What’s happening on the Korean peninsula? If you read the press or listen to the talking heads, your best guess would be that an insane North Korean regime is willing to risk war to manage its own internal political tensions. This conclusion would be hard to avoid because the media rarely provide any historical context or alternative explanations for North Korean actions. For example, much has been said about the March 2010 (alleged) North Korean torpedo attack on the Cheonan (a South Korean naval vessel) near Baengnyeong Island, and the November 2010 North Korean artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island (which houses a South Korean military base). The conventional wisdom is that both attacks were motivated by North Korean elite efforts to smooth the leadership transition underway in their country. The take away: North Korea is an out-of-control country, definitely not to be trusted or engaged in negotiations. But is that an adequate explanation for these events? Before examining the facts surrounding them, let’s introduce a bit of history. Take a look at the map above, which includes both Baengnyeong and Yeonpyeong Islands. The armistice that ended the Korean War fighting established the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) which separates North Korea from South Korea. At that time, the U.S. government unilaterally established another dividing line, one intended to create a sea border between the two Koreas. That border is illustrated on the map by line A, the blue Northern Limit Line (NLL). As you can see, instead of extending the DMZ westward into the sea, the U.S. line runs northward, limiting North Korea’s sea access. The line was drawn this way for two reasons: First, when the fighting stopped, South Korean forces were in control of the islands off the North Korean coast and the U.S. wanted to secure their position. Second, control over those islands enhanced the ability of U.S. forces to monitor and maintain military pressure on North Korea. North Korea never accepted the NLL. It argued for an alternative border, illustrated by line B, the red West Sea Military Demarcation Line (MDL). Acknowledging the reality of Southern forces on the islands off its coast, North Korea sought recognition for a sea border that went around the islands but otherwise divided the sea by extending the DMZ line. The critical point here is that the South Korean and U.S. promoted NLL is not recognized by international law; it has no legal standing. Don’t take my word for it. The following is from Bloomberg News: Then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in a 1975 classified cable that the unilaterally drawn Northern Limit Line was “clearly contrary to international law.” Two years before, the American ambassador said in another cable that many nations would view South Korea and its U.S. ally as “in the wrong” if clashes occurred in disputed areas along the boundary. . . . The line snakes around the Ongjin peninsula, creating a buffer for five island groups that South Korea kept under the armistice that ended the 1950-1953 Korean War, in which U.S.-led forces fought under a UN mandate against North Korean and Chinese troops. The agreement doesn’t mention a sea border, which isn’t on UN maps drawn up at the time. The 3-nautical mile (3.5-statute mile) territorial limit used to devise the line was standard then. Today almost all countries, including both Koreas, use a 12-mile rule, and the islands are within 12 miles of the North Korean mainland. The furthest is about 100 miles (160 kilometers) from the closest major South Korean port at Incheon. “If it ever went to arbitration, the decision would likely move the line further south,” said Mark J. Valencia, a maritime lawyer and senior research fellow with the National Bureau of Asian Research, who has written extensively on the dispute. . . . North Korea, after spending two decades rebuilding its forces, sent vessels across the border 43 times between October and November 1973, sparking confrontations, according to the South Korean Navy’s website. At a meeting with the UN Command, the North’s claim that it was operating within its own waters because the NLL was invalid was rejected. Kissinger and other U.S. diplomats privately raised questions about the legality of the sea border and South Korea’s policing of it in cables that have been declassified and are available to the public. “The ROK and the U.S. might appear in the eyes of a significant number of other countries to be in the wrong” if an incident occurred in disputed areas, U.S. Ambassador Francis Underhill wrote in a Dec. 18, 1973, cable to Washington, using the acronym for Republic of Korea. South Korea “is wrong in assuming we will join in attempt to impose NLL” on North Korea, said a Dec. 22, 1973, “Joint State-Defense Message” to the U.S. Embassy in Seoul. . . . The line “was unilaterally established and not accepted by NK,” Kissinger wrote in a confidential February 1975 cable. “Insofar as it purports unilaterally to divide international waters, it is clearly contrary to international law.” I doubt that discussions of the two events noted above mentioned this history. Tensions in the region are not just the result of past political decisions. Critical decisions continue to be made. For example, in October 2007, an inter-Korean summit meeting between Roh Moo-Hyun (the previous South Korean president) and Kim Jong Il (the North Korean leader) produced a commitment by both sides to negotiate a joint fishing area and create a “peace and cooperation zone” in the West Sea. This agreement could have greatly reduced tensions between the two countries and helped to promote a peaceful reunification process. However, a few months after the summit, the newly elected and current South Korean president, Lee Myung-bak, rejected the agreements reached at that summit and the previous one held in 2000. Lee openly derided past South Korean efforts to improve relations with, and called for aggressive actions against, the North. The U.S. government supported Lee’s position. With this as background, let’s now consider the first event, North Korea’s alleged sinking of the Cheonan. The Lee administration claims that a North Korean submarine was responsible for the sinking of the Cheonan and the deaths of 49 sailors. The Cheonan was an anti-submarine ship, participating in war games at the time of its sinking in the disputed waters surrounding Baengnyeong Island. Significantly, after weeks of official investigation into the cause of the sinking, Lee publicly blamed North Korea only one day before local elections were scheduled, elections that the ruling party was predicted to lose. In fact, Lee’s party did take a beating at the polls. But what about the evidence for North Korean responsibility? North Korea has denied any involvement in the sinking. In fact, there is good reason to believe that the Cheonan sank because it hit a reef; that is what its captain reported when he radioed the South Korean coast guard seeking help. As I noted in a previous posting, perhaps the most compelling evidence casting doubt on South Korean government claims that the Cheonan was torpedoed by a North Korean submarine is the fact that all the Cheonan victims died of drowning, nearly all of the 58 surviving crew members escaped serious injury, and the ship’s internal instruments remained intact. According to several scientists, if the Cheonan had been hit by a torpedo, the entire crew would have been sent flying, leading to fractured bones and the destruction of instruments. What about the most recent incident involving the North Korean artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island? The South Korean position is that its military was merely engaged in “routine” war games (involving over 70,000 troops), which also happened to include the firing of live ammunition into the sea from a military base on the island. It had done nothing to provoke a North Korean artillery attack on the base. In reality, the South had been strengthening its artillery on the island for some time, engaging in ever more aggressive (non-live ammunition) artillery drills with the apparent aim of boosting its capacity to inhibit the movement of the North Korean navy even in its own waters. These drills were a direct threat to North Korean security given how close the island is to its coast. Moreover, although the South claims that its war games and artillery fire were routine, it may be the first time that the South has staged major war games and simultaneously engaged in firing live ammunition into territory claimed by the North. The North fired on the South Korean artillery batteries located on Yeonpyeong Island only after its repeated demands that the South stop its live ammunition firing were rejected by the South. Many unanswered questions remain about the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyeong attack. However, what does appear clear is that there are many complexities surrounding these events that are never made public here in the U.S., and that these omissions end up reinforcing a view of North Korean motivations and actions that is counterproductive to what should be our goal: achieving peace on the Korean peninsula. What might help? How about encouraging the U.S. government to accept North Korean offers to engage in good faith negotiations aimed at signing a peace treaty to officially end the Korean War as a first step towards normalized relations. The fact that our government is reluctant to publicly acknowledge the contested nature of the NLL or pursue an end to the Korean War raises important questions about the motivations driving our own foreign policy. *Dr. Martin Hart-Landsberg is Professor of Economics and Director of the Political Economy Program at Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Oregon, and a KPI Advisor.

In the 1940s George Kennan, U.S. diplomat and scholar, coined the phrase “containment” as an alternative to the more hawkish goal of “rolling back” communism. Soviet expansion should be countered and “contained” with pro-West political and economic alliances, he believed. Even long after Kennan felt it had come to be misinterpreted as a military doctrine and in spite of Nixon’s policy of détente beginning with China in the early 1970s the concept of containment continued to influence U.S. cold war policy. This is particularly true of U.S policy towards Korea, where the free-market and socialist worlds rub shoulders at the DMZ. Today, the term “reign-in,” however, is more commonly used to describe containment, in relation to North Korea. In response to China’s rise as a world power, the Obama administration appears to be re-enacting the containment script in earnest strengthening alliances with countries neighboring China such as India, prodding South Korea and Japan to move towards a “defense” alliance, and by intensifying war exercises in the West Sea as a show of force to China as much as to North Korea. But while the containment doctrine may linger on in U.S. policy, it is already an anachronism on the ground in Asia. Indeed, South Korea, Japan and China have been pursuing serious discussions about a trade agreement of their own to serve as a buffer from the economic slow-downs in Europe and the United States. Globalization and new regional alignments are eroding cold war rivalry in the Northeast Asian marketplace, even as the Obama administration appears to be seeking to shore up cold war alliances in the region. The Obama administration’s approach to North Korea has been premised on the belief that North Korea is in a state of internal disarray, and that with enough coercion from the U.S. and China, North Korea can be pressured to disarm or may even collapse. However the reality today is that North Korea, whatever its internal situation may be, is as defiant as ever of what it perceives as hostile policies towards it. Moreover the events of last year reveal that China does not see it in its interests to join efforts by the U.S. and South Korea to use pressure tactics to “reign-in” its neighbor, and that it is powerful and confident enough to say “no.” China is out of the containment box. It has surpassed Japan to become the world’s second largest economy. It is a leading actor in free markets in every corner of the globe, a major creditor of U.S. debt, and is well on its way to challenging U.S. naval supremacy in the Pacific. For its part North Korea, which has endured untold economic hardships, has proven to be remarkably resilient. It proposed to South Korea and the U.S. this week to “let bygones be bygones,” and to engage in unconditional talks to resolve tensions on the peninsula. In light of ongoing hostilities in the West Sea and China’s refusal to support U.S. policies in the region that might destabilize North Korea, the need for diplomacy is no longer possible to ignore. Policies in Seoul and Washington aimed at pressuring North Korea to denuclearize, relying almost exclusively on economic sanctions and military posturing, are shifting towards diplomatic engagement. After a meeting with his advisors last week President Lee Myung Bak told the press that South Korea has “no choice but to resolve the problem of dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program diplomatically through the six-party talks.” This week in Seoul Stephen Bosworth, U.S. Special Envoy to the six party-talks, declared “we believe that serious negotiation must be at the heart of any strategy for dealing with North Korea.” China, North Korea and Russia, the U.S. South Korea and Japan, are in general agreement that a return to diplomacy means restarting the six-party talks. But getting back to the table will not be easy, much less reaching actionable agreements. To start with, China, North Korea and Russia have been calling for unconditional talks including discussion of issues beyond denuclearization, such as territorial disputes in the West Sea and the need for a peace process. The other parties have been arguing that North Korea must take steps to implement agreements it made during previous six party sessions as a precondition for returning to the talks, focusing mainly on the denuclearization issue. Anger and frustration resulting from fighting in the West Sea has also been a barrier to diplomacy. South Korea is demanding that North Korea apologize for its shelling of Yeonpyeong Island last November, which resulted in the deaths of 4 South Koreans, and admit to torpedoing the Cheonan naval vessel last March, taking the lives of 46 sailors. However, North Korea denies any role in the Cheonan sinking and accuses South Korea of conducting provocative artillery drills within its territorial waters surrounding Yeonpyeong Island. Nevertheless, assuming that these disagreements and issues are overcome — perhaps with the help of a successful summit meeting between China and the U.S. on January 19th — the critical challenge will be for all the parties to actually follow through on the action items they agree upon. In previous talks the parties agreed to achieve denuclearization across the entire Korean peninsula, not just in the north, in a “step by step,” “action for action,” “peaceful manner.” The parties also agreed to work towards the normalization of relations between the United States and North Korea, and between Japan and North Korea, and to implement a permanent “peace regime” on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, “the six parties committed to joint efforts to secure lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia,” according to their joint statement of 2005. Unfortunately these action items require far more will and good faith to implement, than has existed among the participants. The Achilles heel of the six-party talks is that the participants have failed to agree on the fundamental purpose of the talks, not the omission of any key issues. The U.S. and South Korea see the talks as a disarmament process incentivized by the promise of economic aid to North Korea and a yet to-be-decided peace accord. North Korea regards the talks as a process for achieving peace, recognition of its sovereignty, and of ending cold war rivalries on the Korean peninsula from which denuclearization will result. These conflicting views have plagued the talks from their very beginning in 2003. In any case what is now breathing life back into the six-party talks is a common desire to diffuse tensions on the Korean peninsula and avoid more deaths. This strongly suggests that going forward the parties should see their purpose as formulating a peace process. Such an understanding would enable the parties to take immediate steps to prevent further outbreaks of fighting, and to begin negotiating the terms of a peace accord, including steps towards denuclearization and methods of verification. Last year the world was reminded that the Korean War is not over, and that peace is not at hand. It is too early to tell how the U.S. and its allies will evolve their policies and how successful diplomacy will be in 2011. The U.S. and South Korea are convinced that North Korea is not willing to give up its nuclear arms, particularly in light of recent revelations of the latter’s uranium enrichment program. North Korea is unconvinced that the U.S. and South Korea are willing to make peace with it, particularly in light of statements made by President Lee, and supported by President Obama, describing unification as a matter of South Korea absorbing North Korea. Clearly there is tremendous distrust to overcome. Nevertheless, taking one step at a time, it is far better to start the New Year by trading harsh words across a table than by firing more artillery shells over the already bloodstained waters of the West Sea. It is far better to address the challenges of an emergent China by exchanging views and fostering mutual respect in a summit meeting than by engaging in polemics in the press. Progress beyond this point, however, will require flexibility by all parties to reformulate their policies and expectations as needed to foster peace and stability in the region in accordance with changing circumstances in Asia, and willingness to leave paradigms of the past behind. *Paul Liem is Board Chairperson for the Korea Policy Institute

Thirty years ago this fall I was in Pyongyang, North Korea, talking to the Foreign Minister Kim Young Nam. I was part of a small delegation from the American Friends Service Committee, the first American non-sectarian group to visit North Korea since the Korean War. In 1980, the US government refused to talk directly with North Korea and would not give visas to any North Koreans to come here. Then, as now, tensions were high on the Korean peninsula. We wanted to learn how North Korea saw the situation and what common ground we might encourage the US government to explore. On our return we met with representatives of the US National Security Council and the State Department. Although the US did slowly begin contact with North Korea in the years after that, American efforts have been incredibly erratic, making promises to the North during negotiations (such a supplying a safer type of reactor for power generation and other energy assistance) that were not been fulfilled and which triggered angry responses from the North. Sadly, two important lessons we learned in 1980 about how North Korea sees its situation have not yet been recognized as essential to reducing the threat of military conflict. First lesson: North Korea felt then and still feels incredibly vulnerable militarily. Fifty-eight years after the end of the Korean War, the US still maintains over 28,000 troops in South Korea and still retains wartime operational control over South Korean forces. Every year the US joins South Korea in conducting huge and provocative military exercises near the demilitarized zone and in contested waters. Second lesson: Ever since the Korean War ended without a peace treaty — just with a temporary armistice — North Korea has felt a need above all for a permanent peace treaty with the US to protect it from perceived potential military attack. A peace treaty would also include clarification of maritime and land borders between the 2 Koreas. In 1953, the US navy acted unilaterally to impose a Northern Limit Line which has never been recognized internationally. Disagreement about borders related to this line underlies the conflicts this fall over South Korean artillery firing exercises in contested waters that triggered return fire from North Korean units, substantially escalating the risk of war on the peninsula. The US response to this fall’s exchange of shelling by the south and the north has been particularly disappointing. Instead of immediately taking advantage of China’s shared interest in lowering the escalating hostilities, the US turned down Beijing’s proposal to use the crisis to restart needed 6-party talks and instead revved up the conflict by dispatching a nuclear-powered air carrier to military exercises in the disputed waters and pressing both Japan and South Korea to ratchet up their military presence. Even when former US Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson made a trip to North Korea in December, bringing back North Korean offers to welcome back nuclear inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Commission and to decrease its stored nuclear material through shipments to South Korea, the US responded only with skepticism. Both offers provide potentially huge steps forward on the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons development, so it is encouraging that this week the US has sent its special envoy for North Korea, Stephen Bosworth, to the region to meet with Japan, South Korea and China to discuss re-starting talks. I fervently hope that a new round of talks emerges soon and that the US has the wisdom to enter them with an understanding of how North Korea sees its own needs. This will require addressing not only the nuclear issue, but all the issues involved in North Korea’s sense of military vulnerability. It is in the US interest in so many ways to lower tensions with North Korea: not only to lower the nuclear weapons threat, but also to remove an obstacle to the gradual economic reintegration and peaceful reunification of North and South, economically and politically a major stabilization. Cooperation with China in this effort would also provide an excellent model for the Beijing-Washington collaboration which is needed in many parts of the globe. Stability on the Korean peninsula would also allow Washington to back away from the US taxpayer expense of maintaining American military bases in South Korea and Japan, where both populations resent the American soldiers’ presence. All the December deficit reduction reports called for including military spending in needed budgets cuts. Successful negotiations with North Korea could make a major contribution to this deficit reduction, while increasing security and long-term stability for all Koreans. This is the time to let President Obama and Congress know how much we’d like to move the Korean peninsula to the list of places in the world where diplomacy not military force is US strategy for peace-making. For more information, see the Korea Policy Institute website, http://www.kpolicy.org. *Maud Easter traveled to Pyongyang as a member of an American Friends Service Committee delegation in 1980. She is currently the Steering Committee Coordinator for Women Against War in Albany, NY.

