Search Results

By Simone Chun | June 6, 2025 | Originally published in Counterpunch A sea of people waving flags and light sticks stands before the National Assembly in Seoul’s Yeouido on Dec. 14, 2024, when lawmakers passed a motion to impeach President Yoon Suk-yeol for his declaration of martial law on Dec. 3. (Kim Hye-yun/Hankyoreh) One of the most consequential missteps in US Korea policy under the Biden administration was the failure to engage with South Korea’s domestic political realities, particularly the widespread public opposition to President Yoon Suk-yeol’s increasingly authoritarian rule. By relentlessly propping up Yoon to serve Washington’s geopolitical agenda and its escalating Cold War posture toward China, the Biden administration not only ignored Korean public sentiment but also fueled domestic unrest. Domestic outrage against Yoon’s regime came to a head with his attempted imposition of martial law on December 3, 2024—a move that exposed the fragility of his position and deeply damaged Washington’s credibility in the region. Backing unpopular authoritarian leaders for strategic gain is hardly new in terms of US foreign policy, but as Korea’s experience shows, subordinating democratic values to geopolitical priorities carries real costs. Moving forward, US policymakers–and Western media–must begin by acknowledging the historic democratic uprising that put an end to Yoon’s martial law and led to the election of Lee Jae-myung on June 3. His presidency reflects a clear popular mandate that Washington can hardly afford to ignore. The historic disconnect between US policymakers and Korean popular democratic sentiment was made painfully clear during last week’s White House press briefing, when Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt was asked whether the administration had a response to South Korea’s historic election. “Yes, we do!” Then, flipping through her notes, she hesitated and admitted, “Um, we do not… but I will get you one.” That pause said it all: the United States had no prepared remarks on one of the most significant democratic movements in East Asia in decades. When a response finally arrived, it fell short of the moment. And the White House briefly called the election “ fair ” before pivoting to vague claims of Chinese interference in democracies worldwide. There was no mention of Yoon’s illegal martial law declaration, of the tanks in the streets, or the millions who stood unarmed to defend their democracy.  Rather than honoring Korea’s democratic achievement, the official statement simply reaffirmed the US-ROK “ironclad alliance,” emphasized trilateral military ties with Japan, and invoked boilerplate references to “shared democratic values.” For many Koreans, this rang hollow—especially given the Biden administration’s quiet backing of a regime that had nearly dismantled those very principles. Across the Pacific, Korea’s Revolution of Light was met not with solidarity, but with strategic discomfort, silence, and at times, what felt like dismissal or even contempt. While millions of Koreans rose to defend and reclaim their democracy, Washington remained entangled in the rhetoric of power politics—issuing statements that conveyed, at best, indifference, and at worst, implicit threats. Veteran journalist Tim Shorrock , who has covered Korea for over 30 years and helped expose US complicity in the suppression of the 1980 Gwangju Democratic Uprising, went so far as to brand the White House response to Lee’s election “a vicious slander of South Korea’s hard-won democracy.”  Resisting Dictatorship, Defending Sovereignty  On June 3, Koreans elected Lee Jae-myung , the candidate of the Democratic Party of Korea, as the nation’s 21st president, delivering not just a victory at the ballot box but a powerful mandate for democracy, justice, and popular sovereignty. This was not just an election. It was a revolution, albeit a peaceful and democratic one. The extraordinary snap presidential election triggered by the impeachment of President Yoon Suk-yeol turned out voters in record numbers. Of 44.39 million eligible voters, 35.24 million cast their ballots, representing a staggering 79.4% turnout, the highest in nearly three decades. Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party won 49.42% of the vote—the highest share in any presidential race since South Korea’s democratization in 1987—and became the first Korean president to receive over 17 million votes. His far-right opponent, Kim Moon-soo of the People Power Party, trailed with 41.15%. But the numbers tell only part of the story. This election was a national reckoning—a referendum on Yoon’s unconstitutional seizure of power, the people’s unyielding determination to reclaim their democracy, and above all, their sovereignty.  While former president Yoon and his collaborators continued to sow instability and chaos, the Korean people responded with extraordinary discipline, reaffirming their refusal to return to Korea’s authoritarian past. Despite a deeply entrenched conservative base—about 30% of the electorate that reliably supports right-wing candidates regardless of who runs—and Washington’s consistent favoritism toward conservative leadership, voters ultimately propelled opposition liberal candidate Lee Jae-myung to victory.  A Movement, Not Just a Mandate What happened in the wake of Yoon’s illegal martial law declaration was one of the most disciplined, rational, and nonviolent democratic uprisings in modern history.  Millions of Koreans—students, workers, women, and the elderly—resisted not with weapons but with law, protest, and truth. Several dynamics shaped the unprecedented electoral outcome that followed: Broad-Based Support: Despite a last-minute conservative surge, centrist and pro g ressive voters overwhelmingly backed Lee. Exit polls showed nearly 60% of voters supported candidates who endorsed Yoon’s impeachment. The result was a clear mandate to dismantle the remnants of Yoon’s autocratic and insurrection regime. Regional Breakthroughs: Lee achieved historic gains in traditionally conservative strongholds such as the southern province of Busan and the central Chungcheong region, outperforming all previous liberal candidates. His success signals a shift among moderate voters and points to a potential realignment of the electorate and a critical juncture in South Korea’s electoral history. Progressive Unity: For the first time in years, Korea’s democratic-progressive parties stood united. With the exception of the Labor Party, progressive parties, mindful of the fateful 2022 election, when Yoon was elected by a razor-thin margin of 0.7%, chose not to field their own presidential candidates to minimize vote-splitting among minor progressive candidates. Civil society and grassroots organizations mobilized, and millions rallied behind Lee Jae-myung as the only viable path to end the insurrection and restore constitutional order. Amid mass mobilization and a strong democratic resolve, and after three years of incompetent, chaotic, and failed leadership under Yoon, Koreans made a clear choice based on competence and leadership rather than ideology. Koreans Voted for Responsibility in Leadership Lee Jae-myung trajectory is one of both personal triumph and political transformation. Born into poverty, the former child laborer rose to become a human rights attorney, a reformist mayor, and the governor of Gyeonggi Province. After narrowly losing the 2022 presidential race, he faced unprecedented repression under Yoon’s “republic of prosecutors”, with 250 elite prosecutors assigned to investigate him and over 350 raids conducted on his offices. Undeterred, Lee continued to challenge Yoon’s autocratic rule by unifying his party under progressive leadership and systematically confronting the regime’s abuses. His leadership reached its defining moment on the night of December 3, during the martial law crisis. In a contemporaneous YouTube live broadcast from the National Assembly, Lee directly appealed to the public, urging them to gather there to demand the withdrawal of martial law. His calm, resolute handling of this critical moment in the face of personal danger exemplified the highest standard of public service and leadership, deeply resonating with voters.  In a pre-election poll, 35.3% of voters cited “experience and competence” as their top priority. Having campaigned as a policy expert, a public servant, and a survivor of Korea’s harshest inequalities, Lee embodied these qualities. “If anybody is up to the job, he is… He is a pragmatist with a track record of getting things done. He would hit the ground running,” observed Kyung-wha Kang , President and CEO of Asia Society. Lee wasted no time after winning the election. With no transition committee in place, he assumed official responsibilities immediately on June 4, stepping into a presidential office stripped bare by the outgoing regime, and lacking computers, documents, and even pens. Lee compared the presidential office to a tomb , an image that speaks volumes about the Yoon administration’s legacy of corruption, incompetence, and institutional neglect. Lee inherits a nation still reeling from institutional sabotage. The judiciary remains opaque. Political prosecutors continue to stall investigations. Collaborators from Yoon’s failed coup still hold office. And the national security apparatus remains tethered to the US-Japan military order relentlessly pushed by Biden and eagerly embraced by Yoon. Rebuilding Korea’s democracy will take more than a new president. It demands sustained civic engagement and deep structural reform against a persistent insurrectionist bloc that is actively regrouping. Lee cannot govern alone, and the people who brought him to power must remain vigilant. This urgent call for accountability extends beyond Korea’s borders.  A Reckoning for Washington and Western Media Lee’s victory also forces hard questions on Washington and the role of Western media in shaping the narrative around Korea’s democracy.  For three years under the Biden administration, the US propped up Yoon as a loyal ally while escalating tensions with North Korea, expanding trilateral military drills with Japan, and subordinating Korean sovereignty to US goals. Yoon’s attempt to impose martial law was not a rogue act, but rather the culmination of a broader authoritarian drift, fueled by powerful far-right forces and quietly enabled by the Biden administration, which offered Yoon uncritical support, despite mounting warnings about his systematic erosion of civil liberties. To claim that the Biden administration, with its extensive influence over Korea’s domestic and foreign affairs, was unaware of Yoon’s martial law plot is not only implausible, but disingenuous. Yoon’s failed coup revealed not only his own desperation but also the Biden administration’s deeper anxiety over safeguarding its top strategic objective: advancing a new Cold War posture against China through the Korea-US-Japan alliance.  Throughout the crisis, Biden officials focused on the preservation of this alliance, a cornerstone of US military dominance in the region, rather than supporting Korea’s democracy and sovereignty.   This posture was made clear in a U.S. Congressional Research Service report released shortly after Yoon’s impeachment in December 2024. The report criticized Lee for warning against the risks of abandoning Korea’s balanced foreign policy between the U.S. and China. At the same time, the report praised Yoon’s foreign policy record during the martial law crisis, framing Lee’s position as opposition to Yoon’s staunchly pro-American, pro-Japanese, and anti-North Korea and China stance. This alignment-focused approach was further underscored by Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Seoul in early January, even as impeachment proceedings against Yoon were still unfolding. Rather than expressing solidarity with Korea’s democratic movement, Blinken’s presence reinforced Washington’s fixation on military alliance over democratic legitimacy.   After Yoon’s impeachment and Kishida’s resignation, the Biden administration’s priority remained fixed on reinforcing the “ Axis of War ” represented by the US-Japan-South Korea alliance rather than safeguarding Korea’s democracy. Just ten days after Blinken’s visit, as millions of Koreans were braving freezing temperatures to resist Yoon’s insurrection, the US staged joint aerial military exercises in Korean airspace, turning the skies above the democratic uprising into a theater for US-led military force. Then, on January 16, the Biden administration formally objected to an opposition-led investigation into the national security risks posed by Yoon’s aggressive promotion of the US-Japan-South Korea alliance. In Korea, this alliance has been widely perceived as escalating regional tensions and compromising national sovereignty. Biden officials questioned why diplomatic “achievements” like the trilateral pact were cited in the articles of impeachment against Yoon and pressured Korean lawmakers to forgo investigating Yoon for heightening the potential of future conflict with North Korea and China via his involvement of Korea in Washington’s trilateral military pact. In short, the Biden administration succeeded in curtailing the process of holding Yoon accountable for his insurrection in order to serve its own ends. These events revealed the sobering truth that the gravest threat to Korean democracy may no longer come from within the country, but from a Washington security establishment increasingly disconnected from the political realities on the ground, and driven by a foreign policy shaped by a flawed and misguided vision. Seen in this light, Yoon’s failed coup represents not only the collapse of an authoritarian leader’s ambitions but also the failure of the Biden administration’s Korea policy, which was heavily influenced by pro-Japanese security advisors and anti-China hawks like Kurt Campbell . Yoon Suk-yeol’s collapse highlights a simple truth: any US policy in Korea that ignores Korean public opinion is bound to fail. The Trump administration has the opportunity to reset US-South Korea relations  by acknowledging Korean interests and realities. A unique asset that President Trump brings is his past outreach to North Korea, which, while ultimately unsuccessful, was widely supported by Koreans and broke with Washington orthodoxy. More than 80% of Koreans supported Trump’s engagement with North Korea during his first term, viewing it as a bold step toward peace on the Korean Peninsula. A 2025 poll by the American Friends Service Committee shows continuing strong public support in the US as well, with 70% favoring renewed talks and 75% backing cooperation to repatriate Korean War remains. These figures suggest strong backing for diplomacy over escalation, and for a policy that aligns with both American and Korean hopes for peace . The “Revolution of Light” Western media outlets have continued to echo hollow narratives about Korea’s democratic uprising and the ensuing election, with major news organizations such as The New York Times , BBC, and CNN failing to highlight the real threat: tanks deployed by an authoritarian faction backed by the United States. Even after Lee Jae-myung’s decisive victory, much of the coverage framed him not as the embodiment of Korea’s democratic will, but as a potential risk to the US alliance. This framing is both condescending and irresponsible. It reduces Korea’s democratic choice to a footnote in the American strategic calculus and erases the deeper meaning of a grassroots movement led by ordinary citizens whose rallying cries were democracy and sovereignty rather than US military priorities. But the so-called  “Revolution of Light” that brought Lee Jae-myung to the presidency transcends the dismissive portrayals offered by foreign media. For 124 days, from December 3, 2024, to April 4, 2025, millions of Korean people stood unwavering. More than ten million marched to defend the National Assembly, facing down soldiers and tanks. They resisted authoritarianism and oppression, and above all, they voted. One protester said it best: “Even when soldiers forced their way in, we followed legal procedures, removed the leader, and elected a new one. This is democracy.” Lee’s election marks not just an end to authoritarianism, but also the dawn of Korea’s democratic revolution . The future of Korea belongs to its people, and as Washington charts a new path with Korea’s incoming president, it should be guided by the words of John Adams, who centuries ago keenly observed that “ the right of a nation to govern itself is the most sacred of all political rights.”   Simone Chun is a researcher and activist focusing on inter-Korean relations and U.S. foreign policy in the Korean Peninsula. She currently serves on the Korea Policy Institute Board of Directors and the advisory board for CODEPINK. She has over 20 years of teaching and research experience in the United States and has been a central contributor to the creation of a number of interdisciplinary Asian and Korean Studies degree programs. She has served as an assistant professor at Suffolk University, an associate-in-research at Harvard University’s Korea Institute, and a lecturer at Northeastern University. Follow her on Twitter at @simonechun .

