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Challenges of Modernization and Governance in South Korea: The Sinking of the Sewol and Its Causes. Edited by Jae-Jung Suh and Mikyoung Kim. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Review by Haeyoung Kim | December 28, 2017 South Korean President Moon Jae-in won in a landslide election last spring after millions of people took to the streets to call for the resignation of former President Park Geun-hye. The months-long candlelight rallies that lead to President Park’s impeachment and ushered in a liberal Democratic Party leader to head the state were protests to oust not just a president, but also a dysfunctional political and economic system with a callous disregard for the health and safety of its citizenry. What remains to be seen is whether this young administration will meet the demands voiced by the candlelight revolution and develop policy reforms that will radically restructure the political and economic landscape of South Korea. As the new Moon administration continues to formulate its domestic and foreign policy strategies, the important collection of essays in the edited volume Challenges of Modernization and Governance in South Korea: The Sinking of the Sewol and Its Causes come at an opportune time. The book provides the sorely needed analysis to make sense of the tragic Sewol Ferry disaster that took place on April 16, 2014, when the passenger ship capsized and killed 304 of the 476 on board. Of the victims, 250 were high school students. Adding to the horrific death toll was the disorganized and incompetent response by government officials and public authorities, and the endemic corruption and reckless greed revealed in the aftermath. The contributing authors to this volume engage with the ongoing dialogue on the structural challenges of the modern political and economic system in South Korea, which the sinking of the Sewol laid bare. Beginning with a February 2015 roundtable discussion held at the International Studies Association conference held in New Orleans, this edited volume represents a cumulative effort to bring attention to the assorted conditions that enabled the Sewol Ferry to sink and provoked the nationwide crisis. In so doing, the contributing authors present varied framings that critically question and pointedly analyze the nature of South Korea’s compressed modernization and the concomitant maladies endemic to its system. What emerges from this book is a note of caution, urging readers in general and South Koreans in particular to deeply consider the tremendous implications of disregarding or dismissing the hazardous societal consequences to unbridled economic growth. The volume opens with an introductory chapter by one of the editors, Jae-Jung Suh. While situating each chapter in context, Suh also offers weighty reflections on South Korea’s compressed process of modernization, subsequent neoliberalization, and their attendant complications. He concludes that the national crisis incited by the Sewol disaster exposed the tensions inherent to South Korea’s rapid economic and political development, where a singular focus on generating economic growth imposed vulnerabilities upon South Korean society while also precluding a national self-reflexivity. The introduction presents an essential theoretical backdrop to help locate how each chapter contends with the distorted and disproportionate development of Korea’s compressed modernization. Each chapter focuses on a different aspect of this national crisis, while all address how the national crisis impacted the South Korean national psyche and body politic. The contributions by Yoonkyung Lee (Chapter 2) and Su-Dol Kang (Chapter 3) investigate the Sewol crisis by addressing the social impact of South Korea’s neoliberal structural reforms. Lee considers the Sewol crisis not as an incompatible or random anomaly in South Korea’s modern history, but as a predictable byproduct of South Korea’s neoliberal deregulation and the state’s collusion with private enterprise. Examining public safety hazards caused by neoliberal policies and the extraction of the state from the provisioning of public safety regulations and oversight, Lee argues that the Sewol disaster is inextricably linked to South Korea’s neoliberal turn, which led to an increasing prioritization of private profits over public safety. Lee cites the deregulation of the shipping industry initiated by South Korea’s neoliberal transformation as the first failed line of defense that led to the Sewol accident. Beginning in the early 90s during the Kim Young-sam administration and gaining relentless traction with South Korea’s subsequent presidencies, the neoliberal drive for economic and political liberalization led to ordinances in the shipping industry that extended the age limit of passenger ships from 20 years to 30, relaxed guidelines concerning inspections, extended freight loading and freight limits, and modified the legal obligations of shippers if involved in an accident. As noted by Lee, the neoliberal relaxing of regulations is what allowed for a decrepit, overloaded, and structurally unstable ferry to depart from port. Further, decades of neoliberal policy shifts led to an increased privatization of rescue missions from public institutions to private companies. During the Sewol accident, the private company Undine Marine Industries was contracted to have exclusive rescue mission rights, prohibiting other vessels and lifesaving units that were at the ready from assisting in the rescue operation. Market forces and business profit interests, according to Lee, overrode public safety, and the lives of innocent victims served as collateral damage. The flexible neoliberal labor market added to the catastrophe by allowing businesses, including the shipping industry, to treat labor as disposable and replaceable commodities rather than human capital in need of long-term investment. Shipping companies have sought to increase their bottom line by replacing regular employees with less-than-adequately trained temporary non-regular workers who earn roughly half that of a regular worker and are denied basic benefits. On April 16, the day of the Sewol accident, nearly half of the crew operating the Sewol ferry consisted of non-regular contracted workers, including the captain. In an industry where safety is an essential part of daily operations, the negligence toward safety education undoubtedly created a perilous public safety hazard as employees were inadequately trained and lacked incentives to be wholly committed to work-related obligations. Indeed, while Lee recognizes the captain and crew’s moral failings as they neglected basic professional obligations, abandoned ship, and deserted the passengers, the author nonetheless argues that their misconduct must be viewed in the context of their contingent labor status. Su-Dol Kang (Chapter 3) considers the Sewol disaster through the lens of addictive organization theory to reveal the structural dysfunctions of Korean society that have accumulated in the last 50 years in a drive for and addiction to economic growth. Addictive organizations, according to Kang, are those that exhibit behavioral traits similar to those of an addict, including denying, lying, controlling, manipulating, and forgetting. Kang argues that every aspect of contemporary South Korean society lays victim to an addictive system, leading to institutionalized social irresponsibility and tragic accidents like the Sewol disaster. In direct conversation with Lee’s claim of the predictability of the Sewol disaster in Chapter 2, Kang notes that disasters like the Sewol accident are bound to happen given South Korea’s addictive system. Kang catalogs a litany of actions and behaviors that reflect South Korea’s unhealthy addictive society. For instance, prior to the accident, the government lifted shipping industry safety regulations that interfered with profit-maximization, the Sewol routinely underwent inadequate safety checks, and reports of crewmember emergency training were overstated. In the aftermath of the Sewol sinking, the maritime police lied to the press about the size of the rescue operation, the press released false reports about the number of passengers rescued, and authorities interfered with the accurate disclosure of information. Instructed by their superiors at Chonghaejin, the company that owned the Sewol, staff even manipulated the Sewol cargo book after the fact, concealing the ferry’s overloading out of concern that insurance money could not be collected if overloading were identified to be the cause. Kang also argues that addictive systems shift blame during times of emergency, noting that Chonghaejin staff and executives held the captain and crew culpable while the government strove to quickly settle the case and quiet dissenting voices to evade responsibility. The courts eventually convicted the Sewol captain, the ship’s chief engineer, and charged the 13 surviving crewmembers of various charges. Kang argues that these judicial decisions serve to merely misdirect attention from larger systemic societal dysfunctions and are inadequate in uncovering the truth or reaching justice. The following three chapters focus on South Korea’s governance structure and role played by the state in South Korea’s neoliberal shift. In Chapter 4, Taehyun Nam argues that the Sewol disaster brought into stark relief the deficiencies in South Korea’s democracy. Nam examines the attitudes and behaviors exhibited by political elites during and after the crisis, and the structural shortcomings in South Korea’s democratic consolidation. President Park and her administration remained silent or routinely misled the public throughout the disaster, revealing the administration’s attitude on democratic principles like accountability and transparency. After the ferry capsized, the government strove to create the impression of a large and orderly rescue operation, egregiously inflating the number of rescuers, helicopters, and vessels engaged in the mission. Further, a governmental body in charge of press and mass communication reportedly created a team to monitor and filter press coverage of the Sewol disaster in order to minimize reports about the government’s mishandling and responsibility. What followed were highly curated reports and a series of theatrical public performances. For instance, Nam makes note of a staged event at a memorial hall in Ansan, the home city of the high school student victims. The televised report presented President Park embracing a solemn-faced elderly woman, who turned out to be unrelated to any victim but someone recruited by presidential aides. Victim family members, rather, shouted at the President in anger and frustration upon her arrival. Another media stunt included an officer who was ordered to wear a diving suit and was subsequently sprayed with water before a media interview. The government not only censored or sensationalized media reporting, but also repressed civilian critics, threatening the most basic civil liberty of free speech. For instance, the government targeted a schoolteacher who posted online criticism and also artists that illustrated caricatures of the president and her administration. To criticize President Park or her administration was deemed to be a condemnation of the Korean nation, and administration subordinates went so far as to launch a political campaign to protect the president’s reputation. President Park and her administration, according to Nam, repeatedly exhibited attitudes that bore close resemblance to feudal masters, rather than officials elected to serve their constituents in a modern democratic republic. South Korea’s political system grants the president unbridled political authority, and the author argues that the high concentration of power afforded the president is the most considerable defect to South Korea’s democratic consolidation. Also speaking squarely to Yoonkyung Lee’s analysis in Chapter 2, Jong-sung You and Youn Min Park challenge the notion that neoliberal reforms and various forms of deregulation caused the Sewol accident in Chapter 5. While they recognize Korea’s neoliberalization to have significantly contributed to the tragedy, they instead argue that the Sewol crisis is better explained by understanding how the pre-neoliberal government and regulatory agencies were entangled in an institutionalized web of regulatory capture – a system where regulatory agencies lose autonomy and serve private regulated industry rather than public interests. The government and regulatory agencies, the authors argue, were willfully negligent and unable to establish and enforce effective regulations because they were guided by industry lobby interests as a result of being captured by the ferry industry and the private owner of the Sewol ferry. As a result, regulatory safety checks were fatally violated over the course of the Sewol’s operation. The authors also determine regulatory capture to be a legacy of state-corporatist arrangements rather than a phenomenon initiated by neoliberal reforms. Introduced during the Park Chung-hee era, collusive relationships between public bureaucrats and private businesses became deeply embedded in every industry. The Sewol tragedy, the authors outline, reveals the long-standing history of institutional appropriation, pointing specifically to parachute appointments and corporatist business associations. The corrupt and collusive practices of public authorities and private industries date back to South Korea’s authoritarian periods, and the legacies of state corporatism played a significant role in institutionalizing regulatory capture in South Korea. In Chapter 6, Kyung-Sin Park examines the relationship between paternalism and mass disasters. According to Park, independent thinking and autonomous action have been suppressed in South Korea, with an authoritarian culture that paralyzes self-directed thought. Laws that criminalize whistleblowing have been vigorously enforced, indisposing individuals to express government dissent or speak freely about corruption. News broadcasters receive heavy-handed pressure from South Korea’s content regulation authorities, leading to unreliable and inaccurate reporting. The result, Park argues, is a disaster-prone system and a blindsided body politic. Park also points to the hierarchical social norms that dictated behavior on the day of the accident. The passengers fatally deferred to the “Stay Still” order announced by the captain and crew, who failed to issue an “Abandon Ship” message because their superiors had not instructed them to do so. While the author identifies incompetence and immorality to be the ultimate cause of the disaster, Park also suggests that there were a series of missed opportunities to exercise independent judgment and restore normalcy. Rather, a habitual adherence to conform to a social hierarchy led to a disastrous paralysis. Chapters 7 through 9 address the ways in which individuals have negotiated and positioned their place in relation to the neoliberal state after the Sewol disaster. Seungsook Moon (Chapter 7) considers education and disciplinary structures in South Korean high schools and the resultant normative subjectivities that are molded. Moon outlines the incongruity between outlined goals of high-school education and the lived experience of daily schooling. While purportedly fostering notions of democracy, human rights, and self-realization, Moon demonstrates that school days are narrowly focused on college entrance. Also, the excessive preoccupation with being admitted to a prestigious university often leads families to dedicate a significant percentage of their household incomes to subsidize commercial cram schools and private tutors. Moon notes that lower-class families also mobilize resources, however limited, to invest in their children’s education, harboring the hope for upward mobility through education. After visiting Danwon High School located in the provincial city of Ansan, a predominately working-class area in Kyonggi Province, Moon notes that the families of the students who drowned during the Sewol disaster also exhibited this aspirational behavior. The Primary, Middle, and High School Education Ordinance Reform of 2011 instituted dramatic changes to student life. Prior to the reforms, South Korean high schools exhibited militaristic practices to control and guide the daily lives of students, including corporal punishment. School authorities also regulated student appearance and behavior, enforcing meticulous restrictions on hair length and style, clothes, and shoes. The author also notes that basic civil rights were often denied to students; many schools limited student leadership roles to high academic achievers, prohibited participation in extracurricular associations, restricted involvement in political activities, and would threaten expulsion for producing, reading, or circulating “unwholesome” texts. School rules and bodily discipline, the author argues, serve to produce docile, compliant, and useful individuals in the social system. Further, this regulatory mechanism over the body, in turn, produces a conformity to and internalization and acceptance of authority. While the reforms of 2011 improved the human rights of students, the author notes that the form of disciplinary power merely shifted from a physical and brutal one to a more polite Foucauldian pastoral power that governs and guides student conduct and continues to produce docile and compliant subjects.  Moon closes the chapter by reminding the reader that the students who survived the Sewol tragedy were those that disobeyed directives offered by authorities. In Chapter 8, Hyunok Lee considers the relationship between the state and citizenship by examining how a Vietnamese family affected by the Sewol disaster navigated various political, economic, and cultural boundaries of belonging. Tracing the lived experiences of a Sewol victim’s Vietnamese family members that traveled to South Korea after being notified of the sinking, Lee demonstrates how the Sewol disaster revealed South Korea’s social stratification to be organized by socioeconomic difference and citizenship. Denied equal access to pertinent information, excluded from decision-making processes, and provided differential services and protections, the post-disaster situation exposed the precarious and marginal positionality of naturalized citizens and foreigners in South Korea. Lee also shows that the Sewol disaster exposed the vulnerability of the global household as an economic unit. The Vietnam-born Sewol victim immigrated to South Korea in 2006 and married a Korean – a union enabling two low-income households in Vietnam and Korea to collectively navigate the global political economy. The international marriage functioned as a survival strategy, allowing for the reproduction of South Korean citizenry while improving the livelihood of the extended family in Vietnam receiving remittances. The Sewol disaster disrupted this economically and emotionally linked transnational family, and revealed their disenfranchisement from the two countries they straddled. Hyeon Jung Lee chronicles how the bereaved families transformed from passive citizens to resistant subjects in Chapter 9. Outraged by government actions and attitudes after the accident, families began to realize that the state and its officials placed their own interests above those they were elected to serve. Victim families recount the endless stream of lies discharged by government officials about the rescue mission, obfuscating details about the state of affairs and making misleading claims about the families being gold-diggers or pro-North Korean leftists. Victim family members chose to take collective political action by staging sit-in protests, developing a political voice, and standing at the vanguard of the movement to expose the ineptitude of President Park and her administration. Families were also reportedly consumed by profound guilt and regret after the accident, feeling that they too were complicit in the deaths of their children. Through their traumatic losses, victim parents came to the painful self-reflexive conclusion that their all-consuming preoccupation with materialism and accumulating wealth served to reinforce the corrupt and faulty system that robbed them of their children. Their sharp critique of society and themselves have formed the basis of their enduring struggles to fight against the state and a corrupt system based on greed and lies. The volume closes with an incisive epilogue by John Lie, who sketches out the critical contours of each chapter while also asking what the sinking of the Sewol may portend for South Korea. Lie contends that the Sewol crisis, while bringing to light the various long-standing political, economic, and social issues that have eroded the country, was a distinctive rupture in South Korea’s contemporary moment. What comes of this shift in collective consciousness, according to Lie, remains to be seen. Yet, the author forewarns that the sinking of the ferry may foretell the sinking of South Korea, and asks who will come to its rescue. As the above summaries show, each piece in this edited compilation seeks to understand the causes and conditions that led to the Sewol Ferry disaster and the unremitting displays of incompetence and misconduct in the wake of the ferry’s sinking. The volume as a whole shows that the sinking of the Sewol exposed the country’s social and structural ills that have been generated and overlooked through South Korea’s process of modernization. While individual chapters trace how particular socioeconomic or political dysfunctions are not specific to the contemporary period but also linked to South Korea’s earlier authoritarian regimes, the authors could have further contextualized and historicized some of these conditions that may have genealogies that date further back. For instance, South Korea’s compressed development, state corporatism, and state-big business collaborative relations indeed have historical ties to the Japanese colonial period, as South Korea inherited Japan’s model of industrialization. Also, coercive colonial education policies aimed at molding pliable colonial subjects provided a framework for South Korea’s educational system. Finally, what does it mean for the modern South Korean president to act like a monarch or political elites to behave like feudal masters in the context of Korean history? A closer historical examination may reveal just how deeply rooted some of these conditions are. The book provides an urgent warning, underscoring the unsustainability of the current economic and political system, but the reader is left to wonder how South Korea can correct the societal ills outlined in the chapters and actualize the policy proposals presented by some of the authors. Kang, for instance, offers a set of prescriptions to revive the health of South Korean society through instituting a systemic overhaul to begin a process of healing. Like an individual recovering from addiction, the addictive society is called to admit to having a problem and stop engaging with the addictive substance, or in this case processes. Also, Nam suggests that South Korea make significant structural changes to South Korean democracy by amending its constitution to strengthen the legislature and creating a parliamentary system to limit the power of the president. Taking these measures would undoubtedly lead to addiction recovery or better governance, but how do we begin overturning this historically rooted and deeply embedded structure, particularly when political and economic elites are so invested in maintaining the status quo? Perhaps providing actionable policy prescriptions that counter the structural dysfunctions addressed by the authors is beyond the scope of this volume. Indeed, the intent of the volume to make sense of the Sewol Ferry disaster in light of specific socioeconomic conditions in South Korea is in of itself a commendable undertaking. Overall, this compilation is a tremendous contribution to our understanding of the causes and conditions that led to the unconscionable Sewol Ferry disaster. Each chapter, providing incisive and nuanced commentary on the topics involved, may well be read individually as a specialized discussion. The structural organization of the volume as a whole makes the book compulsory reading for the student, community advocate, and policy practitioner interested in understanding South Korea’s modern condition and pursuing alternative visions for a more holistic future. Dedicated to the memory of the Sewol victims and their families, let us hope the conversations contained in this text will impact the policy direction of the new Moon administration and also guide the collective consciousness of South Korea such that the deaths were not in vain. Haeyoung Kim is on the Board of the Korea Policy Institute, and a PhD candidate at the University of Chicago. #MoonJaein #parkgeunhye #Sewol #SouthKorea

(Spencer Platt/Getty Images) Trump’s incompetence and posturing threaten US credibility, with potentially dire consequences. By Tim Beal | December 21, 2017 “Back home, we have a saying: The dog barks, but the caravan continues,” Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho told reporters in New York on Wednesday when he was asked about Mr. Trump’s comment. “If he thought he could scare us with the noise of a dog barking, well, he should be daydreaming.”  Mr. Ri arrived in New York on Wednesday to attend the United Nations General Assembly, where Mr. Trump gave a speech on Tuesday in which he called North Korea a “band of criminals” and its leader, Kim Jong-un, a “Rocket Man” on “a suicide mission.” “The United States has great strength and patience, but if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea,” Mr. Trump said. When asked about Mr. Trump’s Rocket Man comment, Mr. Ri said: “I am sorry for his aides.” Sang-Hun Choe, New York Times, 21 September 2017[1] Oh, The grand old Duke of York, He had ten thousand men; He marched them up to the top of the hill, And he marched them down again. English nursery rhyme[2] “In my position, it is somewhat important that I should not say any foolish things.” Abraham Lincoln, 18 November 1863[3] What happens when you replace the president with a clown? Eugene Robinson, The Washington Post, 13 November 2017[4] The Clown, the Rock, and Geopolitical Struggle North Korea may well be the rock on which the Trump administration, enfeebled and destabilised at home by Russiagate, shatters. Any geopolitical situation presents an interplay between underlying historical forces and strategic imperatives, on the one level, and the decisions, rhetoric and policies of the actors involved, on another. Sometimes the actors are wise, sometimes foolish. Donald Trump brings in an unusual degree of incompetence, bluster and something to which various labels are attached but which might be conveniently called clownishness. If the basis of humour, as Aristotle and others have suggested, is incongruity then “clown,” with its connotations of slapstick, sadness and inadequacy, is perhaps the best fit. Trump plays at being president as a spoiled child might, oblivious to, or ignoring the sniggers of the adults in the room. Trump did not originate the North Korea issue—that is the result of deeper historical processes—but he has exacerbated it to a degree that might have dire consequences. By contrast North Korea is, for reasons of geography and history, a rock against which US hegemony beats, so far, in vain. The Korean peninsula is where most of the world’s major powers meet and contest – the United States, Japan, China and Russia. Possession, or denial of possession by competitors, is of utmost strategic importance. By a historical process, complex in detail but simple in theme, North Korea has ended up as an independent country beholden to none and hosting no foreign military presence. In this, it is similar to China but in contrast to South Korea and Japan. Its deterrent, initially conventional but now moving to nuclear, is the guarantee of that independence. The Kim family has been central to that historical development but what we have is the interaction of nation-states, influenced by individuals but driven by geopolitical imperatives. North Korea poses no security threat to the United States – the huge disparity in power ensures that – but its successful defence of its independence does present a long-term challenge to US global hegemony. The decline of US status in the Middle East might be more pressing, yet it is against Korea that the United States threatens war despite the fact that North Korea, unlike Afghanistan or Iraq, possesses the ability to retaliate. The United States possesses overwhelming power and can, as Trump threatened, “totally destroy” the small Asian country, long a thorn in American hegemonic pride because of its independence and resilience, but its deterrence-based defence strategy presents a dilemma to Washington. Today its deterrence is primarily local and conventional, with the nuclear component as yet uncertain in its efficacy. But there seems little doubt that its nuclear capability, both in terms of explosive power and reach of its missiles is growing fast as exemplified by the 29 November test of the Hwasong-15 ICBM. At some stage—some say already, others say soon—it will be able to retaliate against the US mainland. Yet America’s dilemma is longstanding, predating Trump. If George W. Bush had not torn up Clinton’s Agreed Framework then North Korea would not now be nuclear weapons state. As time passes, military action becomes more hazardous and a negotiated settlement becomes more difficult for the United States to accept. It is one thing to give up the development of nuclear weapons before you have a functioning deterrent but another matter when that is achieved. So any settlement will involve North Korean retaining a minimal nuclear deterrent, with subsequent damage to US prestige. Faced with an existential threat from the United States and South Korea, with Washington refusing to engage in meaningful negotiation, North Korea has little choice but to press ahead with developing its deterrent. However this not merely might trigger precipitate military action by the United States (although the likelihood is small), it also exacerbates relations with China, which is also caught in a dilemma between the fear of giving the United States an excuse to obstruct its ‘peaceful rise’ and allowing an encroachment on its strategic glacis. While the challenge to US statecraft is increasing, its ability to cope is decreasing. Trump’s foreign policy is widely considered by the US elite to be the most inept in recent history. But it goes beyond that. Trump shows no ability to ‘solve’ the North Korea issue, but then neither did Barack Obama. However he greatly exacerbates the problem, undermining America’s status and credibility. On the face of it mid-2017 was a time of crisis when the world came close to nuclear war over the Korean peninsula. In reality, there was fortunately far less danger of that than media hysteria suggested. North Korea was clearly in no position to initiate war against the United States. It had neither the means nor the motive and the idea that it might attack was bred of a combination of self-serving US propaganda and the common misunderstanding of the difference between the rhetoric of deterrence and that of belligerence.[5] The United States, which just as clearly had both means and motive, did not in fact move to a war footing, despite President Trump’s threats.[6] South Korea, despite President Moon Jae-in’s claim that it had been agreed that his administration would play ‘the leading role’ in relations with North Korea, and that he had a veto over military action, was left on the side-lines, watching impotently. [7] This gap between rhetoric and the course of events confirmed the political vitiation of Trump, not absolute of course – even the weakest presidents always have residual power – but with his authority seriously diminished. Trump is the focus of this article for obvious reasons; the United States is the global hegemon, but the other main countries involved, and their leaders, must also be taken into account. Nevertheless, the most consequential outcome of mid-2017 has been the shackling of Trump. He is like a dog barking as the caravan continues and events move on outside his control. Events suggest that his ability to bite is severely constrained by his minders, especially the military. For all the sound and fury, he does not seem, so far, to have the ability to carry out threats, particularly against North Korea. A dog that barks loudly and constantly but does not bite loses credibility and this poses a challenge to the American state that power holders cannot ignore. Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Abe Shinzo: from Peace Proposal to Remilitarisation The United States is the global hegemon, but the other main countries involved, and their leaders, must also be taken into account. Other leaders have been drawn into the maelstrom. Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, whose joint peace proposal was predictably spurned by the United States, were as a consequence somewhat side-lined on peninsula issues.[8] Xi Jinping, if we are to believe the Washington Post, was much embarrassed by his failure to reduce tension and his political standing impaired.[9] However the Western media has its own reasons for such opinions, which may not accord with reality, or Chinese perceptions. Indeed, although the West deems China not to have been tough enough with North Korea, the failure can be more plausibly seen as China not being firm enough with the United States, for fear of having its ‘peaceful rise’ derailed. The elevation of Xi Jinping Thought at the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October suggests that the Washington Post was a bit premature about Xi’s political demise.