President Obama has said that the U.S. needs to compete more effectively for exports. That is why he is calling on Congress to ratify U.S. free trade agreements with Korea, Columbia, and Peru. In the public back and forth about these free trade agreement most of the arguments are about whether the designated tariff reductions mandated by the agreements will produce jobs for U.S. workers. In fact, there is little reason to believe that they will. But, more importantly, little attention has been focused on the fact that these free trade agreements contain many chapters that have far reaching implications beyond employment numbers. In fact, the U.S. free trade agreement with Korea includes 24 chapters. One of those chapters deals with investments. In broad brush, the investment chapter establishes broad limits on the ability of governments (at all levels) to regulate or interfere with private profit seeking investments by (foreign) corporations. According to the chapter, the investments covered by the agreement include: every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk. Forms that an investment may take include: (a) an enterprise; (b) shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise; (c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans; (d) futures, options, and other derivatives; (e) turnkey, construction, management, production, concession, revenue-sharing, and other similar contracts; (f) intellectual property rights; (g) licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar rights conferred pursuant to domestic law; and (h) other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable property, and related property rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens, and pledges. This chapter is supposed to secure the protection of Korean investors in the U.S. and U.S. investors in Korea. In actuality, it will ensure that Korean and U.S. investors will enjoy these protections in their own countries as well. Although this agreement does allow governments to offer foreign investors protections that exceed those they offer their own investors, it is highly unlikely that they would do so. Thus, the freedoms granted to foreign investors under the terms of this chapter will, sooner or later, be extended to domestic firms as well, thereby expanding corporate power more generally. And since, as the above list makes clear, a wide range of activities are to be protected under the terms of this chapter, it is likely that many corporations can expect to benefit from it. One protection granted to foreign companies is the freedom from government imposed performance requirements. According to the chapter: Neither Party may, in connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, or sale or other disposition of an investment in its territory of an investor of a Party or of a non-Party, impose or enforce any requirement or enforce any commitment or undertaking: (a) to export a given level or percentage of goods or services; (b) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content; (c) to purchase, use, or accord a preference to goods produced in its territory, or to purchase goods from persons in its territory; (d) to relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of exports or to the amount of foreign exchange inflows associated with such investment; (e) to restrict sales of goods or services in its territory that such investment produces or supplies by relating such sales in any way to the volume or value of its exports or foreign exchange earnings; (f) to transfer a particular technology, a production process, or other proprietary knowledge to a person in its territory; or (g) to supply exclusively from the territory of the Party the goods that such investment produces or the services that it supplies to a specific regional market or to the world market. This protection clearly limits the ability of a government to implement any meaningful industrial policy. The chapter also grants foreign corporations protection from expropriation. According to the chapter, “Neither party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization.” Critical here is the notion of indirect expropriation or nationalization. Indirect expropriate refers to a government action or regulation that has an “effect equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure.” A direct nationalization is relatively easy to define, since it involves an explicit government seizure of title and/or assets. Determining whether an indirect nationalization has occurred is far more difficult. According to the chapter, such a determination will require: a case-by-case, fact based inquiry that considers all relevant factors relating to the investment, including: (i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action or a series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; (ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action, including its objectives and context. Relevant considerations could include whether the government action imposes a special sacrifice on the particular investor or investment that exceeds what the investor or investment should be expected to endure for the public interest. Given the broad range of covered investments, this definition will likely mean that many government actions, including those dealing with health and safety concerns or land use planning, could conceivably result in an indirect expropriation from the perspective of the investor. This is especially true given that an investor can, as noted above, claim an indirect expropriation if a government action “interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations” or “imposes a special sacrifice on the particular investor or investment that exceeds what the investor or investment should be expected to endure for the public interest.” There is enough ambiguity in all of this, that one can easily imagine foreign corporations challenging many government regulations. And, if a corporation does feel that it is the victim of an indirect expropriation, this chapter gives it the power to directly sue the unit of government that has implemented the offending rule or regulation. Under the terms of the dispute-settlement mechanism, the corporation can have its claim judged under the World Bank sponsored ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) Convention and the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration, the UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) Arbitration Rules, or any other arbitration institution if it is agreed to by both parties. For example, if the ICSID is chosen to judge the claim, which is the most common choice in agreements like this, three arbitrators will be selected from a listing of international trade and investment specialists. Each side selects one with a third to be chosen by agreement of the two sides. In other words, this dispute-settlement mechanism allows a corporation to challenge a governmental action outside the legal system of the host nation and have its case decided according to terms that differ from that nation’s legal system. As Public Citizen reports: The special threat is posed by the fact that there is a huge number of U.S. and Korean companies cross-established in each other’s national markets. If the Korea FTA were to be passed with its current text, at least 1,030 corporations with 2,055 establishments across the United States and South Korea would obtain new FTA rights to demand taxpayer compensation through challenges of U.S. and Korean federal and subfederal laws in foreign tribunals. The scale of investment going in both directions is very unlike previous U.S. FTAs with small developing nations. We already have an example of how this process could conceivably work. NAFTA has a similar investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. In 1996, The Loewen Group, a Canadian funeral home company, lost a $500 million verdict to a Mississippi funeral home business that had accused it of fraudulent business practices. Loewen appealed the case to the Mississippi Supreme Court, which refused to overturn the decision. In 1999, the Loewen Group took its case to a NAFTA tribunal, arguing that the verdict against the company should be invalidated because the court proceedings were tainted by anti-Canadian bias. Loewen asked the tribunal for compensation for what it had to pay to settle the case and for additional damages to compensate the company for the harm done to its business reputation. The tribunal issued its decision in 2003, ruling in favor of the United States. The Dispute Resolution Journal describes the reasoning and conclusions of the tribunal as follows: In its 71-page award, the tribunal . . . acknowledged that this was a difficult case. The award addressed the Loewen Group’s claims of an unfair process as well as the United States’ numerous arguments that it was not liable under NAFTA. In so doing, the tribunal chronicled the injustices suffered by the company and its founder, co-claimant Raymond Loewen. Ultimately, it found, among other things, that “the conduct of the trial judge was so flawed as to constitute a miscarriage of justice amounting to a manifest injustice as that expression is understood in international law.” The tribunal also said that the jury verdict was grossly excessive to the amounts in dispute and therefore the claimants had “strong prospects” of a successful appeal. . . . After recounting its findings, the tribunal explained that its decision to dismiss the NAFTA claims on the merits was ultimately based on a lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that it had no authority to determine the Loewen Group’s NAFTA claims because the company had reorganized under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code as an American corporation and then assigned its NAFTA claims to a newly formed Canadian corporation “owned and controlled by an American corporation.” NAFTA, the tribunal pointed out, was not intended to address investment-related claims by domestic investors against their government. In other words, the tribunal found it within its authority to rule on this case, even though its decision could potentially overturn a decision made by a U.S. court. And it gave strong indication that it felt that such action was justified by its reading of the submitted documents. It rejected the claim only because the Loewen Group, by reorganizing itself as a U.S. registered company, was no longer a “foreign” company and thus no longer had standing under the terms of NAFTA. If the tribunal had ruled in Loewen’s favor, the U.S. government would have been forced to compensate the company. Interestingly, the recently completed U.S.-Australia FTA does not include an investor-state enforcement mechanism, but rather relies on state-state enforcement of the FTA’s investment, services and financial services chapters. It appears that the U.S.-Korea FTA includes an investor-state mechanism because of U.S. insistence. As Public Citizen reports: Korean civil society organizations report that Korean government officials expressed concern about investor-state, which was characterized by Korean negotiators as a U.S. demand. The FTA text itself reveals Korea’s concerns: Korea insisted on and obtained a limitation on investor-state enforcement. Under this limitation, if a U.S. firm starts proceedings in a Korean court or administrative tribunal about a Korean policy that they claim breaches the various property rights established in the FTA, then they may NOT also use the investor-state system. U.S. firms have to pick domestic OR investor-state. USTR did NOT make that exception apply to us. . . . That the Korea government would be concerned is reasonable: there are hundreds of U.S. firms in Korea that would be newly empowered to use the investor-state mechanism to privately enforce the FTA’s extraordinary foreign investor rights that extend beyond Korea domestic law, which like U.S. law does not generally recognize compensation claims for “regulatory” takings. It seems safe to say that this investment chapter will create an environment in which governments will understandably be leery of doing anything that might be viewed as harmful to corporate activities, present or future. Make no mistake, this is the outcome desired by those who drafted the agreement. I bet you have read or heard little about this chapter, or the others that have a similar aim, in the public discussions of the U.S.-Korea FTA. And that is also no accident. It is hard to see how this agreement will serve the public’s interest in either Korea or the U.S. President Obama is pushing Congress to ratify it as soon as possible. It is very important that we push back. Our goal must be the defeat of this and the other so-called free trade agreements. *Dr. Martin Hart-Landsberg is Professor of Economics and Director of the Political Economy Program at Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Oregon, and a KPI Advisor.