By Dae-Han Song | May 1, 2025 | This article was produced by Globetrotter Photograph Source: 기여자 – CC0 On 4 April, 122 days after martial law was declared in South Korea, the constitutional court upheld the National Assembly’s impeachment motion and dismissed the former president Yoon Suk Yeol. Now, the country is readying for the 3 June snap presidential election. While toppling a president involved Herculean efforts, the greater challenge will be changing social conditions to prevent the rise of another Yoon. After all, eight years ago, then-President Park Geun-hye was also impeached. The failure of President Moon Jae-in and the Democratic Party to fulfill the mandate for social change and reform demanded by the candlelight uprising led to widespread disappointment and discontent, ultimately paving the path for Yoon’s election. With the clear frontrunner Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party declaring himself a ‘ centre conservative ’, the election has become a contest between conservatives. And while a Lee victory might be necessary to root out those that directly supported and defended Yoon’s self-coup (when he tried to overcome his political impasse with the National Assembly by declaring martial law), it also requires laying the foundations to break the vice grip on power held by the liberal and conservative parties that brought Korean society to this point. To do so, the people need the power to recall elected officials and directly propose their own laws. Déjà Vu Eight years ago, riding high on the exuberance of the candlelight uprising, the Democratic Party’s Moon Jae-in was given a mandate for reform. With two years left in his term, his party was even handed a supermajority (180 out of 300 seats) in the following National Assembly. Yet, despite his campaign promises, Moon failed to make Korean society more equal (i.e.,  substantially increase  the minimum wage,  control housing prices ), safer (i.e., a  full investigation  of the Sewol Ferry Tragedy to prevent its recurrence,  criminal accountability  for industrial accidents), and free from discrimination (i.e., the  comprehensive anti-discrimination bill ). Now, with the Democratic Party’s Lee Jae-myung the clear frontrunner in opinion polls, the Democratic Party is likely to win the presidency again. If the conservative People Power Party proudly carries the legacy of dictatorship, the liberal Democratic Party, whose ranks swelled with democratisation activists from the 1980s, has long been captured by the economic elite. If Lee wins, he would be in a strong position to implement reforms: the Democratic Party will maintain their supermajority in the National Assembly (achieved in 2020 and 2024) for at least the first three years of the next presidency. Yet, looking at Lee’s track record as the Democratic Party leader since 2022 and his campaign rhetoric, it’s unclear whether his administration would offer policy solutions to ordinary people’s most pressing problems: inflation, growing inequality, housing prices, and discrimination. After all, during Lee’s leadership, the Democratic Party used their supermajority mostly to play the blame game with the Yoon administration. And, rather than addressing inequality by redistributing wealth through taxation, they  abolished  the financial investment tax and are now talking about  increasing  the portion of inheritances exempt from taxation. Unsurprisingly, before Yoon’s self-coup, the Democratic Party was  nearly as unpopular  as the People Power Party. Even now, a vote for Lee has simply become a vote for the lesser evil. And while choosing the lesser evil is necessary to root out the elements of Yoon’s self-coup, breaking out of this impeachment-elections-impeachment cycle requires structural changes. Break the Cycle Today, all parties agree on amending the 1987 constitution, which established the current formal democracy. Even the disgraced conservative People Power Party is calling for constitutional amendments to shorten the next presidential term, given their likely defeat. The Democratic Party is proposing to amend the constitution to redistribute power from the executive to the legislative branch. Yet, neither is addressing the limitations of the 1987 constitution: a formal democracy that limits democratic participation to voting during elections. Impeaching President Yoon created an extraordinary opening for ordinary people (among them,  young women and members of the LGBTQ+ community ) to rise up as democratic actors. Without expanding participation, formal democracy’s response to their efforts, growth, and exuberance amounts to: ‘Thank you for defending democracy. Please make sure to vote’. Korea’s democracy must accommodate the democratic space for these actors to shape their lives and future beyond choosing between two parties. That’s why a progressive current is forming around the need to expand participatory democracy. More specifically, the  People Power Direct Action (established to organise ordinary people to impeach Yoon and expand direct democracy) is proposing to root out the self-coup elements. It wants to do this by empowering people with the right to  recall  elected officials and  propose their own laws. With such expanded powers, voters could remove leaders who have lost their democratic mandate. Before declaring martial law, Yoon’s actions and policies had already turned him into a lame duck president with  20%  approval ratings. Yet, without the recall referendum, voters could do nothing but wait for him to complete the second half of his term. Furthermore, even after Yoon carried out martial law and was impeached by the National Assembly, the public had to anxiously wait for the Constitutional Court to uphold the impeachment. Secondly, the power to propose laws would break the vice grip held by elite interests. If the conservative party proudly carries the legacy of dictatorship, the liberal party, whose ranks swelled with democratisation activists from the 1980s, has long been captured by the elite. After all, in one of the issues most important to young people – housing – (conservative and liberal) National Assembly members are aligned with the elite. The average real estate assets for National Assembly members stand at  KRW 1.9 billion   (about $1.3 million), nearly  five times  the national average. Among the top ten wealthiest,  four  are from the Democratic Party; the  other six , from the People Power Party. In fact, the largest real estate assets –  KRW 41 billion   (roughly $30 million) – are held by a Democratic Party assembly member. Most importantly,  54.7%  of the members of the three permanent committees connected to real estate have significant land holdings themselves. If the National Assembly fails to propose bills that control housing prices, it’s because it hurts their interests. The same argument applies to controlling financial speculation and  stock ownership . And if this is neither shocking nor unique to South Korea, then democracy requires that common people be given the power to propose laws that represent their interests. Lessons across time and place have shown us that the way to the greatest evils is the accumulated disappointments and anger from settling for the lesser evil. To break free, people need to be able to rise as democratic actors. If Yoon’s impeachment opened extraordinary spaces of participation, now they must become integrated into the ordinary workings of democracy. The ability to recall elected officials and propose laws would be a start. KPI Associate Dae-Han Song is in charge of the networking team at the International Strategy Center and is a part of the No Cold War collective.

By Lim Jae-hee, Park Go-eun & Lee Ji-hye   | April 7, 2025 | Originally published in Hankyoreh Amid the joyous mood, many still underscored the tasks that lie ahead to realize true reform and democracy for all Participants in a mass march of victory on April 5, 2025, fill the streets outside Gyeongbok Palace in Seoul, where they celebrate the Constitutional Court’s ruling to remove Yoon Suk-yeol from office as president. (Kim Gyoung-ho/Hankyoreh) “We have brought down the insurrectionist ringleader Yoon Suk-yeol 123 days after his declaration of martial law,” a voice boomed over a crowd of thousands gathered in downtown Seoul on Saturday. Those gathered turned to each other with glee while the emcee addressed them. “Our lives may not change dramatically. But I assure you that those of us who learned how to win through the power of love and solidarity out here in these streets will go on to create a new world, different from the one we lived in before Dec. 3,” the speaker went on. Cries of “Out with Yoon” which had rung throughout the heart of Seoul every weekend for the past four months were replaced with cheers celebrating the triumph of democracy and ones looking forward to the “new world” on the horizon.   In the wake of the president’s ouster preparations are being made for this journey “into the new world,” based on the diverse voices who made the pro-impeachment rallies what they were these last few months.  Bisang Action for Yoon Out and Social Reform, the umbrella group behind the mass pro-impeachment rallies, actively encouraged ordinary people to speak up and make their voices and demands heard throughout the months long fight to depose the president. Since December, laborers, farmers, adolescents, women and others have taken the stage at the rallies to recount the discrimination and hardships they have faced and to call for social and institutional solutions. Now, the group’s 127 affiliated organizations and 189 experts and activists analyzed the demands Koreans made at these protests and organized them into an agenda for reform.  In doing so, the group is laying the groundwork for demanding “democracy for all” from the political sphere and the soon-to-be-elected new government.   The demands compiled by Bisang Action reflected how the public square had brought out people from all walks of life. Broken down, demands spanned 12 categories in total, including restoring the constitutional order, political and judicial reform, bettering the economy and the livelihood of the people, gender equality, climate change, caregiving, labor, freedom of the press, education and youth-related social issues, and food sovereignty. The group extracted 118 tasks to be addressed, including enacting or changing laws, reform and policy shifts, which it categorized into 424 sub-projects.  Tasks associated with gender equality and climate change issues dominated. “As a society, sensitivity on gender issues and climate change has heightened compared to when former President Park Geun-hye was impeached,” said Kim Joo-ho, the policy planning head of Bisang Action. “As areas that were rolled back considerably under the Yoon administration, people spoke that much more passionately on them.”  Bisang Action intends to work with opposition parties to put these issues on the agenda heading into the presidential election. Last month, six opposition parties, including the Democratic Party, issued a joint statement saying they would “encourage and ensure the active participation of the public as we work together to achieve major social reforms.”  As if to make up for the agonizing past four months, Saturday’s mass rally was an ebullient festival in which participants basked in the joy of finally seeing Yoon ousted from office. Still, people raised their voices to underscore that Yoon’s removal did not signify closure, but instead a new beginning.  Cho Hyeon, 45, who came to Seoul from Asan, South Chungcheong Province, said, “While the thought that we were being compensated for lost time made me well up a little, my heart did sink when I remembered that this is merely the beginning. I hope we can become a society that truly protects the values of the Constitution.”  Jin Eun-seon, a wheelchair user, took to the stage to say, “Everyone here at the square could not be more different. Despite our differences, we sought to find common ground and brought our diverse experiences of discrimination and oppression together.”  She added, “I hope we ride on the momentum of this solidarity and take it with us as we return to normalcy after Yoon’s removal from office.”  The chant, “Out, out, Yoon Suk-yeol out!” which had been sung to the melody of Aespa’s “Whiplash” and Infinite Track’s “To You,” was replaced with the chant, “Change, change, change the world!” Lim Jae-hee, Park Go-eun and Lee Ji-hye are staff reporters for Hankyoreh.

By Gregory Elich | March 7, 2025 | Originally published in Counterpunch Photograph Source: Republic of Korea – CC BY-SA 2.0 As the South Korean Constitutional Court’s impeachment trial of President Yoon Suk Yeol heads toward its finish, a second trial has opened at the Seoul District Court, in which the president is charged with the crime of insurrection. As I reported in January, substantial evidence points to Yoon’s intention to unleash a campaign of mass repression under martial law. Recently, startling new evidence has emerged that paints a much darker picture of Yoon’s plan. Investigators discovered a notebook kept by former military intelligence chief Roh Sang-won, who is widely regarded as the architect of martial law. The notebook contains instructions that Roh reportedly wrote down as dictated by his fellow conspirator, Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun. There is suspicion that Kim wrote the notes, although handwriting analysis is inconclusive. It is a distinction without a difference in that the two worked closely together at drafting the plan for military rule, and the contents of the notebook represented agreed-upon procedures. Indeed, Kim repeatedly instructed military officers that Roh’s orders were his orders . It was an ongoing collaboration, as Roh visited Kim’s home 22 times from September up through the night martial law was declared. Kim even provided Roh with his chauffeured car to pass through the checkpoint to his residential compound. Until recently, few details of Roh’s notebook’s contents had been publicly revealed, but South Korean media have now gained access to the entire text. It was known that Martial Law Command had organized two arrest teams to hunt down and seize fourteen prominent people whom Yoon loathed, and bundle them off to a detention center. Among these high-priority targets were former South Korean President Moon Jae-in and the current leader of the opposition Democratic Party, Lee Jae-myung, who is regarded as the main challenger to Yoon. In his martial law speech, Yoon singled out the Democratic Party’s majority in the National Assembly as one of his motivations for imposing military rule. What the newly disclosed information reveals is that around 500 people and organizations were targets for arrest in the early days of martial law. The intended victims were assigned to categories A through D, signifying the importance assigned to their capture. The arrest list included prominent politicians and lawmakers, as well as Buddhist and Christian religious leaders, entertainment celebrities, judges, trade unionists, police chiefs, various types of officials, and even former South Korean National soccer team coach Cha Bum-geun. Up to 200 media figures were listed for “primary collection” in the first round of abductions. In addition to named individuals, entire categories of people were identified for repression, so the intended number of victims in the first wave of arrests was likely to be far higher than the reported 500. The targeted organizations included the Catholic Priests’ Association for Justice , Korean Confederation of Trade Unions , Korean Federation of Teachers’ Associations, Lawyers for a Democratic Society, “all left-wing judges,” and “left-wing entertainers.” As a welcoming gesture for arrestees, the notebook had a reference to hiring gangster thugs to use their fists “to crush the leftist bastards.” The goal was to wipe out the opposition. As phrased in Roh’s notebook, once military rule is established, “eliminate the sprouts to eradicate the root” and “continuously cut off the sprouts” to “ collapse all leftist forces in preparation for the next presidential election.” The South Korean constitution limits presidents to a single five-year term. Nevertheless, martial law planners envisioned at least three terms for Yoon under military rule, with pre-ordained electoral outcomes in his favor. The elimination of the opposition would see to that. Martial law planners had a permanent solution in mind for the prisoners, who were to be taken to “collection centers” located on islands in the West Sea and along South Korea’s fortified northern border. Their fate, quite simply, was to be murdered . “It is difficult to avoid investigation when using domestic personnel,” Roh wrote . “We need professionals.” To carry out that task, seven to eight special agents who are “good at shooting and bombing” would be needed. Roh selected a few special forces soldiers and undercover agents for the assignment, who were to be supplemented by contractors, reservists, and volunteers. “Confirmation kill is necessary,” it was emphasized. In other words, no one should survive. Various methods were contemplated regarding how to “dispose” of the prisoners. One option was to install explosives in the barracks and then blow them up once the prisoners were inside. Another was to attack the barracks with grenades or set them on fire. There was also a plan to sink transport ships taking the abductees to their island destinations. Explosives would be placed in the engine room or hold. Martial law personnel would disembark at Silmido Island, send the ships on their way to Yeonpyeong Island, and then detonate the explosives “at an appropriate location.” Since a transmitter may not be an effective means, it was noted that time bombs were preferred. The explosives would need to be powerful enough to ensure that “no evidence should remain as debris.” Other approaches included an apparent plan to poison food and water or use chemical agents against “an entire prison cell.” There was a recognized need to “destroy the evidence” after the “killing,” or better yet, misdirect responsibility, under the heading, “taking action in the North.” Among the alternatives mentioned were “ outsourcing torpedo attacks ,” hiring foreign Chinese contractors to sink the ships, or informally reaching out to North Korea , with the open question of “what to offer the North” in exchange for its participation. What could be more delusional than to imagine that North Korea would be willing to assist the hostile Yoon to murder hundreds or thousands of his opponents? Even more dismaying, considering that the point would be to direct world blame onto the North. A less fanciful option would be to send transport ships over the Northern Limit Line into disputed waters claimed by both Koreas in hopes of “ provoking the North to attack ,” or failing to elicit a response, then “sinking ships before the North captures them for trespassing, etc.” Once the martial law regime became fully entrenched, the plan was to formalize ongoing repression with a legal veneer. This would be accomplished by establishing a special investigation headquarters staffed by regular and military police and counterintelligence agents. The organization would be responsible for expediting the arrest and trial of people labeled as leftists. Slated to operate for as long as one year, its mission was to process and sentence prisoners on an industrial scale to “the death penalty or life imprisonment.” The 500 individuals and organizations listed by name would comprise the first batch of victims, to be followed by many more in what was to be an ongoing campaign of mass repression to, as Yoon put it in his martial law speech, “ eradicate ” his opponents. Those who attempted to flee or hide would have been systematically hunted down and abducted. A ban on citizens leaving the country was planned to eliminate one avenue for escape. Thought was also given to electronic means for hunting people. The Capital Defense Command contacted ride-sharing companies last August, asking to be granted access to their data in a so-called “wartime situation,” such as identification of customers and real-time tracking location. It should be noted that the Capital Defense Command participated in planning Yoon’s military takeover and played a key role in Yoon’s attack on the National Assembly. One company, Socar, conducted an internal review and rejected the request based on the lack of legal justification. How other ride-sharing companies responded is not publicly known. Whether any agreed to cooperate or not, the result would have likely been the same, as the military could have seized control over electronic tracking capabilities. Martial Law Command attached great importance to crushing dissent and resistance. The martial law decree outlawed all political parties and activities, rallies, and demonstrations, warning that violators would be punished. It was expected that substantial numbers of ordinary citizens would raise their voices in protest and need to be imprisoned. But where to find room to house them all? From March to May last year, the 7th Airborne Brigade visited prisons in North Jeolla Province , requesting facility blueprints and permission to film. It is almost certain that other brigades were making similar requests at other prisons throughout South Korea. The information was intended to help plan to “free up space” to imprison thousands of protestors “ through a large-scale amnesty ” for convicts. Information control was a key component in planning. The martial law decree issued on the night of December 3 declared, “All media and publications are subject to the control of Martial Law Command.” As a first step, Yoon handed orders to Minister of Security and Public Administration Lee Sang-min, instructing him to block the offices and shut off the power and water at media companies critical of his rule. The action was to be coordinated through the National Police Agency and National Fire Agency. According to the testimony of the commissioner of the latter organization, “Cutting off water and electricity is not something that we can do, so we didn’t take any measures.” Whether he was telling the truth or time had run out before action could be taken before martial law was lifted, had Yoon prevailed, these media outlets were destined to be shut down. With domination imposed over media across the political spectrum, the Korean people would have only been exposed to information provided or vetted by the military. Yoon’s plan for martial law collapsed when thousands of citizens rushed to the National Assembly to resist efforts by soldiers to block lawmakers from entering the building and voting to lift martial law. Under the constitution, a president must respect the outcome of that vote. Yoon’s response, instead, was to try and organize a second martial law . By then, it was too late for him, as news broadcasts announcing the result of the vote had deflated support among lower levels of the military for his coup. South Korea had evaded disaster by the narrowest of margins, but it is not out of danger yet. In his final speech to the Constitutional Court, Yoon came across as unhinged, soft-pedaling the seriousness of his martial law plan and accusing the opposition and labor unions of working together with North Korea to threaten national security. With that mindset, Yoon seems likely to launch another martial law if the court does not confirm his impeachment. There is every sign that Yoon believes he can return to active duty as president even if his impeachment is upheld. Imagining that he can be swept back to office by his supporters, Yoon’s public messages have mobilized right-wing extremists to threaten violence on his behalf in the event of his impeachment. Yoon has not been alone in inciting violence. YouTube fanatics are actively whipping up emotions, as is former Defense Minister and martial law planner Kim Yong-hyun, as he issues messages from his prison cell. Kim provided a statement to be read aloud at a recent rally, in which he accused the opposition of colluding with China and North Korea. Kim even supplied chants for the crowd, including a call to punish the constitutional court judges and the message, “The enemy has stolen our president. Let’s rescue him with our own hands.” If Yoon is impeached, powerful forces are bent on returning him to power through violent means. South Korea sits atop a political volcano, with its future balancing on Yoon’s fate. Gregory Elich is a Korea Policy Institute board member. He is a contributor to the collection, Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy (Haymarket Books, 2023). His website is  https://gregoryelich.org    Follow him on Twitter at @GregoryElich .