[10]  On the contrary it is likely that, as the Hankyoreh noted, ‘China is changing’ in a way that may have profound implications: Attention should also be paid to the fact that China is changing. “The Xi Jinping Thought that was introduced during the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China at the beginning of Xi’s second term represents the complete revocation of ‘tao guang yang hui’ [韜光養晦, a strategy of avoiding the spotlight and keeping a low profile]. While Trump has failed in his ambition to ‘make America great again,’ Xi could succeed at making China great again,” said Lee Seong-hyon, a research fellow at the Sejong Institute. This means that China’s willingness to participate in UN Security Council sanctions on the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles in order to avoid a conflict with the US could change in the future. “China’s foreign policy approach could shift toward a confident and aggressive foreign policy that regards competition with the US as ‘growing pains’ rather than something to be avoided,” Lee predicted.[11] China may well be becoming more resistant to US policy over Korea, as well as the South China Sea and a host of other issues, and this increased assertiveness will be mirrored in Russia.[12] For Abe Shinzo, the crisis was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it demonstrated his, and Japan’s, impotence to affect the course of events in the region. This was exemplified in particular by the overflight of Japan by North Korea’s Hwasong-123 IRBM test flight on 29 August and the subsequent one on 15 September, with presumably more to come. On the one hand, the tests posed little real danger to Japan – the trajectory took them across the Tsugaru Strait between Hokkaido and Honshu and well above Japanese airspace – so it is unlikely that an inflight malfunction would have caused any damage to Japan. On the other, it gave Abe good occasion to beat the drum for remilitarisation, and to divert attention from domestic corruption scandals.[13] His strategy paid off with his victory in the snap election that he called to capitalise on events.[14] However there may be seismic shifts under the surface. The US foreign policy establishment breathed a sigh of relief after Trump’s Asia visit in November not because things had gone well—they hadn’t—but because they were not as disastrous as they had been expecting.[15] Japan was the first, and easiest stop. Abe had played “the role of Trump’s loyal sidekick,” gushed the Washington Post, and “found himself in an undeniably better position than South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who has not bonded with Trump.”[16] And yet, careful reading of this article and others makes clear that under the apparent bonhomie, there are less friendly undercurrents as exemplified by the vignette from their press conference on 5 November: “The Japanese people are thriving, your cities are vibrant, and you’ve built one of the world’s most powerful economies,” Trump said, before looking up from his prepared remarks. Turning his head to face Abe next to him, Trump ad-libbed: “I don’t know if it’s as good as ours. I think not, okay?” He emphasized the “okay” by drawing it out leadingly as a parent might with a child. “And we’re going to try to keep it that way,” Trump added, for good measure. “But you’ll be second.” Abe, listening to an interpreter through an earpiece, smiled and remained silent. But his face betrayed a touch of uncertainty as the U.S. leader returned to his script. Abe will presumably put up with a lot in order to advance Japanese remilitarisation and his dream of making Japan a ‘normal country’ again and that, for the moment, depends on American approval. Japanese prime ministers have been playing the role of ‘loyal sidekicks’ since the defeat of 1945. However Trump adds another dimension to the mix and it is likely that Abe, and other Asian leaders, for cultural reasons if for no others, find Trump’s crassness extremely distasteful. Personal feelings will not usually override political expediency but combined with diminished US stature in Asia, much accelerated by Trump, they may lead to a greater willingness to consider alternatives. As we know, here are no permanent friends and enemies, only permanent interests. Gavan McCormack has recently suggested that Abe might be attracted by the economic inducements of a peaceful East Asia suggested at the Vladivostok conference by Putin (and endorsed by Xi) and willing to move away from the US-Japan alliance, the strategy of subjugating North Korea and containing China and Russia. “Plan B” might be under active consideration in Tokyo, and that Vladivostok might mark a first step towards a comprehensive, long overdue, post-Cold War re-think of regional relationships.[17] At the moment, Plan B unfortunately looks highly unlikely but there may be movement in the tectonic plates that will bring surprising realignments before too long Kim Jong Un: the Challenge of Moving from Deterrence to Peaceful Coexistence On the face of it, Kim Jong Un might be considered to have come off the best. Fareed Zakaria has grudgingly called him “smart and strategic.”[18] The feint towards Guam and then testing the Hwasong-12 into the North Pacific on 29 August was adroit.[19] It raised tension with the US (in response to American threats, it should be remembered) and produced the predictable tweets from Trump (‘fire and fury like the world has never seen’) but when the test took place elsewhere, the United States was left floundering.[20] At the same time the test did demonstrate that Guam was within reach.[21] Guam is hugely important in both military and symbolic terms. It is the main forward base on US territory in the Western Pacific, and the place from which attacks on Asian enemies would largely be launched and coordinated. China is the main target of course, and the main threat –its IRBMs are known colloquially in China as “Guam killers” but it also threatens North Korea.[22] On the global stage, China and Russia are the main challenges to American hegemony. US policy towards North Korea has its own dynamics borne of American frustration at its inability to subjugate, or at the very least discipline, North Korea and that has implications for US hegemony over minor powers more generally. If the Trump administration abrogates the Iran deal, will Tehran follow Pyongyang’s example?[23] China and Russia are inevitably linked by geography and history to North Korea. The United States divided Korea in 1945, thus in effect creating the two Koreas as part of its containment strategy towards the then Soviet Union. Today an attack on North Korea would almost certainly embroil the United States in a war with China, since the South Korean conservative elite (which now seems to include or to have incorporated Moon Jae-in) would insist on attempting to gobble up the North. That, for legal and technical reasons, could only be done under US operational control, and it is unlikely that China would tolerate the violent extension of US power to its border. An American war with China, something which is frequently discussed especially in the ‘security community’ would probably involve an attack on North Korea because that would be the most feasible way of being able to utilise the substantial South Korean military machine. The deployment of THAAD in South Korea, ostensibly to defend South Korea against the North, is an expression of these strategic ramifications. Yet THAAD’s primary purpose is to provide an early-warning of ICBM launches from China and Russia and is part of US first-strike capability.[24] Given these inextricable linkages between China, Russia, and North Korea within American strategic imperatives, why is there not more coordination between them? It can be seen as a seemingly unexplored version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in which cooperation would provide better outcomes for all but which they are prevented from achieving from mutual mistrust and their own specific relationship with the United States, in a sense the jailer of them all. The role of Kim Jong Un in this failure of coordination is unclear. Certainly relations between North Korea and Russia, and particularly China, are worse than they were during his father’s period. The 19th Congress of the CCP may well been seen, in retrospect, as the turning point if it does lead to a greater Chinese assertiveness against the United States and a readiness to cooperate with North Korea. On the North Korean domestic front, the economy is doing well, despite US-led sanctions, and the nuclear test of 3 September and recent missiles tests have been successful.[25] It is likely that Kim Jong Un’s popular standing has never been higher though since there is no direct evidence that remains conjecture. However some of this is due to luck – rockets are notoriously prone to failure, and visible failure at that, and some previous nuclear tests have been, according to Western assessments, not entirely successful. Indeed, since the United States has conducted over 1000 nuclear tests (against North Korea’s 6), we can presume it is a risky business. Moreover, although the rapid development of a nuclear deterrent may well be close to putting North Korea beyond the danger of an American attack, the danger is still there and there are great challenges ahead. North Korea has to somehow force or persuade the United States into accepting peaceful coexistence which would entail to some degree the acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear deterrent, abandonment of the hostility policy, the lifting of sanctions, the removal of the military threat and the establishment of normal diplomatic and economic relations. This still seems a distant dream and it is unclear how it can be achieved, not least because of Trump’s erratic, weak and incoherent presidency. That is a discussion for another time. In the meantime it should be noted that a US deal with North Korea would have complex regional and global implications for American power. Moon Jae-in: the Tragedy of the President Who Couldn’t Say ‘No’ One thing seems clear. If the United States is to be brought to accept peaceful coexistence with North Korea, some sort of face-saving device needs to be found and here Moon Jae-in could have played a pivotal role. It would have required great skill and, as always, a bit of luck. He would have had to distance himself from the United States, gently, slowly but firmly. He would have had to extricate South Korea from the nuclear stand-off, making clear that it was primarily a matter between the United States and North Korea and that it was the product of hostility, not the cause of it. The solution then would not be nuclear disarmament, which neither side will do, but a change in relationship which may be possible. He would need to repair relations with China and Russia soured by THAAD by promising, probably through back channels, that South Korea would remove itself from the US missile defense system.[26] He would have had to have gone some way to mending relations with the North, for instance by reopening Kaesong and Kumgangsan joint ventures and affirming that his administration would honour the agreement made by Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. Again a lot of this could be done privately. Moon Jae-in could have attempted to seize the opportunity presented by the Candlelight Revolution to refashion the client relationship with the United States into something more to South Korea’s benefit. Instead he loudly proclaimed his loyalty to the US-ROK alliance and the subordination that entailed. The difficulties and dangers of challenging the existing relationship with the United States should, of course, not be underestimated. On the formal level, Moon Jae-in’s Democratic Party of Korea (Minjoo) does not have a majority in the National Assembly.[27] On the more important informal level, the forces arraigned against reform of the client relationship to the United States are formidable. Conservatives forces in the media, bureaucracy, business, and crucially the military are very strong. The relationship with the United States has been built up over generations. The military, in particular, has a formal, intimate and ongoing subordinate relationship with the United States exemplified by, but not limited to US Operational Command (OPCON). There have been high-profile incidents in the short period of the Moon administration when the military establishment has displayed its independence of presidential authority, including the rushed deployment of THAAD and the statements of the Minister of Defense, Song Young-moo, advocating the re-introduction of US tactical nuclear weapons.[28] President Moon has come out against tactical nuclear weapons, and nuclearisation of the ROK military – stances which annoy the conservatives but are in line with official US policy. [29] However he has not disciplined the military establishment; the Defense Minister has been ‘warned’ but not fired.[30] On the contrary, he has berated the military for a ‘lack of confidence’ that they could ‘overwhelm’ North Korea on their own ironically striking a more aggressive policy towards the North than Park Geun-hye.[31] Meanwhile the South Korea media is replete with articles about the military strengthening its subordination to the United States, increasing its offensive capabilities and ratcheting up tension with the North.[32] Instead of trying to guide the Trump administration into peaceful coexistence with North Korea, Moon has exacerbated American intransigence, declaring that ‘dialogue is impossible.’[33] It is not than he has been blindsided by events. It has long been clear that North Korea will continue developing and testing its nuclear deterrent as long as the United States does not enter into meaningful negotiations. The timing and nature of the tests are unpredictable; the course of development is not. The issue extends far beyond North Korea itself. The United States is an empire in decline and under threat, attempting to preserve its global hegemony in particular against rising China and resurgent Russia. If South Korea cannot break free of the American embrace, it will be ground up in the struggle against North Korean resistance and beyond that, as THAAD illustrates, against China and Russia. It is this element of inevitability, an ineluctable fate following from Moon’s decision not to challenge the US relationship, but rather to embrace it that led me to call this, in an earlier article, a “Korean tragedy.”[34] There is also the element of betrayal of the aspirations of the Candlelight Revolution and the promises made by candidate Moon. As Geoffrey Fattig put it: Despite campaigning for the presidency with a pledge to “say no to the Americans,” South Korean leader Moon Jae-in lately seems like a man who can’t stop saying “yes.”[35] Moon’s response to Trump’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 19 September threatening “to totally destroy North Korea” was truly astounding.[36] Apart from possibly killing up to 25 million North Koreans – whom Seoul claims as its citizens – any such action would also cause huge devastation to South Korea.[37] He applauded Tump’s “firm” stand and described his speech as “very powerful.”[38] He was, the Hankyoreh noted “dancing to the beat of Trump’s drum.”[39] The Problems of Donald Trump Since Trump’s winning of the election in November 2016, his administration has been beset with often interrelated domestic and foreign difficulties. Some of the foreign issues, including North Korea, the Middle East, and the confrontation with China have been inherited from predecessors; Trump may have exacerbated American problems but did not create them. On other matters, such as climate change, the liberal economic order as exemplified by free-trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and issues with South Korea over KORUS FTA, payment for THAAD and US troops, he has oscillated between his campaign promises and the advice of his minders. The one area where as candidate he offered a better alternative to the past policies of Barack Obama and the proposed policies of Hillary Clinton was a less adversarial relationship with Russia. Yet he has had to back track and US relations with Russia are as bad as they have been under Obama, or even worse.[40] None of this has helped Trump. Russiagate overshadows everything else because it joins those forces who oppose any detente with Russia with those who oppose Trump. These are, of course, often the same people, but still separate strands in the political firmament; for those opposed to Trump, it could have been Chinagate, Mafiagate, or whatever would best achieve their objective. Opposition to Trump ranges from the personal – Hillary Clinton and grandees in both parties who were shunted aside in his drive to office – and the more general objection, identified with what is often called the “deep state,” that he is incompetent, narcissistic, unpredictable and unfit to be president. What is known in shorthand as the military-industrial complex, that vast array of people and organisations which thrives on perceived threat to national security, has a particular role to play in this. Apart from the military establishment itself and the armaments industry, the military-industrial complex includes extensive swathes of the civilian bureaucracy, from the CIA to Homeland Security, much of the media, the security think tanks and, of course, politicians anxious both to drape themselves in the flag of patriotism and to attract lucrative military spending to their electorates. Inclusion and ranking in the perceived threat list varies over time and includes near-peer competitors such as China and Russia, small independent states such as North Korea, Syria, and Iran and the amorphous threat of terrorism, in practice usually Islamic. The military-industrial complex is an economic animal and from its point of view, perception matters, and the further that is from reality the better. North Korea fits the bill nicely, China is problematic because of its economic importance to the United States, whilst Russia as threat has the advantage of building on a hostility nurtured over generations, to the Soviet period and earlier. At the same time Russia, no more than the others, actually poses a real threat to US security. The military budgets of the United States and its allies account for some 70% of the world total, exceeding that of Russia 23 times. It should also be noted that the alliance outspends China seven times, and Iran 66 times.[41] With North Korea the ratio moves into the stratosphere, between 300 and up to over a thousand times.[42] The military industrial complex presumably has ambivalent feelings towards Trump. On the one hand, he loves the military, is overawed by generals, with whom he now surrounds himself. He has raised the military budget to new heights. On the other hand, he is incompetent, precipitate and must be restrained. Coping with Trump – Removalists and Shacklers We can divide the deep state into two overlapping groups – the ‘removalists’ who want to get rid of Trump entirely, through impeachment or some other device, and the ‘shacklers’ who are willing to tolerate him as long as he is under restraint. The latter group is probably small, not extending far beyond those such as McMaster, Mattis, and Kelly whose personal fortunes are tied to Trump remaining in office. Some might survive a transfer to Pence or another post-Trump administration but essentially the shacklers are themselves shackled, much as guards are to handcuffed prisoners. A 15 September article in the Wall Street Journal entitled ‘GOP Congressman Sought Trump Deal on WikiLeaks, Russia’ presents an illuminating example of shackling at work.[43] The article recounts how Congressman Rohrabacher had tried to approach Trump with an offer from Julian Assange of WikiLeaks in exchange for a pardon: Mr. Assange would probably present a computer drive or other data-storage device that Mr. Rohrabacher said would exonerate Russia in the long-running controversy about who was the source of hacked and stolen material aimed at embarrassing the Democratic Party during the 2016 election. However, according to the Wall Street Journal: Mr. Kelly told the congressman that the proposal “was best directed to the intelligence community,” the official said. Mr. Kelly didn’t make the president aware of Mr. Rohrabacher’s message, and Mr. Trump doesn’t know the details of the proposed deal, the official said.[44] Since the “intelligence community” is behind the Russiagate accusations, it is no surprise that the matter was not taken further. Rohrabacher subsequently complained that Kelly was preventing him from having access to Trump.[45] This is a telling story because Russiagate is the dagger aimed at the heart of the Trump administration. The basic problem facing the US elite is that Trump’s incompetence is not grounds for removing him constitutionally from office. Invoking the 25th Amendment – removing the president on grounds of “incapacity” – seems at the moment infeasible despite the fantasies of its advocates.[46] Impeachment, whatever its political hurdles, requires “treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors,” hence Russiagate.[47] The allegations may be fraudulent – they almost certainly are – and dangerous in that they fuel anti-Russian hysteria probably with dire long-term consequences, but they offer the best hope for a legal removal of Trump from office, and that is being worked on assiduously.[48] It is curious that President Trump did not meet with Congressman Rohrabacher to hear what he had to say because the Democratic National Committee incident – WikiLeaks said it was a leak whereas the intelligence community claims it was Russian hacking – is central to Russiagate.[49] The Mad Emperor in the Tower with Only Tweets for Solace Trump is like a mad emperor locked in a castle tower by his courtiers. He is allowed the trappings of office but denied free access to power. He is allowed out on state occasions, such as attending the United Nations to deliver a speech written by someone else. He would have endorsed the speech, especially the tough guy bits – we will totally destroy North Korea – and he and the speechwriters (Stephen Miller, assisted, it is claimed, by Steve Bannon and Sebastian Gorka[50]), would no doubt have considered it a masterpiece of presidential eloquence, even though few others shared that opinion. He can still do many things, such as destroying the TPP or the Iran deal but his freedom of action is severely constrained, and nowhere is this more evident than in the case of North Korea policy. The big difference between Trump and the mythical emperor is that he can makes speeches and in particular he can tweet, and that is both his solace and his scourge. His tweets are a constant source of consternation and embarrassment to his officials, frustration and humiliation to the American elite, and to US allies. It would be too simple to say that they delight America’s adversaries because although they demonstrate the incompetence and dysfunction of the Trump administration they are a reminder of the danger he poses. It is more likely that Xi, Rouhani and Kim Jong Un would prefer a more coherent and less erratic US president than Trump even though his very incompetence presents advantages. It may well be that Putin would prefer the virulently anti-Russian, but calculating, Hillary Clinton to Donald Trump. It should be remembered that all countries, not least North Korea, seek to have a good non-confrontational and working relationship with the United States, which is far too important economically and politically for them to want otherwise. Dealing with the unstable and fantasising Trump seems to be a nightmare for all concerned whether adversaries, domestic and international allies, and courtiers.[51] Nevertheless it is the courtiers that form a barrier between Trump and the real exercise of power. Trump may make a speech, or post a tweet threatening North Korea with fire and fury but it is the generals who would have to implement those threats and the indications so far is that they have no intention of doing so. If there was a serious intention of going to war there would be a mobilisation of US forces in the Pacific and, crucially, a move to evacuate US civilians from South Korea, neither of which has happened although plans for exercises are reported.[52] Another good indicator of imminent danger, like the canary in the coal mine, is the financial sector and the reaction of ratings agencies such Fitch and Moody’s, discounting fares of war, is telling.[53] North Korea’s Retaliatory Power The reasons for the reluctance are obvious. Bannon, in his famous American Prospect interview in August touched on it in a more forthright manner than is usual in public: Contrary to Trump’s threat of fire and fury, Bannon said: “There’s no military solution [to North Korea’s nuclear threats], forget it. Until somebody solves the part of the equation that shows me that ten million people in Seoul don’t die in the first 30 minutes from conventional weapons, I don’t know what you’re talking about, there’s no military solution here, they got us.”[54] Bannon only scratched the surface. There are some 75,000 US troops in South Korea and Japan. [55] According to the Korea People’s Army (KPA), all US bases in South Korea are within range of its artillery alone, leaving aside missiles. There are some 200,000 American civilians in South Korea, and another 50,000 in Japan. Because North Korea is so much weaker than the United States and its allies nuclear deterrence offers the best form of defence. As a consequence it would probably retaliate with nuclear weapons if attacked and although the range and efficacy of its weapons are uncertain, the results would certainly be calamitous. Leaving aside the problem of retaliation what would happen in in the event of a US-led invasion of the North? It is likely that there would be fierce resistance from the KPA, and militia, with a people’s war being unleashed. A study in 2011 calculated then even if there were no resistance from the KPA they would still require 400,000 troops to pacify the country.[56] Since the United States has not succeeded in pacifying Afghanistan after 16 years, it might be considered that a similar enterprise in North Koreas would be hazardous. And then there is China. Many ‘experts’ have argued that China could be persuaded to acquiesce in an American occupation of North Korea, perhaps even joining in, as long as there is some buffer zone left along the Yalu, or the Americans promise to leave the peninsula at some future date. Since the underlying reason for the US interest in the Korean peninsula is the containment of China (and the Soviet Union/Russia), such dreams are clearly fanciful. Moreover China has recently warned yet again, via an editorial in the authoritative Global Times, that it will not tolerate an invasion and will intervene: If the US and South Korea carry out strikes and try to overthrow the North Korean regime and change the political pattern of the Korean Peninsula, China will prevent them from doing so.[57] So an attack on North Korea, the fire and fury, the attempt to ‘totally destroy’ it threatened by President Trump, would almost certainly involve war with China. While such a war has been widely discussed, and may well come to pass, it seems unlikely that the generals would be willing to embark on what would surely be the most consequential war in America’s history with Donald Trump as Commander in Chief.[58] However there remain the dangers of what is euphemistically called ‘miscalculation,’ and what might be termed strategic inexorability, which is discussed below. The possibility of an accidental stumbling into war – Armageddon by Accident[59]  – are probably exaggerated but there are indications that elements of the US, and ROK, military might be trying to provoke conflict. In September US B-1B bombers, accompanied not merely by aircraft from South Korea but also Japan, dumped lived bombs “a few dozen miles from the demilitarized zone.”[60] It would not take a B-1B long to travel a few dozen miles. Then a couple of weeks later B-1Bs were reported to have crossed the North Limit Line (NLL).[61] The NLL does not have the same legal standing as the DMZ, since it was unilaterally established by the United States (to keep Syngman Rhee from reigniting hostilities in 1953[62]) but since the US/ROK claim it is the de facto boundary, crossing it is clearly provocative. However even though North Korea claims that it will retaliate “if the U.S. dares to invade our sacred territory by even an inch,’ that should be seen as a necessary component of deterrence strategy, and it seems that it is well aware of the danger of being provoked into giving the United States an excuse for hostilities and as a consequence is very restrained and disciplined in its response to such actions.[63] Effective deterrence, especially for a country such as North Korea faced with an invincible enemy hundreds of times more powerful, has to be a judicious mix of determination, courage and restraint wrapped in an envelope of ambiguity and bluff.[64] A further possible restraint on Trump’s freedom of action is provided by President Moon and the government of South Korea. Moon has claimed on a number of occasions that the United States cannot go to war with North Korea without South Korea’s permission, and this has been reiterated recently by Defense Minister Song Young-moo.[65]  American commentators tend to be sceptical about the veto and certainly Trump’s tweets and his UN speech gave no indication that he thinks he has to ask Moon’s permission. One possible scenario is that the United States would launch an attack on North Korea using ‘offshore assets,’ rather than anything stationed in South Korea. The North would retaliate, including against US forces in the South, the United States would assume ‘wartime operational control’ over the ROK military and go marching merrily in the direction of Pyongyang. However since the United States would need the South Korean military for a gruelling land war in North Korea, and probably against China, they would need to make sure that the generals were fully cooperative. So it might be a matter of discussing things with the generals rather than with President Moon. This ‘militarisation’ of decision making in respect of war with North Korea might be considered complementary to what is already happening in Washington. Curious Consequences of the Militarisation of the Trump Administration One of the characteristics of the Trump administration has been an unprecedented role for the military, something which has been commented upon with vary degrees of approval and disapproval across the political spectrum.[66]. It is not for nothing that the most successful and enduring polities have tended to extol civilian leadership and the importance of keeping generals in their place; in Clemenceau’s phrase, “war is too serious a matter to leave to soldiers.” Certainly this seems to have been the prevailing opinion amongst the Founding Fathers.[67] Moreover it could be argued that it is civilians who have been unsuccessful in the military – Corporal Adolf Hitler comes to mind – in power tend to be most prone to military adventures. Nevertheless it is claimed, plausibly, that generals tend to be more cautious about going to war because they are aware of the possible consequences. Eisenhower is a case in point.[68] The consequences may be minor – the unpleasant duty of writing to relatives of dead soldiers.[69] However the consequences can but much more serious because war is a risky and uncertain business – “Give me lucky generals,” Napoleon said – and the basic trick of the trade is to muster overwhelming force against an inferior enemy. As Admiral Harry Harris, commander of U.S. Pacific Command put it: If we have to fight tonight, I don’t want it to be a fair fight. If it’s a knife fight, I want to bring a gun. If it’s a gun fight, I want to bring in the artillery ― and all of our partners with their artillery.[70] The United States has not fought a war against a substantial adversary for decades – the Korean War (China) and World War II (Germany and Japan) and even these could not project power to the US mainland. American wars during this period have been wars of choice and the chosen have been countries with no capacity to retaliate against the US, or its soldiers and civilians, except on their own soil. North Korea introduces a very new situation and one which may well be the harbinger of things to come, which is why it is so significant. North Korea can retaliate against Americans in its neighbourhood, and before long it will, it is widely presumed, be able to hit the US mainland; some argue that it can do that already.[71] Missile technology gives it reach and nuclear technology, power to inflict great damage. Admiral Harry Harris may have many more guns than Kim Jong Un, and far more powerful ones, but for the first time the victim also has a gun. Not a fair fight, but not the turkey shoot of the past. American officials famously, and foolishly, thought the invasion of Iraq in 2003 would be a “cakewalk”; few would be so sanguine today about an attack on North Korea.[72] This is not to say that there will be no war but if it does happen it will be a result of calculated and contested decision making amongst the generals and not on the whim of President Trump, whatever the experts might say about his theoretical legal powers. Congress may or may not be able to constrain him, but the real power lies with Mattis and his fellows.[73] Slim Prospects for Peace Negotiations If Trump cannot wage war neither can he, for rather different reasons, make peace. The American political system militates against peace negotiations, especially with far weaker counterparts. As the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif pointed out, commenting on US attempts to extract more concessions without yielding anything: “By definition, a deal is not perfect, because in any deal you have to give and take. Otherwise you won’t have a deal.”