A Congressional vote on the proposed Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) is likely to be held in the coming weeks, yet few members of Congress are fully aware of the implications of the agreement. Christine Ahn interviewed Mr. Joo-Ho Lee on January 22, 2011 about the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement’s impact on Korea’s health system. Mr. Lee is the Senior Director of Strategic Planning for the Korean Health and Medical Workers Union (KHMU). In the interview, Mr. Lee discusses the threat that the FTA represents to public health in Korea: among other points, because health insurance corporations are classified as financial investment institutions, not health institutions, they are subject to finance regulations, but not public health regulations. Meanwhile, provisions of the proposed FTA, negotiated primarily in 2006-2007, represent the deregulatory fervor that swept U.S. economic policy at that time. Experts have identified financial deregulation as a major cause of the economic recession in the U.S., and such deregulatory provisions become law under the KORUS FTA. Mr. Lee speaks from his standpoint in the context of Korean society, but this matter, and others that Mr. Lee raises, also impact conditions and public life in the U.S. The Investor-State Dispute (ISD) clause he discusses applies equally to U.S., Korean, and third-nation corporations operating in both countries, allowing corporations to sue governments in Korea or the U.S. to strike down legislation passed in the interest of public health and be awarded taxpayer dollars for profits lost on account of laws protecting the public health. [Ahn] Mr. Lee, what brings you to the United States? [Lee]: I am here to lo learn about single-payer universal health care and California’s Registered Nurse (RN)-to-patient ratio legislation. My union aims to see Korea provide free health care for all citizens and provide adequate staffing for patient safety, which they currently don’t have yet. In order to prepare for a future where health care is free (universal health care), my union is interested in the single payer plan. I am conducting research on what other kinds of health care systems exist through a joint research project with the California Nurses Association and National Nurses United. The Korean healthcare industry, government and hospitals are working to reducing human resources costs to make health care more cost-beneficial. As a result many workers have been laid off and then rehired as irregular workers. [Ahn] The Korea-U.S. FTA is likely to come up very soon for a vote and very few people understand it. What do you think about the FTA? [Lee] Overall, I am against the Korea-U.S. FTA, actually against all FTAs, and instead would like to see fair trade. The FTA supposedly means free trade, but the ‘free’ part refers to corporate freedom, their freedom to make more profit. It’s irrelevant whether the FTA is beneficial to the U.S. or Korea. From the perspective of the working class and public, this FTA is only going to increase the profit maximization of U.S. and Korean corporations, and decrease the quality of life of the working class in both countries. That is why I am opposed to the FTA and very critical of it. [Ahn] My understanding is that there are some provisions within the FTA that would extend the life of patents on pharmaceuticals and negatively influence Korea’s positive list. Could you explain this and also the issue of Free Economic Zones (FEZ) U.S. health care insurance companies are establishing in South Korea? [Lee] Since being here in the United States, I have discovered that a lot of people are critical of pharmaceutical companies because of their extensive taking of benefits and profits, and that their profits were huge. In Korea, it’s the same problem. The entire amount spent annually on health care is about 30 trillion won, or $26 billion dollars. A third of that budget goes to paying for medicines. This is quite high because worldwide, statistically the cost of medicines is typically 1/10th of the entire cost of health care. In Korea it’s much higher because Koreans spend more money on over the counter medicines rather than going to the hospital. Due to the high ratio of spending on medicine, Roh Moo Hyun (the former late South Korean President) sought to introduce a bill to put a limit on the positive list, that it only include generic medicines to keep people’s health care costs low. This bill didn’t go through and his reform failed because of internal politics and lack of support. Under the FTA, pharmaceutical companies and the Korean government will purportedly create an independent agency to determine the costs of medicine. But we all know that pharmaceutical companies will determine the prices of medicine. Patents on U.S. pharmaceuticals would be extended 20-30 years and will therefore prevent all these medicines from becoming generic. Then these corporations can determine their own price, and by being able to determine their own price, they will be able to lobby for their own medicines to be included in the positive list. This will definitely have a huge impact on the cost of medicine, and the money will come from the people’s pockets. Pharmaceutical companies are known for their lobbying activities and their financial support for politicians, for profit hospitals and doctors. For example, pharmaceutical companies finance most medical conferences, not just in Korea but also in the United States, which is also where doctors are given promotional medicines to give to their patients. In addition to pharmaceutical companies, U.S. private health insurance companies coming into Korea will be really detrimental to South Korea’s national health care. Insurance companies will not be regulated by public health care laws—rather, they are set to be regulated by financial legislation because health insurance companies are technically finance companies. MetLife, for example, doesn’t just do health care. There are no articles on public health care or health provisions under financial regulations. The social movements have been fighting for free, universal health care. Currently, public (government run) health care covers about 64% of an individual’s medical costs. Because 36% is not covered, many people buy private insurance. The social movements have been calling for increasing national health care coverage up to 90%. Recently, the South Korean Democratic Party has added this call onto their platform. The critical problem if the FTA passes is with the Investor to State Dispute [ISD] mechanism. If it passes, U.S. health care insurance companies will be able argue that if they lose their profits they will have legal right to sue the state for their losses. For this reason, the South Korean parliament will likely decide against increasing the portion of national health care to 90% of a person’s coverage since such a policy would place the government at risk of being sued for lost and future profits under the ISD mechanism. In recent years, the South Korean parliament tried to regulate the entrance into Korea of super supermarkets (SSM), like Wal-Mart. But Tesco, a British supermarket, used the Korea-EU FTA to threaten lawsuits alleging that such legislation was impeding its future profits. But small-businesses are seeking support from their locally elected officials for some protection from these SSMs. The Korean legislature considered regulations that would prohibit them from entering certain portions of the market, but Tesco threatened to sue the government. Due to the threats, this legislation didn’t even pass Parliament. Even though this regulation was intended to protect Korean markets and the people, the excuse legislators made publicly was “Let the market handle it.” The ISD clause in the FTA is universal to all incoming corporations, including insurance companies, which will only be regulated by the Finance Committee, not the Public Health Committee. Currently, the entrance of private insurance companies into the Korean market will be detrimental for many reasons. First and foremost is the issue of the lack of regulations. In the United States, there are many private insurance companies and U.S. regulations, which prohibit insurance companies from taking advantage of consumers. In Korea, private health insurance is still a relatively recent trend. Korean private health insurance companies have been lobbying to increase their share of the country’s health coverage (currently at 36%). Of the $26 USD billion national budget for medical care, $10-12 billion, half, goes to private insurance. We fear that with the FTA and the incoming U.S. private health insurance companies, the Korean healthcare market will be soon be entirely privatized. Private health insurance already absorbs 30-40 percent of the nation’s entire health cost, and with this FTA their share of the entire health care budget will only grow. [Ahn] Why are South Korean insurance companies supporting this FTA given that they would be in fierce competition with U.S. health insurance companies? [Lee] Good point. First, why would Korean capitalists be supporting the FTA if they would be in direct competition with U.S. corporations? Why would Korean private health care insurance companies support FTA? Actually, if you look at most of Korea’s corporations, the majority of their shareholders are U.S. corporations. For example, if you look at POSCO, Korea electricity, Korea communications, most of the shareholders are comprised of American companies. In other words, the Korean economy is subjugated to the U.S. economy, in that most Korean corporations are already U.S. ones. Approximately 50% of most Korean companies are U.S. owned. For example, GM owns Daewoo. The second reason is that by weakening Korea’s national health care system, the market would expand for private insurance companies. If the national health care system collapses, private insurance companies, which now have 36% of the market, can reap profits from the remaining 64% of the market now receiving care from the public health system. Even small Korean health insurance companies can get a small portion of that market dominated by U.S. companies. It’s still beneficial to them, so of course they would support the FTA. [Ahn] Do you think that because of the growing popularity of moving public health coverage to 90% and the threats to Korea’s national health care system by this FTA, that there is widespread opposition, like there was to the beef issue? [Lee] At the time of the explosive candlelight vigils, there were two important issues. One was beef and the second one was the issue of the privatization of health care. At the time, the progressive movement was able to highlight that the Lee Myung Bak administration was about to privatize the national health care system, which would collapse with the FTA. These two issues became very close to the people’s hearts. It was such a sensitive issue that even political parties are using it on their presidential election platforms. The largest oppositional party is now called the Democratic Party, and they won the last mid-term elections. The Democratic Party took on the issue of free lunch for elementary school students. The conservative Grand National Party was against it. They realized that the policy wouldn’t cost much money and with this issue, they got popular support from the people. With regards to the Yeon-pyeong-do issue, they took up the banner of, “Do we want war or peace? We don’t want war.” This position also received broad popular support. The Democratic Party is running the 90% public coverage of health care on their election platform because they recognize that this is an important issue for the people. I think that their advocating for this policy as an election platform means they think they can win it. The people’s support for the issue is broad. If it comes to a debate in Parliament, then of course the people will advocate for keeping the national health care. One problem is that the Lee Myung Bak administration has been really silent on the FTA clause. They deny that the FTA will affect Korea’s public health system. There are two pillars that support health care in Korea. First, all hospitals are supposed to be not-for-profit. Although a hospital may be privately owned, there are many regulations on how much profit you can make from providing care. As a not-for-profit, you have to reinvest the money back into the hospital. This law keeps hospitals from becoming for-profit. The second pillar is that all hospitals must take national health care insurance. They cannot say, ” I don’t want to take a national health care insurance, I only want to treat patients who have private insurance.” They cannot do that. These two regulations support national health care. Without them, public health care would not survive. Naturally, there are doctors who have incurred high costs of training, and many of them have become discontent or disgruntled by their limited profit making. Meanwhile large hospitals have tried to privatize through lobbying government. One of President Lee’s platforms when he was running for office was to privatize health care. But as soon as he was elected, he hit the wall of people’s resistance on the beef issue and then on the issue privatization of health care. This is one of the sensitive, very sensitive areas that Lee has yet to move on. He could not do anything, so far. [Ahn] But maybe through the FTA he can? [Lee] He may be able to through the FTA, if he can mask the details. But the progressive movements are conducting massive education campaigns to build public support for expanding public healthcare coverage. I believe that the FTA can be stopped by the issue over the public’s right to healthcare. [Ahn] It seems to me the most promising, and I’m honored to be sitting with the person who’s going to help make it happen! [Lee] As for the Free Economic Zone [FEZ], it’s not a part of the FTA package although it came about at the same time. As I’ve noted, the pharmaceutical companies and private health insurance companies (financial services companies) are major drivers for the passage of the FTA. The third industry that threatens the healthcare system is large, for-profit hospitals in the Free Economic Zones. The three interest groups (pharmaceutical companies, private health insurance companies and for-profit hospitals) are working together to destroy the national health care system. We have to see all them working together in tandem. The Lee Myung Bak government has established six special economic zones in major cities, like Incheon, Gwanyang, and Busan. In these six places, U.S. for-profit hospitals have been established to accommodate foreigners, especially foreign investors. The government argues that foreigners living in South Korea will find it hard to go into any hospital to receive care, and that special hospitals must be built for them. In these free economic zones, only private health insurance companies can operate. These for-profit hospitals are not required to take national health care insurance. The reality, however, is that these hospitals are also set up to service Korean nationals who can afford private health insurance. These companies advertise that they have the best health care in the world, the best technology, and direct connections to the U.S. health care system. In response to this trend, our union has come up with the slogan “one country, two health care systems.” This type of health care system will divide up people according to their income level, which will in turn enable private health insurance companies to come in and worsen the quality of the national health care system. [Ahn] Could you clarify that point, Mr. Lee? If you are a trained doctor, and you thought you were one the best doctors, where would you want to work? Would you want a regulated salary position or to work for a private, for-profit hospital that will pay you much more money. The quality of the national health care system will go down, which is the point we have been making in our public education that according to income level, the national health care system will suffer, which covers most (90%) of the people. In response, the government has said that they are just testing this model only in six cities. The government has also said that this would not impact the overall national health care system, but we know otherwise. In conclusion, the three threatening forces—pharmaceutical companies, private health care insurance companies, and for-profit hospitals—are what has made U.S. health care not work for the people, and now they are going to do the same in Korea. They are the enemies of public health care systems around the world, so we need a joint struggle against them, from the United States and Korea. When we talk about the problems of the FTA, we talk about tariffs, opening up markets, protectionist policies. But in the Kor-U.S. FTA, I understand that in the U.S., the loss of jobs in the auto industry and other manufacturing industries is more tangible. It becomes the easy social issue. But, what the FTA also does is deregulate and privatize sectors. It changes a country’s social and public policies. It destroys them, what is left of a social welfare system. We have to understand that this is really about destroying public welfare systems so that corporate profits in both countries will be maximized. Under that premise, when we are struggling against the FTA, there are a lot of things that both countries can learn from each other. There are four classes of social insurances that every country should have: 1) Health care insurance, 2) Compensation for industrial accidents, 3) National pensions, and 4) Unemployment compensation. These are four universal social insurances a country must provide for its people. When we struggle against the FTA, we can focus on how to restore these basic social pacts. We should fight not only to protect what’s left, but also draw from other countries’ examples and learn how people in the United States can restore their social welfare from what has already been privatized. Of course, this is going to be really hard. But this is a movement for humanity. *Christine Ahn is Executive Director of the Korea Policy Institute.

The Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (Korea FTA), which the Obama administration is promising to send to Congress for ratification in the next weeks, would be the largest international trade deal since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Korea is the seventh largest U.S. trading partner and the United States is Korea’s third largest trading partner. Commerce between the two countries is estimated at $86 billion annually. The Korea FTA was originally signed in April 2007 by President Bush and later amended by the Obama administration in December 2010. But neither the U.S. Congress nor the South Korean parliament has yet to sign it. The Korea FTA contains many frightening provisions, particularly the investment chapter, which threatens both U.S. and South Korean public interest laws. According to a flyer prepared by the Citizens Trade Campaign, the investment chapter of the Korea FTA is more potent than past FTAs and grants Korean investors “extraordinary new rights to challenge U.S. laws, regulations and even court decisions as ‘regulatory takings’ in international tribunals that circumvent the U.S. judicial system.” Not only is the Korea FTA expected to displace 888,000 U.S. jobs within seven years, it explicitly omits any reference to the International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions, which is significant given that over half of South Korea’s workforce are irregular workers without adequate protections. Like many previous international trade agreements, the Korea FTA is benignly presented as “reducing barriers to trade” and “improving market access” for U.S. and Korean products. The simplicity of such language belies the anticipated and far-reaching social and environmental impacts should this agreement be ratified. Forceful Opening of Korea In the past century, the United States has played a very heavy hand in Korea. One of its first interactions with Korea took place in 1866, when the heavily armed USS General Sherman sailed up the Taepodong River to force open trade with Korea. In 1882, the United States became the first Western nation to open Korea through a treaty, paving the way for American companies to “develop” Korea’s gold mines, railroads, electrical and telephone systems. Many South Korean opponents of the Korea FTA have likened the trade deal to the 1905 Taft-Katsura Agreement when the United States agreed to allow Japan to colonize Korea in exchange for its takeover of Hawaii and the Philippines. At the end of WWII and Japan’s surrender, the United States played a central role in dividing the Korean peninsula, installing a military government led by Koreans who collaborated with Japanese colonizers and brutally quashing a vibrant grassroots pro-democracy movement. Then came the Korean War, the first Cold War the U.S. fought, which claimed four million lives, separated millions of Korean families, and formalized the division between North and South Korea. As a strategic U.S. front in the Cold War, South Korea received significant amounts of military, development, and food aid. From 1956 to 1970, under PL 480, Korea received $800 million worth of aid commodities, largely in the form of wheat and cotton. The abundant supply of grains kept food prices and wages low, which provided a continuous supply of cheap labor to fuel Korea’s rapidly growing export manufacturing economy. But food aid devastated Korean agriculture. In the 1940s, approximately 583,000 acres were used for wheat production, whereas by 1968, due to the depressing effect of U.S. food aid, only 39,000 acres were used for wheat production. U.S. food aid lowered the prices of other grains, such as barley and rice. By the 1960s, agriculture was no longer the dominant economic sector. “After the Korean War, the United States sent flour, sugar, and milk under PL 480, and the farmers and people of Korea received it gratefully,” said Lee Kwang Seok of the Korean Peasants League in a recent interview. “However, as time went by, we saw that those sectors of the agricultural economy were destroyed. And now with the FTA, the policies are aimed at further destroying agriculture in Korea.” Aggressive U.S. trade policies starting in the 1980s sealed the fate of Korean farmers. During the Reagan administration, the United States began using Section 301 of U.S. trade law to break down South Korean tariffs that helped develop its domestic industries. Korea caved in and lifted tariffs on U.S. beef, wine, rice, and tobacco. Then came the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the push by rich, developed nations to include agriculture in trade negotiations. This proved devastating for small-scale Korean farmers (and other farmers around the world). WTO Kills Korean Farmers In 1995, South Korea joined the World Trade Organization and signed the Agreement on Agriculture. Like many Asian countries, South Korea had limited foreign agricultural imports through the use of quotas and tariffs to protect their agricultural base. But by signing the Agreement on Agriculture, Korea was forced to end its system of quotas and tariffs, and begin to import a certain amount of agricultural commodities. Meanwhile, as the United States and the EU were forcing farmers in poor developing countries through the WTO to open their markets, they were providing billions of subsidies to their own farmers. From 1995 to 2005, OECD countries collectively increased the subsidies they provided their farmers from $182 billion to $300 billion. Although most unsubsidized peasant farmers around the world lived on less than $400 a year, U.S. and EU farmers received on average $21,000 and $16,000 annually in subsidies. Opening Korean markets to cheap foreign imports devastated Korean farmers. Since the 1995 Agreement on Agriculture, Korean farmer debt grew four-fold to approximately $30,000 forcing millions off their land and into poverty. In 1970, farmers made up 44.7 percent of the Korean population. By 1995, only 11.6 percent were farmers. Today, only 3.2 million Korean farmers remain, comprising 7 percent of the population. According to Reverend Han Kyung Ho, President of the Korean Rural Mission, Korea’s dependency on imported food has reduced its food self-sufficiency from 56 percent in 1980 to 25.3 percent by 2004. Lee Kwang Seok of the Korean Peasants League points out that, with rice out of the equation, Korea would only be 5-6 percent food self sufficient. “If a country depends on other countries for food, the sovereignty of the whole nation becomes threatened,” says Reverend Han. “Food is a strong weapon to control another country.” Refusing to have their livelihoods and culture determined by the WTO, Korean farmers have been on the forefront to challenge and disrupt the global free trade agenda. In 2003 at the WTO ministerial meeting in Cancun Mexico, South Korean farmer and former parliamentarian Lee Kyung Hae took his life in protest of the WTO. Lee climbed the chain-linked fence that was erected to keep away civil society groups from disrupting the trade talks and wearing a sign that read “The WTO Kills Farmers,” he stabbed himself in the heart. His suicide was a rallying cry for millions of peasants experiencing the same onslaught of free market forces that are driving them off the land and into ruin. Lee’s death not only helped further galvanize the global peasants movement Via Campesina, it greatly influenced future WTO talks. At the Cancun summit, talks broke down after the EU and United States refused three demands made by developing countries: cut domestic agricultural subsidies by rich, developed countries; exempt certain products that were vital to a country known as “Special Products;” and institute “Special Safeguard Mechanisms” to protect poor farmers by allowing countries to impose a special tariff on certain agricultural goods during volatile periods of import surges or price falls. Again in 2005, at the WTO Ministerial talks in Hong Kong, thousands of Korean and developing country farmers called for the “WTO out of agriculture.” In a spirited display of their militancy, some 50 Korean farmers jumped into the freezing Victoria Harbor in an effort to reach the convention center where official talks were taking place. The concluding Ministerial Declaration recognized the right of developing countries to designate Special Products and institute safeguards. But by 2006, the United States had backtracked, refusing to cut domestic subsidies. The talks have stalled ever since. Recognizing the political constraints placed on the WTO, the United States and other developed countries have since sought bilateral trade deals to pry open or expand existing markets. Hence in 2006, official Korea FTA talks began. Although the Korea FTA does not cover rice, the Agreement on Agriculture has already gradually opened the Korean rice market. By 2014, it will be completely opened. Korean farmers have already been hit hard by free trade, but the stark differences between South Korean and U.S. farms will drive most farmers to ruin. South Korea has just 4.2 million acres of farmland are under cultivation, compared with the United States, which has 434 million acres. The average farm in South Korea is 1.2 acres, compared with the average U.S. farm size of 71 acres. According to Lee of the Korean Peasants League, if the FTA is implemented, South Korean agricultural production will decrease by 45 percent and roughly half of Korea’s farmers will lose their livelihoods. As Korea’s dependency on imports and global food prices soar, South Korean corporations have been purchasing and leasing land in Africa and Asia as a safeguard against the looming threat of food insecurity. In 2009, the South Korean corporation Daewoo, which is also owned by GM, nearly signed a deal with Madagascar for 3.2 million acres of farmland — half the country’s arable land — to produce mainly corn for export back to Korea over the next 99 years. Such land grabs would push residents of those nations into the same food deficits that Korea now faces. Lee Kwang Seok of the Korean Peasants League said that there are now some 30 Korean corporations buying land and investing in industrialized food production abroad, while Korean farmers who grow food cannot survive and are given no support. “Does such a things really have to be done,” Lee recently asked. “We who have lived through Japanese colonialism, do we have to go to other countries and do this?” In a recent op-ed in the Joong Ang Daily, a research fellow with the Samsung Economic Research Institute argues, “It is crucial to secure overseas agricultural suppliers to cope with speculative demand and global climate change.” Hidden Costs of the Korea FTA In addition to devastating Korea’s countryside, the FTA has been used to dismantle several of Korea’s domestic environmental and public health laws. As a precondition for negotiating the FTA, the South Korean government agreed to lower national auto emission standards to accommodate the import of less fuel-efficient vehicles from the United States. At a time when the Obama administration should be advocating for a more progressive global energy policy and greater restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions, the United States is undermining other nations’ efficiency standards. The FTA has also been used to lift Korea’s ban on U.S. beef. In 2003, prior to official FTA talks, the U.S. discovery of a cow with Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) (commonly known as ‘mad-cow disease’) prompted the South Korean government to impose a comprehensive ban on all imports of American beef. This was a major blow to U.S. beef industry since South Korea was its third largest export market with an estimated value of $800 million a year. In 2006, as a pre-condition for FTA talks, South Korea partially lifted the ban on U.S. beef. But after imports resumed, multiple shipments failed South Korea’s import standards prompting South Korea once again to revoke export permits to U.S. meat suppliers. In 2008, as soon as South Korean President Lee Myung Bak, the former Hyundai CEO, came into office, he immediately lifted the beef ban. This unilateral decision enraged South Koreans who then organized massive candlelight vigils and protests over a four-month period. At its height, over 750,000 South Koreans took to the streets calling for the resignation of President Lee and the reinstatement of the export ban to protect Korea’s public health. In the end, South Korea only required the United States to voluntarily certify the safety of U.S. beef. It’s also unclear how much the FTA has been used to dismantle South Korea’s 2000 genetic engineering (GE) labeling law and undermine its commitment to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, an international supplemental agreement to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity. The Cartagena Protocol seeks to protect biological diversity from risks posed by transgenic organisms resulting from biotechnology. Under the protocol, developing nations can restrict and/or label GE organisms to protect their biodiversity and/or public health if inadequate scientific evidence guarantees that a product is safe. The FTA negotiations overturned Korea’s 2000 GE labeling law that had largely kept transgenic imports out of Korea’s food supply. In 2007, the Washington-based Biotechnology Industry Organization hailed the conclusion of the Korea FTA for “providing additional market access opportunities in Korea for U.S. biotechnology companies.” It specifically lauded the U.S. agricultural negotiator for ensuring “that trade of biotech-derived crops, foods, and feeds continues without disruption.” Despite widespread opposition to GE foods in Korea, transgenic imports no longer have to be labeled. The FTA lifted the floodgates for massive imports of GE foods and feedstock, namely U.S. GE corn. In February 2008, less than a year after the ag-biotech deal was signed, the Korean Corn Processing Industry Association purchased 697,000 metric tons of U.S. GE maize, the first major GE shipment destined for food use to arrive in Korea since 2000. Korean approvals of GE imports have since skyrocketed. By February 2008, Korea had approved 102 transgenic organisms for import as feed or food, 70 percent from U.S. firms Monsanto, DuPont, and Dow Chemical. As many Americans struggle for universal healthcare, the FTA spells the death of Korea’s national healthcare program. South Korea has a universal health care system that covers up to 64 percent of all medical costs of its citizens. Korea’s healthcare program costs the government $26 billion annually, of which one-third (or $8.6 billion) is spent on medicines. Conditions imposed by the FTA stipulate two key conditions that will serve to undermine the viability of Korea’s near universal healthcare system. The first is an extension on pharmaceutical drug patents up to 30 years, thereby preventing patented drugs from becoming generic and lowering the cost to end consumers or the government. The second is the addition of patented pharmaceuticals to the government’s list of reimbursable drugs, most of which are currently generics. According to Lee Jooho, Senior Director of Strategic Planning for the Korean Health and Medical Workers Union, these two factors will likely drive up the cost of the national health care program and limit the government’s ability to provision healthcare services to its people. Reversing the Free Trade Agenda The Korea FTA is the latest in a long history of aggressive U.S. foreign policies toward Korea that have significantly undermined Korean farmers. The current FTA will further erode Korea’s agricultural sector and food security while contributing to its environmental degradation through reduced emission standards and potential exposure to contaminated U.S. beef and transgenic crops. With this FTA, Koreans also stand to lose their national healthcare system as U.S. financial services and pharmaceutical firms await the opportunity to use the Investor to State Dispute (ISD) mechanisms to sue governments for infringing on their right to profit. Free trade agreements are fundamentally undemocratic. They serve to undermine the economic viability of traditional livelihoods and compromise the food security of millions of poor people around the world. At this point in human history, it leads both countries in the exact opposite direction that we should be heading. With the world facing the pressing issues of global climate change, biodiversity loss, rising food prices, and declining sources of fossil energy, what is now needed more than ever are national and international policies that favor small-scale ecologically based agriculture and food sovereignty. The Korea FTA should and can be stopped. Both the United States and South Korea should abolish export and domestic subsidies that promote unsustainable agriculture. Through sweeping legislative reforms, both should move swiftly to protect and enhance local sustainable economies that ensure the well-being of its people and sustains the integrity of ecosystems upon which all of our lives depend. Like the people of Tunisia and Egypt have demonstrated, these changes will not come about without struggle. *Christine Ahn is the executive director of the Korea Policy Institute and a Foreign Policy In Focus columnist. **Albie Miles is a Ph.D. Candidate in the department of environmental science, policy and management at the University of California, Berkeley, and an FPIF contributor.