By Paul Liem | March 3, 2025 | Originally published here by the Lee Yueng-hui Foundation * Professor Lee Yueng-hui invited by Korean American students to lecture at UC Berkeley, 1987. In the years since Professor Lee Yueng-hui taught his course on contemporary Korean history at UC Berkeley, 1987, prospects for the peaceful reunification of Korea have gone through many ups and downs.  Regretfully under the administrations of Presidents Joe Biden and Yoon Suk-yeol the foreign policies of the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) lurched to the far right, upending the hope of Professor Lee’s students that Korea with two differing social systems, socialist and capitalist, could thrive in a confederated republic in a state of peace.  How did this come about and what is now the path towards the peaceful reunification of Korea?   Under President Biden the Democratic Party became the party of war.  Billions of US dollars and sophisticated U.S. weapons were poured onto the battlefields of Ukraine; his administration provided military and diplomatic support for Israel’s genocidal destruction of the Gaza Strip; and it engineered multilateral military alliances in Asia to contain the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).   Ever ready to please, President Yoon ingratiated himself to the Biden administration by rushing to embrace the Japan-Korea-U.S. trilateral alliance by increasing the scale and frequency of war games; opening up ROK ports and skies to Japanese war ships, U.S. nuclear submarines and B-1b bombers; and providing weapons to Ukraine, by indirectly selling them to the U.S.  In doing so he hitched his fate to a U.S. administration and Democratic Party widely identified by U.S. voters with neo-liberal policies that led to the deindustrialization of America, the decay of its infrastructure, extreme inequality of wealth, and to costly “forever wars.”  Donald J Trump, pledging to “Make America Great Again,” and to end “forever wars” by making U.S. allies pay and fight their own wars, trounced the Democratic Party, winning both the electorate and the popular vote in the November 2024 elections.   The ROK today is without an elected president at a time when President Trump, in his second term, and with the backing of Republican majorities in the House and Senate, is upending the very liberal order that Biden sought to uphold and that Yoon apparently believed was immutable.  Having bought into the Biden administration’s zeal for targeting unfriendly states as “authoritarian,” notably Russia, China, Iran and the DPRK, Yoon, a zealot himself, attacked his adversaries in the National Assembly as if they were authoritarian enemies of the state.  He is now impeached and under prosecution for his ill-fated bid to declare martial law, while in the world outside his detention cell, U.S. patronage of allies is being replaced, everywhere, by “the art of the deal.”   Professor Lee taught his UC Berkeley students that peaceful reunification was contingent upon the end of rule by U.S. backed military dictatorships and the democratization of South Korean society.  His teaching has withstood the test of time.  In the tradition of Korea’s historic democracy movement, the majority of the population resoundingly support their constitution, democratic processes, and the impeachment of Yoon; and the majority has always favored peace over war with their brethren in the north.  There is, nevertheless, a rising far right movement of Yoon supporters calling for a holy crusade against “communist” conspiracies in civil society, and for regime change in the north.    Democracy in society polarized by rising inequality of wealth, where working people cannot begin to see their way out of debt, has proven to be fragile.  This is so in Korea, as in the U.S. and elsewhere.  If martial law in Korean society is to be averted going forward, the pro-democracy movement must present a way forward for working people.  Forty years ago, when the south Korean people toppled the Chun Du Hwan dictatorship, advocating for an equitable distribution of wealth was considered subversive.  But today politicians, bankers as well as labor unions acknowledge that the prospect of incurring unsustainable household debt is a major factor contributing to Korea’s declining birth rate, and must be reversed.    Sovereignty in international affairs is also a matter to be addressed by a pro-democracy movement.  The ROK economy, dominated by a handful of chaebols, is export driven.  While the greater portion of the profit of trade accrues to the chaebol, loss of market share hits working people the hardest in terms of labor repression, extended working hours, job loss and increasing debt peonage.  Therefore, as a matter of achieving a more equitable distribution of wealth in society, it is incumbent upon a pro-democracy movement to also advocate for a foreign policy that aims to diversify Korea’s trading partners, even if that may require developing economic relations with countries deemed undesirable by the U.S., principally the PRC.   Last but not least a pro-democracy movement must have a policy for peaceful reunification.  Of a national budget of $510 billion proposed for 2025, $45.5 billion are set aside for military spending. Alternatively, if the ROK were to take responsibility for its own security by negotiating peace with the DPRK, it would not be burdened with the cost of its military alliance with the U.S., and neither would the U.S. be burdened with the costs it incurs.  The ROK can maintain good relations with the U.S., based on mutually beneficial trade and other common interests, without having to house U.S. forces on its territory, and it would have a sizeable peace dividend to invest in the well-being of its citizenry.  The U.S. can likewise be encouraged to make peace with the DPRK, just as it seems to be doing with Russia, a recently recommitted ally of the DPRK. The Korean War, in a state of cease fire for 72 years, is America’s longest forever war.    To take the first step towards peaceful reunification, a pro-democracy movement must lead the society in letting go of the long-held belief, put forward by Syngman Rhee, that the territorial boundary of the ROK encompasses the entire Korean peninsula. Peaceful reunification is not possible as long as one side claims the territory of the other.  Aside from this stumbling block, and once the ROK assumes control of its security, there is nothing to stop the ROK and DPRK from normalizing relations and finding a way to thrive on the Korean peninsula in a state of peace.    I may be completely wrong, but I believe that if Professor Lee were teaching at UC Berkeley today, he would consider the normalization of relations between the ROK and DPRK, as separate states, not as a repudiation of previous reunification proposals, but simply as reunification in the most practical manner given the changed circumstances of the times.   Paul Liem is the Chair of the Korea Policy Institute Board of Directors. * The Lee Yueng-hui Foundation was founded to memorialize the life of journalist Lee Yueng-hui (1929-2010), Professor of Hanyang University, and widely regarded as a doyen of Korea's democracy movement.

By Heewon Kim   | March 2, 2025 | Originally published in Hankyoreh Supporters of Yoon Suk-yeol protest outside the Seoul Western District Court in the city’s Mapo District on Jan. 18, 2025, on the day that a detention warrant was sought for the president. (Kim Young-won/Hankyoreh) Many scholars have long held that capitalism inevitably spawns fascism. On the other end of the spectrum, some argue that capitalism inevitably ends in revolution. As capitalism routinely faces crises, the question then becomes which extreme it will career toward each time it falters. If history has taught us anything, it is that the former theory tends to prevail. Unfortunately, this grim prophecy seems like it will remain applicable for a long time to come. Fascism returns, rebranded, whenever capitalism hits a wall. It arrives hand in hand with the haunting sense that it will, somehow, alleviate us of our pain and frustration. In reality, it will only allow those who exploit such crises to feast, yet again, on the pain and sorrow of others. The foundation of modern-day fascism is, without a doubt, neoliberalism. In that regard, South Korean soil is fertile enough to enable fascism to flourish. Every administration has had a shoddy track record when it came to public spending, meaning that Koreans have been forced to fend for themselves while at the mercy of fierce competition. Even before the invocation of martial law, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration had been hacking away at the lives of ordinary Koreans at an alarming speed. Its insistence that relying on the free market will always facilitate the best outcome betrayed its neglect of the safety of Koreans and their livelihoods. The lives of young and old Koreans are becoming more strained by the day. The number of unemployed young people who are not actively seeking a job has reached a post-pandemic high of over 420,000. Those who are employed are working low-level jobs, forcing them to be categorized as “underemployed.” South Korea’s elderly poverty rate is the highest out of all members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.  Neoliberal policies always destabilize people’s livelihoods. This instability is the foundation that fascism thrives on. A world in which one is continuously made to feel small and unfulfilled, even when one continues to put in endless hours of honest work, will spark in people a sense of deprivation. They will say, “I should have a place in this society, economically and socially. Why isn’t it being given to me? What has been taken away from me?” Full of indignance at the state of the unjust world, threatened by a sense of status anxiety, and propelled by rage, these people then set out to save the world by saving themselves. Violence wielded against scapegoats during this process is not only necessary, but justified, as they are considered the evil forces ruining the world. In this context, political scientist and philosopher Alberto Toscano describes fascism as a phenomenon borne from when the “times threatening economic value” and “times which bring identity crises” converge. Yoon Suk-yeol may have declared martial law out of self-absorption, spite and self-interest, but his rogue behavior has opened the door for fascist incitement and violence to spike in South Korean society. Far-right YouTubers, far-right online communities, and far-right Protestantism attract followers in throngs. Their sworn enemies are the North Korean sympathizers of the far left, North Korea, China, “the evil belief of feminism” and “forces promoting homosexuality.” From their viewpoint, China is behind Yoon’s impeachment, which means that keeping Yoon in power is the only way to stop communism from storming the gates of the country.  At the same time, preventing Yoon’s impeachment is a mission of utmost importance as it is crucial for protecting liberal democracy and defending conservative values. These people pray for a country that provides them with stable lives by worshipping an idealized version of such a country that only exists in their minds. That imagined country is frighteningly violent and exclusionary, a place where “outsiders” are permanently expunged. The conspiracy theories, hate speech and violence propagated by far-right forces have reached dangerous new heights as South Korean society continues to crumble. Even after witnessing the shocking, unprecedented scene of an angry mob ransacking a courthouse, many remain blinded by fake news and distrustful of the Constitutional Court, choosing to place their faith in those justifying the declaration of martial law. Some politicians are latching on to fascism — namely, those attempting to resuscitate their political career by leeching off far-right forces and those so obsessed with gaining power that they have no qualms with fascism.  Making Korea a livable country for all is the only way to topple fascism where it stands. A country where everyone is given the equal opportunity to spread their wings, where no laborer is discriminated against or exploited, where the gig economy gives way to a stable system that allows people to breathe, where the playing field is leveled by effective public spending and redistribution of wealth. Policies catering to the whims of major conglomerates, focusing on providing tax cuts to the wealthy, and only revolving around growth will worsen anxiety and inequality, spurring more to associate themselves with the far-right. Let us keep a sharp eye when we inspect upcoming election campaigns. Who will be the ones to capitalize on fascism? Heewon Kim is an Associate Professor at Arizona State University

By Gregory Elich | April 14, 2008 North Korea, it is often said, is a criminal state. One of the more persistent stories supporting that allegation is that the North Koreans are counterfeiting U.S. currency. Through repetition, the claim has taken on an aura of proven fact. This in turn has been cited as justification for everything from imposing punitive measures against North Korea to suggesting that the nation cannot be trusted as a partner in nuclear negotiations. The evidence against North Korea is widely regarded as convincing. “The North Koreans have denied that they are engaged in the distribution and manufacture of counterfeits,” says Daniel Glaser of the U.S. Treasury Department, “but the evidence is overwhelming that they are. There’s no question of North Korea’s involvement.” 1 There is no denying that North Korean citizens have been caught passing counterfeit currency in Europe and Asia, and some defectors from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK — the formal name for North Korea) claim to have first-hand knowledge of state-run counterfeiting operations. In Western media reports the case is treated as proven. Yet the closer one examines the matter, the murkier the picture becomes. Counterfeit currency attributed to North Korea raises deep concern due to its extremely high quality. Dubbed supernotes, their production process closely matches that of the genuine article, and the engraving is so fine it rivals that of the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing. 2 Unlike most of the world’s counterfeit currency, which is printed on offset presses or through digital processes, supernotes are printed on an intaglio press. The Bureau of Engraving and Printing uses Giori intaglio presses for the engraved portions of its bank notes, and an offset press for the background colors. Supernotes use the same technology. An intaglio press operates by applying ink on its plates and then wiping them clean, leaving ink only in the engraved lines. The plate is then pressed against the paper, depositing the ink in ridges. The result is raised printing that ordinary counterfeits can’t duplicate. Supernotes have the same look and feel as U.S. currency. North Korea purchased an intaglio press from the Swiss firm Giori in the mid-1970s. 3 This fact is regarded as an indication that the nation has the technology available to print supernotes. Yet there have been significant advances in the field since the time of its purchase. Because certain auxiliary equipment is lacking, the model owned by the DPRK is considered by experts to be incapable of achieving the level of quality seen on supernotes. Not long after purchasing the Giori, North Korea defaulted on its loan after having made just two payments. For that reason, as well as due to U.S. pressure, Giori ceased shipping spare parts to North Korea many years ago, and according to one expert the North Korean printing press now stands idle. 4 One striking feature of supernotes is the composition of the paper. Throughout the world, currency is printed on cotton-based paper. But U.S. currency is different, being composed of a mix of 75 percent cotton pulp and 25 percent linen. Supernote counterfeits rely on the same unique combination. To produce secure paper like that used in U.S. currency requires advanced technology and the cost far surpasses that of manufacturing regular paper. The price of even a small plant can exceed $100 million. To remain profitable, a paper plant would have to produce more than four thousand metric tons of such banknote paper a year. But the quantity of supernotes seen in circulation so far has required only a tiny fraction of that total. It would seem, then, that the only option for North Korea would be to procure its paper from an existing plant outside of its borders. This would be no easy matter. The paper used in U.S. currency is produced on a Fourdrinier machine at a plant located in the state of Georgia. This machine uses longer pulp fibers than the short pulp fibers used by the rest of the world relying on cylinder mold methods. 5 Former director of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing Thomas Ferguson comments on the quality of the paper in supernotes. “They’re not simulating the paper features by printing on the paper. They are not using somebody else’s paper or bleaching the ink off of genuine notes. Someone specifically made paper, which is a pretty big commitment.” 6 Remarkably, supernote paper even incorporates colored microfibers, a thin security thread marked “USA 100” in microprint, and a multi-tone watermark. These features can only be produced through the use of sophisticated technology at substantial cost. One expert who conducted a chemical and physical analysis of supernotes discovered that the cotton originated in the southern region of the U.S. — precisely where the Bureau of Engraving and Printing gets its cotton. Southern U.S. cotton is available on the world market, but this would make it traceable to some extent. The expert conducting the analysis is said to have been warned by “interested parties” not to make the results public. The implication was that these parties worked for the U.S. government. 7 One of the special features of U.S. currency is the use of optically variable ink (OVI) manufactured by the Swiss firm Société Industrielle et Commerciale de Produits Amon (SICPA). This organization is the sole source for OVI. On the U.S. $100 bill, this color shifting ink is employed on the number in the lower right hand corner. Turning the bill one way, the number appears bronze green. Turned another, it appears black. Supernotes duplicate the same color shift. 8 This particular color combination is reserved for the exclusive use of the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing and is manufactured at only one location in the world. A joint venture was established between SICPA and the California-based OCLI laboratory to manufacture this combination of OVI ink. Bronze-green and black OVI is mixed at the SICPA plant in Virginia, which serves only the U.S. market. The rest of the world gets its supply of OVI from SICPA’s main plant in Switzerland. 9 North Korea was at one time a client of SICPA. Each nation is assigned a unique color combination. The DPRK’s combination was green and magenta, which Treasury official Daniel Glazer asserts can be manipulated to appear similar to the U.S. combination. 10 Yet a forensic laboratory has found that the security ink used in supernotes is not similar. It matches U.S. currency. 