[74] Many Americans, conscious of their county’s dominant position in the world, fail to realise this and this misunderstanding appears to extend into the highest levels of the governance structure. Certainly, given the formal adversarial nature of that structure any concessions tend to be labelled as unpatriotic betrayal by the opposition. This means that only a strong president can negotiate peace. Trump is too weak, both psychologically and politically, to negotiate a deal with North Korea. The problem is compounded as times passes and North Korea’s development of a nuclear deterrent progresses; what was on the table in past is no longer there. Bill Clinton was psychologically strong and confident, and was able to negotiate the Agreed Framework back in 1994. He was not politically strong enough to comply with US commitments, especially after the Republicans won the 1994 midterm elections.[75] The agreement faltered, then died under his successor, George W. Bush. Even so, Clinton had a much easier time of it than Trump would have. North Korea did not then have a nuclear deterrent and was willing to make concessions that of course it would not contemplate now. To achieve a settlement, Trump would have to accept North Korea retaining a minimal nuclear deterrent.[76] Whatever problems Clinton had with the Republicans, they do not compare with Trump’s political isolation, at odds with Republicans and Democrats alike and under attack from the ‘deep state,’ however defined. On top of all this, Trump is narcissistic and insecure and not the sort of person who has the strength to make concessions, however useful they might be in achieving broader aims. The hapless Tillerson and his public ‘castration’ by Trump is a red herring.[77] Tillerson was not negotiating with North Korea or even approaching it, although ‘backchannel’ contact might have been useful in defusing the situation.[78] The Secretary of State might carry out negotiations but cannot initiate them – that is a decision for the President. At this stage, it seems highly unlikely that Trump will have the strength to make that decision, and as time passes it becomes less likely because the required concessions will become larger. Policy Poverty: Neither War Nor Peace, Only Ineffectual Sanctions Trump is stuck and cannot go in the direction of either war or peace. However, despite all the talk about the ‘adults in the room,’ it should not be thought that anyone else in the elite – politicians, generals, officials, commentators and sundry experts – has much idea either.[79] There is the dishonest (“The U.S. has no interest in regime change”) , unilateralist (we will negotiate if there is an “immediate cessation … of weapons tests”) and threatening approach of Mattis and Tillerson in an article in the Wall Street Journal, “We’re Holding Pyongyang to Account.” And then there is the risible, as exemplified in an article in the PacNet Newsletter, a publication of what is claimed to be the world’s leading security think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which suggested: President Trump could send a signed copy of his book, The Art of the Deal, to Kim Jong Un. Sending a book on negotiations written by the leader of the United States is a reminder that Trump values his skills as a deal-maker.[80] Meaningful negotiations might offer a way out but the word “diplomacy,” as used by officials and the media in the present context freighted with the implication that it is peaceful and benign, is nothing of the sort. “Diplomacy” does not mean real negotiations involving give and take but using instruments of coercion that are not direct military action in an attempt to force submission. It involves threats of military action, diplomatic pressure and economic warfare, conventionally abbreviated as sanctions rather than kinetic actions which provoke retaliation. The objectives are the same, only the means varying. Sanctions, if fully implemented by China, would result in mass starvation, which is commonly considered a war crime.[81] Apparently such laws do not apply to the United States in its effort to disarm North Korea for, as an editorial in the Wall Street Journal assures us, “withholding food aid to bring down a government would normally be unethical, but North Korea is an exceptional case.”[82] Exceptionalism has its privileges. However, ethics aside, whatever damage sanctions might do to the North Korean people, they are unlikely to be effective in changing the policy of the government because, in the absence of meaningful negotiations, surrender would inflict even worse damage. Indeed, the lifting of sanctions, at least partially, would probably be a necessary precursor of genuine negotiations. What a US deal with North Korea might involve is a subject in its own right but the starting point would be the awareness, even if not publically admitted, that North Korea with its deterrence-based defence strategy, does not pose a threat to US security but rather a challenge to US hegemony. If North Korea’s deterrence works in forcing the United States to accept peaceful coexistence than that has global implications. There may be ways to tackle that underlying challenge to hegemony though the Trump administration is an unlikely font of deep strategic thinking.[83] But this goes beyond the administration itself – there is little indication in the torrent of articles and speeches published daily that this crucial reality is grasped by the elite generally. Strategic Inexorability and the Challenge to US Hegemony Trump, it seems, can neither go to war, nor formulate a strategy to defuse the situation in a way that helps to preserve US hegemony and might be presented as a victory. He is not alone in in this, but he is president and whilst he is shackled he can do certain things, such as ordering carrier groups to sail around the Western Pacific (sometimes in the wrong direction,[84] making speeches and, his own speciality, tweeting. Twitter is a new phenomenon and whilst other public figures have come to grief using it, no one does it so exuberantly and foolishly as Trump.[85] And therein lies a problem for the adults. Trump hasn’t got the ability to solve America’s North Korea predicament, but he can exacerbate it, and does. Trump’s addiction to Twitter is well known, and widely derided.[86] Twitter offers the toxic combination of the sloppiness of informal, private chat with the permanence and rapid global dissemination of the Internet. Sometimes public figures are discomforted when an ill-considered comment becomes public when a microphone is inadvertently left switched on. With Trump and Twitter neither the comment nor the microphone are inadvertent. Tweets are public and documented; the Los Angeles Times has a webpage claiming to record “Everything President Trump has tweeted”; two countries have sections to themselves, Russia and North Korea.[87] Trump has tweeted on a number of occasions, threatening that he will take action against North Koreas, fire and fury no less, if it does not desist in developing its deterrent, but has not carried through, resulting as many have pointed out, in a lack of credibility.[88] This behaviour has not been confined to North Korea. He backed down significantly in the beginning of his presidency in respect of China, but it has become such a characteristic, in both foreign and domestic affairs, that a columnist in the Washington Post dubbing him the ‘Backdown President.’[89] Credibility is the key aspect of any exercise of authority, be it by a teacher, a parent, or the leader of a global empire. Incompetence is bad enough but Trump’s continuing demolition of US credibility is another matter. Credibility goes in two directions, peace and war – it can be lost by the failure to honour an agreement, such as the Iran deal, or by not carrying out repeated military threats against North Korea. Eliot A. Cohen, the military historian, put it bluntly, if rather disingenuously: [Trump] has now repeatedly insisted that he will resolve the problem that has bedeviled three of his predecessors, and has made it clear that diplomacy is not the way. That leaves either North Korea’s surrender, which will not happen, or war, or another broken promise. The incalculable costs of war could include the loss of hundreds of thousands of Korean lives, and the loss of many thousands of U.S. soldiers and civilians, including military dependents in Korea. It could well bring about a Chinese intervention and direct confrontation with Beijing. It would shatter what remaining confidence America’s allies have in Washington’s good judgment. A climb down, however, will be far worse than Obama’s abortive red line in Syria, as bad as that was. Trump will have shown, once and forever, that he is a blowhard tapping out empty threats on Twitter. On his watch the United States can and will be defied with impunity. And again, what remains of American credibility pretty much anywhere will vanish.[90] The article is disingenuous because its title (“Rex Tillerson Must Go”) suggests that Tillerson’s resignation would somehow solve the conundrum. Eliot is a leading neocon thinker, a co-founder of the Project for the New American Century, and a strong advocate of war against Iraq, Iran and Syria. The title of his latest book makes no secret of where he stands: The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force.[91] He is somewhat confused about East Asian geography – he thinks that Korea is on China’s southern border – but that may be a Freudian slip about Vietnam; he does not regret the war, only the US defeat.[92] Cohen is too astute to fuss about the nonsense of a “threat from North Korea,” seeing this as essentially a choice between war and the further, and potentially disastrous, erosion of US credibility; peace is not in his lexicon. He does not explicitly advocate war but he implies it: “A climb down, however, will be far worse.” Cohen is surely not the only person in the US elite wrestling with this problem. He does not discuss another possibility, one not to be mentioned in public, but no doubt exercising many minds. War with North Korea means war with China. Some would go for that but it is a big decision, fraught with danger. No war but Trump’ s incompetence and his empty bluster risks a precipitous decline in American credibility that extends far beyond the Korean issue. If Russiagate does not succeed in removing Trump from power, will thoughts turns to other, non-constitutional means? There was a two-and-a-half month pause in public deterrent testing after the 15 September launch of the Hwasong-12. No doubt technical reasons were part of the reason but there was speculation that this was a message from Pyongyang to Washington.[93] If so, it was a unilateral freeze that complemented the Chinese/Russia freeze-for-freeze peace proposals.[94] Since there are back-channel communications in place, the Trump administration would have been well aware of the overture. In any case, the administration rejected the overture. It put North Korea back on the terrorism list on 20 November and made it clear that it was going ahead with massive airstrike drills in coordination with the South Korean air force.[95] On 29 September North Korea launched its biggest ICBM yet, the Hwasong-15.[96] The rock holds firm and the caravan moves on, ignoring the barking dog. Retired New Zealand-based academic Tim Beal has written two books and numerous articles on Korean issues and US global policy. He is an Asia-Pacific Journal contributing editor and writes for NK News and Zoom in Korea amongst others. 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So what happens now?” Washington Post, 9 August 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/08/donald-trump-is-playing-a-dangerous-game-with-north-korea/ Fattig, Geoffrey “How the U.S. Makes South Korea’s Life More Difficult.” Foreign Policy in Focus, 13 September 2017.http://fpif.org/how-the-u-s-makes-south-koreas-life-more-difficult/ Fifield, Anna. “North Korea has shown us its new missile, and it’s scarier than we thought.” Washington Post, 30 November 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/30/north-korea-has-shown-us-its-new-missile-and-its-scarier-than-we-thought/ ———. “South Korea’s defense minister suggests bringing back tactical U.S. nuclear weapons.” Washington Post, 4 September 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/south-koreas-defense-minister-raises-the-idea-of-bringing-back-tactical-us-nuclear-weapons/2017/09/04/7a468314-9155-11e7-b9bc-b2f7903bab0d_story.html ———. “U.S., South Korea begin air combat drills that include simulated strikes on North Korea.” Washington Post, 4 December 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-south-korea-begin-air-combat-drills-that-include-simulated-strikes-on-north-korea/2017/12/04/9f4b43e0-d8ca-11e7-8e5f-ccc94e22b133_story.html Frankel, Jeffrey. “Can Trump Deal with North Korea and China?” Project Syndicate, 24 August 2017.https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-deal-making-china-north-korea-by-jeffrey-frankel-2017-08 Gessen, Masha. “John Kelly and the Language of the Military Coup.” New Yorker, 20 October 2017.https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/john-kelly-and-the-language-of-the-military-coup?mbid=social_twitter Gompert, David C. , Astrid Stuth  Cevallos, and Cristina  L. 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Speech, Claims Sebastian Gorka, Who Called it ‘Classic MAGA Agenda’.” Newsweek, 21 September 2017.http://www.newsweek.com/steve-bannon-trump-speech-gorka-669140 Lewis, Jeffery. “Let’s Face It: North Korean Nuclear Weapons Can Hit the U.S.” New York Times, 3 August 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/opinion/north-korea-nukes.html ———. “Trump’s Next Self-Inflicted Crisis Is a Nuclear Iran.” Foreign Policy, 30 August 2017.http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/30/trumps-next-self-inflicted-crisis-is-a-nuclear-iran/ Lithwick, Dahlia. “Is Donald Trump Too Incapacitated to Be President?” Slate, 17 May 2017.http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2017/05/no_the_25th_amendment_is_not_the_solution.html McCormack, Gavan. “North Korea and a Rules-Based Order For the Indo-Pacific, East Asia, and the World.” Asia Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, 15 November 2017.http://apjjf.org/2017/22/McCormack.html McManus, Doyle. “Trump undercuts Tillerson with every tweet.” Los Angeles Times, 4 October 2017.http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mcmanus-tillerson-trump-north-korea-20171004-story.html Michaels, Jim. “What war? U.S. military not mobilizing despite North Korea threats.” USA Today, 14 August 2017.https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/08/12/north-korea-crisis-no-change-u-s-north-korea-military-posture/560652001/ “Military Balance 2017.” International Institute for Strategic Studies, 13 February 2017.http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military%20balance/issues/the-military-balance-2017-b47b “Moody’s Maintains Credit Rating for Korea.” Chosun Ilbo, 19 October 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/10/19/2017101901280.html “Moon says dialogue with N. Korea ‘impossible,’ warns of destruction ‘beyond recovery’ “. Yonhap, 15 September 2017.http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/09/15/0200000000AEN20170915005653315.html “Moon, Trump agree to boost military deterrence, put maximum pressure on N. Korea.” Yonhap, 22 September 2017.http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2017/09/22/0301000000AEN20170922001354315.html Morell, Michael. “North Korea may already be able to launch a nuclear attack on the U.S.” Washington Post, 6 September 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/north-korea-may-already-be-able-to-launch-a-nuclear-attack-on-the-us/2017/09/06/ce375080-9325-11e7-8754-d478688d23b4_story.html “N.Korean Envoy Warns Nuclear War Could Break out at ‘Any Moment’.” Chosun Ilbo, 18 October 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/10/18/2017101800882.html Nakamura, David. “Japanese leader Shinzo Abe plays the role of Trump’s loyal sidekick.” Washington Post, 6 November 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/japanese-leader-shinzo-abe-plays-the-role-of-trumps-loyal-sidekick/2017/11/06/cc23dcae-c2f1-11e7-afe9-4f60b5a6c4a0_story.html ———. “Trump puts North Korea back on state sponsors of terrorism list to escalate pressure over nuclear weapons.” Washington Post, 20 November 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/11/20/trump-puts-north-korea-back-on-state-sponsors-of-terrorism-list-to-escalate-pressure-over-nuclear-weapons/ Nakamura, David , and Anne Gearan. “In U.N. speech, Trump threatens to ‘totally destroy North Korea’ and calls Kim Jong Un ‘Rocket Man’.” Washington Post, 19 September 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/09/19/in-u-n-speech-trump-warns-that-the-world-faces-great-peril-from-rogue-regimes-in-north-korea-iran/ Newkirk II, Vann R. . “The American Idea in 140 Characters.” The Atlantic, 24 March 2016.https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/twitter-politics-last-decade/475131/ Osnos, Evan. “How Trump Could Get Fired.” New Yorker, 8 May 2017.https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/08/how-trump-could-get-fired Park, Byong-su, and Yu-gyung Jung. “US B-1B bombers again conduct military exercises over Korean Peninsula.” Hankyoreh, 12 October 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/814247.html Park, Byong-su, Kyu-nam Kim, and Yu-gyung Jung. “President Moon rebukes Defense Ministry for its “lack of confidence”.” Hankyoreh, 29 August 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/808827.html Park, Si-soo. “N. Korea, US hold ‘secret’ meeting in Switzerland: report.” Korea Times, 14 September 2017.http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/09/103_236447.html Parker, Ashley, and Greg Jaffe. “Inside the ‘adult day-care center’: How aides try to control and coerce Trump.” Washington Post, 16 October 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/inside-the-adult-day-care-center-how-aides-try-to-control-and-coerce-trump/2017/10/15/810b4296-b03d-11e7-99c6-46bdf7f6f8ba_story.html Parker, Kathleen. “Dealmaker in Chief? More like the Backdown President.” Washington Post, 25 April 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dealmaker-in-chief-more-like-the-backdown-president/2017/04/25/7cddddc6-29df-11e7-b605-33413c691853_story.html Pilger, John. “The Coming War on China.” Counterpunch, 2 December 2016.http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/12/02/the-coming-war-on-china/ Rahn, Kim. “Defense ministry deceived Moon on THAAD report.” Korea Times, 31 May 2017.http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/06/205_230387.html Rauhala, Emily. “The timing of North Korea’s nuke test could not be worse for China’s leader.” Washington Post, 4 September 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-timing-of-north-koreas-nuke-test-could-not-be-worse-for-chinas-xi/2017/09/04/f9d0677a-90bb-11e7-b9bc-b2f7903bab0d_story.html Rauhala, Emily, and Simon Denyer. “Why the cheery Trump trip to China may not be so successful.” Washington Post, 9 November 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/trump-thinks-his-china-trip-went-great-that-could-be-a-problem/2017/11/09/2aff59ea-c53d-11e7-a441-3a768c8586f1_story.html Rich, Motoko. “Tokyo Voters’ Rebuke Signals Doubt About Shinzo Abe’s Future.” New York Times, 3 July 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/03/world/asia/japan-tokyo-shinzo-abe-election.html Robinson, Eugene. “What happens when you replace the president with a clown?” Washington Post, 13 November 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-clown-goes-abroad/2017/11/13/854b7186-c8b7-11e7-8321-481fd63f174d_story.html Rosen, Jeffrey. “The 25th Amendment Makes Presidential Disability a Political Question.” The Atlantic, 23 May 2017.https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/presidential-disability-is-a-political-question/527703/ Rossman, Sean. “Trump has tweeted 17 times about North Korea since becoming president.” USA Today, 4 July 2017.https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/07/04/trump-has-tweeted-17-times-north-korea-since-becoming-president/449885001/ Roth, Andrew. “Putin orders cut of 755 personnel at U.S. missions.” Washington Post, 30 July 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-orders-cut-of-755-personnel-at-us-missions/2017/07/30/8a4b0044-7555-11e7-8c17-533c52b2f014_story.html “Russia, China to put forward initiative on North Korea at UN meeting.” Tass, 5 July 2017.http://tass.com/politics/954819 Sanger, David E. “U.S. in Direct Communication With North Korea, Says Tillerson.” New York Times, 30 September 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/30/world/asia/us-north-korea-tillerson.html Savransky, Rebecca. “Obama’s tweet after Charlottesville one of most popular tweets ever.” The Hill, 15 August 2017.http://thehill.com/homenews/news/346602-obamas-tweet-after-charlottesville-one-of-most-popular-tweets-ever Selk, Avi “A cyclist flipped off Trump’s motorcade and entered the annals of presidential protests.” Washington Post, 29 October 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/10/29/a-cyclist-flipped-off-trumps-motorcade-and-entered-the-annals-of-presidential-protests/ Sharman, Jon. “Putin on US administration: ‘It’s difficult to talk with people who confuse Austria and Australia’.” Independent, 5 September 2017.http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/putin-us-administration-russia-austria-australia-confuse-george-w-bush-white-house-administration-a7930241.html Shear, Michael D., and Michael R. Gordon. “How U.S. Military Actions Could Play Out in North Korea.” New York Times, 11 August 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/world/asia/north-korea-trump-military.html Shon, Jin-seok. “Fitch Says N.Korean Risk ‘Nothing New’.” Chosun Ilbo, 13 October 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/10/13/2017101301142.html “Starvation ‘as a weapon’ is a war crime, UN chief warns parties to conflict in Syria.” UN News Centre, 14 January 2016.http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53003 Tau, Byron , Peter  Nicholas, and Siobhan Hughes. “GOP Congressman Sought Trump Deal on WikiLeaks, Russia.” Wall Street Journal, 15 September 2017.https://www.wsj.com/articles/gop-congressman-sought-trump-deal-on-wikileaks-russia-1505509918 Taylor, Adam. “South Korea and China move to normalize relations after THAAD dispute.” Washington Post, 31 October 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/south-korea-and-china-move-to-normalize-relations-after-thaad-conflict/2017/10/31/60f2bad8-bde0-11e7-af84-d3e2ee4b2af1_story.html Tisdall, Simon. “Why Trump’s Afghanistan strategy risks the worst of both worlds ” Guardian, 22 August 2017.https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/22/why-trumps-afghan-strategy-risks-the-worst-of-both-worlds Torode, Greg, and Ben Blanchard. “With all eyes on North Korea, Beijing looks ready to deploy fighter jets in the South China Sea.” Reuters via Business Insider, 31 October 2017.http://www.businessinsider.com/r-beijing-seen-poised-for-fresh-south-china-sea-assertiveness-2017-10?IR=T “U.S. forces in Korea to hold drill for evacuation of noncombatants in June.” Yonhap, 23 April 2017.http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20170423001300315 Visser, Nick. “Attack On North Korea Could Spare Allies, Secretary Mattis Says. Analysts Aren’t So Sure.” Huffington Post, 18 September 2017 Wallace, Christopher. “Trump’s generals: President turns to military men for counsel, order.” Fox News, 8 August 2017.http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/08/08/trumps-generals-president-turns-to-military-men-for-counsel-order.html White, Hugh. “With their threats to China, Trump and Tillerson are making rookie blunders that will only hurt US credibility.” South China Morning Post, 17 January 2017.http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2062762/their-threats-china-trump-and-tillerson-are-making-rookie Wilson, Jordan. “China’s Expanding Ability to Conduct Conventional Missile Strikes on Guam.” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 10 May 2016.https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China%27s%20Expanding%20Ability%20to%20Conduct%20Conventional%20Missile%20Strikes%20on%20Guam.pdf Wire, Sarah D. “Rep. Dana Rohrabacher says Trump’s chief of staff is keeping him from talking to the president about Julian Assange.” Los Angeles Times, 4 October 2017.http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-report-rep-rohrabacher-says-white-1507155591-htmlstory.html “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2016.” State Department, December 2016.https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/2016/index.htm Wright, David. “North Korea’s Longest Missile Test Yet.” Union of Concerned Scientists, 29 November 2017.http://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/nk-longest-missile-test-yet Yi, Whan-woo. “Why has North Korea been silent for more than two months? .” Korea Times, 27 November 2017.http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/11/103_239990.html Yi, Yong-in, and Ji-eun Kim. “US likely to welcome compromise over THAAD deployment.” Hankyoreh, 1 November 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/817028.html Yi, Yong-in, and Byong-su Park. “Sources suggest secret negotiations taking place between North Korea and US.” Hankyoreh, 18 August 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/807415.html Yu, Yong-weon. “Seoul Drafting New Plan for Full-Fledged War with N.Korea.” Chosun Ilbo, 29 August 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/08/29/2017082901321.html Zakaria, Fareed. “Kim Jong Un — smart and strategic?” Washington Post, 14 September 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kim-jong-un–smart-and-strategic/2017/09/14/0c28a516-9988-11e7-82e4-f1076f6d6152_story.html “Zarif: If U.S. wants new nuclear concessions, we do, too.” Tehran Times, 23 September 2017.http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/417021/Zarif-If-U-S-wants-new-nuclear-concessions-we-do-too [1]               Sang-Hun Choe, “Trump Likened to ‘a Dog Barking’ by North Korea’s Top Envoy,” New York Times, 21 September 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/world/asia/north-korea-trump-dog.html [2]               Simon Tisdall, “Why Trump’s Afghanistan strategy risks the worst of both worlds ” Guardian, 22 August 2017.https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/22/why-trumps-afghan-strategy-risks-the-worst-of-both-worlds [3]               Avi  Selk, “A cyclist flipped off Trump’s motorcade and entered the annals of presidential protests,” Washington Post, 29 October 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/10/29/a-cyclist-flipped-off-trumps-motorcade-and-entered-the-annals-of-presidential-protests/ [4]               Eugene Robinson, “What happens when you replace the president with a clown?,” Washington Post, 13 November 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-clown-goes-abroad/2017/11/13/854b7186-c8b7-11e7-8321-481fd63f174d_story.html [5]               Tim Beal, “Hegemony and Resistance, Compellence and Deterrence: Deconstructing the North Korean ‘Threat’ and Identifying America’s Strategic Alternatives,” Journal of Political Criticism, December 2017 [6]               David B. Larter, “If the US is going to war in North Korea, nobody told the US military,” Defense News, 11 August 2017.https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2017/08/11/if-the-us-is-going-to-war-in-north-korea-nobody-told-the-us-military/ [7]               Woo-sang Jeong and Min-hyuk Lim, “Moon Wins U.S. Support for ‘Leading Role’ in Talks with N.Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, 3 July 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/07/03/2017070300792.html; [8]               “Russia, China to put forward initiative on North Korea at UN meeting,” Tass, 5 July 2017.http://tass.com/politics/954819 [9]               Emily Rauhala, “The timing of North Korea’s nuke test could not be worse for China’s leader,” Washington Post, 4 September 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-timing-of-north-koreas-nuke-test-could-not-be-worse-for-chinas-xi/2017/09/04/f9d0677a-90bb-11e7-b9bc-b2f7903bab0d_story.html [10]             Chris Buckley, “China Enshrines ‘Xi Jinping Thought.’ What Does That Mean?,” New York Times, 24 October 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-constitution.html [11]             In-hwan Jung and Ji-won Noh, “US-South Korea alliance hindering efforts to find an exit strategy to NK nuclear crisis,” Hankyoreh, 29 October 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/816477.html [12]             Greg Torode and Ben Blanchard, “With all eyes on North Korea, Beijing looks ready to deploy fighter jets in the South China Sea,” Reuters via Business Insider, 31 October 2017.http://www.businessinsider.com/r-beijing-seen-poised-for-fresh-south-china-sea-assertiveness-2017-10?IR=T [13]             Motoko Rich, “Tokyo Voters’ Rebuke Signals Doubt About Shinzo Abe’s Future,” New York Times, 3 July 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/03/world/asia/japan-tokyo-shinzo-abe-election.html [14]             Tim Beal, “Abe Pulls It Off, But It Will End In Tears,” Zoom in Korea, 24 October 2017.http://www.zoominkorea.org/abe-pulls-it-off-but-it-will-end-in-tears/ [15]             Emily Rauhala and Simon Denyer, “Why the cheery Trump trip to China may not be so successful,” Washington Post, 9 November 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/trump-thinks-his-china-trip-went-great-that-could-be-a-problem/2017/11/09/2aff59ea-c53d-11e7-a441-3a768c8586f1_story.htm; Oliver Holmes and Tom Phillips, “Trump attacks countries ‘cheating’ America at Apec summit,” Guardian, 10 November 2017.https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/nov/10/trump-attacks-countries-cheating-america-at-apec-summi; Robinson, “What happens when you replace the president with a clown?; Max Boot, “Trump’s Worst Trip Ever. Until His Next One,” Foreign Policy, 14 November 2017.http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/14/trumps-worst-trip-ever-until-his-next-one/ [16]             David Nakamura, “Japanese leader Shinzo Abe plays the role of Trump’s loyal sidekick,” Washington Post, 6 November 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/japanese-leader-shinzo-abe-plays-the-role-of-trumps-loyal-sidekick/2017/11/06/cc23dcae-c2f1-11e7-afe9-4f60b5a6c4a0_story.html [17]             Gavan McCormack, “North Korea and a Rules-Based Order For the Indo-Pacific, East Asia, and the World,” Asia Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, 15 November 2017.http://apjjf.org/2017/22/McCormack.html [18]             Fareed Zakaria, “Kim Jong Un — smart and strategic?,” Washington Post, 14 September 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kim-jong-un–smart-and-strategic/2017/09/14/0c28a516-9988-11e7-82e4-f1076f6d6152_story.html [19]              Chris Green, “The Strategic Thinking behind North Korea’s Missile Gambit,” International Crisis Group, 30 August 2017.https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/korean-peninsula/strategic-thinking-behind-north-koreas-missile-gambit [20]             Ji-hye Jun, “Trump warns of ‘fire and fury’; N. Korea threatens to strike Guam ” Korea Times, 9 August 2017.http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/08/103_234484.html [21]             Rahn  Kim, “North Korea proves it has ability to strike Guam,” Korea Times, 29 August 2017.http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/08/103_235578.html [22]             Keith Johnson, “China’s ‘Guam Killers’ Threaten U.S. Anchor Base in Pacific,” Foreign Policy, 11 May 2016.http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/11/chinas-guam-killers-threaten-u-s-anchor-base-in-pacific; Jordan Wilson, “China’s Expanding Ability to Conduct Conventional Missile Strikes on Guam,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 10 May 2016.https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China%27s%20Expanding%20Ability%20to%20Conduct%20Conventional%20Missile%20Strikes%20on%20Guam.pdf [23]             James M. Dorsey, “Playing with Fire: Trump’s Iran policy risks cloning North Korea,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, August 2017.https://www.academia.edu/34114222/Playing_with_Fire_Trumps_Iran_policy_risks_cloning_North_Kore; Jeffery Lewis, “Trump’s Next Self-Inflicted Crisis Is a Nuclear Iran,” Foreign Policy, 30 August 2017.http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/30/trumps-next-self-inflicted-crisis-is-a-nuclear-iran/ [24]             Tim Beal, “The Korean Peninsula within the Framework of US Global Hegemony,” The Asia Pacific Journal – Japan Focus 14, no. 22:3 (2016); ———, “The Deployment of THAAD in Korea and the Struggle over US Global Hegemony,” Journal of Political Criticism, December 2016.http://www.timbeal.net.nz/geopolitics/Beal_JPC_THAAD.pdf [25]             Christine Kim and Jane Chung, “North Korea 2016 economic growth at 17-year high despite sanctions: South Korea,” Reuters, 21 July 2017.http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-economy-gdp-idUSKBN1A607; Gwang-deok Han, “North Korea’s GDP grew 3.9% in 2016, with $1,300 per capita income,” Hankyoreh, 23 July 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/803901.html [26] .           