Year 2010 faded away with a considerable increase in military tensions in Korea and Northeast Asia at large. Unless the escalating tension is diffused somehow, there is an increasing danger that another military clash may re-ignite the deadly Korean War. More recently, on Nov. 23, there was a serious artillery duel between South Korea (Republic of Korea or ROK) and North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK), off the island of Yonpyong in the West Sea. Another major incident happened earlier in 2010 with the mysterious sinking of the South Korean warship, the Cheonan, in the same West Sea on March 26. South Korea blamed the North for the sinking, but the latter denied its responsibility and accused the South of fabricating the evidence against it. In the midst of this barrage of charges and counter-charges, it is important for the American people to sort out the truth and try to understand what really happened in these two incidents. It is far more difficult to discern the truth about the March incident because of the complicated technical issues involved in the case, and the withholding of certain information (e.g. Cheonan‘s communication record) by the South Korean government. However, it is possible to know the real circumstances concerning the artillery duel of November 23 by putting together all the news reports on the case, including the one from North Korea, even though the U.S. officials and mainstream media have spread much misinformation and one-sided accusations against the DPRK. The facts about the artillery duel On November 22, (Korean time), the South Korean military began another major combined war game called “Hoguk,” involving some 70,000 troops, 50 warships, 500 warplanes, and 600 tanks in the areas of Seoul, surrounding provinces and the West Sea. The war game included large-scale aerial and naval drills, including landing operations in the West Sea. This military exercise continued until November 30. North Korea (DPRK) claims that it warned the South Korean military several times and more specifically on November 23, on 8 a.m., that, if the ROK military fired live artillery shells inside the territorial waters of North Korea, it would take a prompt retaliatory strike in response (statement of DPRK Foreign Ministry of Nov. 24, www.kcna.co.jp). Despite this clear warning, on November 23, the South Korean marines stationed on the Yonpyong Island started their live fire drills from 10 a.m., firing about 3,500 rounds, using 11 different weapons. Starting around 1 p.m., they began firing 150 rounds of powerful K-9 artillery shells into the 12-mile territorial water of North Korea. At 2:34 p.m., in angry response, the North Korean Army fired back 150 rounds at the South Korean artillery unit on the island. About 60 rounds hit the island. Then, the South Korean artillery fired back at the North Korean positions across the island, which is about seven miles away from the North Korean coast. In turn, the North Korean military fired back 20 more rounds. In this exchange of artillery fires, two South Korean soldiers and two civilian laborers working on the military base were killed, and about 18 (15 soldiers) others were injured. The number of casualties on the North Korean side is unknown at this time, although there is an unconfirmed report that one officer was killed and two soldiers were wounded. Following the artillery duel, President Obama ordered the dispatch of the George Washington, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (carrying 75 warplanes and a crew of over 6,000), and other warships to conduct another joint U.S.-ROK war game off the west coast of Korea from November 28 to December 1. Furthermore, the ROK, led by the hard-line Myung-Bak Lee administration, also beefed up its marine forces and weapon systems on the five ROK-controlled islands, including Yonpyong Island, located in the West Sea. Real culprit for the current tensions in Korea The November 28 war game was in addition to the several other joint U.S.-ROK military exercises that took place in Korea during the summer of 2010. Thus, it is apparent that these war games have been deliberately planned and staged by the U.S. and South Korea to put maximum pressure on North Korea so that the latter could either implode or strike out violently. The hardliners in South Korea and the U.S. seem to be seeking a regime change or collapse in North Korea through this confrontational policy, one that could easily get out of control. The underlying cause of the lingering military tensions in Korea is the continuing state of war that goes back to the Korean War of 1950-53. Although the Armistice Agreement of 1953 drew a military demarcation line (MDL) on the land, the military representatives from North Korea and the U.S. could not agree on a maritime boundary in the West Sea. North Korea claimed a 12-mile wide territorial water boundary around its coast, but the U.S. and South Korea insisted on three miles. Nevertheless, there was an implied understanding that the MDL would extend to the sea from the end point of the DMZ on the land. However, sometime after the Armistice Agreement, the U.S. military commander in South Korea drew a unilateral line called “the Northern Limit Line” (NLL) in the West Sea that intruded into the 12-mile territorial waters of the DPRK. It is widely known in Korea that this line was drawn by General Mark Clark on August 30, 1953, but there is no clear evidence of that. In fact, a CIA report on NLL states that this line was “established in a 14 January 1965 order of the Commander Naval Forces, Korea.” The NLL hugs the west coast of DPRK at about three miles distant from the coast, except at two areas where the line is even less than three miles. According to the declassified CIA document, “the sole purpose of the NLL was to avoid incidents by forbidding UNC naval units to sail north of it without special permission.” However, the South Korean government has regarded the NLL as a de facto boundary between South and North Korea because it enhanced ROK’s economic (fishing) and security interests. The U.S. Commander apparently never notified North Korea of the NLL, and the DPRK has never recognized it. Even Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State in 1975, admitted in his confidential communication with the U.S. Embassy in Seoul that NLL is “clearly contrary to international law and the USG law of the sea position.” He even supported the position of the DPRK by admitting that “Armistice provides two sides must respect each other’s ‘contiguous waters’, which negotiating history indicates would mean as maximum 12 miles.” Incidentally, under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, each state is entitled to claim a 12-mile territorial water. Both Koreas signed this treaty; nevertheless, South Korea has been irrationally contesting the DPRK’s right to claim the 12 miles. North Korea crossed the NLL on many occasions (e.g. in 1973, 1981, 1991, and 1996). After a naval clash with the South in June 1999, North Korea attempted to negotiate a military demarcation line in the West Sea with U.S. military representatives at a meeting in Panmunjom (the joint military installation in the DMZ where the Armistice was signed). However, the U.S. side rejected the Northern proposal due to the ROK representatives’ insistence that the NLL be retained. This forced North Korea to proclaim its MDL in the West Sea unilaterally on September 2, 1999. This line goes out straight to the sea, perpendicular from the western end of the DMZ, but it provides a sea passage to the five islands which fall under the military control of the “UN Command” under the Armistice Agreement. North Korea declared that the waters above its sea MDL would be defended as its territorial waters. Since then, there have been several naval clashes in the West Sea of Korea—either by South Korea in defending the NLL, or by North Korea in defending its MDL. The path to permanent peace As seen from the brief history of the arbitrary NLL, the U.S. government also bears heavy responsibility in all these military clashes in Korea because the line was drawn by the U.S. military, which is a signatory to the Armistice Agreement on behalf of those countries fighting against DPRK. The U.S. also has a unique role in controlling the South Korean military. Although it sounds ridiculous, the U.S. Commander in South Korea at this time wears three hats: Commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea, Commander of the so-called “UN Command,” and Commander of ROK-U.S. Combined Forces. Thus, the U.S. Commander is responsible for upholding the terms of the Korean War Armistice Agreement of 1953, including “a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control” (Article 12) and withdrawing “all…military forces, supplies, and equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side” (Article 13b). In clear violation of these Armistice provisions, the U.S. Commander in South Korea not only allowed the ROK forces to initiate the massive, threatening artillery fires from the Yonpyong Island, but also failed to remove all the South Korean troops (about 1,000) and heavy weapon systems from the island. Therefore, it is the height of hypocrisy for Hillary Clinton to pretend that the recent artillery duel in Korea was only due to the “provocative” and “belligerent” behavior of North Korea—ignoring the provocative behavior of the ROK military as well as the U.S. military’s own violations of the Armistice Agreement. In fact, the current tensions in Korea could have been avoided if the conservative Lee administration honored the previous inter-Korean agreement of October 4, 2007, which was reached during the second Korean summit. Among others, this agreement specifically mentioned the creation of a “special peace and cooperation zone in the West Sea,” including the “creation of a joint fishing zone and maritime peace zone.” In retrospect, it seems North Korea’s direct fire on Yonpyong Island was disproportionate to the military threats perpetrated by the South Korean marines. In any case, it is quite a relief that the North Korean military did not fire on the island again, although it warned of dire consequences, when the Lee administration staged another provocative artillery live-fire drill on Yonpyong Island on December 20. This drill included participation by some 20 U.S. troops and several ROK warplanes, which flew over the area–threatening to fire on the North Korean positions across the island. Perhaps, North Korea’s restraint was due to the timely intervention of Governor Bill Richardson (of New Mexico), who happened to visit the DPRK during this tense time. For the sake of peace in Korea, all concerned parties in Korea should exercise maximum restraint to avoid further escalation of military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. In particular, the Obama administration should stop any further joint military exercises with ROK that threaten the peace and security of the North Korean government. Above all, we need a final resolution to the long, simmering Korean War by negotiating a peace treaty, which may include a provision fixing a sea boundary between South and North Korea. *John H. Kim is an attorney practicing in New York and is a veteran of the U.S. Army. He volunteers for several non-profit groups.

On the eighth anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, U.S. fighter planes took off to start yet another military action—this time, in Libya. A recent Gallup poll found that only 47 percent of Americans approved of military action in Libya, the lowest level of support for military intervention in 40 years. At the same time, U.S. President Barack Obama has sent Congress a budget that includes $1.2 trillion for military and security expenditures. Clearly, Americans are weary of war, especially during an economic crisis that has threatened jobs, health plans, and pensions most families need to survive. The hopeful news is that a grassroots movement of ordinary people across U.S. towns and cities has launched the New Priorities campaign, uniting under the demand to “bring the troops and war dollars home” by cutting defense spending instead of benefits, jobs, and basic government services. Worldwide actions are also being planned for the Global Day of Action on Military Spending on April 12th to shine a light on egregious amounts of military spending by the world’s governments. Central to these efforts must include demands to shut the 1,000 plus U.S. military bases in over 46 countries. Bases are the most visible structures of the U.S. drive to maintain global military hegemony. Yet for most Americans, bases remain out of sight and outside the national discourse on war. Many don’t know about the enormous footprint of U.S. military installations around the world and how they undermine the lives and aspirations of the people who live directly in their shadow. Ending U.S. wars is essential, but closing down foreign bases is even more critical to dismantling U.S. militarism and global hegemony. On the island of Cheju off the coast of South Korea, villagers are struggling to prevent the construction of a South Korean naval base intended for U.S. military use. In 2009, one of us traveled there and can still remember the tattered yellow flags lining the fence posts of homes, symbolizing the movement’s determination to stop the project. Walking along the endangered rocky coastline at the edge of this quiet village of farmers and fisherfolk, it was clear that Cheju Island and other sites of U.S. military bases in Korea have borne enormous cost to the people and to the future of peace in the region. A Huge Financial Cost Most figures used to estimate the cost of U.S. wars often omit the global network of U.S. bases that provides vital resources and infrastructure to existing military conflicts. The Pentagon’s 2010 Base Structure Report, for example, lists 662 overseas bases, but fails to include the 411 bases in Afghanistan, the 88 remaining bases in Iraq, or sites in Qatar and other countries where U.S. military personnel are stationed. Maintaining and constructing all U.S. bases cost American taxpayers $41.6 billion in 2010, according to Undersecretary of Defense Dorothy Robyn. Of these 662 overseas bases, more than 70 military installations and bases and 28,500 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea. Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug Bandow of the Cato Institute estimate that the cost of U.S. bases in Korea “probably runs on the order of $15 to $20 billion annually.” While the United States and South Korea have agreed to reduce and consolidate the number of U.S. military bases in Korea, other bases and training ranges — including Osan Air Base in Pyeongtaek — are expanding, displacing thousands of villagers and destroying Korea’s productive and limited farmland. The agreements governing the responsibility for U.S. base relocation in Korea illustrate the unequal dynamic prevalent in countries that host U.S. bases. Under the Special Measures and Base Relocation Agreements, the United States and South Korea agreed to share the cost burden of moving U.S. bases, with South Korea obligated to pay more than half that cost. In 2008, South Korea paid $741.4 million, angering South Koreans unhappy over having to foot the majority of the moving bill and the exorbitant cost of cleaning up 60 years of environmental contamination. At some of the 23 bases “returned” to South Korea, the levels of contamination are 100 times above the limit set by Korean law. Cleanup at these sites will require years of decontamination at enormous cost to South Korean citizens, not to mention the public health and ecological consequences for generations to come. Moreover, U.S. bases and troop presence are an extension of U.S. intervention in South Korea. Historically, the U.S. military provided legitimacy, economic aid, and protection to dictatorial regimes that maintained their power with brute force. Today, the U.S. and South Korean governments control and suppress dissent through the infrastructure of bases, particularly Pyeongtaek and Osan, which are now major U.S. military intelligence outposts for the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). While conducting research for his book Spies for Hire on the privatization of U.S. intelligence, Tim Shorrock found unsavory evidence of eavesdropping on Korean civilian activities by U.S. military bases located there. Although the primary target of surveillance activity is North Korea, U.S. intelligence also monitors China and Vietnam from Korean bases. What worries Shorrock is that since 9/11, what is considered a threat has widened to include almost any activity that questions or challenges U.S. interests. His discovery of the U.S. military in Korea colluding with Korean police to monitor anti-base activities is “an amazingly frank assessment that the anti-bases movement is being as closely monitored, and probably more so, than Al Qaeda – and basically puts the movement in the same camp as global terrorists.” But it’s not just anti-base movements. Recently protests against the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement were also noted in the log of the U.S. forces in Korea. Resistance to U.S. Military Bases in Korea Given the fierce opposition to U.S. military bases throughout the Asia-Pacific rim, the United States has become savvy at reducing its military footprint in regions where its presence is politically contested. Rather than establish its own base, the U.S. military has sought the cover of the South Korean military in the construction of a new naval base in Cheju, an island located off the southern coast of South Korea. The people of Cheju Island are known for their fierce resistance to Korea’s division and occupation by U.S. troops over the south during the post-World War II period. For their resistance, the people of Cheju paid dearly. Following the April 3 rebellion of 1948, South Korean government forces killed up to 30,000 people — more than one in ten residents — for opposing separate elections between the north and south and the U.S. occupation of the southern half of Korea. In a long-awaited gesture of apology, in 2005, former President Roh Moo-Hyun named Cheju the “Peace Island.” Cheju Island is a designated UNESCO World Heritage Site and a national protected area by the Korean Cultural Heritage Administration. The Joongduk coastline, adjacent to Gangjeong village, is home to rare sea life, including soft coral, and is the seasonal habitat for dolphins migrating across the Pacific Ocean from Alaska during the summer. In 2002, Seoul announced plans to build a naval base on Cheju. After two villages resisted, Gangjeong Village became the government’s third target. In 2007, 94 percent of the Gangjeong Village People’s Council voted “no” to the base plans. The government then proceeded to pressure residents. Some 1,500 farmers and fishermen live in Gangjeong village, including the legendary Haenye pearl divers—women in their 50s and older who forage in the sea for their livelihoods. Some of the villagers, including a few elderly Haenye divers, sold their farmland to the military under pressure from the South Korean government. According to Sung-Hee Choi, a South Korean peace activist and blogger, many of the villagers who signed the contract now regret their decision. However, they’ve been told that if they renege, they would have to pay back the money plus interest. In May 2009, despite local and global opposition, the South Korean government approved construction of the joint U.S.