11 Furthermore, it is probable that North Korea has long ago exhausted its limited supply of OVI. SICPA spokeswoman Sarah Van Horn points out, “We ceased all OVI deliveries in early 2001, and later that year all security ink supplies.” Severing trade with North Korea came at the request of U.S. officials, long before the Bush Administration publicly accused North Korea of manufacturing and distributing supernotes. 12 One South Korean specialist on the DPRK says that interviews with defectors convinced him of the existence of a state-run counterfeiting operation, and that the intent was to fund covert operations and wage economic warfare against the U.S. 13 But the stories defectors tell do not always hold up. In some cases, defectors report hearsay — what they have heard from others. Other times, defectors appear to have first-hand knowledge, such as the two who talked to BBC News. 14 Yet North Korean defectors, eager to please their new hosts, have been noted for a tendency to tell stories that turn out to be dubious. As Raphael Perle, an analyst for the Congressional Research Service, points out, “A lot of defectors or refugees give us information, but they tell us anything we want to know. You have to question the reliability of what they say.” 15 A North Korean defector who claimed that he had helped design the supernote went into hiding after being accused of being paid to lie about the matter. When asked whose picture was on the $100 bill and what building was depicted on its backside, he said he did not know. A U.S.-based activist interviewed the man, intending to have him testify before Congress, but the activist came to the conclusion that his stories were implausible. “He lost credibility with me. I found him mentally unstable.” The activist said that many defectors tell stories that they think journalists and intelligence agencies want to hear. “He was expecting money.” Defectors “think the U.S. government will give them hundreds of thousands of dollars.” Another defector who initially claimed to be involved in the decision to print supernotes later admitted he had not seen the operation, nor did he learn any details of how it was being done. 16 The 2004 U.S. indictment of Sean Garland, leader of the Irish Worker’s Party and Official Republican Army, on charges of distributing supernotes is considered the centerpiece of the evidence against North Korea. “In or about October 1997,” the indictment reads, Garland met North Korean officials in Poland “to arrange for the purchase of a quantity of supernotes.” Then for the next three years, Garland is said to have distributed the counterfeit currency in Ireland and Great Britain. As leader of the Irish Worker’s Party, he often travelled abroad for “ostensibly legitimate business and personal reasons.” But, the indictment reads, in his travels he met with North Koreans who were involved in the “transportation and sale of supernotes.” Garland also visited Russia, where he is alleged to have purchased more supernotes, although the transactions did not complete until a later time in Belarus. Six codefendants were indicted along with Garland, one of whom was said to have informed law enforcement officials of the location in Moscow of $70,000 in supernotes “that he had obtained from the Sean Garland supernote organization.” 17 In 2002, three of Garland’s codefendants were jailed in Great Britain, as a result of an investigation into the activities of a large-scale counterfeiting ring. Garland himself was not arrested until three years later, and then only in response to the U.S. indictment. Released on bail, he eluded extradition to the U.S. by going to Ireland. The most striking thing about the indictment is its vagueness. No North Korean is identified, and meetings with North Koreans are mentioned without any actual transaction being described. Sean Garland himself states, “I have no associate named Corcoran [one of the codefendants] nor have I any associates in jail in Britain.” 18 The impression one gets is that Garland was indicted because of his political and business contacts with North Koreans, and that tying him to an actually existing counterfeiting ring would make for a persuasive sounding case against North Korea. In contrast to the lack of anything definite concerning Garland, the indictment is more detailed when describing the activities of the codefendants. Garland writes that “neither myself or my legal team have had as yet received any information from the U.S. authorities to set out the nature of the allegations against me.” As for the indictment, “No evidence is offered of any crime or wrongdoing,” and Garland “strenuously” denied the allegations. 19 Having political and business contacts with North Koreans does not in itself indicate involvement in the supernote trade. Counterfeiting allegations against North Korea provided the pretext for harsh economic measures. As the September 2005 six-party nuclear disarmament negotiations were taking place in Beijing, Stuart Levey, under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence in the Department of the Treasury, issued a press release designating Macao-based Banco Delta Asia as a “primary money-laundering concern.” The bank, Levey reported, “has been a willing pawn for the North Korean government to engage in corrupt financial activities.” By providing financial services to the DPRK for over twenty years, it “has facilitated many of that regime’s criminal activities, including circulating counterfeit U.S. currency.” 20 In a matter of days, U.S. financial institutions were instructed to sever relations with Banco Delta Asia. By December of the same year, the Treasury Department had issued an advisory in which it warned that the DPRK “may be seeking banking services elsewhere” following the action taken against the Macao bank. U.S. financial institutions were told to “take reasonable steps to guard against the abuse of their financial services by North Korea.” Tellingly, it added, “We encourage financial institutions worldwide to take similar precautions.” 21 U.S. intelligence officials knew Banco Delta Asia was one of the primary means for North Korea to conduct normal foreign commerce. The effect of the Treasury Department’s announcement was immediate. In the six-day gap between the announcement and the bank’s closing, panicked depositors had withdrawn $132 million, more than a third of the bank’s total funds. 22 Banco Delta Asia was quick to deny the charge, saying that its business relations with North Korea were entirely legitimate and commercial, but the Macao Monetary Authority assumed management of the bank and froze all of North Korea’s accounts. 23 The action against Banco Delta Asia deprived North Korea of a portion of its foreign trade. More importantly, it also served as a means of magnifying the effect of sanctions. By blacklisting Banco Delta Asia, the U.S. set off a chain reaction, and the campaign soon took on global significance. The U.S. Treasury Department sent warning letters to banks around the world, resulting in a wave of banks shutting down North Korean accounts. International financial institutions feared U.S. retaliation, and felt it prudent to close North Korean accounts rather than risk being blocked from access to the U.S. financial system. A blacklisting would in effect mean being driven out of business. Stuart Levey observed with satisfaction that sanctions and U.S. threats had succeeded in applying “huge pressure” on the DPRK, and that this had led to a “snowballing avalanche effect.” U.S. actions undermined the prospect of a peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue. “Squeeze them,” a senior Bush Administration official said, “but keep the negotiations going.” Talks, the official continued, would serve as nothing more than a means for accepting North Korea’s capitulation. A second U.S. official described the goal of talks as a “surrender mechanism.” Even before the signing of the September 19, 2005 nuclear disarmament agreement, the U.S. had already decided “to move toward more confrontational measures,” claimed a former Bush Administration official. 24 Daedong Credit Bank, a majority foreign-owned joint venture bank operating in Pyongyang and primarily serving importers, was immediately affected by the U.S. action, as it had several million dollars in Banco Delta Asia. As general manager of Daedong Credit Bank, Nigel Cowie was in a position to witness the effect of the Treasury Department’s letters. “We have heard from foreign customers conducting legitimate business here, who have been told by their bankers overseas to stop receiving remittances from the DPRK, otherwise their accounts will be closed.” To illustrate the lengths to which U.S. officials were prepared to go, Cowie described an operation that involved his own firm, from which, he said, “you can draw your own conclusions.” An account was opened with a Mongolian bank. Arrangements were made for legal cash transactions. But when the Daedong Credit Bank’s couriers arrived in Mongolia, they were detained by Mongolian intelligence officials, and their money confiscated. Accusations were made that the couriers were transporting counterfeit currency from North Korea. A leak to the news media from an unidentified source led to reports charging that “North Korean diplomats” had been arrested for smuggling counterfeit currency. After two weeks, the Mongolian “intelligence officials in a meeting with us finally conceded that all the notes were genuine; the cash was released.” In the final meeting, Mongolian intelligence officials “appeared rather embarrassed that they had been given incorrect information.” It was the U.S. that had provided that information and set in motion what was in effect harassment by proxy. 25 U.S. actions had widespread repercussions. “For our part,” Cowie explains, “we are only conducting legitimate business, but have nonetheless been seriously affected by these measures. A large amount of our and our customers’ money ­ not just in USD, but in all currencies ­ has effectively been seized, with no indication of when they’ll give it back to us.” The fate of Banco Delta Asia served as an object lesson, as did the freezing of Daedong Credit Bank’s $7 million deposits at Banco Delta Asia. “Banks with any kind of U.S. ties are just terrified to have anything to do with any North Korean bank,” Cowie said. After the majority interest in Daedong Credit Bank was purchased by British-owned Koryo Bank, the new owner, Colin McAskill, asked U.S. officials to examine the bank’s records in order to prove that its funds were legitimate and should be unfrozen. “They’ve had it much too much their own way without anyone questioning what they are putting out,” he said. 26 Warning letters to banks were often followed by personal visits from U.S. officials. Bankers and American officials said that the messages contained a mix of implicit threats and explicit actions. Unsurprisingly, it was not long before nearly all of North Korea’s accounts in foreign banks were closed. The DPRK’s international trade was being choked. Quite often, no pretense was even being made that the actions were related to illegal transactions. U.S. officials were openly pressing financial institutions to sever all economic relations with the DPRK. “The U.S. government is urging financial institutions around the world to think carefully about the risks of doing any North Korea-related business,” Levey said. By September 2006, the U.S. had sent official dispatches to each UN member state, detailing plans for harsher economic sanctions. The planned measures were so strong that several European nations expressed concern, and it was said that the plans aimed at nothing less than a total blockade on all North Korean trade and financial transactions. 27 Selig Harrison, director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, visited the DPRK and reported on what he saw. “I found instances in North Korea authenticated by foreign businessmen and foreign embassies in which legitimate imports of industrial equipment for light industries making consumer goods have been blocked. The North Koreans understandably see this as a regime change policy designed to bring about the collapse of their regime through economic pressure.” 28 The U.S. also imposed sanctions on several North Korean import-export firms, on the unsubstantiated charge that they were involved in the arms trade. Yet more sanctions were then announced, this time against several Indian and Russian firms doing business with the DPRK, along with several North Korean companies. 29 Russian Ambassador to South Korea Gleb Ivashentsov called for the U.S. to offer proof to back its accusation of counterfeiting. “The side that raises the suspicions should present evidence,” he said. “Russia has not received any concrete evidence. There is rumor-level talk on the issue.” 30 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao was equally skeptical, saying that his nation knew nothing of North Korean counterfeit currency flowing into China. 31 On December 16, 2005, U.S. officials finally briefed a number of nations on the evidence against North Korea. But South Korean officials noted afterwards that all they heard was a lot of circumstantial evidence but no concrete information. 32 At the request of the Bush Administration, a conference was organized by Interpol and held in Lyon, France, in July 2006. There the U.S. Secret Service presented its case to more than sixty international bankers, police officials, and banknote producers. No evidence was offered on that occasion either, and the attitude was that the audience should accept the Secret Service’s assertions on faith alone. “I can’t remember if I was laughing or asleep,” remarked one attendee afterwards. 33 A survey of the participants taken at the end of the conference showed that not one person had been fully convinced of the U.S. position. 34 U.S. Treasury officials also met with a North Korean delegation in New York in March 2006, but provided no information to back the charge. DPRK delegation head Ri Gun remarked afterwards, “There was no evidence. There were neither comments nor discussion” relating to evidence. During the meeting, Ri Gun proposed creating a joint U.S.-DPRK consultative body to “exchange information on financial crimes and prepare countermeasures.” The North Koreans said they would respond to evidence of counterfeiting and arrest those who were involved and seize the equipment. “Both sides can have a dialogue at the consultative body through which they can build trust. It would have a very positive impact on addressing the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula,” Ri said. The delegation also suggested that a North Korean settlement account be opened at a U.S. financial institution and placed under U.S. supervision, so as to allay suspicions. The North Korean offers were ignored. 35 In a conciliatory move, the DPRK enacted a law nearly a year later that banned transactions based on illegal activities, including counterfeiting. 36 It took a year and a half, but when the U.S. Treasury Department completed its investigation into the matter, it decided to finalize the rule prohibiting U.S. financial institutions from dealing with Banco Delta Asia. The Department determined that not only were its earlier allegations accurate, but that the bank had also engaged in “additional illicit financial conduct.” 37 Stanley Au, the founder of Banco Delta Asia, responded that his bank did not knowingly do wrong. “We have sent evidence to prove our innocence to the U.S. government several times.” 38 Au charged that the Treasury Department had acted unfairly in punishing his bank without offering any evidence. 39 Because the bank was a small family-owned firm, it lacked the most recent advanced technology for screening cash for counterfeits. Therefore, as a matter of routine the bank sent all large deposits to HSBC in New York to be analyzed before the amounts would be credited to accounts. 40 In the aftermath of the Treasury Department’s initial accusations, the Macao government hired the accounting firm Ernst & Young to investigate operations at Banco Delta Asia. In its final report, Ernst & Young indicated that there was room for improvement in some procedures. But “the procedures in place at the Bank for handling large value (wholesale) deposits of U.S. currency notes ensured that, to a material degree, the Bank did not introduce counterfeit U.S. currency notes into circulation over the relevant period.” For smaller deposits, the accounting firm found that Banco Delta Asia was using a counterfeit banknote scanning machine, as well as doing manual checking. “To this end the Bank passed most U.S. currency notes to HSBC for validation. NK entities were not given value for their deposits of currency until after HSBC had confirmed the deposit to be genuine.” Ernst & Young found that in relation to the total value of U.S. currency sent to HSBC for checking, “the value of counterfeit notes detected was minor. Once detected the counterfeit notes were withdrawn from circulation.” 41 It appears that the Treasury Department’s charges against Banco Delta Asia were motivated strictly by political considerations. Certainly the charges were found to have had no connection to reality. No doubt this is why U.S. officials failed to furnish any evidence to back their accusations. Banco Delta Asia was chosen to serve as an example to other financial institutions dealing with the DPRK. As former State Department official David Asher put it, “We decided to kill the chicken to scare the monkey.” 42 By targeting one of North Korea’s primary external financial partners, the Bush Administration had succeeded in shutting off much of that nation’s foreign trade. That the charge lacked substance was of no import. It had served the purpose of furthering political aims, as had the Bush Administration’s earlier claims about Iraqi chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs. In both cases, media saturation ensured that the lies would be firmly implanted as truth in the minds of the American public. The freezing of North Korea’s funds at Banco Delta Asia violated the recently signed nuclear disarmament agreement and halted its implementation. North Korea justifiably insisted that its funds be released before it would proceed with its obligations under the agreement. In time, the issue became enough of a political embarrassment that the Bush Administration was compelled to relent. North Korea got its money back, believing that this would enable it to regain its limited toehold in the international financial system. But the damage was done. Banco Delta Asia remained blacklisted and most banks continued to be wary of doing business with the DPRK, not wanting to risk U.S. retribution. The Banco Delta Asia story was a fabrication. But what about the main charge — that North Korea is producing supernotes? It is true that on occasion North Korean officials have passed supernotes while abroad. But then so have citizens from dozens of other countries. Indeed, U.S. Secret Service investigations have involved more than 130 countries. 