politics for the last 70 years, including still maintaining wartime operational control over its military, it’s a new day. Not only did Moon win the May 9 election in a landslide victory with the largest margin and greatest number of South Koreans voting in history, he has maintained his enormous popularity with approval ratings at 80 percent. At a forum in Seoul, former U.S. ambassador Kathleen Stevens urged Moon not to mention this when he meets Trump, whose approval ratings stand at 36 percent. Moon swept into office after millions of South Koreans took to the streets and staged candlelight vigils for months to demand the ouster of former President Park Geun-hye, a conservative who was impeached by the National Assembly on charges of corruption. On the even of his election, the progressive Moon told the veteran journalist Tim Shorrock that his election completes the Candlelight Revolution. Unlike other parts of the world, democracy is alive and well in South Korea, and the public are wildly supportive of Moon and his pro-engagement policies. According to a just released South Korean poll, 80 percent of South Koreans want inter-Korean dialogue with North Koreans. While the overwhelming majority of South Korean people and their president may be aligned in this wish, their efforts for reviving the “sunshine policy” — that is, a posture of engagement toward the north — will be hamstrung by Washington’s hardline policy and UN Security Council sanctions. But Moon should be reminded of the international community’s abhorrence of Donald Trump. After all, Trump’s inauguration was welcomed by the historic women’s march, where 5 million women in 673 cities worldwide took to the streets to protest his incoming presidency, in fact the largest protests in U.S. history. From Germany’s Angela Merkel to France’s Emmanuel Macron, Trump has angered many historic U.S. allies. Moon doesn’t have to try to please Washington the way his predecessors have. South Korea is the 11th largest economy in the world and among the top 10 militaries. If South Koreans say they are open to halting joint military exercises with the United States, as was floated last week by Moon Chung-in, a special presidential adviser, Washington should listen. But it’s not just the South Korean people and its leaders that the Trump administration should hear from. According to a May Economist/YouGov poll, 60 percent of Americans, regardless of political affiliation, support direct negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang. On the day of the Moon-Trump summit, nearly a dozen national civic organizations, including Win Without War and Credo, will deliver a petition to Moon signed by more than 100,000 Americans offering strong support for his commitment to diplomacy with North Korea. “President Moon’s commitment to diplomacy and peace is a welcome breath of fresh air, and it is important that he know he has the support of the American people in his efforts,” says Stephen Miles, Director of Win Without War. “Whatever President Trump may tell him in their meetings, President Moon should know the American people want peace.” When the people lead, the leaders will follow. Also this week, a bipartisan group of six prominent former U.S. government officials sent a letter to President Trump urging talks immediately with North Korea. “Pyongyang has shown it can make progress on missile and nuclear technology despite its isolation,” they warned. “Without a diplomatic effort to stop its progress, there is little doubt that it will develop a long-range missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to the United States.” This builds on a letter to Trump signed last month by 64 congressional Democrats urging direct talks with North Korea to avert an “unimaginable conflict.” The letter was co-led by John Conyers, the last Democrat who served in the Korean War. “As someone who has watched this conflict evolve since I was sent to Korea as a young Army Lieutenant,” Conyers said, “it is a reckless, inexperienced move to threaten military action that could end in devastation instead of pursuing vigorous diplomacy.” The American and South Korean people want peace. Hopefully an outcome of the Moon-Trump summit will be that diplomacy prevails, not war. Christine Ahn is a KPI Advisor and a founder of the the National Campaign to End the Korean War.  Ahn is the Executive Director of Women Cross DMZ, a movement of women globally walking to end the Korean War, reunite families, and ensure women’s leadership in the peacebuilding process. #SouthKorea #peacetreaty #THAAD #ChristineAhn #MoonJaein #Armistice

By Martin Hart-Landsberg | June 4, 2017 Originally published in Reports from the Economic Front US-North Korean relations remain very tense, although the threat of a new Korean War has thankfully receded.  Still the US government remains determined to tighten economic sanctions on North Korea and continues to plan for a military strike aimed at destroying the country’s nuclear infrastructure.  And the North for its part has made it clear that it would respond to any attack with its own strikes against US bases in the region and even the US itself. This is not good, but it is important to realize that what is happening is not new.  The US began conducting war games with South Korean forces in 1976 and it was not long before those included simulated nuclear attacks against the North, and that was before North Korea had nuclear weapons.  In 1994, President Bill Clinton was close to launching a military attack on North Korea with the aim of destroying its nuclear facilities.  In 2002, President Bush talked about seizing North Korean ships as part of a blockade of the country, which is an act of war.  