Some of this seems to have happened in the deal struck between South Korea na China on 31 October; Editorial, “Gov’t Has Capitulated to Chinese Bullying,” Chosun Ilbo, 1 November 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/11/01/2017110101595.htm; Yong-in Yi and Ji-eun Kim, “US likely to welcome compromise over THAAD deployment,” Hankyoreh, 1 November 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/817028.htm; Editorial, “Hopeful signs as South Korea and China move beyond THAAD dispute,” Hankyoreh, 1 November 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/817027.htm; Oi-hyun Kim, “Chinese concessions on THAAD speak to fears of losing influence on Korean Peninsula,” Hankyoreh, 1 November 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/817030.htm; Ji-eun Kim et al., “SK Foreign Minister rules out additional THAAD deployments, joining US MD system,” Hankyoreh, 31 October 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/816853.htm; Sang-hun Choe, Jane Perlez, and Mark Landler, “China Blinks on South Korea, Making Nice After a Year of Hostilities,” New York Times, 1 November 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/world/asia/china-south-korea-thaad.htm; Adam Taylor, “South Korea and China move to normalize relations after THAAD dispute,” Washington Post, 31 October 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/south-korea-and-china-move-to-normalize-relations-after-thaad-conflict/2017/10/31/60f2bad8-bde0-11e7-af84-d3e2ee4b2af1_story.html [27]             Rahn Kim, “Personnel affairs dragging down Moon gov’t,” Korea Times, 14 September 2017.http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/09/356_236482.html [28]             Kim Rahn, “Defense ministry deceived Moon on THAAD report,” Korea Times, 31 May 2017.http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/06/205_230387.html; In-hwan Jung, Ji-eun Kim, and Oi-hyun Kim, “Defense Minister raises option of bringing tactical nuclear weapons back to South Korea,” Hankyoreh, 6 September 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/809931.html; Anna Fifield, “South Korea’s defense minister suggests bringing back tactical U.S. nuclear weapons,” Washington Post, 4 September 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/south-koreas-defense-minister-raises-the-idea-of-bringing-back-tactical-us-nuclear-weapons/2017/09/04/7a468314-9155-11e7-b9bc-b2f7903bab0d_story.html [29]             Editorial, “Moon’s Appeasement of N.Korea Comes at the Wrong Time,” Chosun Ilbo, 15 September 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/09/15/2017091501431.html [30]             Yu-gyung Jung, “Moon administration stands firmly against redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons,” Hankyoreh, 13 September 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/810855.html [31]             Byong-su Park, Kyu-nam Kim, and Yu-gyung Jung, “President Moon rebukes Defense Ministry for its “lack of confidence”,” Hankyoreh, 29 August 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/808827.html [32]             “Defense chief vows stronger alliance with U.S. ,” Yonhap, 26 July 2017.http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2017/07/26/6/0401000000AEN20170726006200315F.htm; Yong-weon Yu, “Seoul Drafting New Plan for Full-Fledged War with N.Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, 29 August 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/08/29/2017082901321.html; Deok-han Kim, “U.S. ‘Favorably Inclined’ to Boosting S.Korean Missile Power,” Chosun Ilbo, 9 August 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/08/09/2017080901433.htm; In-hwan Jung, “US to step up sales of advanced military hardware in wake of North Korean nuclear test,” Hankyoreh, 7 September 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/810088.html; Sang-hun Choe, “South Korea Plans ‘Decapitation Unit’ to Try to Scare North’s Leaders,” New York Times, 12 September 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/world/asia/north-south-korea-decapitation-.html [33]             “Moon says dialogue with N. Korea ‘impossible,’ warns of destruction ‘beyond recovery’ “, Yonhap, 15 September 2017.http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/09/15/0200000000AEN20170915005653315.html [34]             Tim Beal, “A Korean Tragedy,” The Asia Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, 15 August 2017.http://apjjf.org/2017/16/Beal.htm; ———, “A Korean Tragedy: Update,” Zoom in Korea, 12 September 2017.http://kpolicy.org/a-korean-tragedy-update/ [35]             Geoffrey  Fattig, “How the U.S. Makes South Korea’s Life More Difficult,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 13 September 2017.http://fpif.org/how-the-u-s-makes-south-koreas-life-more-difficult/ [36]             David  Nakamura and Anne Gearan, “In U.N. speech, Trump threatens to ‘totally destroy North Korea’ and calls Kim Jong Un ‘Rocket Man’,” Washington Post, 19 September 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/09/19/in-u-n-speech-trump-warns-that-the-world-faces-great-peril-from-rogue-regimes-in-north-korea-iran/ [37]             “The Constitution of the Republic of Korea,” Constitutional Court of Korea, Republic of Korea, 29 October 1987.http://ri.ccourt.go.kr/eng/ccourt/news/related.html; Nick Visser, “Attack On North Korea Could Spare Allies, Secretary Mattis Says. Analysts Aren’t So Sure.,” Huffington Post, 18 September 2017 [38]             Christine Kim and Kaori Kaneko, “South Korea says Trump’s warning to North Korea ‘firm and specific’,” Reuters, 20 September 2017.http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-trump-reaction/south-korea-says-trumps-warning-to-north-korea-firm-and-specific-idUSKCN1BV0D; “Moon, Trump agree to boost military deterrence, put maximum pressure on N. Korea,” Yonhap, 22 September 2017.http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2017/09/22/0301000000AEN20170922001354315.html [39]             In-hwan Jung  et al., “Moon exhibits contradictory behavior during visit to UN,” Hankyoreh, 23 September 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/812233.html [40]             Andrew Roth, “Putin orders cut of 755 personnel at U.S. missions,” Washington Post, 30 July 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-orders-cut-of-755-personnel-at-us-missions/2017/07/30/8a4b0044-7555-11e7-8c17-533c52b2f014_story.htm; Jon Sharman, “Putin on US administration: ‘It’s difficult to talk with people who confuse Austria and Australia’,” Independent, 5 September 2017.http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/putin-us-administration-russia-austria-australia-confuse-george-w-bush-white-house-administration-a7930241.html [41]             Calculated from data in Table 18, “Military Balance 2017,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, 13 February 2017.http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military%20balance/issues/the-military-balance-2017-b47b. Military expenditure is only one part of the story, and moreover figures vary. The IISS gives $604,452billion for the US in 2016 but other sources estimate the real figures is closer to one trillion dollars; Chris  Hellman and Mattea  Kramer, “War Pay: The Nearly $1 Trillion National Security Budget ” TomDispatch, 22 May 2012.http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175545 [42]             Lower figure calculated using 2017 data from IISS and the average estimate for North Korea in given by “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2016,” State Department, December 2016.https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/2016/index.htm. The higher figure calculated from a statement by a statement in the National Assembly in 2013; Kyu-won Kim, “Defense intelligence director says N. Korea would win in a one-on-one war,” Hankyoreh, 6 November 2013.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/610084.html [43]             Byron  Tau, Peter  Nicholas, and Siobhan Hughes, “GOP Congressman Sought Trump Deal on WikiLeaks, Russia,” Wall Street Journal, 15 September 2017.https://www.wsj.com/articles/gop-congressman-sought-trump-deal-on-wikileaks-russia-1505509918 [44]             ibid. [45]             Sarah D. Wire, “Rep. Dana Rohrabacher says Trump’s chief of staff is keeping him from talking to the president about Julian Assange,” Los Angeles Times, 4 October 2017.http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-report-rep-rohrabacher-says-white-1507155591-htmlstory.html [46]             Ross Douthat, “The 25th Amendment Solution for Removing Trump,” New York Times, 16 May 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/opinion/25th-amendment-trump.htm; John Hudak, “The 25th Amendment,” Brookings Institution, 9 June 2017.https://www.brookings.edu/blog/unpacked/2017/06/09/the-25th-amendment; Jeffrey Rosen, “The 25th Amendment Makes Presidential Disability a Political Question,” The Atlantic, 23 May 2017.https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/presidential-disability-is-a-political-question/527703; Dahlia Lithwick, “Is Donald Trump Too Incapacitated to Be President?,” Slate, 17 May 2017.http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2017/05/no_the_25th_amendment_is_not_the_solution.htm; Evan Osnos, “How Trump Could Get Fired,” New Yorker, 8 May 2017.https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/08/how-trump-could-get-fired [47]             “High Crimes and Misdemeanors,”  http://www.crf-usa.org/impeachment/high-crimes-and-misdemeanors.html. [48]             Bob Dreyfuss, “Robert Mueller’s End Game: Is Trump’s Impeachment a Possibility?,” The Nation, 12 October 2017.https://www.thenation.com/article/robert-muellers-end-game-is-trumps-impeachment-a-possibility/ [49]             Gregory Elich, “Did the Russians Really Hack the DNC?,” Counterpunch, 13 January 2017.http://www.counterpunch.org/2017/01/13/did-the-russians-really-hack-the-dnc; Patrick Lawrence, “A New Report Raises Big Questions About Last Year’s DNC Hack,” Nation, 9 August 2017.https://www.thenation.com/article/a-new-report-raises-big-questions-about-last-years-dnc-hack/ [50]             Jason Le Miere, “Steve Bannon Helped Write Trump’s U.N. Speech, Claims Sebastian Gorka, Who Called it ‘Classic MAGA Agenda’,” Newsweek, 21 September 2017.http://www.newsweek.com/steve-bannon-trump-speech-gorka-669140 [51]             Karen DeYoung and Greg  Jaffe, “For some foreign diplomats, the Trump White House is a troubling enigma,” Washington Post, 9 October 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/for-some-foreign-diplomats-the-trump-white-house-is-a-troubling-enigma/2017/10/09/50323152-a534-11e7-ade1-76d061d56efa_story.htm; Antony J. Blinken, “Trump Alienates America’s Allies and Hands Iran a Victory,” New York Times, 13 October 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/13/opinion/trump-false-narrative-iran.html [52]             Jim Michaels, “What war? U.S. military not mobilizing despite North Korea threats,” USA Today, 14 August 2017.https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/08/12/north-korea-crisis-no-change-u-s-north-korea-military-posture/560652001/;”U.S. forces in Korea to hold drill for evacuation of noncombatants in June,” Yonhap, 23 April 2017.http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN2017042300130031; Dan Lamothe, “Despite Trump’s threats to North Korea, the U.S. military doesn’t appear to be on a new wartime footing,” Washington Post, 11 August 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/08/11/despite-trumps-threats-to-north-korea-the-u-s-military-doesnt-appear-to-be-on-a-wartime-footing; Michael D. Shear and Michael R. Gordon, “How U.S. Military Actions Could Play Out in North Korea,” New York Times, 11 August 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/world/asia/north-korea-trump-military.html; Sang-hun Choe, “U.S. Military to Begin Drills to Evacuate Americans From South Korea,” New York Times, 16 October 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/world/asia/us-drills-evacuate-civilians.html [53]             Jin-seok Shon, “Fitch Says N.Korean Risk ‘Nothing New’,” Chosun Ilbo, 13 October 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/10/13/2017101301142.html; “Moody’s Maintains Credit Rating for Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, 19 October 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/10/19/2017101901280.html [54]             Robert Kuttner, “Steve Bannon, Unrepentant,” American Prospect, 16 August 2017.http://prospect.org/article/steve-bannon-unrepentant [55]             Oliver Holmes, “What is the US military’s presence near North Korea? ,” Guardian, 9 August 2017.https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/09/what-is-the-us-militarys-presence-in-south-east-asia [56]             Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer  Lind, “The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,” International Security 36, no. 2 (2011). [57]             Editorial, “Reckless game over the Korean Peninsula runs risk of real war,” Global Times, 10 August 2017.http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1060791.shtml [58]             Robert Farley, “Asia’s Greatest Fear: A U.S.-China War,” National Interest, 9 June 2014.http://nationalinterest.org/feature/asia-flames-us-china-war-10621?page=sho; David C.  Gompert, Astrid Stuth  Cevallos, and Cristina  L. Garafola, “War with China: Thinking through the Unthinkable,” RAND, 28 July 2016.http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1140/RAND_RR1140.pd; Peter Apps, “Commentary: Here’s how a U.S.-China war could play out,” Reuters, 9 August 2016.http://www.reuters.com/article/us-commentary-china-apps-idUSKCN10I0W; John Pilger, “The Coming War on China,” Counterpunch, 2 December 2016.http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/12/02/the-coming-war-on-china; Benjamin Haas, “Steve Bannon: ‘We’re going to war in the South China Sea … no doubt’ ” Guardian, 2 February 2017.https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/02/steve-bannon-donald-trump-war-south-china-sea-no-doub; Robert Farley, “Could America Win a War Against Russia and China at the Same Time? ,” National Interest, 3 February 2017.http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/could-america-win-war-against-russia-china-the-same-time-19305 [59]             Dan  De Luce, Jenna McLaughlin, and Elias Groll, “Armageddon by Accident,” Foreign Policy, 18 October 2017.http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/18/armageddon-by-accident-north-korea-nuclear-war-missiles/ [60][60]           Dan Lamothe, “U.S. jets drop live bombs in a new show of force aimed at North Korea,” Washington Post, 18 September 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/09/18/u-s-jets-dropped-live-bombs-in-a-new-massive-show-of-force-aimed-at-north-korea/ [61]             Byong-su Park and Yu-gyung Jung, “US B-1B bombers again conduct military exercises over Korean Peninsula,” Hankyoreh, 12 October 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/814247.html [62]             Daniel Ten Kate and Peter S.  Green, “Defending Korea Line Seen Contrary to Law by Kissinger Remains U.S. Policy,” Bloomberg, 17 December 2010.http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-16/defending-korea-line-seen-contrary-to-law-by-kissinger-remains-u-s-policy.html [63]             “N.Korean Envoy Warns Nuclear War Could Break out at ‘Any Moment’,” Chosun Ilbo, 18 October 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/10/18/2017101800882.html [64]             Beal, “Hegemony and Resistance, Compellence and Deterrence: Deconstructing the North Korean ‘Threat’ and Identifying America’s Strategic Alternatives.” [65]             Hye-jeong Choi, “South Korea holds ultimate decision for military action on Peninsula,” Hankyoreh, 18 August 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/807417.htm; Rahn  Kim, “US won’t go to war without ROK: minister,” Korea Times, 12 October 2017.http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/10/103_237566.html [66]             Robert Costa and Philip Rucker, “Military leaders consolidate power in Trump administration,” Washington Post, 22 August 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/military-leaders-consolidate-power-in-trump-administration/2017/08/22/db4f7bee-875e-11e7-a94f-3139abce39f5_story.htm; Stephen Kinzer, “America’s slow-motion military coup,” Boston Globe, 16 September 2017.https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/09/16/america-slow-motion-military-coup/WgzYW9MPBIbsegCwd4IpJN/amp.htm; Masha Gessen, “John Kelly and the Language of the Military Coup,” New Yorker, 20 October 2017.https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/john-kelly-and-the-language-of-the-military-coup?mbid=social_twitte; “”Above All” – The Junta Expands Its Claim To Power,” Moon of Alabama, 21 October 2017.http://www.moonofalabama.org/2017/10/above-all-the-junta-expands-its-claim-to-power.htm; Christopher Wallace, “Trump’s generals: President turns to military men for counsel, order,” Fox News, 8 August 2017.http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/08/08/trumps-generals-president-turns-to-military-men-for-counsel-order.html [67]             Michael F. Cairo, “Civilian Control of the Military,” Democracy Papers [State Department, Bureau of International Information Programs], 26 October 2005.https://web.archive.org/web/20051026185242/http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/democracy/dmpaper12.htm [68]             Andrew Bacevich, “The Greatest Person then Living,” London Review of Book, 27 July 2017.https://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n15/andrew-bacevich/the-greatest-person-then-living [69]             Costa and Rucker, “Military leaders consolidate power in Trump administration.” [70]             Harry Harris, “Despite Threats and Uncertainty, America’s Commitment to Asia Remains Ironclad,” Huffington Post, 21 September 2016.http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/despite-threats-and-uncertainty-americas-commitment-to-asia-remains-ironclad_us_57e14aa2e4b08cb14097f4f9 [71]             Jeffery Lewis, “Let’s Face It: North Korean Nuclear Weapons Can Hit the U.S.,” New York Times, 3 August 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/opinion/north-korea-nukes.htm; Michael Morell, “North Korea may already be able to launch a nuclear attack on the U.S.,” Washington Post, 6 September 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/north-korea-may-already-be-able-to-launch-a-nuclear-attack-on-the-us/2017/09/06/ce375080-9325-11e7-8754-d478688d23b4_story.html [72]             Hendrik  Hertzberg, “Cakewalk,” New Yorker, 14 April 2003.http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/04/14/cakewal; Ken Adelman, “Cakewalk In Iraq,” Washington Post, 13 February 2002.http://www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2002/msg00243.html; Harry J. Kazianis, “The Case for Containing North Korea,” The National Interest, 15 October 2017.http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/the-case-containing-north-korea-22727 [73]             Garrett Epps, “Trump Doesn’t Have the Authority to Attack North Korea Without Congress,” The Atlantic, 30 August 2017.https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/trump-doesnt-have-the-power-to-attack-north-korea-without-congress/538425; Jeremy Herb, “Could Congress stop Trump from bombing North Korea?,” CNN, 10 August 2017.http://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/09/politics/trump-bomb-north-korea-congress/index.html;David Ignatius, “Our best hope against nuclear war,” Washington Post, 3 October 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/our-best-hope-against-nuclear-war/2017/10/03/7df61d86-a883-11e7-92d1-58c702d2d975_story.html [74]             “Zarif: If U.S. wants new nuclear concessions, we do, too,” Tehran Times, 23 September 2017.http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/417021/Zarif-If-U-S-wants-new-nuclear-concessions-we-do-too [75]             John Delury, “Lessons from North Korea,” Foreign Affairs (2015). [76]             David Lai and Alyssa Blair, “How to Learn to Live With a Nuclear North Korea,” Foreign Policy, 7 August 2017.https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/07/how-to-learn-to-live-with-a-nuclear-north-korea/ [77]             Jackson Diehl, “Bob Corker on Trump’s biggest problem: The ‘castration’ of Rex Tillerson,” Washington Post, 13 October 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/bob-corker-on-trumps-biggest-problem-the-castration-of-rex-tillerson/2017/10/13/8a331abc-b03b-11e7-be94-fabb0f1e9ffb_story.html [78]             Yong-in Yi and Byong-su Park, “Sources suggest secret negotiations taking place between North Korea and US,” Hankyoreh, 18 August 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/807415.htm; Si-soo Park, “N. Korea, US hold ‘secret’ meeting in Switzerland: report,” Korea Times, 14 September 2017.http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/09/103_236447.htm; David E Sanger, “U.S. in Direct Communication With North Korea, Says Tillerson,” New York Times, 30 September 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/30/world/asia/us-north-korea-tillerson.html [79]             Ashley Parker and Greg Jaffe, “Inside the ‘adult day-care center’: How aides try to control and coerce Trump,” Washington Post, 16 October 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/inside-the-adult-day-care-center-how-aides-try-to-control-and-coerce-trump/2017/10/15/810b4296-b03d-11e7-99c6-46bdf7f6f8ba_story.html [80]             Rorry Daniels, “Time to save face in US-DPRK relations,” Pacnet Newsletter, 10 October 2017.https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-73-time-save-face-us-dprk-relations [81]             “Starvation ‘as a weapon’ is a war crime, UN chief warns parties to conflict in Syria,” UN News Centre, 14 January 2016.http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53003 [82]             Editorial Board, “Options for Removing Kim Jong Un,” Wall Street Journal, 4 September 2017.https://www.wsj.com/articles/options-for-removing-kim-jong-un-1504556500 [83]             Tim Beal, “North Korea’s Deterrent and Trump’s Options,” Zoom in Korea, 26 July 2017.http://www.zoominkorea.org/north-koreas-deterrent-and-trumps-options/ [84]             Sang-Hun Choe, “South Koreans Feel Cheated After U.S. Carrier Miscue,” New York Times, 19 April 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/world/asia/aircraft-carrier-south-korea.htm; Amy Davidson, “Donald Trump, North Korea, and the Case of the Phantom Armada,” New Yorker, 19 April 2017.http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/donald-trump-north-korea-and-the-case-of-the-phantom-armada [85]             Ironically It was Obama who first introduced Twitter to presidential politics back in 2007 and in contrast to Trump he seems to used it sparingly and effectively; Vann R.  Newkirk II, “The American Idea in 140 Characters,” The Atlantic, 24 March 2016.https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/twitter-politics-last-decade/475131; Rebecca Savransky, “Obama’s tweet after Charlottesville one of most popular tweets ever,” The Hill, 15 August 2017.http://thehill.com/homenews/news/346602-obamas-tweet-after-charlottesville-one-of-most-popular-tweets-ever [86]             Sean Rossman, “Trump has tweeted 17 times about North Korea since becoming president,” USA Today, 4 July 2017.https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/07/04/trump-has-tweeted-17-times-north-korea-since-becoming-president/449885001; Zack Beauchamp, “Here are 2 wildly incorrect Trump administration tweets about North Korea,” Vox, 2 October 2017.https://www.vox.com/world/2017/10/2/16395048/north-korea-trump-tweet; Doyle McManus, “Trump undercuts Tillerson with every tweet,” Los Angeles Times, 4 October 2017.http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mcmanus-tillerson-trump-north-korea-20171004-story.html [87]             “Everything President Trump has tweeted (and what it was about),”  http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-updates-everything-president-trump-has-tweeted-and-what-it-was-about-2017-htmlstory.html. [88]             Henry Farrell, “North Korea just called Trump’s bluff. So what happens now?,” Washington Post, 9 August 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/08/donald-trump-is-playing-a-dangerous-game-with-north-korea; Jeffrey Frankel, “Can Trump Deal with North Korea and China?,” Project Syndicate, 24 August 2017.https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-deal-making-china-north-korea-by-jeffrey-frankel-2017-08 [89]             Hugh White, “With their threats to China, Trump and Tillerson are making rookie blunders that will only hurt US credibility,” South China Morning Post, 17 January 2017.http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2062762/their-threats-china-trump-and-tillerson-are-making-rooki; Kathleen Parker, “Dealmaker in Chief? More like the Backdown President,” Washington Post, 25 April 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dealmaker-in-chief-more-like-the-backdown-president/2017/04/25/7cddddc6-29df-11e7-b605-33413c691853_story.html [90]             Eliot A.  Cohen, “Rex Tillerson Must Go,” The Atlantic, 2 October 2017.https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/trump-tillerson-self-respect-north-korea-puerto-rico-diplomacy/541695/ [91]             Eliot A. Cohen, The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force (New York: Basic Books, 2017). [92]             ———, “How were we in Vietnam?,” New York Times, 21 July 1985.http://www.nytimes.com/1985/07/21/books/how-were-we-in-vietnam.html [93]             Whan-woo Yi, “Why has North Korea been silent for more than two months? ,” Korea Times, 27 November 2017.http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/11/103_239990.html [94]             “Joint statement by the Russian and Chinese foreign ministries on the Korean Peninsula’s problems,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 4 July 2017.http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/maps/kr/-/asset_publisher/PR7UbfssNImL/content/id/2807662 [95]             David Nakamura, “Trump puts North Korea back on state sponsors of terrorism list to escalate pressure over nuclear weapons,” Washington Post, 20 November 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/11/20/trump-puts-north-korea-back-on-state-sponsors-of-terrorism-list-to-escalate-pressure-over-nuclear-weapons; Anthony H. Cordesman, “North Korea and the Terrorism List: The Need for a Strategy, Not an Irritant,” CSIS, 20 November 2017.https://www.csis.org/analysis/north-korea-and-terrorism-list-need-strategy-not-irritant; Anna Fifield, “U.S., South Korea begin air combat drills that include simulated strikes on North Korea,” Washington Post, 4 December 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-south-korea-begin-air-combat-drills-that-include-simulated-strikes-on-north-korea/2017/12/04/9f4b43e0-d8ca-11e7-8e5f-ccc94e22b133_story.html [96]             David Wright, “North Korea’s Longest Missile Test Yet,” Union of Concerned Scientists, 29 November 2017.http://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/nk-longest-missile-test-ye; Anna Fifield, “North Korea has shown us its new missile, and it’s scarier than we thought,” Washington Post, 30 November 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/30/north-korea-has-shown-us-its-new-missile-and-its-scarier-than-we-thought; “DPRK Gov’t Statement on Successful Test-fire of New-Type ICBM,” Rodong Sinmun, 29 November 2017.http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2017-11-29-0002 [1]               Sang-Hun Choe, “Trump Likened to ‘a Dog Barking’ by North Korea’s Top Envoy,” New York Times, 21 September 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/world/asia/north-korea-trump-dog.html [1]               Simon Tisdall, “Why Trump’s Afghanistan strategy risks the worst of both worlds ” Guardian, 22 August 2017.https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/22/why-trumps-afghan-strategy-risks-the-worst-of-both-worlds [1]               Avi  Selk, “A cyclist flipped off Trump’s motorcade and entered the annals of presidential protests,” Washington Post, 29 October 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/10/29/a-cyclist-flipped-off-trumps-motorcade-and-entered-the-annals-of-presidential-protests/ [1]               Eugene Robinson, “What happens when you replace the president with a clown?,” Washington Post, 13 November 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-clown-goes-abroad/2017/11/13/854b7186-c8b7-11e7-8321-481fd63f174d_story.html [1]               Tim Beal, “Hegemony and Resistance, Compellence and Deterrence: Deconstructing the North Korean ‘Threat’ and Identifying America’s Strategic Alternatives,” Journal of Political Criticism, December 2017 [1]               David B. Larter, “If the US is going to war in North Korea, nobody told the US military,” Defense News, 11 August 2017.https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2017/08/11/if-the-us-is-going-to-war-in-north-korea-nobody-told-the-us-military/ [1]               Woo-sang Jeong and Min-hyuk Lim, “Moon Wins U.S. Support for ‘Leading Role’ in Talks with N.Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, 3 July 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/07/03/2017070300792.html; [1]               “Russia, China to put forward initiative on North Korea at UN meeting,” Tass, 5 July 2017.http://tass.com/politics/954819 [1]               Emily Rauhala, “The timing of North Korea’s nuke test could not be worse for China’s leader,” Washington Post, 4 September 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-timing-of-north-koreas-nuke-test-could-not-be-worse-for-chinas-xi/2017/09/04/f9d0677a-90bb-11e7-b9bc-b2f7903bab0d_story.html [1]               Chris Buckley, “China Enshrines ‘Xi Jinping Thought.’ What Does That Mean?,” New York Times, 24 October 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-constitution.html [1]               In-hwan Jung and Ji-won Noh, “US-South Korea alliance hindering efforts to find an exit strategy to NK nuclear crisis,” Hankyoreh, 29 October 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/816477.html [1]               Greg Torode and Ben Blanchard, “With all eyes on North Korea, Beijing looks ready to deploy fighter jets in the South China Sea,” Reuters via Business Insider, 31 October 2017.http://www.businessinsider.com/r-beijing-seen-poised-for-fresh-south-china-sea-assertiveness-2017-10?IR=T [1]               Motoko Rich, “Tokyo Voters’ Rebuke Signals Doubt About Shinzo Abe’s Future,” New York Times, 3 July 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/03/world/asia/japan-tokyo-shinzo-abe-election.html [1]               Tim Beal, “Abe Pulls It Off, But It Will End In Tears,” Zoom in Korea, 24 October 2017.http://www.zoominkorea.org/abe-pulls-it-off-but-it-will-end-in-tears/ [1]               Emily Rauhala and Simon Denyer, “Why the cheery Trump trip to China may not be so successful,” Washington Post, 9 November 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/trump-thinks-his-china-trip-went-great-that-could-be-a-problem/2017/11/09/2aff59ea-c53d-11e7-a441-3a768c8586f1_story.htm; Oliver Holmes and Tom Phillips, “Trump attacks countries ‘cheating’ America at Apec summit,” Guardian, 10 November 2017.https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/nov/10/trump-attacks-countries-cheating-america-at-apec-summi; Robinson, “What happens when you replace the president with a clown?; Max Boot, “Trump’s Worst Trip Ever. Until His Next One,” Foreign Policy, 14 November 2017.http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/14/trumps-worst-trip-ever-until-his-next-one/ [1]               David Nakamura, “Japanese leader Shinzo Abe plays the role of Trump’s loyal sidekick,” Washington Post, 6 November 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/japanese-leader-shinzo-abe-plays-the-role-of-trumps-loyal-sidekick/2017/11/06/cc23dcae-c2f1-11e7-afe9-4f60b5a6c4a0_story.html [1]               Gavan McCormack, “North Korea and a Rules-Based Order For the Indo-Pacific, East Asia, and the World,” Asia Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, 15 November 2017.http://apjjf.org/2017/22/McCormack.html [1]               Fareed Zakaria, “Kim Jong Un — smart and strategic?,” Washington Post, 14 September 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kim-jong-un–smart-and-strategic/2017/09/14/0c28a516-9988-11e7-82e4-f1076f6d6152_story.html [1]                Chris Green, “The Strategic Thinking behind North Korea’s Missile Gambit,” International Crisis Group, 30 August 2017.https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/korean-peninsula/strategic-thinking-behind-north-koreas-missile-gambit [1]               Ji-hye Jun, “Trump warns of ‘fire and fury’; N. Korea threatens to strike Guam ” Korea Times, 9 August 2017.http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/08/103_234484.html [1]               Rahn  Kim, “North Korea proves it has ability to strike Guam,” Korea Times, 29 August 2017.http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/08/103_235578.html [1]               Keith Johnson, “China’s ‘Guam Killers’ Threaten U.S. Anchor Base in Pacific,” Foreign Policy, 11 May 2016.http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/11/chinas-guam-killers-threaten-u-s-anchor-base-in-pacific; Jordan Wilson, “China’s Expanding Ability to Conduct Conventional Missile Strikes on Guam,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 10 May 2016.https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China%27s%20Expanding%20Ability%20to%20Conduct%20Conventional%20Missile%20Strikes%20on%20Guam.pdf [1]               James M. Dorsey, “Playing with Fire: Trump’s Iran policy risks cloning North Korea,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, August 2017.https://www.academia.edu/34114222/Playing_with_Fire_Trumps_Iran_policy_risks_cloning_North_Kore; Jeffery Lewis, “Trump’s Next Self-Inflicted Crisis Is a Nuclear Iran,” Foreign Policy, 30 August 2017.http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/30/trumps-next-self-inflicted-crisis-is-a-nuclear-iran/ [1]               Tim Beal, “The Korean Peninsula within the Framework of US Global Hegemony,” The Asia Pacific Journal – Japan Focus 14, no. 22:3 (2016); ———, “The Deployment of THAAD in Korea and the Struggle over US Global Hegemony,” Journal of Political Criticism, December 2016.http://www.timbeal.net.nz/geopolitics/Beal_JPC_THAAD.pdf [1]               Christine Kim and Jane Chung, “North Korea 2016 economic growth at 17-year high despite sanctions: South Korea,” Reuters, 21 July 2017.http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-economy-gdp-idUSKBN1A607; Gwang-deok Han, “North Korea’s GDP grew 3.9% in 2016, with $1,300 per capita income,” Hankyoreh, 23 July 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/803901.html [1] .             