43 It should be noted that much of North Korea’s trade is conducted on a cash basis. The U.S. designation of the DPRK as a “terrorist nation” mandates its exclusion from contact with the U.S. financial system, and for the most part the international system follows suit. Only a handful of banks such as Banco Delta Asia have been willing to do business with North Korea. Nigel Cowie, general manager of Daedong Bank, points out that North Korea’s currency is not convertible, “so imported goods are bought and sold for hard currency.” One of the reasons Cowie gives for North Korea’s reliance on cash transactions is “the absence of the normal system of reciprocal correspondent bank accounts that exists in other countries which enables transactions to be settled by electronic book entry.” The bottom line “is that people tend to transact largely in cash, which in itself is not illegal – in this market, it is in fact often the only way.” 44 That very reliance on cash transactions ensures that supernotes inevitably make their way into the local economy. For someone looking to unload a quantity of supernotes, where better to move them than by trading with North Korea? With a population reluctant to deposit money in bank accounts and with banks lacking the kind of counterfeit detection equipment that would flag a supernote as fake, North Korea makes an inviting target. And sooner or later, those same supernotes are going to find their way outside of the North Korean economy. This does not necessarily mean that North Koreans passing the notes would be aware of it, although it is possible that there may be some corrupt individuals in North Korea who are knowingly involved in the trade. There is much that is odd about supernotes. Banknote specialist Klaus W. Bender points out that experts regard the print quality as “simply superb.” In some ways, Bender continues, “the supernotes are even better than the authentic 100-dollar bills of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. Under the microscope, for example, the supernote shows an especially fine execution of lines on the facing side, which cannot be found on the real note. The complicated seal of the Department of the Treasury on the facing side is copied with absolute perfection, but just below it, one finds in the banknote numbering a marking compound that should not be there. And then, missing from this excellently copied supernote, of all things, are the magnetic and infrared security features that would prevent banknote examining systems from bouncing it. Every surveillance device of an American bank or the Fed recognizes the supernote immediately as a counterfeit and spits it out. Do the counterfeiters perhaps intend that the supernote be recognized immediately in the United States?” 45 A report issued by the Swiss police concurs that the makers of the supernote seem to have deliberately introduced subtle errors into the process. Extra strokes have been added. When placed under ultraviolet or infrared light, stripes can be seen or numbers vanish on supernotes. 46 The most perplexing aspect of supernote production is their low quantity. By 2006, the Secret Service had seized $50 million in supernotes, an average of just $2.8 million per year since the first one was discovered. And since supernotes are usually detected the moment they enter the international banking system, the total quantity produced is probably not significantly higher. Supernotes make up a small percentage of the total counterfeit dollars in circulation. “To provide a point of reference,” said Michael Merritt of the U.S. Secret Service, “during fiscal year 2005, the Secret Service seized over $113 million in counterfeit U.S. currency.” Not only is the amount of supernotes small relative to less sophisticated counterfeits, but it is insignificant compared to the $760 billion in genuine U.S. currency in circulation. 47 The Swiss police observe, “What defies logic is the limited, or even controlled, amount of ‘exclusive’ fakes that have appeared over the years. The organization could easily circulate tenfold that amount without raising suspicions.” Yet a printing press “like the one in North Korea can produce $50 million worth of bills in a few hours.” 48 During the 1970s, Giori replaced its standard model printers in a phased approach with its new “Super” series. The standard model was capable of printing three thousand sheets per hour. Each sheet held 32 notes. If North Korea purchased one of the older standard models, it would have taken just over five hours to produce $50 million. And $2.8 million a year would have required running the press for less than half an hour. Production would be done for the year. The newer Orlof press can spew out 12,000 sheets per hour, each sheet containing sixty notes. Only two and a half minutes would be needed to generate $2.8 million in notes. 49 Clearly, supernotes are being produced for a very specific purpose. Also difficult to explain is the speed with which supernotes have kept pace with the numerous modifications made to U.S. engraving plates since 1989. This in itself is a prohibitively expensive process. German banknote specialist Klaus W. Bender remarks, “The counterfeiters immediately implemented each and every change to the 100-dollar bill. The pace at which they put out their revised fake notes made observers even wonder whether they had access to information concerning to the speed with which the Fed replaced its old notes.” 50 The microprint in U.S. currency sometimes measures only 1/42,000 of an inch. “This microprint is considered unique in the world of banknotes. It was reproduced so perfectly by the counterfeiters that even under a microscope no difference is distinguishable. The gravure of an intaglio printing plate requires many months of hard work and eats up many tens of thousands of dollars per plate. For security reasons, the craft is always taught in-house only. So where do the counterfeiters get this specialized knowledge?” 51 Just who is producing supernotes? Initially, the U.S. accused Iran and Syria, even though the latter country did not have a banknote press of its own. Then North Korea was identified as the culprit. While it cannot be ruled out that North Korea is producing supernotes, that prospect raises the question of motive. By the reckoning of the U.S. Secret Service, supernotes pose a low threat, given the small amounts in circulation and the preponderant distribution outside of U.S. borders. Furthermore, supernotes are identified the moment they hit the U.S. banking system, which would seem to rule out the motivation of “economic warfare” that has been attributed to North Korea. Nor does the production of supernotes make sense as a profit-making venture. A single new Giori printing machine now costs more than the $50 million in supernotes found so far. To give some idea of the expense, when Nigeria opened its second printing plant in Abuja, it cost more than $135 million, and that does not take into account property costs. 52 A plant to produce the type of paper used in supernotes is similarly expensive and large quantities of the proper type of paper would have to be manufactured to avoid ongoing financial loss. OVI ink is also quite expensive, even more so since most of the ink is lost when the printing plates are wiped clean just before pressing the paper. Factor in the cost of keeping up with multiple changes to the engravings, and no sane individual would undertake such a daunting operation to produce limited quantities with an eye to making a profit. U.S. officials like to point out that they have seen no evidence that any nation other than North Korea is producing supernotes. True enough, but neither is there any evidence that North Korea is doing so. By all accounts, such an operation would require the resources of a government or governmental organization. Klaus W. Bender suggests one intriguing possibility. “One notices that the supernotes always turn up in small, well-measured quantities, as though their volume were controlled.” This is not how normal counterfeiters behave. “They want to unload their hot goods as quickly as possible. Further, experts believe they have determined that the supernotes regularly crop up in those regions in which U.S. foreign policy is just encountering problems: the Near and Middle East, central African countries, and especially East Africa. Active in these places are opposition politicians, rebelling tribes, and private armies of diverse warlords doing the bidding of the CIA. Could it be that they are being paid for their services in counterfeit dollar notes?” Bender posits that such groups might use the money to purchase arms abroad, including from North Korea, and that from North Korea the money would make its way back to Western nations. “It is not clear how much the U.S. Secret Service knows itself, or is allowed to know.” The CIA is said to have a printing plant located north of Washington, DC, in which the same Giori printing presses are installed that are used in the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. 53 It has also been suggested that limited quantities of counterfeit notes are being introduced into the market in such a way as to assist law enforcement agencies in tracking the movement of funds among criminal and terrorist organizations. 54 Everything is speculation at this point in time, but of all the various scenarios that have been suggested, it is this last one that is the most plausible. It is the only one where all of the pieces fit together into a coherent whole. The U.S. still insists that it has solid evidence against North Korea, even though it won’t reveal it. But U.S. officials also claimed to have proof that Banco Delta Asia was culpable in aiding North Korea in distributing supernotes. Given the Bush Administration’s proclivity for mendacity, some measure of skepticism would seem to be called for. When looking at the facts alone, the only thing that can be said with certainty is that the source of supernotes has yet to be determined. As with all stories that the public is asked to accept on blind faith, the topic should be examined with critical thinking. At a minimum, the expectation of evidence should be the norm when unsubstantiated stories with a political point are told. Too often, credulity and misplaced trust in Western leaders have led to tragic consequences. Gregory Elich is on the Board of Directors of the Jasenovac Research Institute and on the Advisory Board of the Korea Truth Commission. He is the author of the book Strange Liberators: Militarism, Mayhem, and the Pursuit of Profit. [1] Stephen Mihm, “No Ordinary Counterfeit,” New York Times, July 23, 2006. [2] Stephen Mihm, “No Ordinary Counterfeit,” New York Times, July 23, 2006. [3] Klaus W. Bender, Moneymakers: The Secret World of Banknote Printing , p. 71, Wiley, Weinheim, 2006.    Klaus W. Bender, “The Mystery of the Supernotes,” Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und  Sicherheitspolitik (Dusseldorf), January 11, 2007. [4] Klaus W. Bender, “The Mystery of the Supernotes,” Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (Dusseldorf), January 11, 2007 [5] Klaus W. Bender, Moneymakers: The Secret World of Banknote Printing , p. 109, Wiley, Weinheim, 2006. [6] Kevin G. Hall , “Fake $100 ‘Supernotes’ Have Features Just Like the Real Ones,” McClatchy Newspapers, January 9, 2008. [7] Klaus W. Bender, “The Mystery of the Supernotes,” Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (Dusseldorf), January 11, 2007   Kevin G. Hall, “Fake $100 ‘Supernotes’ Have Features Just Like the Real Ones,” McClatchy Newspapers, January 9, 2008. [8] Klaus W. Bender, “The Mystery of the Supernotes,” Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (Dusseldorf), January 11, 2007 [9] Klaus W. Bender, Moneymakers: The Secret World of Banknote Printing , pp. 91-93, Wiley, Weinheim, 2006 [10] Stephen Mihm, “No Ordinary Counterfeit,” New York Times, July 23, 2006. [11] Klaus W. Bender, “The Mystery of the Supernotes,” Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (Dusseldorf), January 11, 2007 [12] Kevin G. Hall, “Fake $100 ‘Supernotes’ Have Features Just Like the Real Ones,” McClatchy Newspapers, January 9, 2008. [13] Stephen Mihm, “No Ordinary Counterfeit,” New York Times, July 23, 2006. [14] “What is a Superdollar?”, BBC News, June 19, 2004. [15] Stephen Mihm, “No Ordinary Counterfeit,” New York Times, July 23, 2006. [16] Tim Johnson, “Defectors Offer Stories of Fake U.S. Bills, But They Don’t Check Out,” McClatchy Newspapers, January 10, 2008. [17] United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Indictment, “United States of America v. Sean Garland, also known as ‘the Man with the Hat’, Christopher John Corcoran, also known as ‘Christie’, David Levin, also known as David Batikovich Baitikian, also known as Gediminas Gotautas, also known as ‘Russian Dave’, also known as ‘Doctor’, Terence Silcock, also known as ‘Terry’, Hugh Todd, also known as F.B. Rawing, also known as Peter Keith Clark, Alan Jones, and Mark Adderley, Defendants, September 30, 2004. [18] Sean Garland, Letter to the Irish Times, November 17, 2005. [19] Sean Garland, Letter to the Irish Times, October 17, 2005. [20] U.S. State Department, press release, “U.S. Cites Banco Delta Asia for Money Laundering, Other Crimes,” September 15, 2005. [21] Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Advisory, “Guidance to Financial Institutions on the Provision of Banking Services to North Korean Government Agencies and Associated Front Companies Engaged in Illicit Activities,” December 13, 2005. [22] Letter by James T. Barnette of Collier Shannon Scott, LLC, to William J. Fox, Director of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, October 17, 2005. [23] Jay Solomon, “How U.S. Used Finance to Pressure North Korea,” Wall Street Journal Asia, April 12, 2007. [24] Christian Caryl, “Pocketbook Policing,” Newsweek, April 10-17, 2006.     Joel Brinkley, “U.S. Squeezes North Korea’s Money Flow,” New York Times, March 10, 2006. [25] Nigel Cowie, “US Financial Allegations: What they Mean,” Nautilus Institute, May 4, 2006.     Jay Solomon, “How U.S. Used Finance to Pressure North Korea,” Wall Street Journal Asia, April 12, 2007. [26] Nigel Cowie, “US Financial Allegations: What they Mean,” Nautilus Institute, May 4, 2006.     “North Korea’s Nuclear Push May be Stymied by U.S. Banking Rules,” Bloomberg, March 7, 2006.     Anna Fifield, “Bankers Challenge US Sanctions on North Korea,” Financial Times (London), September 5, 2006. [27] Steven R. Wiseman, “U.S. Pursues Tactic of Financial Isolation,” New York Times, October 16, 2006.     “North Korean Regime Feeling Pinch from Sanctions: U.S.,” Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), April 3, 2006.     “North Funds Lose Havens in Sanctions,” JoongAng Ilbo (Seoul), August 24, 2006.     “US Targets Business with North Korea,” Associated Press, September 9, 2006.     “US Reportedly Asks for Cooperation with Sanctions on DPRK from UN Member States,” Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), September 13, 2006. [28] Selig S. Harrison, “N.K. Nuclear Test Depends on U.S.,” Hankyoreh (Seoul), October 2, 2006. [29] Jeannine Aversa, “White House Targets N. Korean Companies,” Associated Press, October 21, 2005.     “US Slaps Sanctions on N.Korea, Russian Firms,” Reuters, August 4, 2006.     “U.S. Slaps Sanctions on Two N.Korean Firms,” Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), August 7, 2006. [30] Lee Chi-dong , “Russia Urges U.S. to Present Evidence of N. Korean Counterfeiting,” Yonhap (Seoul), March 7, 2006. [31] “China Unaware of Counterfeit Dollars Linked to North Korea – Spokesman Cited,” Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), October 26, 2006. [32] Kwon Tae-yol, “ROK ‘Does Not Agree 100 Percent’,” Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), December 20, 2005. [33] Kevin G. Hall, “U.S. Counterfeiting Charges Against N. Korea Based on Shaky Evidence,” McClatchy Newspapers, January 10, 2008. [34] Klaus W. Bender, “The Mystery of the Supernotes,” Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (Dusseldorf), January 11, 2007 [35] “No Evidence on Counterfeiting, Says North Korean Diplomat,” Agence France-Presse, March 9, 2006.     “North Korea Urges US to Accept Proposal to Settle ‘Counterfeit Notes’ Issue,” KCNA (Pyonyang), March 28, 2006. [36] “ROK Intelligence Agency Says DPRK Enacts Anti-Money Laundering Law,” Agence France-Presse, February 20, 2007. [37] U.S. Department of Treasury, Prepared Remarks of Stuart Levey, “U.S. Treasury Finalizes Rule Against Banco Delta Asia,” March 14, 2007. [38] Ser Myo-ja, “Not Guilty Says Macau Bank Chief,” JoongAng Ilbo (Seoul), March 17, 2007. [39] “Macao Bank Says Scapegoated by U.S. over N. Korea Links,” Japan Economic Newswire, May 9, 2007. [40] William Foreman, “Macau Bank Says HSBC Helped it Authenticate U.S. Dollar Deposits by North Korea,” Associated Press, February 2, 2007. [41] Ernst & Young, “Banco Delta Asia S.A.R.L. Report to the Administrative Committee,” December 16, 2005. [42] Jay Solomon, “How U.S. Used Finance to Pressure North Korea,” Wall Street Journal Asia, April 12, 2007. [43] Statement of Michael Merritt, Deputy Assistance Director, Office of Investigations United States Secret Service, before the Committee on Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Governmental Information, and International Security, “How North Korea Funds its Regime,” April 25, 2006. [44] Interview with Nigel Cowie, “Foreign Bank Feeling the Pinch in Pyongyang,” Korea Herald (Seoul), March 29, 2006. [45] Klaus W. Bender, Moneymakers: The Secret World of Banknote Printing , p. 263, Wiley, Weinheim, 2006 [46] Kevin G. Hall, “Swiss Authorities Question U.S. Counterfeiting Charges Against North Korea,” McClatchy Newspapers, May 22, 2007.     Kevin G. Hall, “Fake $100 Bills Have Features Just like the Real Ones,” McClatchy Newspapers, January 10, 2008. [47] Statement of Michael Merritt, Deputy Assistance Director, Office of Investigations United States Secret Service, before the Committee on Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Governmental Information, and International Security, “How North Korea Funds its Regime,” April 25, 2006.     Jaroslav Anders, “Counterfeiting Threat to U.S. Currency Low, Report Says,” State Department Documents and Publications, November 28, 2006. [48] Kevin G. Hall, “Swiss Authorities Question U.S. Counterfeiting Charges Against North Korea,” McClatchy Newspapers, May 22, 2007. [49] Klaus W. Bender, Moneymakers: The Secret World of Banknote Printing , p. 62, Wiley, Weinheim, 2006 [50] Kevin G. Hall, “Fake $100 ‘Supernotes’ Have Features Just Like the Real Ones,” McClatchy Newspapers, January 9, 2008.   Klaus W. Bender, “The Mystery of the Supernotes,” Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (Dusseldorf), January 11, 2007 [51] Klaus W. Bender, “The Mystery of the Supernotes,” Düsseldorfer Institut für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (Dusseldorf), January 11, 2007 [52] Klaus W. Bender, Moneymakers: The Secret World of Banknote Printing , p. 80, Wiley, Weinheim, 2006 [53] Klaus W. Bender, Moneymakers: The Secret World of Banknote Printing , p. 264, Wiley, Weinheim, 2006 [54] Kevin G. Hall, “U.S. Counterfeiting Charges Against N. Korea Based on Shaky Evidence,” McClatchy Newspapers, January 10, 2008.   Gregory Elich is a Korea Policy Institute board member. He is a contributor to the collection, Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy (Haymarket Books, 2023). His website is  https://gregoryelich.org    Follow him on Twitter at @GregoryElich .