In 2013, the US conducted war games which involved planning for preemptive attacks on North Korean military targets and “decapitation” of the North Korean leadership and even a first strike nuclear attack. I don’t think we are on the verge of a new Korean war, but the cycle of belligerency and threat making on both sides is intensifying.  And it is always possible that a miscalculation could in fact trigger a new war, with devastating consequences. The threat of war, perhaps a nuclear war, is nothing to play around with.  But – and this is important — even if a new war is averted, the ongoing embargo against North Korea and continual threats of war are themselves costly: they promote/legitimatize greater military spending and militarization more generally, at the expense of needed social programs, in Japan, China, the US, and the two Koreas.  They also create a situation that compromises democratic possibilities in both South and North Korea and worsen already difficult economic conditions in North Korea. There is a choice for peace We doesn’t have to go down this road—we have another option—but it is one that the US government is unwilling to consider, much less discuss.  That option is for the US to accept North Korean offers of direct negotiations between the two countries, with all issues on the table. The US government and media dismiss this option as out of hand—we are told that (1) the North is a hermit kingdom and seeks only isolation, (2) the country is ruled by crazy people hell bent on war, and (3) the North Korean leadership cannot be trusted to follow through on its promises.  But none of this is true. First: if being a hermit kingdom means never wanting to negotiate, then North Korea is not a hermit kingdom. North Korea has been asking for direct talks with the United States since the early 1990s.  The reason is simple: this is when the USSR ended and Russia and the former Soviet bloc countries in central Europe moved to adopt capitalism.  The North was dependent on trade with these countries and their reorientation left the North Korean economy isolated and in crisis. The North Korean leadership decided that they had to break out of this isolation and connect the North Korean economy to the global economy, and this required normalization of relations with the United States.  Since then, they have repeatedly asked for unconditional direct talks with the US in hopes of securing an end to the Korean War and a peace treaty as a first step towards their desired normalization of relations, but have been repeatedly rebuffed.  The US has always put preconditions on those talks, preconditions that always change whenever the North has taken steps to meet them. The North has also tried to join the IMF and WB, but the US and Japan have blocked their membership. The North has also tried to set up free trade zones to attract foreign investment, but the US and Japan have worked to block that investment. So, it is not the North that is refusing to talk or broaden its engagement with the global economy; it is the US that seeks to keep North Korea isolated. Second: the media portray North Korea as pursuing an out of control militarism that is the main cause of the current dangerous situation.  But it is important to recognize that South Korea has outspent North Korea on military spending every year since 1976.  International agencies currently estimate that North Korean annual military spending is $4 billion while South Korean annual military spending is $40 billion.  And then we have to add the US military build-up. North Korea does spend a high percentage of its budget on the military, but that is because it has no reliable military ally and a weak economy.  However, it has largely responded to South Korean and US militarism and threats, not driven them.  As for the development of a nuclear weapons program: it was the US that brought nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula.  It did so in 1958 in violation of the Korean War armistice and threatened North Korea with nuclear attack years before the North even sought to develop nuclear weapons. Third: North Korea has been a more reliable negotiating partner than the US. Here we have to take up the nuclear issue more directly.  The North has tested a nuclear weapon 5 times: 2006, 2009, 2013, and twice in 2016. Critically, North Korean tests have largely been conducted in an effort to pull the US into negotiations or fulfill past promises.  And the country has made numerous offers to halt its testing and even freeze its nuclear weapons program if only the US would agree to talks. North Korea was first accused of developing nuclear weapons in early 1990s.  Its leadership refused to confirm or deny that the country had succeeded in manufacturing nuclear weapons but said that it would open up its facilities for inspection if the US would enter talks to normalize relations.  As noted above, the North was desperate, in the wake of the collapse of the USSR, to draw the US into negotiations.  In other words, it was ready to end the hostilities between the two countries. The US government refused talks and began to mobilize for a strike on North Korean nuclear facilities.  A war was averted only because Jimmy Carter, against the wishes of the Clinton administration, went to the North, met Kim Il Sung, and negotiated an agreement that froze the North Korean nuclear program. The North Korean government agreed to end their country’s nuclear weapons program in exchange for aid and normalization.  And from 1994 to 2002 the North froze its plutonium program and had all nuclear fuel observed by international inspectors to assure the US that it was not engaged in making any nuclear weapons.   