Some of this seems to have happened in the deal struck between South Korea na China on 31 October; Editorial, “Gov’t Has Capitulated to Chinese Bullying,” Chosun Ilbo, 1 November 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/11/01/2017110101595.htm; Yong-in Yi and Ji-eun Kim, “US likely to welcome compromise over THAAD deployment,” Hankyoreh, 1 November 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/817028.htm; Editorial, “Hopeful signs as South Korea and China move beyond THAAD dispute,” Hankyoreh, 1 November 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/817027.htm; Oi-hyun Kim, “Chinese concessions on THAAD speak to fears of losing influence on Korean Peninsula,” Hankyoreh, 1 November 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/817030.htm; Ji-eun Kim et al., “SK Foreign Minister rules out additional THAAD deployments, joining US MD system,” Hankyoreh, 31 October 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/816853.htm; Sang-hun Choe, Jane Perlez, and Mark Landler, “China Blinks on South Korea, Making Nice After a Year of Hostilities,” New York Times, 1 November 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/world/asia/china-south-korea-thaad.htm; Adam Taylor, “South Korea and China move to normalize relations after THAAD dispute,” Washington Post, 31 October 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/south-korea-and-china-move-to-normalize-relations-after-thaad-conflict/2017/10/31/60f2bad8-bde0-11e7-af84-d3e2ee4b2af1_story.html [1]               Rahn Kim, “Personnel affairs dragging down Moon gov’t,” Korea Times, 14 September 2017.http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/09/356_236482.html [1]               Kim Rahn, “Defense ministry deceived Moon on THAAD report,” Korea Times, 31 May 2017.http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/06/205_230387.html; In-hwan Jung, Ji-eun Kim, and Oi-hyun Kim, “Defense Minister raises option of bringing tactical nuclear weapons back to South Korea,” Hankyoreh, 6 September 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/809931.html; Anna Fifield, “South Korea’s defense minister suggests bringing back tactical U.S. nuclear weapons,” Washington Post, 4 September 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/south-koreas-defense-minister-raises-the-idea-of-bringing-back-tactical-us-nuclear-weapons/2017/09/04/7a468314-9155-11e7-b9bc-b2f7903bab0d_story.html [1]               Editorial, “Moon’s Appeasement of N.Korea Comes at the Wrong Time,” Chosun Ilbo, 15 September 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/09/15/2017091501431.html [1]               Yu-gyung Jung, “Moon administration stands firmly against redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons,” Hankyoreh, 13 September 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/810855.html [1]               Byong-su Park, Kyu-nam Kim, and Yu-gyung Jung, “President Moon rebukes Defense Ministry for its “lack of confidence”,” Hankyoreh, 29 August 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/808827.html [1]               “Defense chief vows stronger alliance with U.S. ,” Yonhap, 26 July 2017.http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2017/07/26/6/0401000000AEN20170726006200315F.htm; Yong-weon Yu, “Seoul Drafting New Plan for Full-Fledged War with N.Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, 29 August 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/08/29/2017082901321.html; Deok-han Kim, “U.S. ‘Favorably Inclined’ to Boosting S.Korean Missile Power,” Chosun Ilbo, 9 August 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/08/09/2017080901433.htm; In-hwan Jung, “US to step up sales of advanced military hardware in wake of North Korean nuclear test,” Hankyoreh, 7 September 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/810088.html; Sang-hun Choe, “South Korea Plans ‘Decapitation Unit’ to Try to Scare North’s Leaders,” New York Times, 12 September 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/world/asia/north-south-korea-decapitation-.html [1]               “Moon says dialogue with N. Korea ‘impossible,’ warns of destruction ‘beyond recovery’ “, Yonhap, 15 September 2017.http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/09/15/0200000000AEN20170915005653315.html [1]               Tim Beal, “A Korean Tragedy,” The Asia Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, 15 August 2017.http://apjjf.org/2017/16/Beal.htm; ———, “A Korean Tragedy: Update,” Zoom in Korea, 12 September 2017.http://kpolicy.org/a-korean-tragedy-update/ [1]               Geoffrey  Fattig, “How the U.S. Makes South Korea’s Life More Difficult,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 13 September 2017.http://fpif.org/how-the-u-s-makes-south-koreas-life-more-difficult/ [1]               David  Nakamura and Anne Gearan, “In U.N. speech, Trump threatens to ‘totally destroy North Korea’ and calls Kim Jong Un ‘Rocket Man’,” Washington Post, 19 September 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/09/19/in-u-n-speech-trump-warns-that-the-world-faces-great-peril-from-rogue-regimes-in-north-korea-iran/ [1]               “The Constitution of the Republic of Korea,” Constitutional Court of Korea, Republic of Korea, 29 October 1987.http://ri.ccourt.go.kr/eng/ccourt/news/related.html; Nick Visser, “Attack On North Korea Could Spare Allies, Secretary Mattis Says. Analysts Aren’t So Sure.,” Huffington Post, 18 September 2017 [1]               Christine Kim and Kaori Kaneko, “South Korea says Trump’s warning to North Korea ‘firm and specific’,” Reuters, 20 September 2017.http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-trump-reaction/south-korea-says-trumps-warning-to-north-korea-firm-and-specific-idUSKCN1BV0D; “Moon, Trump agree to boost military deterrence, put maximum pressure on N. Korea,” Yonhap, 22 September 2017.http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2017/09/22/0301000000AEN20170922001354315.html [1]               In-hwan Jung  et al., “Moon exhibits contradictory behavior during visit to UN,” Hankyoreh, 23 September 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/812233.html [1]               Andrew Roth, “Putin orders cut of 755 personnel at U.S. missions,” Washington Post, 30 July 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-orders-cut-of-755-personnel-at-us-missions/2017/07/30/8a4b0044-7555-11e7-8c17-533c52b2f014_story.htm; Jon Sharman, “Putin on US administration: ‘It’s difficult to talk with people who confuse Austria and Australia’,” Independent, 5 September 2017.http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/putin-us-administration-russia-austria-australia-confuse-george-w-bush-white-house-administration-a7930241.html [1]               Calculated from data in Table 18, “Military Balance 2017,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, 13 February 2017.http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military%20balance/issues/the-military-balance-2017-b47b. Military expenditure is only one part of the story, and moreover figures vary. The IISS gives $604,452billion for the US in 2016 but other sources estimate the real figures is closer to one trillion dollars; Chris  Hellman and Mattea  Kramer, “War Pay: The Nearly $1 Trillion National Security Budget ” TomDispatch, 22 May 2012.http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175545 [1]               Lower figure calculated using 2017 data from IISS and the average estimate for North Korea in given by “World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2016,” State Department, December 2016.https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/2016/index.htm. The higher figure calculated from a statement by a statement in the National Assembly in 2013; Kyu-won Kim, “Defense intelligence director says N. Korea would win in a one-on-one war,” Hankyoreh, 6 November 2013.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/610084.html [1]               Byron  Tau, Peter  Nicholas, and Siobhan Hughes, “GOP Congressman Sought Trump Deal on WikiLeaks, Russia,” Wall Street Journal, 15 September 2017.https://www.wsj.com/articles/gop-congressman-sought-trump-deal-on-wikileaks-russia-1505509918 [1]               ibid. [1]               Sarah D. Wire, “Rep. Dana Rohrabacher says Trump’s chief of staff is keeping him from talking to the president about Julian Assange,” Los Angeles Times, 4 October 2017.http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-report-rep-rohrabacher-says-white-1507155591-htmlstory.html [1]               Ross Douthat, “The 25th Amendment Solution for Removing Trump,” New York Times, 16 May 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/opinion/25th-amendment-trump.htm; John Hudak, “The 25th Amendment,” Brookings Institution, 9 June 2017.https://www.brookings.edu/blog/unpacked/2017/06/09/the-25th-amendment; Jeffrey Rosen, “The 25th Amendment Makes Presidential Disability a Political Question,” The Atlantic, 23 May 2017.https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/presidential-disability-is-a-political-question/527703; Dahlia Lithwick, “Is Donald Trump Too Incapacitated to Be President?,” Slate, 17 May 2017.http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2017/05/no_the_25th_amendment_is_not_the_solution.htm; Evan Osnos, “How Trump Could Get Fired,” New Yorker, 8 May 2017.https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/08/how-trump-could-get-fired [1]               “High Crimes and Misdemeanors,”  http://www.crf-usa.org/impeachment/high-crimes-and-misdemeanors.html. [1]               Bob Dreyfuss, “Robert Mueller’s End Game: Is Trump’s Impeachment a Possibility?,” The Nation, 12 October 2017.https://www.thenation.com/article/robert-muellers-end-game-is-trumps-impeachment-a-possibility/ [1]               Gregory Elich, “Did the Russians Really Hack the DNC?,” Counterpunch, 13 January 2017.http://www.counterpunch.org/2017/01/13/did-the-russians-really-hack-the-dnc; Patrick Lawrence, “A New Report Raises Big Questions About Last Year’s DNC Hack,” Nation, 9 August 2017.https://www.thenation.com/article/a-new-report-raises-big-questions-about-last-years-dnc-hack/ [1]               Jason Le Miere, “Steve Bannon Helped Write Trump’s U.N. Speech, Claims Sebastian Gorka, Who Called it ‘Classic MAGA Agenda’,” Newsweek, 21 September 2017.http://www.newsweek.com/steve-bannon-trump-speech-gorka-669140 [1]               Karen DeYoung and Greg  Jaffe, “For some foreign diplomats, the Trump White House is a troubling enigma,” Washington Post, 9 October 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/for-some-foreign-diplomats-the-trump-white-house-is-a-troubling-enigma/2017/10/09/50323152-a534-11e7-ade1-76d061d56efa_story.htm; Antony J. Blinken, “Trump Alienates America’s Allies and Hands Iran a Victory,” New York Times, 13 October 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/13/opinion/trump-false-narrative-iran.html [1]               Jim Michaels, “What war? U.S. military not mobilizing despite North Korea threats,” USA Today, 14 August 2017.https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/08/12/north-korea-crisis-no-change-u-s-north-korea-military-posture/560652001/;”U.S. forces in Korea to hold drill for evacuation of noncombatants in June,” Yonhap, 23 April 2017.http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN2017042300130031; Dan Lamothe, “Despite Trump’s threats to North Korea, the U.S. military doesn’t appear to be on a new wartime footing,” Washington Post, 11 August 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/08/11/despite-trumps-threats-to-north-korea-the-u-s-military-doesnt-appear-to-be-on-a-wartime-footing; Michael D. Shear and Michael R. Gordon, “How U.S. Military Actions Could Play Out in North Korea,” New York Times, 11 August 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/11/world/asia/north-korea-trump-military.html; Sang-hun Choe, “U.S. Military to Begin Drills to Evacuate Americans From South Korea,” New York Times, 16 October 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/world/asia/us-drills-evacuate-civilians.html [1]               Jin-seok Shon, “Fitch Says N.Korean Risk ‘Nothing New’,” Chosun Ilbo, 13 October 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/10/13/2017101301142.html; “Moody’s Maintains Credit Rating for Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, 19 October 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/10/19/2017101901280.html [1]               Robert Kuttner, “Steve Bannon, Unrepentant,” American Prospect, 16 August 2017.http://prospect.org/article/steve-bannon-unrepentant [1]               Oliver Holmes, “What is the US military’s presence near North Korea? ,” Guardian, 9 August 2017.https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/09/what-is-the-us-militarys-presence-in-south-east-asia [1]               Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer  Lind, “The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,” International Security 36, no. 2 (2011). [1]               Editorial, “Reckless game over the Korean Peninsula runs risk of real war,” Global Times, 10 August 2017.http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1060791.shtml [1]               Robert Farley, “Asia’s Greatest Fear: A U.S.-China War,” National Interest, 9 June 2014.http://nationalinterest.org/feature/asia-flames-us-china-war-10621?page=sho; David C.  Gompert, Astrid Stuth  Cevallos, and Cristina  L. Garafola, “War with China: Thinking through the Unthinkable,” RAND, 28 July 2016.http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1140/RAND_RR1140.pd; Peter Apps, “Commentary: Here’s how a U.S.-China war could play out,” Reuters, 9 August 2016.http://www.reuters.com/article/us-commentary-china-apps-idUSKCN10I0W; John Pilger, “The Coming War on China,” Counterpunch, 2 December 2016.http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/12/02/the-coming-war-on-china; Benjamin Haas, “Steve Bannon: ‘We’re going to war in the South China Sea … no doubt’ ” Guardian, 2 February 2017.https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/02/steve-bannon-donald-trump-war-south-china-sea-no-doub; Robert Farley, “Could America Win a War Against Russia and China at the Same Time? ,” National Interest, 3 February 2017.http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/could-america-win-war-against-russia-china-the-same-time-19305 [1]               Dan  De Luce, Jenna McLaughlin, and Elias Groll, “Armageddon by Accident,” Foreign Policy, 18 October 2017.http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/18/armageddon-by-accident-north-korea-nuclear-war-missiles/ [1][1]             Dan Lamothe, “U.S. jets drop live bombs in a new show of force aimed at North Korea,” Washington Post, 18 September 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/09/18/u-s-jets-dropped-live-bombs-in-a-new-massive-show-of-force-aimed-at-north-korea/ [1]               Byong-su Park and Yu-gyung Jung, “US B-1B bombers again conduct military exercises over Korean Peninsula,” Hankyoreh, 12 October 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/814247.html [1]               Daniel Ten Kate and Peter S.  Green, “Defending Korea Line Seen Contrary to Law by Kissinger Remains U.S. Policy,” Bloomberg, 17 December 2010.http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-16/defending-korea-line-seen-contrary-to-law-by-kissinger-remains-u-s-policy.html [1]               “N.Korean Envoy Warns Nuclear War Could Break out at ‘Any Moment’,” Chosun Ilbo, 18 October 2017.http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2017/10/18/2017101800882.html [1]               Beal, “Hegemony and Resistance, Compellence and Deterrence: Deconstructing the North Korean ‘Threat’ and Identifying America’s Strategic Alternatives.” [1]               Hye-jeong Choi, “South Korea holds ultimate decision for military action on Peninsula,” Hankyoreh, 18 August 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/807417.htm; Rahn  Kim, “US won’t go to war without ROK: minister,” Korea Times, 12 October 2017.http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/10/103_237566.html [1]               Robert Costa and Philip Rucker, “Military leaders consolidate power in Trump administration,” Washington Post, 22 August 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/military-leaders-consolidate-power-in-trump-administration/2017/08/22/db4f7bee-875e-11e7-a94f-3139abce39f5_story.htm; Stephen Kinzer, “America’s slow-motion military coup,” Boston Globe, 16 September 2017.https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/09/16/america-slow-motion-military-coup/WgzYW9MPBIbsegCwd4IpJN/amp.htm; Masha Gessen, “John Kelly and the Language of the Military Coup,” New Yorker, 20 October 2017.https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/john-kelly-and-the-language-of-the-military-coup?mbid=social_twitte; “”Above All” – The Junta Expands Its Claim To Power,” Moon of Alabama, 21 October 2017.http://www.moonofalabama.org/2017/10/above-all-the-junta-expands-its-claim-to-power.htm; Christopher Wallace, “Trump’s generals: President turns to military men for counsel, order,” Fox News, 8 August 2017.http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/08/08/trumps-generals-president-turns-to-military-men-for-counsel-order.html [1]               Michael F. Cairo, “Civilian Control of the Military,” Democracy Papers [State Department, Bureau of International Information Programs], 26 October 2005.https://web.archive.org/web/20051026185242/http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/democracy/dmpaper12.htm [1]               Andrew Bacevich, “The Greatest Person then Living,” London Review of Book, 27 July 2017.https://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n15/andrew-bacevich/the-greatest-person-then-living [1]               Costa and Rucker, “Military leaders consolidate power in Trump administration.” [1]               Harry Harris, “Despite Threats and Uncertainty, America’s Commitment to Asia Remains Ironclad,” Huffington Post, 21 September 2016.http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/despite-threats-and-uncertainty-americas-commitment-to-asia-remains-ironclad_us_57e14aa2e4b08cb14097f4f9 [1]               Jeffery Lewis, “Let’s Face It: North Korean Nuclear Weapons Can Hit the U.S.,” New York Times, 3 August 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/opinion/north-korea-nukes.htm; Michael Morell, “North Korea may already be able to launch a nuclear attack on the U.S.,” Washington Post, 6 September 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/north-korea-may-already-be-able-to-launch-a-nuclear-attack-on-the-us/2017/09/06/ce375080-9325-11e7-8754-d478688d23b4_story.html [1]               Hendrik  Hertzberg, “Cakewalk,” New Yorker, 14 April 2003.http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2003/04/14/cakewal; Ken Adelman, “Cakewalk In Iraq,” Washington Post, 13 February 2002.http://www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2002/msg00243.html; Harry J. Kazianis, “The Case for Containing North Korea,” The National Interest, 15 October 2017.http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/the-case-containing-north-korea-22727 [1]               Garrett Epps, “Trump Doesn’t Have the Authority to Attack North Korea Without Congress,” The Atlantic, 30 August 2017.https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/trump-doesnt-have-the-power-to-attack-north-korea-without-congress/538425; Jeremy Herb, “Could Congress stop Trump from bombing North Korea?,” CNN, 10 August 2017.http://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/09/politics/trump-bomb-north-korea-congress/index.html;David Ignatius, “Our best hope against nuclear war,” Washington Post, 3 October 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/our-best-hope-against-nuclear-war/2017/10/03/7df61d86-a883-11e7-92d1-58c702d2d975_story.html [1]               “Zarif: If U.S. wants new nuclear concessions, we do, too,” Tehran Times, 23 September 2017.http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/417021/Zarif-If-U-S-wants-new-nuclear-concessions-we-do-too [1]               John Delury, “Lessons from North Korea,” Foreign Affairs (2015). [1]               David Lai and Alyssa Blair, “How to Learn to Live With a Nuclear North Korea,” Foreign Policy, 7 August 2017.https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/07/how-to-learn-to-live-with-a-nuclear-north-korea/ [1]               Jackson Diehl, “Bob Corker on Trump’s biggest problem: The ‘castration’ of Rex Tillerson,” Washington Post, 13 October 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/bob-corker-on-trumps-biggest-problem-the-castration-of-rex-tillerson/2017/10/13/8a331abc-b03b-11e7-be94-fabb0f1e9ffb_story.html [1]               Yong-in Yi and Byong-su Park, “Sources suggest secret negotiations taking place between North Korea and US,” Hankyoreh, 18 August 2017.http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/807415.htm; Si-soo Park, “N. Korea, US hold ‘secret’ meeting in Switzerland: report,” Korea Times, 14 September 2017.http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/09/103_236447.htm; David E Sanger, “U.S. in Direct Communication With North Korea, Says Tillerson,” New York Times, 30 September 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/30/world/asia/us-north-korea-tillerson.html [1]               Ashley Parker and Greg Jaffe, “Inside the ‘adult day-care center’: How aides try to control and coerce Trump,” Washington Post, 16 October 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/inside-the-adult-day-care-center-how-aides-try-to-control-and-coerce-trump/2017/10/15/810b4296-b03d-11e7-99c6-46bdf7f6f8ba_story.html [1]               Rorry Daniels, “Time to save face in US-DPRK relations,” Pacnet Newsletter, 10 October 2017.https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-73-time-save-face-us-dprk-relations [1]               “Starvation ‘as a weapon’ is a war crime, UN chief warns parties to conflict in Syria,” UN News Centre, 14 January 2016.http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53003 [1]               Editorial Board, “Options for Removing Kim Jong Un,” Wall Street Journal, 4 September 2017.https://www.wsj.com/articles/options-for-removing-kim-jong-un-1504556500 [1]               Tim Beal, “North Korea’s Deterrent and Trump’s Options,” Zoom in Korea, 26 July 2017.http://www.zoominkorea.org/north-koreas-deterrent-and-trumps-options/ [1]               Sang-Hun Choe, “South Koreans Feel Cheated After U.S. Carrier Miscue,” New York Times, 19 April 2017.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/world/asia/aircraft-carrier-south-korea.htm; Amy Davidson, “Donald Trump, North Korea, and the Case of the Phantom Armada,” New Yorker, 19 April 2017.http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/donald-trump-north-korea-and-the-case-of-the-phantom-armada [1]               Ironically It was Obama who first introduced Twitter to presidential politics back in 2007 and in contrast to Trump he seems to used it sparingly and effectively; Vann R.  Newkirk II, “The American Idea in 140 Characters,” The Atlantic, 24 March 2016.https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/twitter-politics-last-decade/475131; Rebecca Savransky, “Obama’s tweet after Charlottesville one of most popular tweets ever,” The Hill, 15 August 2017.http://thehill.com/homenews/news/346602-obamas-tweet-after-charlottesville-one-of-most-popular-tweets-ever [1]               Sean Rossman, “Trump has tweeted 17 times about North Korea since becoming president,” USA Today, 4 July 2017.https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/07/04/trump-has-tweeted-17-times-north-korea-since-becoming-president/449885001; Zack Beauchamp, “Here are 2 wildly incorrect Trump administration tweets about North Korea,” Vox, 2 October 2017.https://www.vox.com/world/2017/10/2/16395048/north-korea-trump-tweet; Doyle McManus, “Trump undercuts Tillerson with every tweet,” Los Angeles Times, 4 October 2017.http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mcmanus-tillerson-trump-north-korea-20171004-story.html [1]               “Everything President Trump has tweeted (and what it was about),”  http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-updates-everything-president-trump-has-tweeted-and-what-it-was-about-2017-htmlstory.html. [1]               Henry Farrell, “North Korea just called Trump’s bluff. So what happens now?,” Washington Post, 9 August 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/08/donald-trump-is-playing-a-dangerous-game-with-north-korea; Jeffrey Frankel, “Can Trump Deal with North Korea and China?,” Project Syndicate, 24 August 2017.https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-deal-making-china-north-korea-by-jeffrey-frankel-2017-08 [1]               Hugh White, “With their threats to China, Trump and Tillerson are making rookie blunders that will only hurt US credibility,” South China Morning Post, 17 January 2017.http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2062762/their-threats-china-trump-and-tillerson-are-making-rooki; Kathleen Parker, “Dealmaker in Chief? More like the Backdown President,” Washington Post, 25 April 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dealmaker-in-chief-more-like-the-backdown-president/2017/04/25/7cddddc6-29df-11e7-b605-33413c691853_story.html [1]               Eliot A.  Cohen, “Rex Tillerson Must Go,” The Atlantic, 2 October 2017.https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/trump-tillerson-self-respect-north-korea-puerto-rico-diplomacy/541695/ [1]               Eliot A. Cohen, The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force (New York: Basic Books, 2017). [1]               ———, “How were we in Vietnam?,” New York Times, 21 July 1985.http://www.nytimes.com/1985/07/21/books/how-were-we-in-vietnam.html [1]               Whan-woo Yi, “Why has North Korea been silent for more than two months? ,” Korea Times, 27 November 2017.http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/11/103_239990.html [1]               “Joint statement by the Russian and Chinese foreign ministries on the Korean Peninsula’s problems,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 4 July 2017.http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/maps/kr/-/asset_publisher/PR7UbfssNImL/content/id/2807662 [1]               David Nakamura, “Trump puts North Korea back on state sponsors of terrorism list to escalate pressure over nuclear weapons,” Washington Post, 20 November 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/11/20/trump-puts-north-korea-back-on-state-sponsors-of-terrorism-list-to-escalate-pressure-over-nuclear-weapons; Anthony H. Cordesman, “North Korea and the Terrorism List: The Need for a Strategy, Not an Irritant,” CSIS, 20 November 2017.https://www.csis.org/analysis/north-korea-and-terrorism-list-need-strategy-not-irritant; Anna Fifield, “U.S., South Korea begin air combat drills that include simulated strikes on North Korea,” Washington Post, 4 December 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-south-korea-begin-air-combat-drills-that-include-simulated-strikes-on-north-korea/2017/12/04/9f4b43e0-d8ca-11e7-8e5f-ccc94e22b133_story.html [1]               David Wright, “North Korea’s Longest Missile Test Yet,” Union of Concerned Scientists, 29 November 2017.http://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/nk-longest-missile-test-ye; Anna Fifield, “North Korea has shown us its new missile, and it’s scarier than we thought,” Washington Post, 30 November 2017.https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/30/north-korea-has-shown-us-its-new-missile-and-its-scarier-than-we-thought; “DPRK Gov’t Statement on Successful Test-fire of New-Type ICBM,” Rodong Sinmun, 29 November 2017.http://www.rodong.rep.kp/en/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2017-11-29-0002 #Trump #KimJongUn #KoreanWar #SouthKorea #Japanmilitary #Nuclearweapons #TimBeal #MoonJaein #NorthKorea

By Martin Hart-Landsberg | December 3, 2017 Tensions between the US and North Korea are again rising in the wake of North Korea’s November 28th test of an ICBM that experts believe has the potential to deliver a nuclear bomb to cities on the east coast of the US, including Washington D.C. As I have written before, we desperately need to change US foreign policy towards North Korea.  North Korea’s leaders continue to seek talks with the United States, with all issues on the table, those of concern to them and those of concern to the US government.  But the US government continues to refuse.  The Trump administration has even rejected North Korean offers to freeze its production and testing of missiles and nuclear weapons in return for a halt to US war games directed against North Korea. Instead, Trump continues Obama’s strategy of responding to every North Korean missile launch or nuclear test with new military threats and sanctions. Unfortunately, changing US foreign policy towards North Korea is no easy matter.  One reason is that there are powerful forces opposing a de-escalation of tensions.  Sadly, the tension is useful to the US military industrial complex, which needs enemies to support its desire increase in the military budget.  It is also useful to the US military, providing it with a justification for maintaining troops on the Asian mainland and in Japan.  The tension also helps the US government isolate China and boost right-wing political tendencies in Japan and South Korea, developments favorable to our own militarists and right-wingers.  Of course, the costs of US policy fall on ordinary people. Another reason for the difficulty in changing US policy towards North Korea is that the US media does little to provide the context necessary for people in the United States to understand its lawless and destructive nature. The illegality of Trump administration threats of destruction The Trump administration has repeatedly threatened North Korea with total destruction.  What is missing from media accounts of these threats is the explanation that they represent a violation of the UN Charter and international law.  As Gavan McCormack explains: According to the UN Charter’s Article 2 (3), disputes between states must be settled by peaceful means and (4) “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state …” [italics added]. Article 33 further specifies the obligation of parties to any dispute likely to endanger international peace and security to “first of all, seek a solution by negotiation inquiry, mediation, conciliation … or other peaceful means of their own choice.” By ruling out negotiations with North Korea and insisting only on submission, the US, Japan and Australia ignore or breach this clear rule (and Japan breaches also the proscription on the “threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes” in its own constitution). Going beyond that, President Trump has also not only insulted the North Korean leader from the platform of the UN General Assembly but actually threatened his country with “total destruction,” by “fire and fury, and frankly power the likes of which this world has never seen before.” That surely qualifies as threat. It is even genocidal, and therefore criminal behavior, not only on the part of those (Trump) who utter it but on the part also of those like Abe and Turnbull (to whom perhaps now India’s Modi is to be added) who endorse and encourage it. Moreover, in 1996, the International Court of Justice, in response to a UN request, ruled that threats to use nuclear weapons against another country are a violation of international law except “in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.”  In certainly seems clear that the US is in violation of international law because of its repeated threats and military exercises designed to practice a nuclear attack on North Korea. Tragically, the US media has remained silent about this lawlessness on the part of the US government. The illegality of US-initiated UN sanctions on North Korea The US has aggressively pursued the adoption of UN sanctions on North Korea.  The ones adopted in August and September are the most sweeping yet. They call for blocking North Korean exports of coal, iron, iron ore, lead, lead ore, seafood and textiles, all of which are important earners of foreign exchange. The resolutions also ban countries from opening new or expanding existing joint ventures in North Korea or renewing labor export agreements.  They also impose a cap on the amount of oil North Korea is allowed to import and call for a total ban on the country’s import of natural gas and condensates.  If rigorously enforced these sanctions will devastate living conditions for the great majority of North Koreans. However, sanctions that target an entire population with the aim of causing economic collapse, such as those being imposed on North Korea, are illegal under the UN charter.  