By Myoung-in Kim | January 22, 2025 | Originally published in Hankyoreh Korea needs to start again from the fundamental principles of liberty, equality and solidarity to build a true democratic, constitutional republic The insurrection that was started on Dec. 3 is still ongoing. This insurrection needs to be swiftly put to an end, but in order to do that, we need to consider the qualities of an insurrection and what it means to quell it.  Legally, the recent incident bears similarities to Chun Doo-hwan’s coup in December 1979. Politically, however, it is closer to Park Geun-hye’s 2017 influence-peddling scandal. The former incident resulted in over seven years of Chun ruling with an iron fist, which was met with desperate civic resistance. In the latter incident, people employed the legal counteroffensive of impeachment to dismantle bygone authority, which makes it more similar to Dec. 3.  Therefore, considerations of how to bring an end to the insurrection and what happens after are inseparable from a proper retrospection on the implementation of Korean democracy following Park’s 2017 impeachment and the inauguration of the Moon Jae-in administration.  In today’s era of neoliberal hegemony, the economic realm, which comprises capital and labor and the distribution of products, has become the inviolable territory of the market; and even social-cultural fields and ideological realms are managed under the premise of market absolutism. What’s known as politics has been reduced to nothing more than a service sector to preserve and manage the structuralized neoliberal system. In this state, the ideological inclination of the ruling faction is nothing more than a meaningless color choice.  From the stance of the neoliberal ruling class that serves financial capital, a right-wing government allows them to openly and easily maintain their privilege. With a moderate or left-wing government, the only difference is that they are slightly inconvenienced and have to pretend to compromise. The “people’s government” era of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun is the period during which neoliberalism took root in Korean society, while the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations were determined to be robber barons and flimsy administrations. The Moon Jae-in administration presented a facade of being a democratic administration that actually didn’t accomplish anything. This perspective makes things a little clearer.   The Yoon Suk-yeol administration could be viewed as the most corrupt version of the backward, right-wing, robber-baron governments of the neoliberal era. The right-wing establishment that had its heyday during the Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations was momentarily obstructed from exercising its privilege during the Moon Jae-in administration that followed Park’s impeachment.  To chase away unpleasant memories of having to involuntarily rearrange their power structure during this era of obstruction, they threw in their lot with Yoon, who emerged as a candidate solely as an opposing figure against the Moon administration. He was an unvetted prospect hailing from a special class of prosecutors. By choosing Yoon as their representative, they unexpectedly succeeded in reclaiming power, as if they’d won the lotto. The problem was, setting aside his lack of political experience, Yoon was totally unqualified to lead the country as its president.  Lee Myung-bak was a con artist, but thanks to his years of experience in the business and financial world, he at least knew how to keep up appearances. While Park really achieved nothing aside from becoming president, as the daughter of a dictator and the country’s first female president, she at least maintained a class of presidential dignity. It’s clear that Yoon, however, is increasingly becoming an insufferable figure. In the end, he floundered by declaring martial law out of the blue.  While we cannot confirm that Yoon acted according to the orders of first lady Kim Keon-hee, who some say has been the de facto president, the martial law declaration was undeniably an act of anachronistic greed and an attempt to privatize the presidency for an indefinite period of time. Whatever the case, what happened, happened. South Korea, which had been lauded as an advanced nation, became a backward country where a president could pull a self-coup overnight. The one silver lining, however, is that Yoon’s act of rash self-destruction has provided an opportunity for us to quickly address the stagnation that has steadily aggregated in Korean society.  For starters, the current insurrection situation needs to be settled as quickly as possible in a legal and constitutional way. The first step in this process is to continue the process of removing the insurrection ringleader, Yoon, that was begun by the impeachment motion. This includes his criminal investigation and trial, which should conclude in the maximum sentence allowed by law.  We also need to aggressively push for the dissolution of the People Power Party, the party of far-right vested interests, that is ruled by a number of collaborators who took part in the insurrection. We then must elect a new president and form a new democratic government.  From its general election victory to its swift suppression of the insurrection, the Democratic Party, the main opposition, has been partially exempted from taking accountability for the failures of the Moon administration. Considering the current political landscape, the Democratic Party seems to be the most probable candidate to become the ruling party. This would complete the political process of quelling the insurrection.  Yet it would be naive to conclude that Korean democracy would be restored at that point. Strictly speaking, it would be a return to ground zero in Korean democracy. The potential of establishing a constitutional republic that arose in 1987 has been suffocated over the past 30 years by a two-party system. In reality, our democracy has been reduced to ruins. From ground zero, we need to start again from the fundamental principles of liberty, equality and solidarity to build a true democratic, constitutional republic. This journey needs to be led by a new order, not the old one.   While they made an appearance during the 2016 protests at Gwanghwamun, the youth and women voters had failed to surmount the fences of their identity up until that point. This time, they emerged as an overwhelming collective in the Yeouido protests. The sense of crisis that they might lose democracy, which they’d been enjoying as carefreely as if it were the air they breathe, brought them out from the shadows.  Moreover, in the great fight for democracy, they acted with surprising aggressiveness, eagerly siding not only with older generations but with the farmers in Namtaeryeong and the disabled in Anguk. They have started becoming allies to all minorities fighting for their rights. They appeared to have been stuck in identity politics, but they broke free of that and stood on the front lines to stop the insurrection, going even further to exhibit marvelous acts of solidarity. It is moving to see among them the potential to defeat neoliberal hegemony and to build a new democratic republic.  These people did not march out into the freezing cold to get rid of one foolish president. They did not take time out of their studies or work to simply take part in the “public square spectacle.” They are no longer “admirable young people.” They are the ones who need to emerge as the political agents in order to create hope in Korean society, which has been bruised by inequality and discrimination and exclusion and hatred, a society that stands helpless amid the imminent climate crisis. It is only when their dreams of entering “into a new world”— that is, a new democratic republic — are realized that the insurrection will finally be over. Myoung-in Kim is a literary critic and professor emeritus of Inha University.

By Simone Chun | January 6, 2025 | Originally published in Counterpunch Yoon declaring martial law. For more than 44 hours Koreans have braved freezing snowstorms to demand the arrest of the elusive Yoon Suk Yeol, who has barricaded himself inside his official residence in defiance of constitutional and legal authority.  Yoon, extolled by Washington as a “champion of democracy,” has vanished from public view behind hastily erected barricades manned by security and military personnel while ignoring repeated summons from both the anti-corruption and prosecution services. Capping a monthlong standoff with the National Assembly, and the Korean public over his brazen attempted coup , Washington’s “ perfect partner ” has spent the past week deploying the armed military and security services at his disposal to physically prevent police from serving him with an arrest warrant for insurrectionism and abuse of authority. Investigators from the Corruption Investigation Office attempting to execute the warrant–the first against a sitting president–were forced to withdraw from the presidential compound after a five-hour standoff with the over 200 armed men deployed by Yoon. This unprecedented drama began unfolding on the night of December 3, 2024. Amid 250+ days of intentionally destabilizing US-led war games and months of massive citizen protests demanding his resignation, the deeply unpopular president put his nation under martial law for the first time since 1979, dispatching armed troops with the orders to “shoot to kill” if necessary to surround the National Assembly and prevent lawmakers from convening to rescind the order. By the following night, some 2 million Koreans bearing light sticks, candles, and beacons formed a luminous sea around the National Assembly to demand the impeachment of Yoon Suk-yeol, while lawmakers clambered over fences and security barriers to gain access to the chambers. With a vote of 204 to 85, which included 12 lawmakers from the ruling People’s Power Party (PPP), the National Assembly impeached Yoon, with Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung declaring , “the people have proved that they are the owners of this country.” While the Constitutional Court has 180 days to render a judgment on whether the impeachment motion is constitutional, Yoon’s rogue insurrectionism and contemptuous defiance of the rule of law is continuing, escalating tensions and instability. Yoon’s motivation for his failed insurrection lies in the ongoing crisis of legitimacy facing his puppet government, which has eagerly acquiesced to every demand made by its American and Japanese “allies” while making a hollow mockery of Korean self-determination and ignoring the interests of the nation he swore to defend. Since assuming power in 2022 after winning the presidency by a razor-thin margin of 0.7%, Yoon has actively worked to undermine the very basis of Korean independence and democracy back to its roots during the brutal period of Japanese colonization in WWII. Moreover, Washington’s unquenchable geopolitical ambitions , couched behind its so-called “ ironclad commitment to Korea,” mandates the continuation of its policy of preferring right-wing governments at the expense of Korea’s sovereignty. This has overtly empowered and legitimized Yoon’s autocratic pursuit of power against the interests of the Korean people. Thus, Yoon–who represented his country by sycophantically singing “American Pie” during a state dinner at the White House–has dutifully promoted the US-led trilateral “ Axis of War ”, facilitating non-stop US-led wargames, and escalating tensions with Pyongyang while persecuting his domestic critics as “communists” and “anti-state forces.” His ongoing rogue behavior of defiance of the rule of law is directly related to the strong support he has received from Washington as “Biden’s man” in Seoul. With the President suspended from power, what’s next for Korea’s “Revolution of Lights”?  How can the world support Korea’s quest for democracy, peace, and true sovereignty? Demand accountability for Yoon’s legacy of authoritarianism, his continuing assault on democracy and the rule of law, and his betrayal of Korean sovereignty in service of Washington’s geopolitical ambitions. Call for a final end to Washington’s shameful history of subverting South Korean politics by abetting dangerous far-right forces that take Korea’s democracy and sovereignty hostage. Simone Chun is a researcher and activist focusing on inter-Korean relations and U.S. foreign policy in the Korean Peninsula. She currently serves on the Korea Policy Institute Board of Directors and the advisory board for CODEPINK. She has over 20 years of teaching and research experience in the United States and has been a central contributor to the creation of a number of interdisciplinary Asian and Korean Studies degree programs. She has served as an assistant professor at Suffolk University, an associate-in-research at Harvard University’s Korea Institute, and a lecturer at Northeastern University. Follow her on Twitter at @simonechun .