Unfortunately, the US did not live up to its side of the bargain; it did not deliver the aid it promised or take meaningful steps towards normalization. In 2001 President Bush declared North Korea to be part of the axis of evil and the following year unilaterally canceled the agreement.  In response, the North restarted its nuclear program. In 2003, the Chinese government, worried about growing tensions between the US and North Korea, convened multiparty talks to bring the two countries back to negotiations.  Finally, in 2005, under Chinese pressure, the US agreed to a new agreement, in which each North Korean step towards ending its weapons program would be matched by a new US step towards ending the embargo and normalizing relations.  But exactly one day after signing the agreement, the US asserted, without evidence, that North Korea was engaged in a program of counterfeiting US dollars and tightened its sanctions policy against North Korea. The North Korean response was to test its first nuclear bomb in 2006.  And shortly afterwards, the US agreed to drop its counterfeiting charge and comply with the agreement it had previously signed. In 2007 North Korea shut down its nuclear program and even began dismantling its nuclear facilities—but the US again didn’t follow through on the terms of the agreement, falling behind on its promised aid and sanction reductions.  In fact, the US kept escalating its demands on North Korea, calling for an end to North Korea’s missile program and improvement in human rights in addition to the agreed upon steps to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  And so, frustrated, North Korea tested another nuclear weapon in 2009. And the US responded by tightening sanctions. In 2012 the North launched two satellites.  The first failed, the second succeeded.  Before each launch the US threatened to go to the UN and secure new sanctions on North Korea.  But the North asserted its right to launch satellites and went ahead.  After the December 2012 launch, the UN agreed to further sanctions and the North responded with its third nuclear test in 2013. This period marks a major change in North Korean policy. The North now changed its public stance: it declared itself a nuclear state—and announced that it was no longer willing to give up its nuclear weapons.  However, the North Korean government made clear that it would freeze its nuclear weapons program if the US would cancel its future war games.  The US refused and its March 2013 war games included practice runs of nuclear equipped bombers and planning for occupying North Korea.  The North has therefore continued to test and develop its nuclear weapons capability. Here is the point: whenever the US shows willingness to negotiate, the North responds.  And when agreements are signed, it is the US that has abandoned them.  The North has pushed forward with its nuclear weapons program largely in an attempt to force the US to seriously engage with the North because it believes that this program is its only bargaining chip.  And it is desperate to end the US embargo on its economy. We lost the opportunity to negotiate with a non-nuclear North Korea when we cut off negotiations in 2001, before the country had a nuclear arsenal. Things have changed.  Now, the most we can reasonably expect is an agreement that freezes that arsenal.  However, if relations between the two countries truly improve it may well be possible to achieve a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula, an outcome both countries profess to seek. New possibilities and our responsibilities So, why does US refuse direct negotiations and risk war?  The most logical reason is that there are powerful forces opposing them.  Sadly, the tension is useful to the US military industrial complex, which needs enemies to support the ongoing build-up of the military budget.  The tension also allows the US military to maintain troops on the Asian mainland and forces in Japan.  It also helps to isolate China and boost right-wing political tendencies in Japan and South Korea.  And now, after decades of demonizing North Korea, it is difficult for the US political establishment to change course. However, the outcome of the recent presidential election in South Korea might open possibilities to force a change in US policy. Moon Jae-in, the winner, has repudiated the hard-line policies of his impeached predecessor Park Guen-Hye, and declared his commitment to re-engage with the North.  The US government was not happy about his victory, but it cannot easily ignore Moon’s call for a change in South Korean policy towards North Korea, especially since US actions against the North are usually presented as necessary to protect South Korea. Thus, if Moon follows through on his promises, the US may well be forced to moderate its own policy towards the North. What is clear is that we in the US have a responsibility to become better educated about US policy towards both Koreas, to support popular movements in South Korea that seek peaceful relations with North Korea and progress towards reunification, and to work for a US policy that promotes the demilitarization and normalization of US-North Korean relations. Martin Hart-Landsberg is Professor Emeritus of Economics at Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Oregon; Adjunct Researcher at the Institute for Social Sciences, Gyeongsang National University, South Korea; and Adjunct Professor at Simon Fraser University, Canada. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Korea Policy Institute and the steering committee of the Alliance of Scholars Concerned About Korea, a co-editor of Critical Asian Studies, and has served as consultant for the Korea program of the American Friends Service Committee. #KoreaPeace #MartinHartLandsberg #DPRK #KoreanWar #Nuclearweapons #Armistice #NorthKorea