As McCormack points out: Only sanctions carefully tailored to apply to those who act in the name of the government and bear responsibility for its offensive actions may be legitimate. . . . The point is clear that that those imposing sanctions bear an obligation to ensure they impact only upon those who are in a position of power, not on innocent civilians. There is reason to wonder if the United Nations itself, by the ordering of collective punishment of the entire North Korean people for offenses committed by their government, may be acting criminally. Again, where are the stories pointing out the lawlessness of US and UN actions? The missing explanation of North Korean responses to US policy The reporting on North Korea’s November 28th ICBM test offers another example of the US media’s failure to educate its readers. For example, here is the LA Times: The launch is North Korea’s first since it fired an intermediate-range missile over Japan on Sept. 15, and may have broken any efforts at diplomacy meant to end the North’s nuclear ambitions. U.S. officials have sporadically floated the idea of direct talks with North Korea if it maintained restraint. . . . Italy’s U.N. Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi, the current Security Council president, told reporters late Tuesday that “it’s certainly very worrying. Everybody was hoping that there would be restraint from the regime.” This reporting certainly suggests that North Korea just doesn’t want peace no matter how hard the US and broader international community try.  But the story changes if we provide some missing context. Since 2013 North Korea has offered to halt its testing of missiles and nuclear weapons if the US would halt its war games.  The US organizes two different annual war games in South Korea, the first is held over March and April and the second is in August.  But from time to time, it also engages in other smaller military exercises on and near the Korean peninsula. The August 2017 war games included planning for a nuclear attack and “decapitation” of North Korea’s leadership.  These August war games are smaller than the March-April ones but still large.  This one included some 20,000 US and 50,000 South Korean troops.  And this year, for the first time, they were combined with a separate 18 day live-fire exercise involving US and Japanese forces on the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. North Korea responded to these threatening maneuvers by first firing a missile over Hokkaido on August 29, the day after the completion of the US-led exercises.  Then on September 3, it conducted its sixth and largest test of a nuclear weapon.  And finally, on September 15, it tested a new intermediate-range missile to demonstrate its ability to hit the major US air base in Guam. There are 75 days from September 15 to November 28; this is an important interval.  The reason is that the US had publicly called upon North Korea to halt its missile testing for at least 60 days to show its good will. For example, in August, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson told a group of reporters that “The best signal that North Korea could give us that they’re prepared to talk would be to stop these missile launches . . . We’ve not had an extended period of time where they have not taken some type of provocative action by launching ballistic missiles. So I think that would be the first and strongest signal they could send us is just stop, stop these missile launches.”  And in October, Joseph Yun, the U.S. State Department’s top official on North Korea policy, told an audience at the Council on Foreign Relations “that if North Korea halted nuclear and missile testing for about 60 days, that would be the signal the United States needs to resume direct dialogue with Pyongyang.” As we have seen, the North Koreans did refrain from missile launches and weapon tests for more than 60 days.  But, what did the US do during that time to encourage North Korea? On September 23 the Pentagon sent B-1B Lancer bombers, nicknamed “the swan of death,” to fly over international airspace just off the coast of North Korea, the first time since the Korean War that a U.S. bomber flew over North Korea’s east coast. Then for five days, starting October 16, the US conducted joint naval exercises with South Korea that included the nuclear aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan, three nuclear submarines, Aegis destroyers and more than 40 other battleships and numerous fighter aircraft. In November, the US conducted more navel drills.  This time it was a four-day exercise involving three aircraft carriers–the USS Ronald Reagan, Theodore Roosevelt and Nimitz–and their multiship strike groups in the waters between South Korea and Japan.  This was the first time all three aircraft carriers were together in the Western Pacific in a decade.  South Korean and Japanese warships also participated in the exercise. Also in November, President Trump placed North Korea back on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, which meant new sanctions.  And finally, again in November, the US announced yet another war game to be scheduled for the period December 4-8 involving US, Japanese, and South Korean forces.  Called Vigilant Ace, the military announced that this exercise would include “enemy infiltration” and “precision strike drills” and involve 8 air bases, 12,000 soldiers, and 280 aircraft, including the two stealth fighters, the F-22 and the F-35.  This was to be the first time that the F-22 and F-35 would be used in war games on the Korean peninsula. So, after waiting 75 days, and observing US actions, all of which were hostile, North Korea not surprisingly responded with the launch of its most powerful ICBM, showing the US that it could target even its capital if attacked.  But by presenting this missile launch without the appropriate context the media made it appear as just another example of North Korea’s recklessness and hostility. Sadly, we have a lot of work to do. Martin Hart-Landsberg is Professor Emeritus of Economics at Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Oregon; Adjunct Researcher at the Institute for Social Sciences, Gyeongsang National University, South Korea; and Adjunct Professor at Simon Fraser University, Canada. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Korea Policy Institute and the steering committee of the Alliance of Scholars Concerned About Korea, a co-editor of Critical Asian Studies, and has served as consultant for the Korea program of the American Friends Service Committee. Follow his blog, Reports from the Economic Front. #Trump #MartinHartLandsberg #Nuclearweapons #Asia #NorthKorea

RT Deutsch Interview with Gregory Elich |November 30, 2017 Published originally on RT Deutsch and  gregoryelich.org Q: President Donald Trump put North Korea back on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, a designation that allows the United States to impose more sanctions and risks inflaming tensions over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. How could Trump‘s policy affect China‘s and Russia‘s ties to Pyongyang? What effect will this have on North Korea? A: The Trump administration’s policy has already had a severe impact on Russian and Chinese relations with North Korea, and this latest measure only deepens the freeze. It didn’t have to be this way, as both Russia and China sought regional economic integration with North Korea. Russia had signed a deal with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to modernize its rail system, in exchange for access to mineral resources. There was also the Rajin-Khasan Railway project, which would have benefited North and South Korea, as well as Russia and China. For its part, China had been expanding joint economic projects with North Korea, which also would have led to increased economic integration. Imagine how different the situation would look today, had the Trump administration chosen to support Russia’s and China’s efforts. Instead, Washington’s harsh rhetoric and punitive actions prompted North Korea to fast-track its missile and nuclear weapons program. That, in turn, has provided Trump with the pretext for further ramping up tensions. The immediate effect on North Korea of being designated a state sponsor of terrorism is somewhat limited, in that the nation is already facing draconian sanctions. However, the inclusion of Chinese companies in the sanctions can be considered a shot across China’s bow. It is a message to China that it can either cooperate with the U.S. on increasing pressure on North Korea or face economic punishment through more sanctions on Chinese firms. Trump has also announced that the terror designation is only the opening step in a series of further actions he intends to take against North Korea. Q: From a Japanese perspective this was very welcomed. For Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the fear of being attacked by a North Korean rocket is a convenient one. The people´s minds are in favor of Abe and his attempt to change the constitution that allows Japan to engage in a war and invest in the military. What is to your understanding of the Japanese role in the conflict? A: Because Trump and Abe are of like mind when it comes to North Korea, Abe is in effect playing the role of echo chamber for Trump, validating the latter’s thoughts and plans. No doubt, it is for this reason that Trump communicates with Abe on the subject far more often than he does with South Korean President Moon Jae-in. At a time when it is vital that Trump take into account dissenting viewpoints and consider the complexities of the situation, the relationship with Abe is instead encouraging Trump’s conviction that he has little or nothing to learn from those who may differ with him. It has long been Washington’s goal, predating Trump, for Japan to change its constitution so that it could directly support U.S. military operations. The Trump administration is pushing hard to establish a U.S.-Japan-South Korea military alliance that would not only confront North Korea but also serve as a sort of Asia-Pacific counterpart to NATO. That coalition could act as one in any military adventures the U.S. chooses to launch in future years. Q: This decision was made when a high-level envoy from Beijing returned from Pyongyang. Officially, the Chinese visit to the neighboring country was made in conjunction with the 19th party congress, which manifested Xi Jinping‘s second five-year term. But without publicly being said it looked according to the press as an effort from China to reestablish or reconfirm ties with Pyongyang and discuss the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. What is your understanding of Chinese-North Korean relations? What kind of leverage does China have on North Korea today? A: China and North Korea are not commenting on the content of those talks, so one can only speculate as to their exact nature. I would like to think that Chinese envoy Song Tao’s visit to Pyongyang aimed to improve relations and engage in discussions on the basis of mutual respect on how to find a way out of the impasse that the U.S. has imposed. But I suspect it is more likely that the visit was driven by China’s wish to avoid Washington’s wrath and that the message was for North Korea not to do anything to embolden Trump further and to consider giving into his demands. China’s primary goals are peace on the Korean Peninsula and to maintain good economic relations with the United States, a significant trade partner. It views Washington’s reaction to North Korea’s nuclear program as a potential threat to both of those goals. Since it is not possible to influence U.S. behavior in a significant way, Chinese officials have continually attempted to dissuade North Korea from pursuing its nuclear program, and this has placed a strain on relations. The widespread view in the U.S. that China can and does have leverage over North Korea is based on a profound misunderstanding. The most salient aspect of the DPRK’s political philosophy is pride in its independence and the determination to choose its path. No one is going to be able to dictate what it should do. Ironically, if anything, the UN sanctions that have sharply curtailed economic ties between China and North Korea have only reduced what little influence China may have had. Q: During the last vote on sanctions against North Korea, China and Russia used their rights for a veto. They feared that sanctions against North Korea would cause a humanitarian disaster. Does the Western world fail to interpret the real domestic situation in North Korea when they decide to use sanctions as a tool to pressure the leadership? A: On the contrary, not only does the United States take into account the economic harm sanctions can cause, it is counting on that. The aim of sanctions is to inflict collective punishment on a nation’s entire population. The same was true of any of the sanctions campaigns the U.S. waged against other countries in the past. In effect, it is war by non-military means, and humanitarian considerations don’t factor. China and Russia have voted in favor of all UN sanctions against North Korea that the United States has submitted, but their veto capability allowed them to negotiate a reduction in the severity of sanctions. Even so, the final versions of UN sanctions as passed have been quite extreme. Q: The South Korean president said his goal is to reestablish diplomatic channels with Pyongyang. How can this be achieved? What has been done so far? Are those attempts undermined by the U.S.? A: Moon Jae-in was elected in part because of his vow to improve relations with North Korea. After taking office, he has mostly backtracked on those pledges. Moon has voiced strong support for Trump’s policy of “maximum pressure” on North Korea and remarked favorably on Trump’s belligerent rhetoric. He has also repeatedly said that now is not the time for dialogue with North Korea. Moon has limited himself to proposing talks with North Korea on relatively minor matters, such as resuming meetings of divided families and reestablishing military and government hotlines. The North Koreans have rejected those proposals, accusing Moon of insincerity, due to his advocacy for increasing sanctions and building up military pressure. I see no prospect of Moon achieving any progress on reestablishing diplomatic channels with North Korea as long as he continues to offer total support to Trump’s reckless policy. As to why Moon’s position has shifted so dramatically after taking office, one can only guess. There may have been some behind the scenes pressure from the United States, or Moon may feel that if he gives Trump everything else he asks, he may have enough influence to dissuade Trump from attacking North Korea. Certainly, on more than one occasion Moon has said that the U.S. cannot launch a war on the Korean Peninsula without South Korea’s agreement. It is notable, though, that no one in Washington is making the same claim. Q: Trump wanted to form an alliance between Japan, Seoul, and Washington against North Korea. But this failed due to the never-ending dispute about Seoul‘s fear of more retaliation from China. The deployment of THAAD damaged South Korean-Chinese relations severely. How much does Seoul follow American orders? A: By foisting the unwanted THAAD on South Korea, the United States did cause a significant rift between China and South Korea. Recently, however, South Korea has prioritized repairing relations with China and substantial progress has been made along those lines. I don’t think the United States is going to relent on efforts to establish a U.S.-South Korea-Japan military alliance, as this is one of its key geopolitical goals in the Asia-Pacific. The main roadblock now is that the majority of South Koreans find such an alliance unpalatable, given the historical memory of brutal colonial domination by Imperial Japan. But what the South Korean people may want is not a consideration for U.S. officials, and I anticipate that in the end the U.S. will get its alliance. There are many ways for the U.S. to impose its will on South Korea. Q: Is there a military solution for the US in North Korea. If not, how can diplomacy be successful on the issues of the Korean Peninsula? A: The first thing that must be said is that any talk of a solution is regarding a problem that is entirely artificial. It is the United States that manufactured the situation by sanctioning North Korea and repeatedly carrying out war exercises in the region, in which it practiced the bombing and invasion of the DPRK. And it is the United States that demonstrated through launching a series of unprovoked attacks on essentially defenseless nations that only a nuclear deterrent can offer protection to North Korea. Now that North Korea has made substantial progress towards achieving an effective nuclear deterrent, the United States has a simple solution to the supposed concern over nuclear missiles being fired at U.S. territory or bases: don’t attack North Korea! U.S. officials know very well that there is no chance of North Korea launching a first strike. It would be suicidal for the DPRK to do so. The real threat to the United States is the example that North Korea is setting. If it can complete development of a nuclear deterrent, it would prevent the United States from being able to attack it. Other small nations facing U.S. hostility could take note of that example. The last thing U.S. officials want to see is for target nations being able to defend themselves. Consequently, Washington considers it a priority to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear program. Unfortunately, the Trump’s administration’s idea of “diplomacy” is to continue applying sanctions until North Korea capitulates. Only after North Korea gives the United States what it wants – nuclear disarmament or at least substantial progress in that direction – would the Trump administration consider talks. And what would be left to talk about if the U.S. gets what it wants as a precondition? Why, more demands on North Korea, relating to other matters. Sanctions wouldn’t be lifted on the DPRK until it not only dismantles its nuclear program but also much of its conventional forces as well. It would also need to implement a host of political and economic demands. This is a long way from North Korea’s desire for diplomacy based on mutual “action for action.” The DPRK wants the normal give and take and compromise of diplomacy. Since the Trump administration rules out diplomacy, it is unlikely to happen. Trump has narrowed down the options to war or a sanctions-induced humanitarian disaster that compels North Korea to surrender to U.S. demands without receiving anything in return. The big question is how long Trump is willing to wait for that humanitarian disaster before he wants to resort to war. His military advisors have informed him of the enormous consequences of the military option, but how much of that matters to Trump? We don’t know, but the indications are not encouraging. Perhaps the best that one can hope for is for the status quo to continue until the next U.S. president takes office. There is no reason to expect Trump’s successor to be any more inclined to diplomacy, but one can hope that he or she will at least be less open to the military option. Unfortunately, by backing the United States to the hilt on North Korea, Moon Jae-in has only succeeded in training Trump to disregard him and South Korea’s interests. This is unfortunate because were South Korea to oppose Trump vigorously and prioritize improving relations with North Korea, it could be a game changer. Gregory Elich is on the Board of Directors of the Jasenovac Research Institute and the Advisory Board of the Korea Policy Institute. He is a member of the Solidarity Committee for Democracy and Peace in Korea, a columnist for Voice of the People, and one of the co-authors of Killing Democracy: CIA and Pentagon Operations in the Post-Soviet Period, published in the Russian language. He is also a member of the Task Force to Stop THAAD in Korea and Militarism in Asia and the Pacific. His website is https://gregoryelich.org Follow him on Twitter at @GregoryElich #Trump #GregoryElich #KoreanWar #Nuclearweapons #NorthKorea

Noam Chomsky. (Flickr/ Andrew Rusk) By C.J. Polychroniou | June 26, 2018 Originally published in Truthout. After 18 months of Trump in the White House, American politics finds itself at a crossroads. The United States has moved unmistakably toward a novel form of fascism that serves exclusively corporate interests and the military, while promoting at the same time a highly reactionary social agenda infused with religious and crude nationalistic overtones, all with an uncanny touch of political showmanship. In this exclusive Truthout interview, world-renowned linguist and public intellectual Noam Chomsky analyzes some of the latest developments in Trumpistan and their consequences for democracy and world order. C.J. Polychroniou: Noam, I want to start by asking for your reading of what took place at the Singapore summit, and the way this event was covered in the US media. Noam Chomsky: It’s reminiscent of Sherlock Holmes and the dog that didn’t bark. What was important was what didn’t happen. Unlike his predecessors, Trump did not undermine the prospects for moving forward. Specifically, he did not disrupt the process initiated by the two Koreas in their historic April 27 [Panmunjom] Declaration, in which they “affirmed the principle of determining the destiny of the Korean nation on their own accord” (repeat: on their own accord), and for the first time presented a detailed program as to how to proceed. It is to Trump’s credit that he did not undermine these efforts, and in fact made a move toward facilitating them by cancelling the US-South Korean war games, which, as he correctly said, are “very provocative.” We would certainly not tolerate anything of the sort on our borders – or anywhere on the planet – even if they were not run by a superpower which not long before had utterly devastated our country with the flimsiest of pretexts after the war was effectively over, glorying in the major war crimes it had committed, like bombing major dams, after there was nothing else to bomb. Beyond the achievement of letting matters proceed, which was not slight, no “diplomatic skills” were involved in Trump’s triumph. The coverage has been quite instructive, in part because of the efforts of the Democrats to outflank Trump from the right. Beyond that, the coverage across the spectrum illustrates quite well two distinct kinds of deceit: lying and not telling relevant truths. Each merits comment. Trump is famous for the former, and his echo chamber is as well. Liberal commentators exult in totting up and refuting Trump’s innumerable lies and distortions, much to his satisfaction since it provides the opportunity for him to fire up his loyal — by now almost worshipful — base with more evidence of how the hated “Establishment” is using every possible underhanded means to prevent their heroic leader from working tirelessly to defend them from a host of enemies. A canny politician, Trump surely understands well that the base on which he relies, by now almost the entire Republican Party, has drifted to a surreal world, in part under his influence. Take the major Trump-Ryan legislative achievement, the tax scam — “The US Donor Relief Act of 2017,” as Joseph Stiglitz termed it. It had two transparent aims: to enrich the very wealthy and the corporate sector while slamming everyone else, and to create a huge deficit. The latter achievement — as the main architect of the scam Paul Ryan helpfully explained — provides the opportunity to realize the cherished goal of reducing benefits that serve the general population, already very weak by comparative standards, but still an unacceptable infringement on the prerogatives of the 1%. The congressional Joint Committee on Taxation estimates [3] that the law will add $1 trillion to deficits over the next decade. Virtually every economist generally agrees. But not 80 percent of Republican voters, of whom half believe that the deficit will be reduced by the gift their leader has lavished upon them. Or consider something vastly more significant, attitudes toward global warming (apologies for the obscenity: climate change), which poses a severe threat to organized human life, and not in the distant future. Half of Republicans believe that what is plainly happening is not happening, bolstered by virtually the entire leadership of the Party, as the Republican Primary debates graphically revealed. Of the half who concede that the real world exists, barely half think that humans play a role in the process. Such destructive responses tend to break through the surface during periods of distress and fear, very widespread feelings today, for good reason: A generation of neoliberal policies has sharply concentrated wealth and power while leaving the rest to stagnate or decline, often joining the growing precariat. In the US, the richest country in history with unparalleled advantages, over 40 percent [4] of the population don’t earn enough to afford a monthly budget that includes housing, food, child care, health care, transportation and a cell phone. And this is happening in what’s called a “booming economy.” Productivity has risen through the neoliberal period, even if not as much as before, but wages have stagnated or declined as wealth is funneled to a few bulging pockets. Distress is so severe that among white middle-aged Americans, mortality is actually increasing, something unheard of in functioning societies apart from war or pestilence. There are similar phenomena in Europe under the “business first” (“neoliberal”/”austerity”) assault. Returning to forms of deceit, one technique is simply lying, honed to a high art by the Maestro. Another technique is not telling parts of the “whole story” that matter. To illustrate, consider the analysis of “Trump’s claims about the North Korea deal” [5] by the expert and highly competent fact-checker of The Washington Post, Glenn Kessler. His article originally ran under the title of “Not the Whole Story,” with the title presented in extra-large letters to emphasize the ignominy. Kessler’s acid (and accurate) critique of Trump’s distortions and inventions opens by declaring (again correctly) that “North Korea has a long history of making agreements and then not living up to its obligations,” citing the most crucial case, the September 2005 US-North Korea agreement (under six-power auspices), in which, in the official wording, “The DPRK [North Korea] committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards.” As Kessler points out, the North Koreans did not live up to these promises, and in fact, soon returned to producing nuclear weapons. Obviously, they can’t be trusted. But this is “Not the Whole Story.” There is a rather significant omission: Before the ink was dry on the agreement, the US undermined it. To repeat the unwanted facts from our earlier discussion of the matter [6], “the Bush administration broke the agreement. It renewed the threat of force, froze North Korean funds in foreign banks and disbanded the consortium that was to provide North Korea with a light-water reactor. Bruce Cumings, the leading US Korea scholar, writes that ‘the sanctions were specifically designed to destroy the September pledges [and] to head off an accommodation between Washington and Pyongyang’.” The whole story is well-known to scholarship, but somehow doesn’t reach the public domain. Kessler is a fine and careful journalist. His evasion of “the whole story” appears to be close to exceptionless in the media. Every article on the matter by The New York Times security and foreign policy experts is the same, as far as I’ve seen. The practice is so uniform that it is almost unfair to pick out examples. To choose only one, again from a fine journalist, Washington Post specialist on Korea Anna Fifield writes [7] that North Korea “signed a denuclearization agreement” in 2005, but didn’t stick to the agreement (omitting the fact that this was a response to Washington’s breaking the agreement). “So perhaps the wisest course of action,” she continues, “would be to bet that it won’t abide by this one, either.” And to complete the picture with a banned phrase, “So perhaps the wisest course of action would be to bet that [Washington] won’t abide by this one, either.” There are endless laments about the deceitfulness and unreliability of the North Koreans; many are cited in Gareth Porter’s review of media coverage [8]. But it would be hard to find a word about the rest of the story. This is only one case. I don’t incidentally suggest that the deceit is conscious. Much more likely, it’s just the enormous power of conformity to convention, to what Gramsci called hegemonic “common sense.” Some ideas are not even rejected; they are unthinkable. Like the idea that US aggression is aggression; it can only be “a mistake,” “a tragic error,” “a strategic blunder.” I also don’t want to suggest this is “American exceptionalism.” It’s hard to find an exception to the practice in the history of imperialism. So far, at least, Trump has kept from disrupting the agreement of the two Koreas. Of course, all of this is accompanied by boasts about his amazing deal-making abilities, and the brilliance of his skillful tactics of threatening “fire and fury” in order to bring the dictator to the negotiating table. There are many accolades by others across the spectrum for this triumph — which is about on a par with the standard claims that Obama’s harsh sanctions forced Iran to capitulate by signing the joint agreement on nuclear weapons, claims effectively refuted by Trita Parsi (Losing an Enemy). Whatever the factual basis, such claims are necessary to justify harsh measures against official enemies and to reinforce the general principle that what we do is right (with occasional tragic errors). In the present case too, there is good evidence that the truth is almost the opposite of the standard claims, and that the harsh US stance has impeded progress toward peaceful settlement. There have been many opportunities in addition to the 2005 agreement. In 2013, in a meeting with senior US diplomats, North Korean officials outlined steps toward denuclearization. One of those who attended the meeting, former US official and Stimson Center Senior Fellow Joel Wit reports that [9], “Not surprisingly, for the North Koreans, the key to denuclearization was that the United States had to end its ‘hostile policy’.” While the US maintains its threatening stance, the North Korean leadership — “not surprisingly” — has sought “to develop a nuclear arsenal as a shield to deter the US while they moved to develop the economy.” The North Korean government, in June 2013, “issued an important new pronouncement that it was open to negotiations on denuclearization,” Wit writes, adding that, “The Obama administration dismissed it at the time as propaganda.” He adds further that “the North Koreans have given a great deal of thought to denuclearization and almost certainly have a concrete plan of action for the upcoming [Singapore] summit, whether the White House does or not.” In fact, at the 2013 meetings, “the North Korean officials actually laid out a concrete plan to achieve denuclearization,” Wit reports. Not the only case. China’s “double freeze” proposal, supported by Russia, Germany and others, has been on the table for years, rejected by Washington — until the Singapore summit. Trump’s diplomacy, such as it is, has been subjected to withering attack, especially by liberal opinion: How could the US president agree to meet on friendly terms with a brutal dictator? How could he fail to demand that North Korea end its human rights violations, which are indeed horrendous? Willingness to look at “the whole story” suggests some other questions, of course unasked — in fact, unthinkable: How could Kim agree to meet on friendly terms with the head of the state that world opinion overwhelmingly regards as the greatest threat to peace? How could North Korea fail to demand that the US end its human rights violations, also horrendous? Has North Korea done anything remotely like invading Iraq, the worst crime of this century? Or destroying Libya? Has it been condemned by the ICJ [International Court of Justice] for international terrorism (“unlawful use of force”)? And a lot more that is easy enough to reel off. It made perfect sense for North Korea not to bring up US crimes as a condition for moving forward. The proper goal of the meeting was to expedite the efforts of the two Koreas to pursue the directions outlined in their April 27 Declaration. And the argument cuts both ways. Interestingly enough, while Trump seeks to appease his political doppelgänger in Pyongyang, he has succeeded in alienating most of the US’s major Western allies, including Canada, France and Germany. Is this the consequence of his alleged foreign policy doctrine “We are America, bitch” [10]? There are extensive efforts to try to discern some coherent doctrine that guides Trump’s behavior, but I suspect it’s a fool’s errand. A very good predictor of Trump policy is [his fixation on] … reversing anything associated with the despised “Kenyan Muslim” he replaced: in foreign policy, tearing up the successful Iran deal and accepting the long-standing possibilities for addressing the serious North Korea crisis (proclaiming to have created an astonishing breakthrough). Much the same is true of other actions that look like random shots when the driving forces are ignored. All of this has to be done while satisfying the usual Republican constituencies: primarily the business world and the rich. For Trump, that also means unleashing the more brutal wing of the Republican Party so that they can dedicate themselves even beyond the norm to the interest of private wealth and corporate power. Here the technique is to capture the media with attention-grabbing antics, which can be solemnly exposed while the game goes on — so far, quite effectively. Then comes the task of controlling the so-called “populist” base: the angry, frightened, disillusioned white population, primarily males. Since there is no way for Trumpism to deal with their economic concerns, which are actually being exacerbated by current policy-formation, it’s necessary to posture heroically as “standing up” for them against “malevolent forces” and to cater to the anti-social impulses that tend to surface when people are left to face