-South Korean naval base. The military has begun to dredge the Joongduk coastline to accommodate the massive naval warships. If construction proceeds, it will not only destroy the rare coral reefs and surrounding ecosystems, it will kill the area’s fishing industry and displace citrus growers in Gangjeong village whose lands will be confiscated as part of the base expansion. Gangjeong villagers have filed several lawsuits without much success. On December 15, 2010, a Cheju court ruled that the naval base did not infringe on the rights of the villagers, despite the projected destruction of the tangerine groves and the soft coral habitat where the villagers fish. The Gangjeong villagers have used every possible democratic means to block the base construction, but the South Korean government has been completely unresponsive. On Christmas Day, some 500 supporters joined dozens of villagers to block the cement trucks brought in by the Navy to pour concrete over the coral reefs along the shoreline. The Cheju facility is ostensibly a South Korean naval base, but for all intents and purposes it will be used by the U.S. military. This was confirmed when Americans made calls to the South Korean embassy to demand the closing of the base, to which the South Korean embassy responded, “Call your own government, which is pressuring us to build this base.” Dozens of families from Gangjeong village are currently occupying the site, stopping the construction cranes from dredging up the shoreline and facing off against riot police. Not for Korean Security When most Americans learn how U.S. military bases are infringing on the sovereignty and rights of the Korean people, most agree that it’s high time for troops to be withdrawn. But many ask, what about the threat of nuclear-armed North Korea—who will protect the Korean people? Contrary to most fear-mongering projections of a nuclear North Korea, South Korea’s military capacity is far superior to North Korea’s by any standard. In the 1990s, Seoul was spending seven times that of Pyongyang on defense, and by 2008, they had increased it two-fold. “Most economic and military indicators show that South Korea has an edge over North Korea in almost all measures of power,” writes Jae-Jung Suh of Johns Hopkins University. South Korea clearly has the capability to defend itself should the need arise, and certainly without support from U.S. bases. Another misnomer is that the U.S. troops are there to protect the civilian population. In fact, South Koreans have experienced the impunity with which U.S. troops behave on their territory. Organizations have documented thousands of crimes committed by soldiers against South Koreans. Between 1988 and 1996, U.S. troops committed an average of two crimes per day, ranging from the mundane to the heinous. The frequency of crimes committed by U.S. military personnel demonstrates the impunity with which U.S. forces act in South Korea — and likely, in many other host countries in which Status of Forces Agreements clearly give the U.S. military the upper hand. But perhaps more relevant today than the U.S.-South Korean military alliance is the grander regional alliance the United States has been forming in response to the perception of a growing Chinese military and economic threat. A key indicator of this is how the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense alliance has been transformed. Under the 2009 “Strategic Flexibility” agreement signed by Presidents Obama and Lee, the defense of South Korea is returned to Seoul, allowing the United States to use its bases in South Korea as a launching pad to deploy its forces outside Korea. The new arrangement also commits South Korean troops to join U.S.-led military deployments beyond Korean borders. In a 2007 interview, former U.S. Forces in Korea Commander General B.B. Bell explained why South Korea was so vital to America. “Twenty-five percent of the world’s trade flows through northeast Asia,” Bell replied. “Whether it’s Korea, Japan, or China, if you’re trading in the world, one out of every four things you trade, commodity-wise and dollar-wise, is going through that area.” Korea itself is the seventh-largest U.S. trading partner. Bell further explained that the U.S. military must stay engaged in Northeast Asia “because of the natural resources, lines of communication, and products that we will have to deliver around the world.” But there’s more than cargo protection driving U.S. base strategy — U.S. bases are there to encircle China. Of all U.S. military bases, South Korea is the closest spot to Beijing, a strategic location to gather intelligence, and a key point for a possible standoff with China. The Project for the New American Century, a neoconservative think tank of Bush officials advocating for American-led global domination, clearly states this: “Raising U.S. military strength in East Asia is the key to coping with the rise of China to great-power status.” The realignment and consolidation of U.S. bases is also revealing. Many of the larger U.S. bases have been moved away from the Demilitarized Zone toward more southern locations, most of which are along Korea’s West Coast, close to China. This network of bases is part of a new missile defense shield directed as much toward China as toward North Korea. Throughout the region, U.S. base expansions are taking place in the Asia-Pacific theatre, including Japan, Okinawa, Guam, and Australia, which effectively form a belt of bases that encircle China and Russia. The United States, South Korea and Japan have strengthened their tri-lateral alliance, which has resulted in more intense and frequent joint war games by all three nations, such as the recent Key Resolve Foal Eagle ROK-U.S. joint military exercises involving 13,000 U.S. troops, 200,000 South Korean troops, and a nuclear aircraft carrier. This broader regional strategy also explains U.S. pressure on South Korea to build a naval base in Cheju. Bruce Gagnon of the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space explains why villages in Cheju are being destroyed to accommodate the expansion of the U.S. military base: “China imports 80 percent of its oil on ships and a Navy base on Cheju would help give the U.S. ability to ‘control’ this vital shipping lane in the Yellow Sea.” Gagnon further explains, “While the declining U.S. economy can’t compete with China anymore, the Pentagon is embarking on a strategy that says if we can control access to declining supplies of oil, then we will still hold the keys to the global economic engine.” According to Michael Klare, author of Resource Wars and Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Petroleum Dependency, “China’s decisions on energy preferences will largely determine whether China and the United States can avoid becoming embroiled in a global struggle over imported oil and whether the world will escape catastrophic climate change.” In 2010, China surpassed the United States in energy consumption, which doesn’t bode well for a looming standoff over energy. With bases encircling China, the U.S. military has the capacity to stave off a growing Chinese presence and control its energy routes. South Koreans know this reality well. In a recent visit to Pyeongtaek, when Bruce Gagnon asked the Pyongtaek Peace Center, an organization based in South Korea, to whom the United States was directing its aggression, they replied, “Russia and China. Russia has large supplies of natural gas. It’s about energy wars.” Close Down U.S. Bases and Cut Military Spending As grassroots efforts are made in the U.S. to shift funding from the military budget to our communities, we must remember the active struggles of groups overseas that are directly resisting the footprint of U.S. military bases. Whether in Okinawa, Guam, or Korea, residents are on a daily basis fighting to stop the construction or expansion of U.S. military bases. Not only are the massive joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises diverting critically needed public dollars in both countries, they are moving the two Koreas further away from the promise of reconciliation and reunification. U.S. bases in Korea are no longer needed for the purpose of South Korean national defense. The real issue is how these bases are serving to keep tensions high on the Korean peninsula and in the region as a whole. Rather than accept the unending stalemate that continually threatens to erupt into war, in the United States, a broad movement is calling for an end to the Korean War, in solidarity with groups in South Korea that have long campaigned for the same demand. The signing of a peace treaty is the first step to demilitarizing not just the Korean peninsula, but also the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, and paving the way for a self-determined reunification of the two Koreas. When we say bring the war dollars home, we are referring not just to active hot-wars but also the network of bases that makes war and U.S. empire-building possible and thwarts democratic advancement and the development of more just, equitable societies. Perhaps few can express the importance of this struggle better than those who have defended their rights to land and life against US military interests. From 2004 to 2007, for nearly 1000 days, villagers in Pyongtaek, South Korea held candlelight vigils to stop the expansion of the US military base, Camp Humphreys. When asked by the South Korean Defense Ministry for the price for his land, Pyongtaek village leader Kim Ji Tae replied, “The price will be unimaginably high. The price must include every grain of rice grown and harvested here. It must include all of our efforts to grow them, as well as our whole life here, including our sighs, tears and laughter. The price must include the stars, which have witnessed our grief and joy, and the wind, which has dried our tears. If all of these could be added, I would tell you the price.” We must call for the defunding of U.S. bases and war games, and join this global people’s struggle for peace and sovereignty. *Christine Ahn is the Executive Director of the Korea Policy Institute and Sukjong Hong is a member of Nodutdol for Korean Community Development.

In early April I had the chance to visit one of the most beautiful areas in South Korea. Gangjeong Village on the island of Jeju is a small farming and fishing community on the island’s southern coast. Entering the village you see citrus groves and greenhouses on all sides. On the main street, women were sitting on the sidewalk cleaning fish and selling them to the locals. The cherry trees lining the main street were just beginning to bloom. It was a welcome break from congested and crowded Seoul where I live. In many ways it reminds me of the island in Denmark where I grew up. Nothing special seems to be going on, and that’s the beauty of it. But this community of approximately 1,500 farmers and fishermen is in the midst of a struggle against the South Korean government’s attempt to build a major naval base right in the middle of their village. The Navy and the Korean government claim that the base will have minimum impact on the environment and that it will create jobs and attract new tourists to the area. The villagers will have none of it. They see that the base will destroy their way of life, their village and the peace that Jeju islanders strive for. But the navy continues to raze farms and fishing grounds despite their protests. Jeju’s Geo-strategic Curse The island of Jeju is as far away from Seoul as you can get geographically and mentally. This autonomous island province, located south/southwest of the Korean peninsula is in many ways distinct from mainland Korea. It’s relative geographic isolation, volcanic geological history, and warmer climate has formed a people whose traditions, food, and culture is as distinct as the islands natural features. Because of this, Jeju is also the biggest single tourist destination in Korea often named “Honeymoon Island” as it is a favored destination for newlywed Korean couples. The island economy is also distinct. Agriculture, tourism, and fishing are the three main economic sectors, helping the island preserve its natural beauty and traditional way of life. Development in Jeju can be said to have followed a pace in which it was possible to modernize without having to completely compromise the island’s environment, traditions and culture. This is not to say that Jeju is an untouched island paradise. Luxury tourist resorts, golf courses, and tacky tourist attractions can be found in many places, but once you venture a bit off the beaten path you will find the Jeju that makes it a special place. Nevertheless, Jeju’s curse is its strategic location between South Korea and Japan, and its close proximity to China. It is only 300 miles from the Chinese mainland and Shanghai. For centuries, Jeju has been the battleground for conflicts that had little to do with the islanders themselves. In modern times, Jeju was annexed along with the rest of the Korean Empire by Japan in 1910. Thousands of island men were sent to work in mines and factories in Japan and Manchuria, while women were forced into prostitution to service the Japanese Imperial Army. Towards the end of World War II, the Japanese heavily fortified the island, deployed 70,000 soldiers, and forced the islanders to construct coastal defenses in anticipation of a U.S. invasion. When Japan surrendered in 1945, Jeju joined the rest of Korea to celebrate the end of decades of colonial rule and exploitation. But for the people of Jeju, the horrors experienced under Japanese rule were nothing compared to what was to come. The Jeju Massacres The division of the Korean Peninsula by the United States and the Soviet Union turned Jeju into a battlefield for subsequent cold war conflicts on the peninsula. In 1948, with U.S. and U.N. support, South Korea held elections that established a separate state in the south, thus solidifying Korea’s division. In response, 30,000 islanders in Jeju went out to protest the elections, which was abruptly ended when police opened fire and killed eight protesters. This prompted riots throughout the island and the boycott of the South Korean elections by Jeju islanders. Unfortunately, the United States overseers annulled the Jeju election results due to their lack of participation, and Syngman Rhee was elected without the votes from Jeju counted. But that wasn’t all. Korean right wing nationalists labeled the entire island as Communists sympathizers. When U.S. backed leader Syngman Rhee took power following the elections, he initiated a massive “Red” cleansing campaign targeted the Jeju general population. Using the South Korean military and ultra rightist paramilitary groups from the Northwest Korean Youth Association, the Rhee government employed a scorched earth strategy of repression resulting in the indiscriminate raping of women and burning of villages. Thousands of people were killed. It is estimated that 70 percent of entire villages were razed to the ground and 30,000 people—ten percent of the island’s population—were murdered. It was a brutal precursor to what the mainland would experience during the Korean War. At the newly constructed Peace Park Museum and Memorial for the massacre, one can take a few moments to reflect on Jeju’s fate as a battleground for imperial and ideological conflicts and the meaningless loss of lives that people here have suffered. I went there on April 4th for the commemoration of “Sasam” as the massacre is called locally. From the thousands of people who were gathered for the memorial ceremony, it is clear that the massacre has left deep scars in Jeju society. For years, any mention of the massacre could lead to imprisonment and torture. Relatives of those who had been labeled as Communists were prevented from taking public service positions or jobs in many companies. Many are still afraid to talk about what happened. It was not until 2006 that the late President Roh Moo-Hyun officially apologized for the massacre and designated Jeju “Island of World Peace”. For 50 years, successive governments in Seoul silenced the Korean people’s memories of systematic murder, rape and torture. As one exits the museum, a sign reads: “Jeju April 3rd Incident will be remembered as a symbol of the preciousness of peace, unity and human rights.” But the government’s memory is short. Plans for a major naval base on Jeju had been in the works since 2002 at different locations, but opposition from local residents halted construction several times. The Plight of Gangjeong Village In Gangjeong however, the navy and the South Korean government seem determined to construct the base by any means necessary. I met an artist and activist Sung-Hee Choi is living in Gangjeong to support the struggle of the villagers. Gangjeong means the “Village of Water,” she says, referring to the abundance of surface fresh water in the area, a rarity on this island of porous volcanic rock. The clean water from the Gangjeong stream is what makes the farmland some of the most fertile on the island. Greenhouse after greenhouse and miles of citrus orchards confirm that farming here is a good way of life for the residents. Much of this will soon be paved over if the Navy and central government get their way. As we walk down to the beach, we pass bulldozed fields with chopped down wilted citrus trees and collapsed green houses. The Navy contractors from Samsung and Daerim are not wasting any time. It is quite obvious that such physical destruction is part of the Navy’s strategy to silence resistance in the village. Some residents have already given up the fight and sold their land fearing that they will be fined if they did not sell. The government alleges that the construction is legal, that the residents have been offered fair compensation, but many locals feel pressured and cajoled into selling their land. Down at the beach one quickly recognizes that this is a uniquely beautiful coastal stretch. The volcanic rocks, many coves and unique fresh water tidal pools provide habitats for a wealth of animal and plant life. Underneath the water, endangered soft corals provide habitat for an abundance of sea life. The importance of these ecosystems have been officially recognized by UNESCO as part of its designation of the Jeju biosphere reserve and the provincial government is currently seeking nomination as one of the 7 Natural Wonders of the World. But again the government seems to care little about these designations. Construction companies have already destroyed large areas of volcanic rock formations with their bulldozers and trucks. As we walk along the cliffs and lava rock formations, we have a moment to stop at a few of the fresh water tide pools filled with marine life. “I never noticed these pools before,” Sunghee says. “I have been too busy watching the navy watching us.” She points to the navy headquarters a few hundred yards away from where they track and monitor all movement on the coast. Except for a few women gathering shellfish, we are alone. Sunghee tells me that usually spies working for Samsung or the Navy disguised as sport fishers watch them. I can see that the constant monitoring is taking its toll on both activists and villagers. Each