By Gregory Elich | January 3, 2025 | Originally published in Counterpunch Photograph Source: 대한민국 국회 – KOGL Type 1 Since South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s failed attempt to impose martial law on December 3, a steady stream of revelations has emerged from reporters and investigators, painting an increasingly disturbing picture of events. Plans drawn up by Yoon’s co-conspirators included a shocking level of brutality and the promise of repression on a mass scale. His administration even made efforts to provoke a conflict with North Korea to bolster the case for martial rule. Although many Western reports framed the end of martial law as a triumph of democracy, South Korea is not out of danger yet. The extreme right actively opposes Yoon’s impeachment, and it remains to be seen if the Constitutional Court will confirm Yoon’s impeachment. Background to Martial Law Although the martial law declaration shocked many, signs of Yoon’s authoritarian nature were apparent long before. There was his propensity for making blanket condemnations of critics as “anti-state forces,” in essence conflating opposition to his right-wing policies with treason. That attitude was often openly expressed, as in a speech Yoon delivered on National Liberation Day in 2023, branding the liberal and progressive opposition as “anti-state forces that blindly follow communist totalitarianism, distort public opinion, and disrupt the society through manipulative propaganda.” In Yoon’s Manichean viewpoint, pitted against his far-right policies was a sizeable segment of Korean society that lacked legitimacy. “The forces of communist totalitarianism,” he continued in delusional mode, “have always disguised themselves as democracy activists, human rights advocates, or progressive activists while engaging in despicable and unethical tactics and false propaganda. We must never succumb to the forces of communist totalitarianism.” Yoon’s repressive tendencies often came to the fore more directly. Such was the case on May 31, 2023, when police attacked a union rally and then searched a construction union headquarters several days later, seizing electronic equipment and documents. In another example, a year ago, National Intelligence Service (NIS) agents, backed by more than a thousand riot police, raided the headquarters of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) and fourteen other union offices and residences. Based on the trumped-up charge that union officials were taking orders from North Korea, the raid netted three unionists who were arrested and later convicted to multi-year prison sentences. It is worth recalling that the NIS has a history of fabricating evidence against activists, most famously in its manufactured ‘evidence’ that led to the forcible dissolution of the Unified Progressive Party ten years ago. Political organizations also experienced repression, and last August, police raided the office of the People’s Democratic Party and its members’ residences, and two leaders of Korea Solidarity were sentenced to prison terms for violating the National Security Act, which has often been used as a weapon over the years to smother dissent. Yoon has faced rising labor unrest in response to his anti-labor policies. His response has been to implement a repressive policy against the union movement, characterized by a pattern of harassment . One of Yoon’s primary motivations for a military takeover was to deal a fatal blow to the union movement. He often ranted about the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, a particularly passionate object of his hatred. At Yoon’s residence in August, he discussed adopting emergency measures and specified what that meant for the KCTU: “We have to take action against these people.” Yoon obsessed over the April 10 legislative election in South Korea, which handed a landslide victory to the opposition, widely seen as a rebuke to him personally and his policies. Social media was flooded with inaccurate claims of electoral fraud by his supporters. No doubt, Yoon found such claims a more acceptable explanation of electoral disaster than to look within himself as the cause. Yoon began to cultivate relationships with far-right YouTubers who fed his delusion, firing his resentment and anger, and the subject formed another main factor motivating his plan for a military takeover. Planning for Military Dictatorship Martial law had a long gestation, the origin of which predated the April 10 election. Yoon drove the process at every step, with the earliest documented case of its expression in December 2023, when he remarked to military officials, “The only way to solve difficult social problems is through emergency measures.” Serious planning got underway in five-party meetings led by Yoon that took place between June and November and which were attended by his key co-conspirators. Representing the military were General Lee Jin-woo, commander of the Capital Defense Command, and Special Warfare Commander Kwak Jong-geun. Others included Kim Yong-hyun, who held the position of chief of the Presidential Security Service at the time of the initial meeting and later on became defense minister. The final member of the team was Yeo In-hyung, chief of the Defense Intelligence Command. Yoon met with Yeo and Kim at least ten times to plan the operation, ending in November when they conducted a martial law simulation . At first, things did not go as smoothly as Yoon would have liked. According to an inside military source , “The president’s commitment to martial law has always been firm,” but Kim Yong-hyun was initially not very actively involved. By March 2024, though, Kim “had become a staunch believer in martial law, while on the other hand, National Intelligence Service Director Cho Tae-yong and [then Defense Minister] Shin Won-sik consistently opposed it.” At dinner one evening that month, Yoon, livid over his political frustrations, blurted out , “We will have to impose martial law soon.” Taken aback, Shin and Cho tried to dissuade Yoon, without success. Emotions ran high, and after dinner, Kim and Yeo joined Shin at his home, where they clashed over Yoon’s comment. Shin adamantly opposed martial law, and he and Kim soon became embroiled in a heated argument, shouting at each other until late into the night. Something had to be done about Shin, who, although a hawk, did not support Yoon’s overturning of the constitutional order. A man with his attitude toward martial law would not do. On August 12 , Yoon nominated the more supportive Kim Yong-hyun as his new minister of national defense, which took effect in September. A firm believer in martial law was needed in this position of authority over the military, and Kim was that man. In appointing Kim, Yoon shunted Shin to another position where he would not get in the way. Plans had progressed in September to the stage where elite agents from the Headquarters Intelligence Detachment (HID) began training to carry out operations under martial law. The HID is a special warfare unit that, in the event of war, has as its mission infiltration into North Korea to assassinate officials and commit acts of sabotage. Why this particular skill set was considered suitable against a domestic civilian population is indicative of Yoon’s attitude toward democratic opposition. HID agents assigned to martial law operations were chosen for their proficiency in hand-to-hand combat . On the day Yoon declared martial law, five of the HID agents deployed to Pangyo, on the outskirts of Seoul, and the remaining 35 were assigned to various locations inside the capital city. By November, the Defense Counterintelligence Command  drafted high-level plans for martial law . Roh Sang-won, a former intelligence commander widely regarded as the architect of Yoon’s martial law insurrection, devised imple mentation plans. Roh brought an unsavory background to the project beyond his intelligence experience. Six years ago, he was dishonorably discharged from the service after being sentenced to 18 months in prison for sexual assault . Despite his civilian status, Roh was a key collaborator, apparently due to his intelligence experience and longstanding friendship with Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun. In mid-November, Roh instructed Maj. General Moon Sang-ho , head of the Defense Intelligence Command, to provide a list of 15 people skilled in covert operations who would assist in a planned raid on the National Election Commission. Moon selected agents for the mission “who were really good at North Korean operations.” As the day of martial law approached, plans became more detailed. On December 1, Roh met with Moon and two military intelligence colonels at a Lotteria fast-food restaurant, where they discussed operational plans supporting martial law . Despite Roh’s civilian status, he gave the orders. Roh instructed the others to seize control of the election commission “to secure evidence of election fraud.” It was unconventional, to say the least, for a civilian to be in a military chain of command, delivering orders. However, Roh’s tight relationship with Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun was well understood. Roh played upon that factor in promising future assistance in directing promotion opportunities to the two colonels if they cooperated. However, the instructions that Defense Minister Kim had issued to Moon beforehand carried more weight: “Make it known that Roh Sang-won’s orders are my orders.” Several hours before Yoon declared martial law on December 3, a second meeting occurred at Lotteria. This time, Koo Sam-hoe, commander of the Second Armored Brigade, joined others in attendance. Under orders from Roh, Koo headed afterward to an intelligence command center in Gyeonggi Province to join HID agents on standby mode. Koo’s apparent role was connected to his brigade being the closest armored unit to Seoul. Although no information on the nature of his orders has been revealed yet, it should be noted that on the same day, Defense Minister Kim remarked , “The National Assembly is messing around with the defense budget, so let’s smash it with tanks.” There are well-founded suspicions that the conspirators anticipated that there would be large-scale demonstrations against martial law and that tanks were needed to put them down. Martial Law Goes into Effect At about 10:25 PM on December 3, Yoon began his speech proclaiming martial law. Supplementing the speech, the martial law decree prohibited all political activities, strikes, and demonstrations. It also stipulated that all acts that deny or attempt to overthrow military rule, which the document perversely termed “the free democratic system,” would not be allowed. All media were to be placed under the control of the Martial Law Command, with the warning that violators may be arrested, detained, searched without a warrant, and punished. The decree was chillingly redolent of South Korea’s previous experiences under martial law when people faced repression on a mass scale, imprisonment, torture, and executions. The South Korean constitution provides for martial law based on two exigencies – military necessity or national emergency. Neither applied in this case. But Yoon calculated that violence could substitute for legality. According to one estimate, Yoon unleashed at least 4,200 riot police and more than 1,700 military personnel at a variety of locations as his insurrection unfolded. Another estimate puts the combined total at 4,749. Because the constitution grants authority to the National Assembly to overturn martial law, it was Yoon’s primary target. If Yoon could stop the National Assembly from reaching a quorum and taking a vote, then he could make martial law stick. As soon as the news was broadcast, outraged citizens by the thousands raced to the National Assembly to confront the army and police, buying enough time for arriving lawmakers to fight their way through the military blockade and gain entry to the building. Those inside the building erected barricades at the doors and used fire extinguishers to fend off soldiers who had entered through windows. Many of the soldiers deployed to the National Assembly were informed beforehand that they were being sent to the border area and instructed to write a will and have blood drawn. Helicopters transporting them to the scene deliberately adopted complex flight patterns to disorient the passengers as to their destination. However, as soon as they arrived, it was immediately apparent to the soldiers that they had been misled. Several soldiers resisted orders to drag legislators out of the building. One soldier pointed out that his unit comprised only 230 people and asked, “So how could we possibly drag them out?” The officer in charge responded by explaining, “Dragging out means subduing them with guns or special forces techniques to immobilize them and then dragging them out.” Yoon’s motives were both strategic and personal, and his animus drove him to instruct the deputy director of the National Intelligence Service to target several individuals that he particularly loathed, including Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung, National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik, and Han Dong-hoon, the leader of his ruling party. “Take this opportunity to arrest them all, sort them all out, and give the National Intelligence Service the authority to conduct counter-intelligence investigations,” he urged. Additional orders went out to the counterintelligence arrest team to prioritize apprehending those three individuals and transferring them to a detention facility in Suwon, using handcuffs and shackles. The personalization of Yoon’s martial law took on such prominence that the office of the Defense Counterintelligence Command’s arrest team had a whiteboard listing the names of fourteen people to be rounded up. As Yoon began to fear that his plan to blockade the National Assembly was starting to unravel, his compound became a beehive of activity. A flurry of calls went out, demanding that martial law troops crush resistance. In one encrypted call to Special Warfare Commander Kwak , Yoon said he did not think the Assembly had a quorum yet and ordered him to break down the doors, go in, and drag out the people inside. Colonel Kim Hyun-tae of the Special Warfare Command received a similar call from Yoon , who told him that “there shouldn’t be more than 150 lawmakers in the chamber.” Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun made frantic calls along the same lines, instructing Colonel Kim to go in and drag out Assembly members before a quorum formed. He also urged Kwak to order his soldiers to force their way in, firing blanks and tasers. Under pressure from Kwak, commanders at the scene discussed those orders and the option of shutting off power to the National Assembly, but many of them expressed doubts about the legality of those orders . Desperate for more forceful action, Yoon reached out to Lee Jin-woo , commander of the Capital Defense Command, pleading, “Can’t four people go in and take them out, one by one?” Yoon soon called again. “Haven’t you gone in yet? What are you doing? Break down the door with a gun and drag them out.” Yoon badgered National Police Commissioner Cho Ji-ho six times that night, demanding , “Chief Cho, arrest all the lawmakers trying to enter the National Assembly. It’s illegal. All the lawmakers are violating the proclamation. Arrest them.” Meanwhile, as soon as Yoon proclaimed martial law, ten Defense Intelligence Command soldiers entered the National Election Commission (NEC) headquarters in Gwacheon. Around two hours later , 110 military personnel deployed around the building, only departing about fifty minutes after the National Assembly vote. An additional 130 troops headed to a position near the commission’s Election Training Center in Suwon. Martial law troops photographed wire connections to the servers and other details in preparation for reconnection in a planned removal of servers to a martial law-controlled installation. However, time ran out when the National Assembly vote cut short that assignment. Jeong Seong-woo, chief of the Counterintelligence First Division, met with the Military Security Office director, Cyber ​​Security Office director, and Scientific Investigation Office director to convey instructions from the head of Counterintelligence, Yeo In-hyung. “The prosecution and the National Intelligence Service will come to the Central Election Commission,” he informed them. “The important tasks will be entrusted to the prosecution, and we will provide support afterward.” These instructions strongly indicate that the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office, or well-placed officials within, were complicit in the martial law conspiracy. After Martial Law Fails, Yoon Strives for a Second Martial Law At 1:01 AM on December 4, having collected a quorum, the 190 assembly members who had successfully made their way inside voted unanimously to reject Yoon’s martial law. As specified by South Korea’s martial law act , once the National Assembly votes to lift a martial law decree, the president must announce its termination “without delay.” Rather than follow that constitutional obligation, Yoon maintained three and a half hours of public silence. Yoon’s immediate reaction was to ignore the National Assembly’s decision and forge ahead with plans to impose martial law. After the vote, Yoon called Commander Lee Jim-woo, telling him , “I can’t even confirm that 190 people have come in… Even if it’s lifted, I can declare martial law two or three times, so keep going.” For the first two hours, the Martial Law Command repeatedly contacted the administrative office of the Supreme Court, demanding that it send a court clerk to the command, presumably to act as a liaison officer. Through this arrangement, the military hoped to exert control over the judiciary. Doubting the legitimacy of martial law, the Supreme Court disregarded the demand. Half an hour after the National Assembly vote, Yoon summoned generals to meet with him in the martial law situation room at the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A bus transported 34 generals and high-ranking officers to Yoon’s compound. Details of the meeting have not been made public. What is known is that not long after martial law was voted down, the martial law command ordered the 7th Airborne Brigade in North Jeolla Province and the 13th Airborne Brigade in North Chungcheong Province to go into standby mode and prepare to advance on Seoul and reinforce troops stationed there. The 11th Airborne Division in Jeollanam-do Province was also set to go, issuing bulletproof vests, helmets, and firearms to the unit and keeping vehicle engines running, ready for immediate departure. Yoon also convened a council of ministers meeting in a KakaoTalk group chat room, which may not have gone as he had hoped, as Yoon subsequently went on the air at around 4:30 AM to announce the lifting of martial law. It was only then that airborne troops were told to stand down. It is not publicly known what other factors may have contributed to Yoon’s tardy decision to lift martial law. Yoon’s Plans for the First Days of Martial Law The Martial Law Command had prepared multiple facilities to house prisoners. One site, the B1 Bunker at the Capital Defense Command, located on the border between Seoul and Gwacheon, can hold up to five hundred people. A second site, the psychological warfare building in Seoul, is not far from the National Assembly, and it is here where prisoners were to be processed through the not-so-gentle hands of HID interrogators. These sites were intended to handle high-profile prisoners. It appears that ordinary civilians who were arrested would be directed into standard prisons. At 1:01 AM on December 4, as the National Assembly voted down martial law, a nationwide request went out to prisons, asking them to report on their capacity . Such a request would ordinarily only occur during regular working hours for prison staff, and the unusual timing is highly suggestive that the martial law operation included plans for immediate mass incarceration. Had Yoon prevailed, his troops stood poised to seize control of the election commission and its computer servers, which were to be examined for imagined evidence of electoral fraud. Democratic Party assemblyman Kim Byung-joo received information from an inside source that intelligence agents, supplemented by HID soldiers, planned to go to the National Election Commission headquarters, “overpower the department heads and thirty key staff members, bind their wrists and ankles with cable ties, cover their faces with masks, and bring them to the B1 bunker.” Election computer servers were to be transferred to the counterintelligence agency. A harsher fate than imprisonment awaited election officials after being abducted by the martial law arrest team. Specific equipment was needed to encourage the desired answers from the prisoners during interrogation, including awls, nippers, hammers, and metal baseball bats . It is all too easy to imagine the kind of damage such implements could inflict upon human beings. However, there were those who liked the idea, in particular Roh. At the December 1 Lotteria meeting, he said he would personally interrogate the chairman of the NEC. “Bring the baseball bat to my office,” he ordered, adding that he can break anyone who “doesn’t talk properly.” Roh also intended to compel the election commission website manager to post a “confession of electoral fraud” on the NEC’s website. At little more than two weeks before martial law, Roh was even more explicit about the interrogation methods that were to be employed against captured election officials. “If we catch and pulverize all the people involved in the fraudulent election, everything that was fraudulent during the election will come out.” Martial law planners intended to arrest and imprison a great many people. Following the collapse of Yoon’s insurrection, police raided the home of conspirator Roh, the central figure in drawing up implementation plans for martial law. They uncovered Roh’s notebook , where he had jotted down meeting notes. He identified as “targets for collection” and “detention and handling” the names of politicians, journalists, labor unionists, religious figures, judges, and government workers. Shockingly, the notebook mentioned executions by gunshot. How many people were destined to be killed under martial law has not yet been revealed. We only know the intention. Yoon personally supervised operations to arrest those whom he especially detested. High on his list was Speaker of the National Assembly Woo Won-shik. Forty minutes after martial law was voted down, several soldiers and two plainclothesmen arrived at Woo’s home , evidently waiting for his arrival so that they could seize him. However, like most lawmakers, Woo stayed overnight at the National Assembly to defend against any further attack by Yoon’s forces. Woo thereby evaded capture, and the soldiers waiting to pounce on Woo only departed three hours later , once Yoon announced the end of martial law. Cover Up Efforts at coverup began immediately after the cancellation of martial law. When soldiers returned to camp after the confrontation at the National Assembly, their mobile phones were