difficult circumstances alone, without institutions and organizations to support them in their struggles. That’s also being done effectively for the time being. The “We are America, bitch” posture appeals to chauvinistic instincts and the white supremacy that is a deeply rooted feature of American culture and is now exacerbated by concern that whites might even become a minority. The posture can also delude working people into believing that their tough-guy protector will bring back the world they’ve lost. Such propaganda exercises cannot, of course, target those actually responsible for the plight of the victims of neoliberal globalization. On the contrary, attention has to be diverted away from corporate managers who largely shape state policy while establishing complex global supply chains to maximize profit at the expense of working people. More appropriate targets are desperate people fleeing horrors for which we are largely responsible: “foreigners” who have been “robbing us” with the connivance of “treacherous liberals” and other assorted devils that can be conjured up in periods of social breakdown. Allies, friends, who cares? There is no need for policies that are “coherent” in any traditional sense. Consequences don’t matter as long as the primary goals are met. After months of harsh rhetoric against China’s trade practices, Trump has decided to impose tariffs of $50 billion on Chinese imports, prompting Beijing, subsequently, to declare that the US has embarked on a trade war and to announce in turn that it will retaliate with similar measures against US imports. First, isn’t it true that China is merely practicing today the same sort of mercantilist policies that the US and Great Britain practiced in the past on their way to global ascendancy? Second, is the targeting of tariffs expected to have any impact either on China’s economy or on the size of the US trade deficit? And lastly, if a new era of protectionism is about to take off, what could the consequences of such development be for the reign of global neoliberalism? Several questions arise. First, what is Trump’s motive? If it were concern about China’s economic management and trade policies, he wouldn’t be going out of his way to alienate allies with tariffs and insults but would be joining with them to confront China on the issues of concern. If, however, the driving force is what I discussed earlier, then targeting both China and allies with abuse and tariffs has a certain logic: It may play well in the rust belt, contributing to the delusion that our hero is fighting to ensure jobs for working people — though it’s a tricky strategy, because it harms other parts of his loyal base, mainly farmers, and also, though more subtly, because it imposes a new tax on consumption, which is what tariffs amount to. As for China’s economic policies, yes, they are similar to those that have been used by developed societies generally, beginning with Britain and then its former North American colony. Similar, but more limited. China lacks the means available to its predecessors. Britain stole superior technology from India, the Low Countries [11], Ireland, and by force and severe protectionism, undermined the Indian economy, then the world’s most advanced along with China. The US, under the Hamiltonian system [12], resorted to high tariffs to bar superior British goods, and also took British technology in ways barred by the current US-initiated global trading system. Economic historian Paul Bairoch describes the US as “the mother country and bastion of protectionism” into the 1920s, well after it had become far and away the richest country in the world. The general practice is called “kicking away the ladder” by economic historians: first use the practices to develop, then bar others from following. Earlier, Britain’s economic development relied on large-scale piracy, now considered by its former practitioner to be the most heinous of crimes. Keynes wrote that the booty of English pirates, like the famed and admired Sir Francis Drake, “may fairly be considered the fountain and origin of British foreign investments.” Piracy was also a standard practice in the American colonies. Both British and US economies also relied crucially on the most hideous system of slavery in human history. Cotton was the oil of the industrial revolution, providing the basis for manufacturing, finance, commerce, retail. Such practices are not available to China. Like Britain before it, the US called for “free trade” when it recognized that the playing field was tilted properly in its direction. After World War II, when the US had incomparable power, it promoted the “liberal world order” that has been an enormous boon to the US corporate system, which now owns about half of the global economy, an astonishing policy success. Again, following the British model, the US hedged its commitment to “free trade” for the benefit of domestic private power. The British-dominated “free trade” system kept India as a largely closed protectorate. The US-dominated system imposes an extreme patent system (“intellectual property”) that provides virtual monopoly power to major US industries. The US government also provides huge subsidies to energy industries, agribusiness and financial institutions. While the US complains about Chinese industrial policy, the modern high-tech industry has relied crucially on research and development in the publicly subsidized sector of the economy, to such an extent that the economy might fairly be regarded as a system of private subsidy, private profit. And there are many other devices to subsidize industry. Procurement, for example, has been shown to be a significant device. In fact, the enormous military system alone, through procurement, provides a huge state subsidy to industry. These comments only skim the surface. Britain abandoned laissez-faire when it could no longer compete with Japanese competition, part of the background for World War II in the Pacific. Some in the US are having similar qualms today, concerns that Trump is cynically exploiting. But not the powerful corporate sector that relies crucially on the US-designed global economic order. The corporate sector relies so extensively on the global economy it has designed that it is sure to use its enormous power to try to head off a major trade war. The Trump tariffs and the retaliation might escalate, but it’s likely that the threat will be contained. Trump is quite right, however, in proclaiming that the US would “win” a limited trade war, given the scale of the US economy, the huge domestic market and unique advantages in other respects. The “We are America, bitch” doctrine is a powerful weapon of intimidation. The Trump administration is moving full speed ahead with its intent on cracking down on unauthorized entries to the country by separating immigrant children from their parents. More than 2,000 children have been separated from their parents during the last seven weeks, and Attorney General Jeff Sessions sought recently to justify Trump’s immigration policy by citing a verse from the Bible. What can one say about an advanced Western society in which religion continues to crowd out reason in shaping public policy and public attitudes? And didn’t the Nazis, although they were no believers, also use Christianity to justify their immoral and criminal acts? The immigration policy, always grotesque, has descended to levels so revolting that even many of those who foster and exploit xenophobia are running for cover — like Trump, who is desperately trying to blame it on the Democrats, and like the First Lady, who is appealing to “both sides of the aisle” [13] to come together to stop the obscenity. We should, however, not overlook the fact that Europe is crawling through much the same gutters. One can quote scripture for almost any purpose one likes. Sessions doubtless knows that “all the law” hangs on two commandments: loving God and “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” But that is not the appropriate thought for the occasion. It is true, however, that the US is unique among developed societies in the role of religion in social life, ever since the Puritans landed. Recently, Trump stated that he had the absolute right to pardon himself (after he had already said that he could shoot someone on New York’s 5th Avenue and not lose any support), while his lawyer, former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani, said the president could even commit murder in the Oval Office and still not be prosecuted for it. Your thoughts? After praising Kim [Jong Un] effusively as a strong leader who “speaks and his people sit up at attention,” Trump added: “I want my people to do the same.” When the predictable reaction followed, he said he was kidding. Maybe. I hope we don’t have an opportunity to find out. While it is clear that the country is well on its way to becoming a pariah nation, the Democrats continue to focus their attention primarily on Trump’s alleged collusion with Russia and unethical behavior, all the while trying to outflank the president on the jingoist front, adopting new restrictions for the 2020 elections so they can keep away the likes of Bernie Sanders, and of course, playing masterfully the fundraising game that works in a plutocracy. With all this in mind, how would you describe the nature of contemporary US politics? Much as in Europe, the centrist political institutions in the United States, which have long been in the driver’s seat, are in decline. The reasons are not obscure. People who have endured the rigors of the neoliberal assault — austerity in the recent European version — recognize that the institutions are working for others, not for them. In the US, people do not have to read academic political science to know that a large majority, those who are not near the top of the income scale, are effectively disenfranchised, in that their own representatives pay little attention to their views, hearkening rather to the voices of the rich, the donor class. In Europe, anyone can see that basic decisions are made by the unelected Troika, in Brussels, with the northern banks peering over their shoulders. In the US, respect for Congress has long been hovering in single digits. In recent Republican primaries, when candidates emerged from the base, the Establishment was able to beat them down and obtain their own candidate. In 2016, that failed for the first time. True, it’s not far from the norm for a billionaire with enormous media support and almost $1 billion in campaign funding to win an election, but Trump was hardly the choice of the Republican elites. The most spectacular result of the election was not the Trump phenomenon. Rather, it was the remarkable success of Bernie Sanders, breaking sharply with US political history. With no support from big business or the media, Sanders might well have won the Democratic nomination had it not been for the machinations of Obama-Clinton party managers. Similar processes are apparent in recent European elections. Like it or not, Trump is doing quite well. He has the support of 83 percent of Republicans [14], which is without precedent apart from rare moments. Whatever their feelings may be, Republicans dare not cross him openly. His general support in the low 40s is not far from the norm, about the same as Obama’s going into his first midterm. He is lavishing gifts on the business world and the wealthy, the authentic constituency of the Republicans (with the Democrat leadership not far behind). He has thrown enough crumbs to keep the Evangelicals happy and has struck the right chords for racist/white supremacy elements. And he has, so far, managed to convince coal miners and steel workers that he is one of them. In fact, his support among union members has increased to 51 percent. It is hardly in doubt that Trump cares almost nothing about the fate of the country or the world. What matters is me. That’s clear enough from his attitude toward global warming. He is perfectly well aware of the dire threat — to his properties. His application for a seawall [15] to protect his Irish golf course is based explicitly on the threat of global warming. But pursuit of power impels him to lead the race to destruction, quite happily, as is evident from his performances. The same holds of other serious, if lesser, threats, among them the threat that the country may be isolated, despised, declining — with dues to pay after it’s no longer his concern. The Democrats are now torn between a popular base that is largely social democratic and a New Democrat leadership that panders to the donor class. Under Obama, the party was reduced to shambles at the local and state level, a particularly serious matter because the 2020 elections will determine redistricting, offering opportunities for gerrymandering even beyond today’s scandalous situation. The bankruptcy of the Democrat elite is well-illustrated by the obsession with alleged Russian meddling with our sacred elections. Whatever it might amount to — apparently very little — it cannot begin to compare with the “meddling” of campaign funding, which largely determines electoral outcomes, as extensive research has shown, particularly the careful work of Thomas Ferguson [16], which he and his colleagues have now extended to the 2016 elections. As Ferguson points out, when Republican elites realized that it was going to be Trump or Clinton, they responded with a huge wave of last-minute money that not only led to Clinton’s late October decline but also had the same effect on Democratic candidates for Senate, “virtually in lock step.” It is “outlandish,” Ferguson observes, that former FBI Director James Comey or the Russians “could be responsible for both collapses” in the final stage of the campaign: “For the first time in the entire history of the United States, the partisan outcome of Senate races coincided perfectly with the results of every state’s presidential balloting.” The outcome conforms very well to Ferguson’s well-supported “Investment theory of party competition.” But facts and logic matter little. The Democrats are bent on revenge for their 2016 failure, having run such a rotten campaign that what looked like a “sure thing” collapsed. Evidently, Trump’s severe assault against the common good is a lesser matter, at least to the party elite. It’s sometimes been noted that the US not only regularly meddles in foreign elections, including Russian ones, but also proceeds to subvert and sometimes overthrow governments it doesn’t like. Horrifying consequences abound, to the present, from Central America to the Middle East. Guatemala has been a horror story since a US-backed coup overthrew its elected reformist government in 1954. Gaza, declining in misery, may become unlivable by 2020, the UN predicts [17], not by acts of God. In 2006, Palestinians committed a grave crime: They ran the first free election in the Arab world, and made the “wrong” choice, handing power to Hamas. Israel reacted by escalating violence and a brutal siege. The US reverted to standard operating procedure and prepared a military coup, pre-empted by Hamas. In punishment for this new crime, US-Israeli torture of Gaza sharply increased, not only with strangulation but also regular murderous and destructive US-backed Israeli invasions, on pretexts that quickly collapse on examination. Elections that come out the wrong way plainly cannot be tolerated under our policy of “democracy promotion.” In recent European elections, there has been much concern about possible Russian meddling. That was particularly true of the 2017 German elections, when the far-right party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) did surprisingly well, winning 94 seats in the Bundestag, the first time it had won seats. One can easily imagine the reaction had Russian meddling been detected behind these frightening results. It turns out that there was indeed foreign meddling, but not from Russia. AfD hired a Texas media firm (Harris Media) known for support of right-wing nationalist candidates (Trump, Le Pen, Netanyahu). The firm enlisted the cooperation of the Berlin office of Facebook, which provided it with detailed information about potential voters for use in microtargeting those who might be receptive to AfD’s message. It may have worked. The story seems to have been ignored, apart from the business press [18]. If the Democratic Party cannot overcome its deep internal problems and the slow expansion of the economy under Obama and Trump continues without disruption or disaster, the Republican wrecking ball may be swinging away at the foundations of a decent society, and at the prospects for survival, for a long time. C.J. Polychroniou is a regular contributor to Truthout as well as a member of Truthout’s Public Intellectual Project. He is a political economist/political scientist who has taught and worked in universities and research centers in Europe and the United States. He is the author of several books, and his articles have appeared in a variety of publications. #Trump #NoamChomsky #PanmunjeomDeclaration #USDPRKSummit #NorthKorea

By Suzy Kim | Aug 19, 2018 This article originally appeared in Perspectives Daily, the American Historical Association’s online newsmagazine. The June 12 summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un was a historic moment—for the first time a sitting US president met with the leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, since its founding in 1948. It was remarkable to see the Stars and Stripes standing next to the DPRK flag, and to see the two leaders shake hands in acknowledgement of each other as equals rather than as sworn enemies. Reactions in the United States to this history-in-the-making have ranged from cautious optimism to cynical skepticism. But what these apprehensions indicate is the crumbling of the so-called liberal order under the weight of its own contradictions. Nicholas Kristof, regular columnist for the New York Times, represents the spectrum of reactions well, concluding that Trump was “outfoxed” and “hoodwinked” by Kim. Explaining why the summit made him uncomfortable despite his preference for diplomacy, Kristof wrote, “There was also something frankly weird about an American president savaging Canada’s prime minister one day and then embracing the leader of the most totalitarian country in the world.” In fact, there’s been an odd convergence of reactions that have united hardline Republican hawks like John Bolton with liberal Democrats like Chuck Schumer, who signed a letter warning Trump against any deal that did not include concessions from North Korea regarding its nuclear program. The letter insisted on “anywhere, anytime” inspections of all suspected sites of weapons of mass destruction, a probable nonstarter for a North Korea already wary of American threats and encroachment to its sovereignty. For liberals siding with Bolton, their position has much to do with Roger Cohen’s argument that Trump is envious of Kim Jong Un and his absolute authority as dictator. Trump’s failings as a leader, they say, are similar to Neville Chamberlain’s—the British prime minister who tried to negotiate with Hitler to thwart World War II. In making this anachronistic comparison, they, like Cohen, believe that Trump has “saluted evil” and gone back on “more than seven decades of American stewardship of the world after the defeat of evil in 1945.” For many, including Kori Schake of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Trump’s rapprochement with North Korea signals “a turning point in world history: the end of the liberal order.” The liberal order, according to Schake, began at the conclusion of World War II when “America established a set of global norms that solidified its position atop a rules-based international system . . . promoting democracy, making enduring commitments to countries that share its values, protecting allies, advancing free trade and building institutions and patterns of behavior that legitimize American power by giving less powerful countries a say.” Even while acknowledging that “America doesn’t always get it right,” Schake claims that “the results speak for themselves” since it’s been over 70 years without great-power conflict. Without any hint of irony or contradiction, she describes the numerous wars that have been waged by “democracies” since World War II as “enlarging the perimeter of security and prosperity, expanding and consolidating the liberal order.” Drawing on aggregate data in the abstract such as growth in the global economy, she neglects to define what “security and prosperity” mean or scrutinize on whom these are bestowed and at whose expense. Schake is oblivious to the harm done in the name of maintaining the liberal order, not only domestically in terms of racist, sexist, and classist exclusionary policies, but also internationally, least of which include the millions of lives lost in Asia, upward of 70 percent civilian deaths during the Korean War, not to mention the Vietnam War (and most recently the Iraq War). Tellingly, the NBC television show Saturday Night Live ran a comedy sketch soon after Trump’s election in which a group of New Yorkers watching the election results respond in markedly contrasting ways. White liberals reacted with utter horror that the election was a “nightmare scenario” and “the most shameful thing America has ever done,” while African Americans were hardly surprised, shaking their heads at the utter lack of historical awareness of institutional racism, structural inequalities, and foreign interventionism. Asia Institute founder and director Emanuel Pastreich argues that US foreign policy has been unequivocally a form of gunboat diplomacy in which US military power is used to benefit multinational corporations. While previously there was at least an attempt to hide the government-corporation nexus, this collusion has now become blatant under Trump’s presidency. These are the foundations upon which the liberal order stands. What the majority of liberals fail to acknowledge is just how similar Trump’s message of unilateralism and America First (what one White House official recently characterized as the “We’re America, Bitch” doctrine) is to the idea of American exceptionalism that has defined American identity since the end of World War II. The “indifference to democracy and human rights and cultivation of dictators” is not a “new world” Trump is creating, as Schake claims; it has undergirded the United States’ superpower status since 1945. While Schake raises alarm bells that “America will be seen as—and may even become—no different from Russia and China,” it is this very idea of American exceptionalism that has led to the Trump Doctrine. While leadership does matter for both people in the United States and elsewhere, reactions to the summit have overwhelmingly concentrated on the individual personalities of Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un. This focus on the individual is one of the very tenets of liberalism, and in that sense, Trump—despite criticisms to the contrary—is the very product of the liberal order. By contrast, Kim Jong Un’s first words at the summit—that few in America noticed—focused on the collective past despite the infamous personality cult in North Korea. He said: “It was not an easy path to get here. The past held us back, and the mistaken biases and habits shielded our eyes and ears, but we have overcome all of these to come here” (emphasis mine). Kim Jong Un is having to end a war that was fought by his grandfather; it has taken three generations to get here. Reactions to the summit in the United States are a kind of mourning at the disintegration of the Pax Americana and the pride of American exceptionalism with it. But this feeling of loss at the end of the liberal order should be put into proper perspective. The last 70 years hold a very different significance for Korea, which was divided into two separate states in 1948 precisely to uphold that liberal order. The Republic of Korea as the bulwark against the Communist North was founded exactly 70 years ago on August 15, 1948, followed by the DPRK the following month. It’s long overdue for Korea to be able to chart its own future. It’s time to bid farewell to the liberal order. Suzy Kim is associate professor of Korean history at Rutgers University, and author of Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950 (Cornell Univ. Press, 2013). She was guest editor of the special issue “(De)Memorializing the Korean War” in Cross-Currents: East Asian History & Culture Review (2015). #Trump #KoreaPeace #KimJongUn #DPRK #KoreanWar #Nuclearweapons #NorthKorea

77 year-old Park Seong-hwan sits in front of the pictures of family taken in North Korea, in his appartment in Seoul, South Korea on July 14, 2018. (Photo by Woohae Cho/Getty Images) By Simone Chun | August 22, 2018 Originally published in Common Dreams and Counterpunch. This past July marked the 65th anniversary of the armistice that halted the Korean War. In addition to leaving nearly 5 million dead, injured, or missing, this bloody conflict forcibly separated nearly 10 million Korean families on either side of the 38th parallel. Since the 1980s, a mere 20 face-to-face reunions have been held under tightly controlled conditions, with the last such event occurring in 2015. These reunions are infrequent one-time events–no one has ever been given a second chance to see their relatives on the other side of the border. Family members who have been separated since the war are given a single opportunity to see long-lost loved ones for a few short hours, after which they must once again separate. In South Korea, the majority of the over 132,000 separated family members are 80 or older, and more than half of those applying for reunions between 1988 and 2018 have died without ever having had the chance to see their loved ones in the across the border. At this point, in order for all surviving separated family members to be able to see their relatives in the North at least once before they perish, a minimum of 7,300 reunions must occur per year. As a result of the 2018 Panmunjom declaration, North and South Korea agreed to hold an additional reunion in August of this year. South Korea uses a lottery system to randomly select a small number of surviving family members for reunion events, and this year’s event will include only 98 elderly survivors from South. A journalist who was in attendance during the public screening for the initial participant pool described the Red Cross office where the event was held as “a sea of tears” echoing with the cries of grief-stricken elderly survivors who did not make the list.  One 95-year old man, recognizing this as his final opportunity to see his loved ones, begged the government to open the demilitarized zone for a single month so that all separated family members would have the chance to see their loved ones at least once. “I don’t remember how many times I applied.  President Moon and Chairman Kim can meet. Why can’t I meet my family in the North?” A 90-year-old woman refused to leave the building, pleading to be allowed to see the 3-year old daughter she left in North Korea over 68 years ago. When I visited South Korea in May as part of an international peace delegation, I met a female peace activist whose elderly mother, a farmer in a South Korean border town, was separated from her family during the war.  She gave me a special gift: a handmade scarf upon which was inscribed a poem written by her mother.  While working the fields, her mother would gaze at her hometown across the border—easily visible on a clear day—wondering ceaselessly about the family she left behind more than six decades ago. The Thousand-Mile River Lee Bum-og The narrow river separating us may as well be a thousand miles wide I can see a home to which I cannot return The Han River that meets the Imjin and the Yaesung flows to the ocean It is said that humans are highest order of creation But we are more wretched than any beast Birds fly to their homes and return To my eyes, birds scorn humans.How can there be a half-century of separation between brothers and sisters, between parents and children?Amid the rain of bombs, I fled to save my life The friends who fled have all dispersed here and there With silvery hair they are soon to depart this world. Can those who still live ever feel the soil of home beneath their feet? Her searing poem depicts her life in a divided Korea as a state of permanent longing that is coming to a bitter end. For her and tens of thousands like her, every day counts. It is absolutely essential that we work to prioritize the regularization of North-South family reunions and the establishment of permanent venues in both North and South Korea for this purpose. Dr. Simone Chun serves on the Steering Committee of the Alliance of Scholars Concerned About Korea and is a Korea Policy Institute Associate and a member of the Korea Peace Network. #KoreaPeace #SeparatedFamilies #KoreanWar #SouthKorea #PanmunjeomDeclaration #NorthKorea

By Ajamu Baraka | September 30, 2018 Originally published in Black Agenda Report. The critics had already signaled their strategy for derailing any meaningful move toward normalizing relations between the United States and North Korea. Right-wing neoliberals from CNN, MSNBC and NPR are in perfect alignment with the talking points issued by U.S. Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and the Democrat Party that took the position that anything short of the North Koreans surrendering their national interests and national dignity to the United States was a win for North Korea. For much of the foreign policy community, corporate media pundits and leaders of the two imperialist parties, the issue is North Korean de-nuclearization. But for the people in Korea and throughout the global South, the real issue has always been the unfinished business of ending the war and beginning the de-colonization of the Korean peninsula. The interrelated issues of respecting the dignity and sovereignty of the North Korean nation and engaging in an authentic process of de-colonization are precisely why the U.S.-North Korean initiative will fail without a major intervention on the part of the people in the United States demanding that their leaders commit to diplomacy and peace. There should be no illusions about U.S. intentions. If U.S. policymakers were really concerned with putting a brake on the North Korean nuclear-weapons program, they would have pursued a different set of policies. Such policies would have created the necessary security conditions to convince the North Koreans that a nuclear deterrence to the United States was unnecessary. The fact that those conditions were not created were less a result of the evil intentions of the North Koreans than it reflected the need to maintain the justification for continued U.S. military deployment in South Korea and in the region. Being able to point to North Korea as a threat to regional security has provided the justifications for U.S. power projection in the region and the ever-expanding U.S. military budget. With the growing power of China over the last few decades, the threat of North Korea allowed the United States to continue a physical presence right at the underbelly of China. That is why the “agreed framework” under Clinton was not implemented and then jettisoned by the Bush administration. It is also why the Obama administration’s so-called strategic patience was really about a series of increasingly provocative military exercises and no negotiations. Full Spectrum Dominance and the Psychopathology of White Supremacy Korea has historically played a significant role for the U.S. imperial project since the end of the Second World War. The emergent forces U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower identified as the military/industrial/complex are still present, but are now exercising hegemonic power, along with the financial sector within the U.S. state. Those forces are not interested in a diplomatic resolution of the Korean colonial question because their interests are more focused on China and maintaining U.S. regional hegemony in East Asia. The tensions in Korea have not only provided them the rationale for increased expenditures for various missile defense systems but also for bolstering public support for the obscene military budgets that are largely transferred straight to their pockets. That is why the historic record is replete with the United States sabotaging negotiated settlements with the North, but then pointing to North Korean responses to those efforts as evidence of North Korean duplicity. In addition to the material interests and hegemonic geopolitical objectives, the social-psychological phenomenon of inculcated white supremacy is also a factor and has buttressed imperial policies toward that nation for years. For example, the psychopathology of white supremacy invisibilizes the absurdity and illegitimacy of the United States being in a position to negotiate the fate of millions of Koreans. The great “white father” and savior complex is not even a point of contestation because it is not even perceived–the rule of whiteness through the dominance of the Western capitalist elite has been naturalized. Therefore, it is quite understandable that for many, the summit is the space where the North Koreans are essentially supposed to surrender to the United States. It is beyond the comprehension of most policymakers and large sectors of the public that North Koreans would have ever concluded it is not in their national interest to give up their defenses to a reckless and dangerously violent rogue state that sees itself beyond the law. And it is that strange white-supremacist consciousness that buys into the racist trope that it was Trump’s pressure that brought North Korea to the table. The white-supremacist colonial mentality believes the natives will only respond to force and violence. As U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC), the good old boy from South Carolina, argues “The only way North Korea will give up their nuclear program is if they believe military option is real.” But as Kim Kye Gwan, North Korea’s first vice minister for foreign affairs and former nuclear-program negotiator pointed out in relationship to the reasons why North Korea stayed with the process: “The U.S. is miscalculating the magnanimity and broad-minded initiatives of the DPRK as signs of weakness and trying to embellish and advertise as if these are the product of its sanctions and pressure.” Unfortunately, the white-supremacist world-view renders it almost impossible to apprehend reality in any other way. That is why it is inevitable that the Trump administration—like the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations—will mis-read the North Koreans. The North Korea issue is a classic example of why it is impossible to separate a pro-peace, anti-war position from the issue of anti-imperialism. The concrete, geopolitical objectives of U.S. imperialist interests in the region drives the logic of regional dominance, which means peace, de-colonization and national reconciliation for Korea are counter to U.S. interests. And while we must support the U.S. state’s decision to halt military exercises, we must recognize that without vigorous pressure from the people to support an honest process, the possibility of conflict might be ever more alive now as a result of the purported attempt at diplomacy. The nature of the North Korean state is not the issue. What is the issue is a process has begun between the two Korean nations that should be respected. Therefore, de-nuclearization should not be the focus—self-determination of the Korean peoples must be the center of our discussions. On that issue, it is time for activists in the United States to demand the United States get out of Korea. The peace and anti-war movement must support a process that will lead to the closure of U.S. military bases, the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the elimination of the nuclear threat. In short, U.S. based activists must support an end to the Korean war and the start of the de-colonization of South Korea. Ajamu Baraka is the national organizer of the Black Alliance for Peace and was the 2016 candidate for vice president on the Green Party ticket. He is an editor and contributing columnist for the Black Agenda Report and contributing columnist for Counterpunch. #KoreaPeace #NorthKorea #Nuclearweapons #selfdetermination