time I saw Sunghee over the few days, she always looked exhausted. From the perspective of villagers and activists, the navy is playing a game of psychological warfare with those who oppose base construction. We walk back to where we entered the beach. Artworks, posters and boards tell visitors about the unique ecosystems of this coastal stretch and how all of it will be destroyed by the base construction. On the rocks we meet well-known movie critic Professor Yang Yoon-Mo. A Jeju native, Mr. Yang has lived in a tent on the rocks for four years to protest the base construction. I ask for a brief interview but Mr. Yang declines. “There is no more to be said or explained,” says Yang. “Now I just want to enjoy the beauty of this place.” It is a beautiful and quiet spring day and the coast is almost deserted besides a few tourists. The peace is disturbed only when two minivans come down to the beach. Sunghee’s and Mr. Yang’s faces light up. The minivans have transported solidarity delegations from Okinawa and Gwangju to Gangjeong to support the villagers. Both delegations have experienced the consequences of being victims of larger geopolitical and ideological conflicts. Okinawans have protested U.S. military presence for decades and Gwangju delegates are relatives of the victims of the brutal Gwangju massacre in 1980. Sunghee explains that construction machines are usually there, but that they were probably withdrawn for fear of conflict with protestors during the weekend of the Sasam commemoration and the solidarity demonstration announced by the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU). Several villagers, including the mayor, have been injured and arrested from skirmishes with the police. It seems that this day the Navy and construction companies have decided it is wisest to withdraw given all the media attention during Sasam. Why the Naval Base on Jeju The Korean Navy claims that the new “eco-friendly” naval base will create jobs and increased security for the island. But it is difficult to imagine an eco-friendly 50-hectare naval base that will house 8,000 marines, up to 20 destroyers, several submarines and two 150,000-ton luxury cruise liners. Considering that each destroyer has up to a 100,000 horsepower engine it is difficult to see how the base can be considered safe for an ecologically sensitive environment, not to mention that most of the volcanic rock formation will be paved over with cement and concrete. The second argument is that the new base will provide an economic boost for the island. But what kind of jobs will be created? People in Gangjeong are farmers and fishers living off the wealth of land and sea. The jobs that usually accompany military bases are more likely to be in service industries such as bars, brothels and souvenir shops. The sheer size of the naval base will inevitably lead to the complete erasure of this community, and the villagers know it. The final argument for the base is that it will provide vital security for the island. But history shows otherwise. Any time a major military force has been present on the island it has led to death, displacement, and destruction of the local population. Jeju islanders experienced atrocities from the Japanese during the occupation and later by their own countrymen during the Jeju massacre. The real issue here is not about the security of Jeju, but rather the strategic placement of a new naval base tasked with securing shipping lanes which are the lifeline of South Korea’s resource intensive corporations. This new strategically located fleet will also take on an increasingly offensive role in the East China and South China Sea. In a recent article Christine Ahn and Sukjong Hong reveal how the base will play a strategic role in efforts by the U.S.-South Korea-Japan alliance to reign in Chinese naval expansion. While South Korea claims that the base is not intended for use by the United States, the likelihood that the U.S. Navy would utilize the base in any military conflict in the region is obvious given U.S. operational control over Korea’s military. The base is also viewed by some in the military establishment as symbolic of South Korea’s emergence as a world power in which the navy will play a central role. In an interview with the conservative paper JoongAng Daily Admiral Jung Ok-keun of the ROK Navy said, “The establishment of the flotilla is a sign that we are becoming one of the powerful navies in the world, the goal we have been dreamed of.” There can hardly be any doubt that this new 953 billion Won naval base will serve as a strategic offensive outpost for South Korea and its allies. In this context it is difficult to understand how a base in Gangjeong will increase security for Jeju residents. In a potential military conflict with China, Gangjeong will be an important strategic target, just as Pearl Harbor was for the Japanese in WWII. Still Hope Sunghee and I walk back to the village. She is clearly encouraged by the arrival of the Gwangju and Okinawa delegations, and re-energized by the peaceful and beautiful coastline. After teaching an English class to some local students, we walk over to one of the local restaurants for dinner before joining a solidarity demonstration organized by KCTU later that evening. We have to give up finding food in the center of the village because most of the restaurant owners have left for the demonstration. Sunghee tells me that the village has been torn apart by the struggle – neighbor against neighbor, and relatives and against relatives. Many have given up, exhausted and fearful of the Navy. Not all, however, have thrown in the towel. We arrive at the community soccer field situated right across the road from the main gate to the Navy headquarters. We greet the dog that activists, in a gesture of humor, have placed to watch the Navy headquarters, and join the 1,300 protesters who have come from all over Korea to support the villagers. It is already dark when we arrive, but the hundreds of candles held by the protesters provide a comforting atmosphere. Protesters are of all ages and walks of life: families with children, villagers, workers and activists. Watching the crowd sing songs for peace and reunification, it is hard to believe the government’s claim that the protest is the work of a handful of extreme activists. Sitting in the bus on the way back to my hotel, I reflect on the last few days in Jeju and how if this naval base is not stopped, the Gangjeong villagers’ livelihoods, histories and traditions may soon be erased from memory, all because of strategic geo-political ambitions that have nothing to do with them or their way of life. On April 6th, two days after my visit to Gangjeong, the navy began construction again. Sunghee Choi and Yoon-mo Yang were arrested and detained by the police. Sunghee was released the following day, but Mr. Yang was not released until April 8th. Meanwhile the villagers continue to block the construction of the base. To stay updated, follow Sunghee Choi’s blog. This UNESCO World Heritage designated island stands to lose much of what makes it part of our world heritage. The transformation of Jeju into a military base also shows that much has yet to change in South Korea before a true democracy is established. The strategies of subtle coercion and lack of transparency by both the Navy and the South Korean government against its own people are discouraging to any person concerned about democracy and the rights of people. The struggle of Gangjeong villagers for land, life, and peace should concern us all. *Anders Riel Müller is a fellow with the Korea Policy Institute living in South Korea.

On April 28, former US President Jimmy Carter and three former European heads of state landed in Seoul after traveling to Pyongyang to help reopen dialogue between the two Koreas. Known as the Elders, they carried this message to the leaders of South Korea and the United States: “Chairman and General Secretary Kim Jong-il said he is willing and the people of North Korea are willing to negotiate with South Korea or with the United States or with the six powers on any subject any time and without any preconditions.” Also on their agenda was North Korea’s current food crisis. According to a recent UN report, up to 6 million people are facing food shortages. This has raised concerns among many in the international community that the situation may grow into a full-blown famine like that of the mid-1990s which claimed the lives of up to one million North Koreans. While many global leaders have returned from Pyongyang with similar messages regarding North Korea’s desire for engagement, the difference this time is the Elders’ understanding that North Korea’s food crisis stems from the unending Korean War, including over half a century of sanctions against the North. “In almost any case when there are sanctions against an entire people, the people suffer the most and the leaders suffer least,” Carter said. “We believe that the last 50 years of deprivation of the North Korean people of adequate access to trade and commerce has been very damaging to their economy.” Mary Robinson, former Irish president and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights said that North Korea is facing a “matter of life-and-death urgency” as a result of food shortages. Pyongyang has reached out to Washington and Seoul for food aid, but not much food is forthcoming. South Korean President Lee Myung Bak says Seoul won’t send food to fellow hungry Koreans until political and military matters are resolved. And the Obama administration, which has been blindly following Seoul’s lead, says it’s still assessing the need, despite the major cross-team UN report which found that a quarter of North Koreans were in urgent need of food. Carter rightly held Washington and Seoul accountable by stating, “to deliberately withhold food aid to the North Korean people because of political or military issues not related is really indeed a human rights violation.” There are several causes of North Korea’s food crisis, some unique to North Korea, others not. North Korea, like Pakistan, experienced unprecedented rains last August and September, which led to severe flooding and reduced their harvest by 44 percent compared with that of 2009. Like other countries, North Korea’s purchasing power of commercial food imports was significantly weakened by rising global food and fuel prices. In 2007, Pyongyang spent USD 62 million on 192,000 metric tons of grain. But because of rising food prices, despite doubling this amount in 2008, they could only buy and import 30 percent more grain. Tensions over North Korea’s testing of missiles and a nuclear weapon and their alleged sinking of the South Korean ship Cheonan ushered in more rounds of UN sanctions and a nearly complete halt in trade with two of its significant trading partners, Japan and South Korea. But more than trade has been cut. Before the Lee regime came into office in 2008, South Korea sent 400,000 metric tons of rice to the North. That year, under Lee, rice aid dropped by 70 percent and then food aid was completely halted. Following Seoul’s lead, the Obama administration also stopped aid to North Korea. Although China, Russia, India and other countries have been sending aid, it has not closed the gap previously filled by US and South Korean aid. In addition to halting government aid, the Lee regime has thwarted efforts by South Korean humanitarian aid groups, like the Korean Sharing Movement. Among South Korea’s largest and most influential humanitarian aid groups, the Korean Sharing Movement has for years sent food, medicine, construction materials to North Korea. They not only view North Korea’s development as a human right, they view exchanges between Koreans as crucial to building trust and fostering understanding towards peace and reconciliation. Yet their valiant efforts and others like them in the South have been stymied since the Lee regime took power. In 2007, the Korean Sharing Movement organized 2,962 South Koreans on 65 trips to North Korea. By 2009, only 84 South Koreans went on 25 humanitarian aid trips. And by 2010, the Lee administration began interrogating aid workers to threaten and deter others from reaching out to North Koreans. As Carter noted, North Korea’s deprivation is also the result of “some problems they may have brought on by themselves.” Indeed, like all governments, the Kim regime is responsible for ensuring that its people have access to adequate food. They are also responsible for perpetuating an ecologically and economically unsustainable system of industrialized agriculture, which depends heavily on inputs such as fertilizer and pesticides, which they must import. But as Carter and the Elders noted, sanctions and restricted trade are severely undermining the North Korean people’s development, which is a result of the unending Korean War. Yes North Koreans need aid, but what they need more than food is an end to hostilities, the lifting of sanctions, and a genuine engagement plan that includes a formal resolution to the Korean War. *Christine Ahn is the Executive Director of the Korea Policy Institute and a member of the National Campaign to End the Korean War.

It is evident that a nuclear-armed North Korea is exceedingly detrimental to U.S. and allied security interests. It also appears obvious that a military attack on North Korea is highly unlikely to succeed in eliminating Pyongyang’s nuclear capability. Given the configuration of North Korean military forces, military action surely would entail unacceptable destruction to Seoul and adjacent areas of South Korea. Given Chinese support to North Korea, sanctions alone cannot succeed. However dim the prospect for success, the only realistic option is to pursue dialogue and negotiations with North Korea to try to persuade the regime to give up its nuclear weapons and its production facilities to produce them. It clearly would have been preferable, and certainly more feasible, to reach agreement with North Korea before it succeeded in exploding a nuclear device in 2006. While North Korean intransigence and irresponsible behavior deserve much of the blame for the impasse, it also should be recognized that counter-productive U.S. actions towards North Korea undermined U.S. credibility and at the very least provided Pyongyang with ostensible justifications for its unwillingness to reach agreement to abandon its nuclear weapons program. It therefore may be useful to review prior U.S. negotiating strategies and tactics to illustrate lessons that should instruct future efforts to try to achieve North Korean agreement to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. Diplomacy with rogue regimes is not appeasement. When nations have conflicting positions on important matters of national interests, especially national security, it is prudent to attempt to negotiate agreements that can result in benefits to both sides. Engaging in dialogue or diplomacy with an opponent should not be regarded as unacceptable because it would “reward bad behavior.” Negotiations with North Korea were publicly characterized as such by high-level administration officials during President George W. Bush’s first term in office. This position in effect eliminated the only feasible opportunity to provide North Korea with positive incentives to give up its nuclear weapons program. Serious overtures responsibly delivered should not be summarily rejected. In the fall of 2002, Donald Gregg, former ambassador to South Korea during the Bush I presidency, and Donald Oberdorfer, former Washington Post reporter, delivered a message from Kim Jong IL to the White House: “If the United States recognizes our sovereignty and assures non-aggression, it is our view that we should be able to find a way to resolve the nuclear issue …. If the United States makes a bold decision, we will respond accordingly.” Not only did the administration ignore this and other overtures, but shortly thereafter it persuaded South Korea and Japan to join in stopping the delivery of fuel oil to North Korea as required by the 1994 Agreed Framework. Signed in October 1994, the Agreed Framework required Pyongyang to stop its nuclear weapons program in return for two nuclear power reactors and fuel oil from the United States until the reactors were completed. Soon after the message was ignored and deliveries of fuel oil terminated, North Korea ordered the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to leave the country, announced abrogation of the Agreed Framework and withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and began separating plutonium from its spent fuel rods. Inexplicably, the Bush administration did next to nothing in response to these actions. It is not sensible for either party to insist on preconditions to talks that are in fact the desired final outcome. During President Bush’s first term, it was the administration’s policy that a precondition to negotiating any concessions to North Korea was the “complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement” of its nuclear program. Needless to say, this demand was a non-starter, and it delayed any chance of progress in persuading North Korea to eliminate its nuclear program. Commitments made during negotiations should be scrupulously honored to demonstrate good faith and permit further progress. As part of the 1994 Agreed Framework that froze the North Korean nuclear weapons program, the U.S. committed, among other measures, to reduce barriers to trade and investment with North Korea within three months; to organize a consortium with South Korea and Japan to build two light water reactors in North Korea, the first to be completed by 2003; and to work toward normalization of relations. It was not until June of 2000 that the U.S. partially lifted its economic sanctions in a meaningless gesture to allow trade in consumer goods; the first indication of movement toward normalization of relations was Secretary of State Madeline Albright’s two-day visit to North Korea in October 2000; and concrete for the foundation of the first light water reactor was not poured until August 2002. In 2001, North Korea had threatened to re-start its reactor if the U.S did not provide compensation for the lengthy delay in building the first of the two light water reactors. In February 2008, four months after the conclusion of the Phase II agreement in Six Party Talks, a U.S. delegation to North Korea headed by former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sig Hecker, issued a report of its findings. The report concluded that North Korea had received only a small fraction of the promised fuel oil and equipment to repair its electrical grid; the U.S. had not removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, as promised; and North Korean companies were still barred from commerce with the U.S. under the Trading with the Enemy Act, despite promises to remove that restriction. The report stated that North Korea was willing to carry out its obligations to disable key nuclear facilities once these issues were resolved. The psychological aspects of pronouncements and actions during the negotiating process should not be ignored. Gratuitous threats and insults can impede progress in negotiations, especially with a defensive country like North Korea with its poor economy and resultant sensibilities. In January 2002, President Bush anointed North Korea as a charter member of the “axis of evil.” The classified Nuclear Posture Review, leaked in March 2002, stated that the U.S. reserved the right to employ nuclear weapons “preemptively” against North Korea and four other states to prevent their developing nuclear weapons. This in effect provided North Korea with an additional incentive to develop a nuclear deterrent. On 13 March 2002, North Korea responded that it would not remain a passive onlooker to these threats, but would take strong countermeasures against them. In July 2002, in response to a North Korean request for a meeting of foreign ministers, President Bush refused, calling Kim Jong IL a “pygmy” and a “spoiled child at the dinner table,” comments hardly designed to foster North Korean receptivity and cooperation. Name calling is no substitute for diplomacy. It is essential to focus on the main objective of negotiations and not allow lesser tactical considerations to block progress. The fourth round of Six Party talks produced a milestone Joint Statement, signed on 19 September 2005, which included provisions for “coordinated steps … in a phased manner in line with the principle of ‘commitment for commitment, action for action’.” The U.S. affirmed in the statement that it would respect North Korean sovereignty, yet took action immediately thereafter to freeze about $25 million in North Korean deposits in Banco Delta Asia in Macao, which it accused of laundering ill-acquired North Korean funds. Regarding the action as an attack on its sovereignty, North Korea suspended its participation in the Six Party talks. Pyongyang stated in April 2006 that it would return to the Six Party talks if the U.S. lifted its freeze on the funds in the Macao bank, but the U.S. instead tightened financial sanctions on North Korea. On 3 October 2006, Pyongyang warned that it would test a nuclear weapon; six days later, it conducted its first nuclear weapons test. This action prompted the U.S. to be more forthcoming. Six Party talks resumed in February 2007 after a 16 month hiatus with parallel US-North Korea talks on the issue of frozen funds. The Six Parties signed an agreement on ways to implement the September 2005 Joint Statement and established five working groups to deal with various issues of concern, while the U.S. agreed to resolve the funds issue in 30 days as part of the parallel talks. On 10 April, the U.S. agreed to release the money; and finally, on 25 June, North Korea announced that the funds had been received. Freezing the funds accomplished nothing except impeding negotiations for some 20 months. Vacillation and unilateral changes to agreements undermine a nation’s reputation and credibility in the negotiating process. In October 2007, a joint statement was released on mutual commitments to be fulfilled during Phase II of the Six Party talks with North Korea. Among other actions, North Korea agreed to disclose full information on its plutonium program, but there were no provisions in the Phase II agreement for verifying the declaration. In May 2008, North Korea released extensive documentation of its plutonium program, as promised; and in June, the North submitted to Beijing a declaration of its nuclear inventory. Though questioned by some, North Korea’s claim that it had separated only 38 kilograms of plutonium was in the range of U.S. estimates. The U.S. then began steps to remove North Korea from its list of terrorism sponsoring states while Pyongyang imploded a cooling tower at its plutonium producing Yongbyon nuclear plant. In a speech on 18 June 2002, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice admitted U.S. intent to unilaterally alter the Phase II agreement by insisting on verification of the North Korean documentation before the U.S. would fulfill its Phase II commitments to de-list North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism and relax sanctions on North Korea under the Trading with the Enemy Act. In the following month, the U.S. proposed a stringent draft verification protocol covering all elements of North Korea’s nuclear programs, including uranium enrichment, and repeated its unwillingness to fulfill its Phase II commitments until the verification demands were met. On 1 October 2008, the U.S. submitted a less intrusive draft verification protocol; but several days later, the U.S. reversed itself again by insisting on the earlier and more stringent version as a condition for continuing the delivery of energy aid also promised in the Phase II agreement. Following delivery of heavy fuel oil in December, South Korea and Japan joined the U.S. in suspending fuel oil deliveries. In April 2009, North Korea formally withdrew from the Six Party talks, ejected U.S. and International Atomic Energy Agency monitors and threatened to bolster its nuclear deterrent. On 25 May 2009, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test. It is impossible to know whether U.S. failure to adhere to its commitments was the proximate cause of subsequent North Korean actions, but it certainly provided North Korea with a justifiable pretext. Where should we go from here? It still appears obvious that the only way to contain, reduce and eventually eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs is through dialogue and diplomacy. No progress can be made with a continuation of a strategy of “strategic patience,” which is a formula for doing nothing to resolve the problem. At the same time, the U.S. must defer to its ally South Korea, which has been the victim of North Korean attacks on its warship Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, killing a total of 50 South Koreans. Seoul has proposed direct talks with North Korea before it will agree to the resumption of Six Party talks. China has stated that Six Party format should be resumed after inter-Korean talks followed by bi-lateral talks between Washington and North Korea. Yet it appears that the U.S. may be falling back to the policy of setting preconditions on North Korea before re-engaging in dialogue. On 16 April 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and South Korean Foreign Minister Kim Sung-Hwan called on North Korea to “demonstrate its genuine determination in denuclearization with actions,” without specifying what would be required. In March of this year a senior Obama administration official went so far as to state, without attribution, that since North Korea’s top priority is bi-lateral discussions with the U.S., we should refuse to accommodate any such request – a formula for blocking resumption of the Six Party talks. It is clear that North Korea has engaged in a series of dangerous and provocative actions that caused the death of innocents and threatened peace on the Korean peninsula. Yet it also must be acknowledged that American actions in many cases have been counter-productive and have not helped to defuse dangerous situations or to lead to a negotiated solution on North Korea’s nuclear program. It is important for the United States to open the channels of communication not only to pursue the objective of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula but also to prevent the tensions between the two Koreas from escalating into an armed conflict. Strategic patience is a formula for continued deadlock and danger. *Lt. General Robert G. Gard, Jr. (USA, ret.) is Chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation where his work focuses on nuclear nonproliferation, missile defense, Iraq, Afghanistan, military policy, nuclear terrorism, and related national security issues. Gard has written for well-known periodicals that focus on military and international affairs and lectured widely at U.S. and international universities and academic conferences.

In a matter of weeks, Congress could vote on the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. If passed, the Korea-U.S. FTA is predicted to have profound consequences on jobs, workers’ rights, environmental protections, the U.S. trade deficit, banking and financial services, healthcare, agriculture, and both governments’ ability to pass public health and anti-discrimination laws. Yet here in the United States, there is almost no word about it in the media and no public debate. Large corporations and the South Korean Embassy have been spending millions of dollars to lobby for the FTA while the U.S. people, a majority of whom opposes such deals, are not even aware that the largest trade deal since NAFTA could be passed before mid-summer. It is critically important that we take the time now to learn about this agreement and act. The Korea-U.S. FTA was negotiated in 2006 and signed in 2007 by Presidents Bush and Roh. It was renegotiated by the Obama and Lee administrations in December 2010. Negotiations were closed to the public while hundreds of corporate advisers were invited in to shape the deal. Because it was signed under Fast-Track authority, Congress has almost no opportunity to engage in meaningful debate about the FTA’s provisions, but must vote up or down within a fixed period of time. The Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, like most FTAs, fundamentally does two things: it reduces tariffs; and it restricts the ability of governments to regulate corporate activity. While many of the largest corporations in both countries stand to gain, Korean corporations will profit more from tariff reductions, whereas U.S. corporations will benefit by weakening democratic checks on them. The Economic Policy Institute estimates that the Korea-U.S. FTA will cause a loss of 159,000 jobs in the United States. Even the U.S. International Trade Commission, a federal agency, predicts that the deal will worsen the U.S.’s global trade deficit. Despite this, the Obama and Lee administrations have been pushing strongly for this agreement. The South Korean government has been actively lobbying members of the U.S. Congress and funding a massive public relations campaign to convince Korean Americans that the FTA is good for Korea and good for America, plastering Facebook and the Korean media with ads, and putting pressure on Korean American public figures to speak out in support of the deal. In fact, the FTA is good for neither Americans nor Koreans. It is good only for a narrow group of transnational corporations, but will be disastrous for workers, consumers, small family farmers, the environment, and democratic process—in both countries. This article addresses the likely impact of the FTA, if passed, in Korea. Farmers Many of us remember Lee Kyung Hae, the Korean farmer and Parliamentarian who took his life in protest at the 2003 WTO meeting in Cancun. Lee climbed up the chain-link fence intended to keep protestors away from the official talks and stabbed himself in the heart. He was wearing a sign that read “WTO Kills Farmers.” Lee’s death became a rallying cry for millions of peasants experiencing the same onslaught caused by so-called free trade, and galvanized them to fight even harder against the WTO. Korean farmers are so militant because for them, this is a struggle between life and death. This FTA—because of the stark differences between Korean and U.S. farms—will drive most farmers to ruin. Korea has only 4.2 million acres of farmland, compared with the US’s 434 million. The average farm size in Korea is 1.2 acres, compared with the U.S.’s 71 acres. The National Family Farm Coalition, an alliance of American small family farmers, opposes the deal because only large U.S. agribusiness corporations will benefit. Meanwhile, the Korean Peasants League estimates that if the FTA is implemented, Korean agricultural production will decrease by 45 percent and force roughly half of Korean farmers off their land. Korean farmers stand to lose their land, livelihoods and lives, and Korea stands to lose its rural farming tradition and culture. Workers and financial deregulation Korean workers are famed for their militancy around the world. It is important, however, to understand the conditions facing most workers in Korea, which drive them to be so fierce. Of all OECD countries, Korean men and women work the longest hours. In Korea, 87% of men and 77% of women work over 40 hours a week. While labor laws are on the books, they are widely and casually disregarded. One of the most dangerous parts of this FTA for people in general and workers specifically is its investment chapter. The deal was negotiated in 2006, at the height of the deregulatory fervor that brought on our current economic recession. The deal grants unprecedented freedoms to investment banks and financial corporations to manipulate the economy. In the late 1990s, many in our Korean American community immigrated to the U.S. because of the Asian financial crisis that ravaged Korea’s economy. Koreans not only lost jobs and savings, they lost significant labor protections while their quality of life and work prospects drastically declined. Even as Korea’s overall economy eventually improved, the lives of ordinary Koreans did not. More people became irregular workers, earning half the salary of regular workers and without benefits or pensions. In 2000, 40 percent of Korean workers were irregular workers; by 2008, that number had grown to 60 percent. Of that irregular workforce, 67.5 percent are women workers. Korea also has the largest gender wage gap of all OECD countries. Most labor economists say that this FTA will only intensify these trends and eliminate hundreds of thousands of jobs, at a time when both governments are cutting social welfare programs. Furthermore, neither the U.S. nor Korea has ratified ILO Conventions 87 and 98, which are core international labor standards guaranteeing the freedom of association, the right to organize, and the right to collective bargaining. The Korea-U.S. FTA contains a “rule of origin” provision, which allows up to 65% of the foreign content of many manufactured goods to be eligible for tariff-free treatment. This 65% rule means that many jobs will not go to Korean or U.S. workers. Instead, transnational corporations will seek to outsource production to neighboring countries with lower wages and weaker labor standards, such as China and Mexico. The majority of Korean manufacturers are small-scale businesses, and already the subcontracting practices between them and large chaebols (conglomerates) are unfavorable. Furthermore, the FTA’s investment chapter bans “performance requirements,” which means that governments can’t mandate that a certain percentage of local workers be employed or that materials be sourced locally. Environment The FTA has also been used to dismantle Korea’s environmental and public health laws. During talks, Korea agreed to a side deal, which basically overturned its 2000 genetic engineering labeling law that kept genetically modified organisms (GMOs) out of Korea’s food supply. By 2008, Korea had approved 102 GMOs for import as feed or food, 70 percent from the U.S. firms Monsanto, Dupont and Dow Chemical. The Korean government also agreed to lower national emissions standards to accommodate the import of less fuel-efficient and more polluting U.S. vehicles. At a time when the Obama administration should be advocating for more progressive energy policies that restrict greenhouse gas emissions, it is undermining other nations’ efficiency standards. The FTA would also make the passage of future environmental conventions related to international trade more difficult because both countries must agree to them. Democracy Finally, if passed, the FTA has and will continue to seriously undermine democracy in both Korea and the United States. In Korea, perhaps the most egregious example is the dismantling of Korea’s universal healthcare system. U.S. pharmaceutical companies are eager to seize the opportunity to break open Korea’s $8 billion pharmaceutical market, of which they have already cornered $2.6 billion. The FTA has the potential to destroy Korea’s public health care system: It would force open Korea’s list of reimbursable drugs to include non-generics; it would establish an “independent” body with industry representatives determining which drugs can get be reimbursed and influencing which already existing public-health laws can be overturned; and it extends patents, making it more difficult for generic medications to reach the market and easier for U.S. pharmaceutical companies to sue generic drug manufacturers, even after a patent expires. All these changes combined would likely make Korea’s health care system completely unaffordable and pave the way for it to become increasingly privatized. U.S. drug prices won’t be affected since pharmaceutical prices are already set by insurance companies, but if signed, the FTA will certainly reduce our chances in the U.S. of ever getting universal healthcare and negotiating government-set price controls. What has been the resistance to the FTA in Korea? The resistance peaked in 2008 after the current President Lee Myung Bak, a former Hyundai CEO, agreed to overturn Korea’s limited ban on U.S. beef, which was put into place after American cattle was contaminated with mad cow disease in 2003. This sparked massive protests—over a million Koreans took to the streets, including teens and housewives—unprecedented since the pro-democracy demonstrations in the 1980s. Despite widespread public opposition, the Lee administration is still pursuing the FTA. In a recent poll conducted by Hankyoreh newspaper, more than half of those surveyed opposed the FTA. Only 36% had a favorable opinion, and 70% felt it was inappropriate that the Korean government renegotiated the trade deal in December, just days after the Yeongpyongdo military crisis with North Korea. Sixty percent were “concerned that Korean government policies will be diminished.” And they are right. Korean legal scholars have found that the FTA violates 169 Korean laws. To silence the opposition, the Lee administration has turned to authoritarian practices reminiscent of past dictatorships. It has used violent police force against peaceful assemblies, banned public assembly against the FTA, and issued arrest warrants for more than 170 civil society leaders who organized against the FTA. The Lee government has also blocked anti-FTA advertising from airing on TV while running its own pro-FTA commercials. Korea’s National Human Rights Commission has found that the government’s tactics are inconsistent with the Korean Constitution. FTAs are fundamentally undemocratic and undermine farmers, workers, small businesses, and the right of people through governments to enact laws that govern their health and environment. This is why the Korea-U.S. FTA is opposed by the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions and the AFL-CIO; by the Korean Peasants League and the National Family Farm Coalition; and by thousands of grassroots and advocacy organizations in Korea and the United States. Finally, we should note that FTAs are intended to consolidate corporate power, and if the Korea-U.S. FTA passes, it will make the passage of the other FTAs much more likely. We need to come together to fight this FTA and the Colombia and Panama FTAs as well. For more information and to take action:     · Korean Americans for Fair Trade     · Korea Policy Institute     · Global Trade Watch     · Citizens Trade Coalition *Christine Ahn is Executive Director and Seung Hye Suh is a board member of the Korea Policy Institute. Both are active in the national network Korean Americans for Fair Trade.