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (right) and South Korean President Moon Jae-in (left) gesture as they watch a gymnastic and artistic performance at the May Day Stadium on September 19, 2018, in Pyongyang, North Korea. By Christine Ahn | September 30, 2018 Originally published in Truthout. A historic opportunity to end the seven-decade Korean War is suddenly within reach. The world witnessed world-class peacemaking between North and South Korea last week at the third inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang as North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in declared “a Korean Peninsula free of war” and “a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.” But peacemaking between the two Koreas alone is not enough: The success of this process also rests on progress between Washington and Pyongyang, and particularly on the signing of a peace treaty to end the Korean War. To a packed audience of 150,000 North Koreans wildly cheering on their feet on September 20 at the May Day Stadium in Pyongyang, President Moon affirmed, “We have lived together for 5,000 years and been separated for 70 years. We must live together as one people.” At their summit, Kim and Moon announced a long list of actionable steps they will take to improve relations, from establishing a reunion center for divided families to reopening the Mt. Kumgang tourism center and the Kaesong industrial zone — two inter-Korean development projects from the previous Sunshine Policy years that were shut down as relations worsened between the two Koreas during the previous two hardline administrations. The defense ministers also agreed in a separate military agreement to reduce military tensions by downsizing the number of guards near the Military Demarcation Line, the border dividing North and South Korea in the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) established by the Armistice Agreement in 1953. The Korean leaders also agreed to de-mine a village in the DMZ surrounding the border between North Korea and South Korea. As part of the Pyongyang Declaration by the two Koreas to transform the Korean Peninsula “into a land of peace free from nuclear weapons and nuclear threats,” Kim committed to “permanently dismantle the Dongchang-ri missile engine test site” in the presence of international inspectors, and “the permanent dismantlement of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon.” But this would depend on “corresponding measures” by the United States “in accordance with the spirit of the June 12 US-DPRK Joint Statement.” Trump last month canceled Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s trip to North Korea, saying North Korea had not made “sufficient progress” toward denuclearization. North Korean leaders, however, say the United States hasn’t honored its end of the Singapore Declaration in which the first two items were to improve relations and establish a peace process. Denuclearization came third, and the repatriation of the remains of US service members was a last added item. Pyongyang has already made several concessions: It has halted missile and nuclear tests, begun to dismantle the Sohae missile launch site and destroyed the Punggye-ri nuclear test in the presence of foreign journalists, released three detained Americans, and repatriated the remains of US service members from the Korean War. The United States, meanwhile, has halted one joint military exercise after Trump’s spontaneous announcement at the press briefing following his meeting with Kim. But these joint exercises could easily be resumed. North Korea has made clear that denuclearization will require a peace process that includes concrete steps toward a Peace Treaty, as promised in the 1953 Armistice Agreement signed by the United States, North Korea and China. James Laney, a former US ambassador to South Korea under Clinton, has argued, “A peace treaty would provide a baseline for relationships, eliminating the question of the other’s legitimacy and its right to exist. Absent such a peace treaty, every dispute presents afresh the question of the other side’s legitimacy.” But North Korea is unlikely to unilaterally surrender its nuclear weapons without improved relations. We knew that the Clinton and Bush administrations were close to waging a pre-emptive strike on Pyongyang, but now Bob Woodward’s book Fear has also confirmed that even President Obama weighed a first strike on North Korea. Kim has seen what happened to Iraq, Libya and Iran, not to mention his own country’s experience of a devastating US bombing. Most Americans have no idea that in just three years, the Korean War claimed over 4 million lives. The US dropped 635,000 tons of bombs on Korea, more than it did in the rest of the Asia-Pacific in WWII combined, and it used 33,000 tons of napalm in Korea — more than in Vietnam. Curtis LeMay, a US Air Force general in the Korean War, testified, “We burned down just about every city in North Korea and South Korea … we killed off over a million civilian Koreans and drove several million more from their homes.” The US’s indiscriminate bombing campaign leveled 80 percent of North Korean cities, killing one out of every four family members. The bombing of homes was so devastating that the regime urged its citizens to build shelter underground. On July 27, 1953, the Korean War ended in a stalemate with a ceasefire. Military commanders from the US, North Korea and China signed the Armistice Agreement and promised within 90 days to return to negotiate a peace settlement. Sixty-five years later, we are still waiting for that Peace Treaty to end the Korean War. A peace treaty would end the state of war between the United States and North Korea, taking the threat of a military conflict off the table. A ceasefire — a temporary truce — is what has defined the US-North Korean relationship. One tangible step that the Trump administration can take that the North Koreans would view as a “corresponding measure” is to declare an end to the Korean War. Joseph Yun, the former State Department envoy to North Korea during the Obama and Trump administrations, has said “the end-of-war declaration has to be done.” In an interview with the Asahi Shimbun, Yun said, “I don’t agree that [the US] would lose any significant item by saying the war has come to an end.” This would demonstrate the US commitment to improve relations and establish trust as a key toward normalizing relations between the two countries. “I think the opening reciprocal liaison offices would be a strong signal to North Korea that the United States is willing to change the relationship and willing to take steps towards normalization,” Yun said. Henri Féron, a legal scholar at Columbia Law School, has argued that “a peace treaty is a versatile instrument that can be tailored to further US and South Korean interests in addressing the security challenges posed by North Korea.” Féron adds that several UN organs have called for the replacement of the Korean War Armistice Agreement, “including the General Assembly, the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General and even the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in [North Korea].” Despite tremendous progress by the two Koreas toward formally ending the Korean War with tangible steps toward reunification, Vincent Brooks, Commander of the US Forces in Korea, recently blocked an application by South Korea to allow a train to travel across the military demarcation line to test the rail lines from Seoul to Sinuiju. Brooks is also head of the “UN Command which oversees the armistice,” which many have come to believe is the United Nations. Perhaps in an effort to deflect pressure on the UN for blocking progress between the two Koreas, in a September 17 Security Council briefing, Under-Secretary General Rosemary DiCarlo clarified, “Notwithstanding its name, the “United Nations Command” is not a United Nations operation or body, nor does it come under the command and control of the United Nations. Furthermore, it was not established as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council and is not funded through the United Nations budget.” The US also tried to block the opening of a diplomatic office in Kaesong. According to the Chosun, a conservative paper in South Korea, an unnamed US official warned, “If the [South] Korean government opens a liaison office in Kaesong, [South] Korea will risk violating sanctions that have drawn North Korea back to the negotiating table.” But the Koreans plowed forward and on September 14 opened the liaison office, which will facilitate year-round communication between Seoul and Pyongyang. While the prospect of undoing 70 years of mistrust and propaganda may seem daunting and impenetrable, it isn’t. The greatest enemies to peace are apathy and the belief that we can’t overpower those wanting perpetual war. It was the Korean War, after all, which inaugurated the Cold War and the military industrial complex. According to Korea historian Bruce Cumings, “The Korean conflict was the occasion for transforming the United States into a very different country than it had ever been before, one with hundreds of permanent military bases abroad, a large standing army and a permanent national security state at home.” Korea expert Gregory Elich wrote in the Monthly Review, “As Dean Acheson, Secretary of State under President Truman, put it, the Korean War ‘came along and saved us.’ It made possible the quadrupling of the defense budget under Truman, and brought about final approval of National Security Council Report 68, which triggered the Cold War and militarized American policy.” The Korean War also cemented the idea of the US as the world’s police officer. We must help bring closure to the longest-standing US conflict now. President Moon is in office for just over three years, and South Koreans’ desire for a formal end to the Korean War is our greatest asset. Eight of 10 South Koreans support the Pyongyang Summit. As James Clapper, the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Obama administration told journalist Tim Shorrock from The Nation, “The two Koreas have every right to move ahead like they are, even if people here [in Washington] don’t like it.” Even The New York Times editorial board is now arguing that “ending the formal state of war 65 years after the fighting ceased should not be that difficult, even if the ultimate goal — ridding the world of the threat from North Korea’s nuclear arsenal — remains elusive.” Americans should stand with Koreans to help end the war with a Korea Peace Treaty and unite the Korean peninsula. It is the just and moral thing to do. Christine Ahn is the founder and international coordinator of Women Cross DMZ, a global movement of women mobilizing for peace on the Korean peninsula. #KimJongUn #peacetreaty #PyongyangDeclaration #ChristineAhn #MoonJaein

THE U.S. WAR ON NORTH KOREA AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE SCREENING OF MEMORY OF FORGOTTEN WAR, WITH FILMMAKER IN PERSON, +  ROUNDTABLE   DISCUSSION When: Friday,November 9,2018. Doors open at 6 p.m. Free & open to the public. Where: Southface Institute,Home Depot Training Center,241 Pine St. NE; Atlanta, GA 30308 The Korean War,the first hot war of the Cold War,has not yet ended. Not simply a problem “over there,” the unending Korean War is an intimate and everyday condition of the American past and present.An asymmetrical war during which the United States perpetrated a “bombing holocaust” on North Korea, the Korean War has continuously informed U.S.regime-change policy toward North Korea for the past several decades. As a mode of imperial consciousness, the disavowal of the ongoing war normalizes the fact that the unending Korean War serves as the necessary condi­tion for a U.S.militarized presence in Northeast Asia and justifies renewed U.S.war as a “solution” to an unfinished war of intervention. This roundtable brings together anti-war activists,cultural workers,and politically engaged schol­ars to address not only the looming spectacle of renewed U.S.war on North Korea but also the un­ending Korean War that hovers illegibly below the surface in the United States. The panelists on this roundtable will point to the urgency of a call to knowledge in critical opposition to current calls to arms or for a “militarized peace.” SPEAKERS  INCLUDE: Christine Hong, University of California, Santa Cruz – Monica Kim, New York University – Hyun Lee, Nodutdol for Korean Community Development – Deann Borshay Liem, Filmmaker Sponsored by the Korea Policy Institute, ANSWER Coalition, Georgia WAND,and Asian Americans Advancing Justice-Atlanta. For further information, please contact cjhong@ucsc. edu. #KoreaPeace #DPRK #KoreanWar #MonicaKim #DeannBorshayLiem #Armistice #ChristineHong #HyunLee #NorthKorea

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un arrives at Dang Dong station in Vietnam’s Lang Son Province on Feb. 26. (EPA/Yonhap News) February 26, 2019 Press Release Washington, DC – As President Trump arrives to Hanoi, Vietnam, Rep. Ro Khanna, along with eighteen Democratic Members of Congress, have introduced a resolution calling for a final settlement of the Korean War, now officially in its 68th year. The resolution — which is backed by former President and Nobel Peace Laureate Jimmy Carter and a range of Korean-American and pro-diplomacy organizations — urges the Trump Administration to provide a clear roadmap to achieve a final peace settlement while highlighting the importance of reciprocal actions and confidence-building measures between the parties. “Historic engagement between South and North Korea has created a once-in-a-generation opportunity to formally end this war,” said Rep. Ro Khanna, a member of the House Armed Services Committee. “President Trump must not squander this rare chance for peace. He should work hand in hand with our ally, South Korean President Moon Jae-in, to bring the war to a close and advance toward the denuclearization of the peninsula.” “I commend this important resolution that will help bring this nearly 70 year conflict to a close,” said President Jimmy Carter. “I have visited North Korea several times to talk with their leadership and study the best path forward for peace. Ending the threat of war is the only way to ensure true security for both the Korean and American people and will create the conditions to alleviate the suffering of the ordinary North Koreans who are most harmed by ongoing tensions.” Co-led by prominent progressive Reps. Andy Kim, Barbara Lee, Pramila Jayapal, Deb Haaland, and Jan Schakowsky, the resolution calls on the Trump Administration to make greater efforts to include women in the peace process, citing the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 which Trump signed into law.  Women’s rights icon Gloria Steinem, founder of the peace group Women Cross DMZ, published an op-ed in the Washington Post on Sunday in support of the resolution. The resolution clarifies that ending the war does not necessitate a withdrawal of US troops from Korea or an acceptance of North Korea as a legitimate nuclear power. The resolution calls on the Administration to continue the repatriation of servicemember remains, and expand cooperation to achieve reunions of divided Korean and Korean-American families and facilitate people-to-people exchanges and humanitarian cooperation. Rep. Khanna has been a consistent voice for diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula. Shortly after Trump threatened “fire and fury” against North Korea, Khanna was joined by over 70 Congressmembers on his bipartisan “No Unconstitutional Strike on North Korea Act”, which would reinforce existing law prohibiting an unauthorized and unprovoked strike on North Korea. He has also been critical of those in both parties who have sought to restrict flexibility in negotiations, instead urging support for the diplomatic approach of our South Korean ally and its President, Moon Jae-in. Rep. Khanna will travel to Atlanta next week to sit down with Pres. Carter to discuss developments on the Korean Peninsula and solicit guidance from the Nobel Laureate about how the next generation of policymakers can best pursue a pro-diplomacy agenda for America. Current original cosponsors (18): Pramila Jayapal, Mark Pocan, Barbara Lee, Deb Haaland, Ilhan Omar, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Eleanor Holmes Norton, Jan Schakowsky, Raúl Grijalva, Bobby Rush, Eddie Bernice Johnson, Tulsi Gabbard, Adriano Espaillat, Andy Kim, Rashida Tlaib, Judy Chu, José Serrano, Gwen Moore The resolution is endorsed by organizations including the National Association of Korean Americans, Ploughshares Fund, Women Cross DMZ, Korean Americans in Action, United Methodist Church – Global Ministries, Win Without War, Peace Action, American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL), Just Foreign Policy, Beyond the Bomb, and Physicians for Social Responsibility. #Trump #KoreaPeace #KimJongUn #DPRK #USDPRKSummit #NorthKorea

By Tim Shorrock | March 4, 2019 Originally published in the Nation.com South Koreans are learning the hard truths expressed in the protest music of Phil Ochs from the darkest days of the Cold War. “When it comes to times like Korea, there’s no one more red, white, and blue” than the American liberal, he sang in one of his most biting verses. Decades later, with the two Koreas on the brink of ending a war that ripped their country apart and triggered the massive US military intervention of 1950, the liberals and Democrats who earned Ochs’s derision may be undermining the best chance for peace on the peninsula in a generation. As US diplomats prepare for the second summit between President Trump and Kim Jong-un next week in Hanoi, senior Democrats in the House and Senate, joined by a few Republicans, have been sounding alarm bells, warning that South Korean President Moon Jae-in is moving too fast in reconciling with North Korea by seeking a premature lifting of sanctions on the nuclear-armed state. They are also expressing strong reservations about the US and South Korean negotiations with Kim and warning Trump not to budge on his “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign until Kim has completely dismantled North Korea’s nuclear-weapons and missile program. Kim temporarily halted the program nearly 500 days ago by suspending all testing of his “nuclear force.” The congressional actions have been fueled by a steady stream of pessimistic and often misleading studies from Washington think tanks, eagerly embraced by US media hostile to the peace process, alleging that Kim is “playing” Trump and that both Moon and Trump may stop short of demanding North Korea’s immediate denuclearization by embracing a more incremental approach. In recent days, word has been circulating in Washington that Trump’s team in Hanoi, led by State Department special envoy Stephen Biegun, may loosen some US sanctions in return for North Korea’s closing down of its huge nuclear complex at Yongbyon, which South Korea’s Hankyoreh newspaper describes as “the center and symbol of North Korea’s nuclear development program.” Other reports claim that the two countries may set up liaison offices in their respective capitals as the bilateral talks move forward. Those attempts at a compromise, in turn, have set up an internecine battle inside the Trump administration, with hard-liners like John Bolton, who is visiting South Korea this weekend, trying to head off Biegun’s diplomacy. But Trump is sticking to his guns. “I’m in no particular rush” as long as the North’s test suspension remains in place, Trump told reporters at the White House on February 19. That same day, President Moon told Trump in a 35-minute phone call that South Korea was ready to use economic incentives, including connecting inter-Korean roads and railroads and other projects, to “reduce the burden” on the United States in forging an agreement with North Korea. “Seoul is ready to reboot inter-Korean exchanges with an early resumption of joint economic projects,” a presidential official at the Blue House told reporters. Top Democrats, however, oppose such moves. Last week, Senator Bob Menendez, the ranking Democrat on the powerful Foreign Relations Committee, joined Republican Ted Cruz in sending a strongly worded letter to Trump that directly attacked President Moon’s push for closer economic ties with North Korea. They urged the White House to rein in the US ally by committing “the full weight of the U.S. government to ensuring the integrity of the sanctions regime.” Senator Menendez is also the author of a resolution, now under consideration in the Senate and House, promoting the trilateral military alliance between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, which is highly unpopular among Koreans. It comes as Tokyo and Seoul are locked in a bitter dispute over Japan’s use of “comfort women” as sex slaves during World War II and its refusal to provide restitution to thousands of Koreans forced to labor in Japanese mines and factories during that time. The resolution, which was introduced in the House by Democratic Representative Eliot Engel, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, is widely seen in Seoul as a way to pressure President Moon to back off and settle the dispute. The most dramatic moment of congressional impatience with South Korea came last week, when House Speaker Nancy Pelosi met with a high-level delegation of South Korean lawmakers from both the ruling and opposition parties. The group, which was led by Representative Moon Hee-sang, the speaker of South Korea’s National Assembly, came to Washington to seek support for the inter-Korean peace process started by President Moon during the “Olympic Truce” of January 2018. According to Korean reporters who were briefed on the meeting, the session was uncomfortable from the start and had to be extended “as the talks grew intense.” Pelosi, citing her own visit to Pyongyang in 1997, reportedly told her visitors not to trust the North and asserted (apparently with prodding from Representative Na Kyung-won, the floor leader of the right-wing opposition Liberty Korea Party) that North Korea’s “real goal isn’t its own denuclearization but South Korea’s demilitarization.” At one point, Pelosi insisted that last June’s summit in Singapore—the first-ever meeting between a US president and a North Korean leader—was “nothing but show.” The implication was that the South Koreans, who have had extensive discussions on economic, political, and military issues with their Northern counterparts over the past year, are naive and don’t understand the threat to their own country. Representative Moon, in an interview with Fox 11 in Los Angeles, said he responded to Pelosi that the second summit in Hanoi “is of great importance to the Korean people and it will determine the fate of our country. That’s how important it is.” The US congressional pressure on South Korea to end its dispute with Japan also contributed to the tension. The issue of Japan’s wartime crimes is particularly sensitive for Representative Moon, who recently suggested that the Japanese emperor apologize to his country for its war crimes against Koreans. Later, he called Japan a “brazen thief” for demanding that he retract his comments. After hearing Pelosi express her concern about the dispute between South Korea and Japan, Speaker Moon told Korean reporters that the House speaker was essentially lobbying for Shinzo Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party government in Tokyo. “I think Japan told her to have a word with [us] before the meeting, or in other words, scold us,” he said, according to the Joongang Daily. Pelosi’s press office did not return phone calls or e-mails seeking comment and clarification. Still, Pelosi’s comments rattled many Koreans, who are hoping for a successful summit so they can proceed with their plans to eliminate tensions with the North. “Reconciliation and peace between North and South Korea is a gravely historic matter that should be for the Korean people to decide,” Simone Chun, a Korean scholar and activist who has spoken to congressional staffers about the peace process, told The Nation. “It cannot be allowed to be reduced to a bargaining chip in the struggle for one-upmanship between Republicans and Democrats.” Chun was also critical of Representative Na of the Korean opposition party for raising fears during her visit to Washington about a North Korean nuclear attack and opposing an end-of-war declaration at the upcoming summit. “What Pelosi did was to legitimize the ultra-right-wing views expressed by Na,” she said. Hwang Joon-bum, the Washington correspondent for Hankyoreh, South Korea’s largest progressive daily, wrote an op-ed about the House speaker’s remarks. “Pelosi is just one person who reflects the dominant viewpoint in the American political establishment, the mainstream media and think tanks,” he said. “There was never any chance” that the lawmakers’ tour “would reverse the deep-rooted distrust of North Korea and the antipathy to Trump both inside and outside of the US political establishment.” The US critics, he added, “aren’t impressed by North Korea’s suspension of nuclear and missile testing since Nov. 2017, its willingness to demolish its Yongbyon nuclear facility and [Kim Jong-un’s] focus on an economic line.” Daniel Jasper, the public-education-and-advocacy coordinator for Asia of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), said in an interview that he hoped Democrats would start seeing the Trump-Kim talks through Korean eyes. “We are urging Democratic leadership to see the peace process for what it is—a Korean-led effort to end a 70-year-old war,” Jasper told The Nation. “Changing from the view that the current situation is a nuclear standoff to the view that this situation is the result of an un-ended war is essential to understanding what types of reciprocal actions are pragmatic and necessary, as well as why diplomacy is needed in the first place. We remain hopeful that the Democrats will rise above partisanship and political calculations to support the overall goal of peace.” AFSC, which established its first operations in North Korea in 1980, works with four cooperative farms in the country to raise productivity and implement sustainable agricultural practices, Jasper said. But the Menendez letter showed little appreciation for South Korea’s efforts to help the North improve its economy. Menendez and Cruz listed a series of South Korean actions they consider troublesome, including moves by Korean banks to “pursue investments and operations” in the North and the participation of “multiple business executives” in President Moon’s summit in Pyongyang last September to discuss reopening the Kaesong Industrial Zone just north of the DMZ and tours of Mount Kumgang, a tourist site beloved by South Koreans. They also complained about President Moon’s recent calls to lift sanctions on the North “as soon as possible” and plans by both Koreas to break ground on a new cross-border rail project “within this year.” They added that North Korea’s “opacity” and its “well-documented efforts of evading sanctions” makes it impossible to ensure “that economic engagement with the North—regardless of intent to contribute to positive diplomatic progress on denuclearization—would not violate U.N. Security Council resolutions or be used for illicit activities prohibited by U.S. sanctions.” Meanwhile, in another move that could constrain both South Korea and the United States in their negotiations with the North, Representative Tom Malinowski, a newly elected Democratic congressman from New Jersey, joined Republican Representative Mike Gallagher in introducing a bill that would restrict the US government and the Pentagon from reducing US troops in South Korea from their current level of about 28,000 to 22,000 or less unless the secretary of defense could assure Congress it would not have an “adverse” impact on US security. The bill, H.R. 889, states that a “withdrawal or significant reduction” of US forces, which could happen eventually if a peace deal is reached, “may risk upsetting the military balance” in the Asia region. It also uses language similar to the Menendez letter concerning the US alliance with Japan, saying that the trilateral ties between the United States, Japan, and South Korea “form the bedrock of regional stability.” Malinowski, a former director of Human Rights Watch, was the assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor during the Obama administration. In 2017, he wrote an article for Politico titled “How to Take Down Kim Jong Un” that essentially called for a campaign that would “lead to the end” of the North Korean regime “and its reason to exist as a country.” The Democratic Party’s current approach was established last June, one week before the Singapore summit, in a letter to Trump from Senate minority leader Chuck Schumer and signed by Senators Menendez, Dick Durbin, Dianne Feinstein, Sherrod Brown, Mark Warner, and Patrick Leahy. It laid out a series of demands, including North Korea’s “dismantlement and removal” of its chemical and biological weapons, which are not currently part of the talks, and urged the White House to “maintain a tough approach to China” throughout the peace process. The Schumer letter also rejected any incremental steps by the US government in its dealings with Kim. “Any deal that explicitly or implicitly gives North Korea sanctions relief for anything other than the verifiable performance of its obligations to dismantle its nuclear and missile arsenal is a bad deal,” the Democratic senators declared. Chun, the scholar-activist, said in a recent e-mail to peace activists that the Schumer letter “completely overlooked the recent progress toward peace evinced by the inter-Korean summit and the Panmunjom Declaration and discounted the overwhelming support for the peace process by Koreans. It also offers no alternative vision for peace on the Korean Peninsula and considers Korean interests only insofar as they serve the narrow political agenda of the Democratic Party.” After the Schumer letter went out, according to activists who spend time on Capitol Hill, Representative Pelosi and other House Democratic leaders told their caucus “not to speak supportively” of the Singapore summit, which happened to coincide with a week of advocacy on Korea by peace groups. “Many of our folks lobbying on the Hill were stunned at how hostile many Dems were,” one activist told The Nation. But now, with the Trump-Kim negotiations in full swing, a few Democrats are ready to take a new approach. A group of lawmakers from the Congressional Progressive Caucus plan to announce an action next week to express support for the Korea peace process and call on the United States to finally end the Korean War through a peace agreement. That would be most welcome, said Kevin Martin, president of Peace Action and national coordinator of the Korea Peace Network. “Democrats should support diplomacy, and remember the most important president in this process is Moon Jae-in, not Donald Trump,” Martin said. “Moon’s persistent leadership toward reconciliation and diplomacy with North Korea represents the fervent desire of the Korean and Korean-American people for peace. Members of Congress from both parties should understand that and support it, skepticism about Trump and Kim notwithstanding.” Tim Shorrock is a Washington, DC–based journalist and the author of Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing, and  a Korea Policy Institute Associate. #DPRK #KoreaPeace #Sanctions #USDPRKSummit