confiscated, and they were forbidden to leave the base , an order that was not rescinded until December 17, three days after Yoon was impeached. The intent was to cut off communication with the outside world and prevent soldiers from appearing as witnesses before investigators. Only the commanders were exempted from this order. It is also reported that lower-level personnel in the Capital Defense Command and Special Forces faced similar restrictions. Lim Tae-hoon, director of the Military Human Rights Center, noted, “Attempts to destroy evidence and conceal the truth are being openly carried out everywhere. As long as Yoon Suk Yeol, the mastermind behind the insurrection, is not arrested and detained, attempts to destroy evidence by those involved in the insurrection will not cease.” After martial law came to an end, several conspirators gathered at Yoon’s residence to coordinate their stories to the public. Afterward, all the participants changed their mobile phones in an apparent attempt to cover their tracks. For his part, Yoon repeatedly employed delaying tactics, such as instructing his security service to block police from searching his home and repeatedly ignoring summons to appear before investigators. There is reason to suspect that the insurrection had more widespread roots than initially thought. Back on September 4, Democratic Party assemblyman Yang Moon-seok raised concerns that 130 generals had made or started to make deletions to Namuwiki, a Korean information website, over a short span of time. At his September press conference, Yang expressed fears about what he thought this may have portended. “I have strong suspicions that the Yoon Suk Yeol government and the military are preparing for a state of emergency, such as martial law, aimed at war or large-scale military deployment.” That fear, it turned out, was well-placed, and if there is indeed a connection with the mass deletions, then investigators have yet to uncover the full extent of the rot at the heart of the military. The first person to delete information was Commander of the Defense Counterintelligence Command Yeo In-hyung, who played a pivotal role in the martial law plot. Others known to have been involved in the insurrection also made deletions, but a connection has not yet been established for the others. It may be that the generals’ motivation was to remove public information that could tie them to other conspirators. At a meeting of the National Assembly Steering Committee on December 19, Yang once again raised suspicions about the incident , calling for an investigation and suggesting that the fact that generals “deleted their information on Namuwiki is highly likely to indicate that they are hidden collaborators in the insurrection.” Military Emergency as Justification for Military Rule As December 3, the day of martial law approached, the Yoon administration sought to establish a legal framework for military rule that the National Assembly could not reverse. Military necessity was one option. All one had to do was create a conflict with North Korea, and then no one could stop martial law. Astonishingly, the conspirators imagined that they could fine-tune the level of North Korea’s response just enough to manufacture a conflict while sacrificing some South Korean lives along the way, but without plunging the peninsula into a far more serious war. However, always in a conflict, the other side makes its calculations, and it is a delusion to believe that those can be externally guided. Those South Korean citizens who may have lost their lives in the process were not a factor for consideration. In one of the efforts to stir up trouble, South Korea sent drones over Pyongyang in October, releasing propaganda leaflets. Based on reports provided to Democratic Party investigators, it was the Office of National Security that ordered Drone Command to launch the cross-border drones, bypassing the Ministry of National Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the military produced and supplied the propaganda leaflets to be dropped. Hoping for a response from the North Koreans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced , “In the event of a drone infiltration, we will respond accordingly and take due measures.” However, the South Korean military reaped only disappointment as North Korea failed to take the bait, denying the South of an opportunity for disproportionate retaliation. A more surefire approach was needed. Roh Sang-won’s notebook documented a more reckless concept. The Northern Limit Line is a highly disputed maritime boundary off the western coast that had been drawn, without North Korean participation, angling sharply northwards to hand over to South Korea a few islands that, in normal practice, would have belonged to the North. If one wanted to provoke a conflict, this would be a promising location to do so. In his notebook, Roh had written down the phrase, “inducing a North Korean attack around the Northern Limit Line (NLL).” First, the scene had to be set, and on June 3, 2024, the South Korean military nullified its September 19, 2018 agreement with North Korea that had, among other things, bound both sides to “cease all live-fire and maritime maneuvers” off the west coast. Later that month, the South Korean Marine Corps on the western islands of Yeonpyeong and Baengnyeongdo fired nearly 300 rocket, missile, and howitzer rounds. When that failed to elicit the desired reaction from the North, additional large-scale firing drills were conducted in September and November. One South Korean military official commented , “We thought this should have been enough to trigger a response from the NK military, but there was no reaction, and there was no sign of any provocation.” There is a discernible tone of disappointment in that statement. Another contentious issue in inter-Korean relations that held potential was related to the decades-long practice of right-wing groups in South Korea sending balloons across the border to dump propaganda materials. Tons upon tons of material repeatedly strewn across the landscape forced North Korea to expend enormous time and money in clean-up efforts. For years, the North Koreans limited themselves to complaints about the practice, generally to no avail. Finally, in May 2024,  the exasperated North Koreans decided to give their neighbors in the South a taste of their own medicine. Over a period of several months, a series of trash-dumping balloons were sent across the border, imposing on the South Koreans their own need for expensive clean-up operations. Here, surely, was an opportunity, martial law planners concluded. Since the North Koreans failed to respond as desired to indirect attempts to trigger conflict, then more direct action could do the trick. At more than one point, Roh and Defense Minister Kim discussed the potential ramifications of attacking balloon launch sites. They expected that North Korea would respond with countermeasures. In turn, South Korea could next strike Pyongyang, leading to an all-out war. This was too much even for such an extremist as Roh, who expressed reservations that Kim did not share. Undeterred, Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun established a chain of command dedicated to Operation North Wind to prepare for an artillery attack on North Korea. According to an inside military source, five days before martial law, Defense Minister Kim ordered Kim Myung-soo, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to carry out military strikes on North Korean balloon launch sites, an act of war that could have led to disastrous and uncontrollable consequences. Fortunately for Koreans on both sides of the border, Chairman Kim Myung-soo refused to follow such an irresponsible order. For his understandable caution, he was rewarded by having Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun shower him with verbal abuse. In the end, none of these potential pathways to producing a military conflict bore fruit, and impatience may have driven Yoon to act when he did. Yoon’s plunging approval rating had dropped to 17% the month before martial law, accentuating his political failure and almost certainly hastening his urge to act. A single source, an HID agent whose name has not been revealed for obvious reasons, contacted Assemblyman Lee Kwang-hee and provided details on one of the wilder schemes meant to buttress the case for martial law. Given the source and the ample evidence that the insurrectionists were capable of anything, his story cannot be too readily dismissed. According to the informant , the 35 HID agents deployed in Seoul had each been armed with five pistol magazines and a C4 plastic explosive. Their assignment was to create violent incidents if the martial law plan fell apart, which would provide Yoon with the pretext he needed for a second martial law adventure. The HID agents were not told when they would go into action; they only had to wait for the order to proceed. Their assigned targets were the Cheongju International Airport, the THAAD anti-missile base at Seongju, and the military airbase at Daegu. To maximize effect, American military assets were among the targets . The HID informant felt conflicted about his mission when he realized that he had been tasked to carry out an act of terrorism, and that led him to reveal what he knew in the hope that publicity would “stop the mission as soon as possible.” The informant’s revelation appeared to have his desired impact, as once the story made the news, the order came down to the HID agents to cancel their missions. Democratic Assemblyman Park Sun-won, a former National Intelligence Service deputy director, pointed out that hitting those targets would inevitably involve the U.S. military. Presumably, that intervention would have supported Yoon against his contrived enemies. Park also believes that if Yoon had managed to trigger a conflict with North Korea, that would have enabled martial law forces to more freely kill political opponents. There have also been uncorroborated reports that the Martial Law Command had planned assassinations and other acts of violence to provide a falsified pretext for martial law, in which South Korean soldiers would be suited in uniforms of the North Korean People’s Army to misdirect responsibility. At this time, evidence for this allegation is thin. However, it does appear that an operation of some sort may have been in the works. In August, the Defense Intelligence Command contracted with a private company to manufacture 170 North Korean military uniforms to be delivered in the first week of December. The company, which had experience in manufacturing uniforms, was supplied with an actual North Korean uniform to use as a model. The ostensible purpose for the request was that the uniforms were needed to produce a movie, an unlikely scenario for the Defense Intelligence Command. Despite the company’s skepticism about the stated need, it made the uniforms and delivered them on December 6, by which time martial law had collapsed. Relations with the United States For the United States, Yoon had been a dream come true, a president who wholeheartedly embraced his assigned role as a junior partner in the anti-China tripartite military alliance with the U.S. and Japan. If Washington had any deep concern about martial law, it would only be that failure might risk opening the door to a less enthused, albeit still obedient, partner for U.S. militarism. Certainly, U.S. relations with South Korea would not have been adversely impacted by military dictatorship, as attested to by U.S. relations during South Korea’s previous experiences under martial law and other cases such as Pinochet’s Chile or Suharto’s Indonesia. What the United States did care about – and deeply so – was that regardless of events, South Korea would maintain its support for U.S. military confrontation with China. That is all that mattered, even if the freedom of South Korean people had to be sacrificed along the way. All the U.S. had to offer regarding Korea’s internal situation were anodyne comments, phrased so as not to antagonize any party. The Biden administration was far more active in laying stress on the expectation that South Korea should continue supporting U.S. militarism in the Asia-Pacific. Numerous statements and direct contacts were made to Seoul to remind them of that fact, including a personal visit from U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell. Military Dictatorship Over the Long Term So far, investigators have mainly centered their attention on the events leading up to and during the period of martial law. It is hoped that they will also address an additional question: what were the insurrectionists’ long-term plans? How did they envision military rule in the months and years to come? We do not have much direct information yet. Still, we can discern Yoon’s objectives in general terms based on the speech he delivered on December 3, in which he excoriated the National Assembly as a “den of criminals.” He went on to threaten to “immediately eradicate the unscrupulous pro-Pyongyang anti-state forces,” using his customary twisted characterization of progressives, trade unionists, activists, and the majority of Democratic Party members and supporters. One can conclude that a vast swathe of Korean society would have been imperiled. Let us also dwell upon Yoon’s choice of the word ‘eradicate’ in that speech. It is a strong word, and Yoon deemed it important enough that he spoke it three times. What kind of violence was Yoon suggesting with such language? We know the Martial Law Command was preparing for a significant influx of prisoners. However, mass incarceration is not necessarily synonymous with eradication. Yoon may have had something more permanent in mind. Additionally, Yoon had already demonstrated that he had no compunction in employing violence and that, at a minimum, plans included executing at least some high-profile prisoners and violently torturing election officials. Might many ordinary citizens also have been similarly ‘eradicated’? Even if this would not have been the case, under martial law, Korean society as a whole was fated to be subjected to repression on a mass scale. Furthermore, Yoon envisioned military rule as a long-term process. Just hours before announcing martial law, he issued a directive to “prepare a reserve fund for the emergency martial law legislative body” to replace the National Assembly. One does not establish a military-appointed legislature without anticipating it will be in place for years. Looking to the Future Yoon’s defiant attitude toward investigators has hindered progress in the impeachment process, allowing him time to systematically destroy evidence. In addition to obstructing legal procedures, his seditious messages are rousing extremist elements within the ruling People’s Power Party and among his supporters to back his refusal to relinquish power. Some fanatics have even begun to advocate violent measures . In his New Year message , Yoon warned that South Korea was in danger from “anti-state groups,” referring to advocates for the restoration of democracy and legality. Yoon added, “With you, I will fight to the end to protect this country,” signaling extremists to mobilize a tenacious and potentially violent resistance to keep him in power. Although stripped of active duties, Yoon remains as president of South Korea. It may take months for the Constitutional Court to reach a ruling on impeachment, and if the court fails to uphold Yoon’s impeachment, he will return to active duty as president. In that scenario, the only lesson he is likely to have learned is that a second attempt at martial law must employ more violence to succeed. South Korea’s future is riding on the development and outcome of the effort to bring Yoon to justice. Gregory Elich is a Korea Policy Institute board member. He is a contributor to the collection, Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy (Haymarket Books, 2023). His website is  https://gregoryelich.org    Follow him on Twitter at @GregoryElich .

By KJ Noh | December 11, 2024 | An earlier version of this article appeared in Counterpunch South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol announcing the lifting of his martial law decree. After South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol's coup was rescinded after 6 hours, Western pundits opined that this was an affirmation of South Korean democracy's robustness and resilience, its institutional maturity and strength. This is like saying after a survivor fights off an assault, that this demonstrates a mature state of legal order.  Hardly.  It signals the opposite: it demonstrates a gaping, terrifying lack of order. The defeat of martial law in South Korea is certainly an affirmation of the South Korean people: their courage and fearlessness.  But few Koreans are feeling safe that "democracy worked".   The most terrifying phrase in the South Korean lexicon is "martial law decree"--it triggers visceral memories of torture, disappearances, mass graves, and deep, paralyzing terror.  Even now, legislators are sleeping inside the Parliament building to ensure that if a second Martial Law decree is proclaimed, they will not have to scramble and claw their way through barricades to vote again.  Likewise, protestors are protesting and demanding impeachment while standing in spirited vigil outside the building to tackle martial law troops if they come surging out of their barracks again.    The recent motion to impeach Yoon Suk Yeol, which failed because his party walked out of chambers, signals a further breakdown.  Yoon, charged with insurrection, is still officially the sitting president--the head of government and commander-in-chief of the military--while the country is supposedly being headed by the Prime Minister and the head of the ruling party.  Since the constitution does not allow for such ad hoc transfer of powers, citizens are referring to this as a "soft coup".  And while the investigating police and prosecutors office have opened investigations, they are the very institutions whose leaders were involved in the coup, leading to doubts as to whether justice can be administered.  All this chaos undercuts the assertion that Korea is a "mature, leading democracy... one of the strongest, most dynamic democracies in the world, a champion of democracy for the world" .  Had it not been for thousands of Koreans streaming out at midnight and running interference with their bodies against martial law troops, South Korea's three-decade-long political experiment would have reverted to blank terror like a suddenly snapped film reel. Yoon's martial law declaration sought to white out all civil and political rights, as well as to extirpate and annihilate all political opposition--what he referred to as pro-North, anti-state forces.  It is only a series of lucky coincidences and missteps that it was thwarted.  And the crisis is not over yet. A Fraudulent Alliance of Democracies The coup attempt also highlights the mendacity that undergirds the US myth of "an alliance of democracies"--an alliance in which South Korea's President Yoon was touted as the leader of "the Global Pivot state", championing liberal democracy around the world and fighting "autocracies".   Yoon was even invited to address a joint session of the US congress, where, to repeated standing ovations, he unironically warned that "totalitarian forces may conceal and disguise themselves as defenders of democracy or human rights" and bloviated about the importance of the rule of law. This mendacity and hypocrisy is also evident in the reactions of the Western powers to the coup.  After martial law was declared and as legislative aides frantically barricaded doors in parliament to stymie marauding paratroopers, the only statement western governments and leaders could muster was  "we are watching things closely ".   Not one of them condemned or denounced the coup as an egregious attack on democracy or the South Korean body politic--as they would have immediately if any non-US-client state had declared martial law. They also intoned, hypnotically, "Korea is our closest ally": code for "We support Yoon and his policies".  In one telling back-and-forth, State Department Spokesperson Vedant Patel was asked if the US supported the recission of martial law.  Patel refused to condemn martial law, and also refused to support the national assembly's recission of martial law.  Instead, he mumbled vagaries about "peaceful resolution" and "rule of law", while talking of a "fluid situation" about which he could "not jump to any conclusions" or "get ahead of the process". The Taiwan DPP authorities, touted as a model Asian democracy, did them one better: as a kindred US-quisling state, they openly endorsed Yoon's absurd declaration of Martial law, posting  in their official account:  South Korean legislature has been controlled by pro-North Korean forces. To protect constitutional freedoms, SK president Yoon Suk Yeol has initiated nation-wide martial law. They bemoaned that they, too, were defending against "worldwide dark and evil forces" in their legislature, hinting they might also do the same. Insurrection, Democratic style After the South Korean coup blew over--for now--the same western pundits commented breezily, "Isn't South Korea's democracy great?".   No, it's not.  This insurrection could have turned out very, very badly--and it's not over yet.  It's not difficult to show that Yoon Suk Yeol committed treason--running roughshod over the South Korean constitution, by: Declaring martial law without justification: Martial law, under the Korean constitution, is reserved for war or catastrophic national emergencies that require suspension of government for military rule. Budget disagreement or policy friction/deadlock--not unusual in a polity--does not justify deploying armed force to assert power.  Labeling normal opposition as North Korean/anti-state subversion signals a despotically unbalanced mindset that harkens back to the worst excesses of the previous military dictatorships. Illegal plans for kidnapping: Intelligence services were directed to arrest "key political figures"--including opposition DPK party leader, Lee Jae Myung, the speaker of the assembly Woo Won-shik, the leader of the PPP (his own party), Han Dong Hoon, and RKP leader Cho Kuk, among others.  Post-decree disclosures have revealed that there were plans to hold these legislators in a black site bunker of the Capital Defense Command in Gwacheon.   Potential Election manipulation:  troops were sent to occupy national election committee offices.  These armed troops also brought with them an ambulance and an empty truck--possibly in anticipation of mass bloodshed and the need to cart away casualties and corpses.  Ominously, they seemed to have had a mission to target election servers.   Obstructing the constitutional process:  Korean martial law allows for the suspension of normal executive and judicial processes, but it does not allow for suspension of the legislature. In fact, the South Korean constitution specifically provides for legislators to rescind a martial law decree as part of its constitutional system of checks and balances. That Yoon sought to override that provision and prevent legislators from exercising their constitutional mandate by sending fully armed special warfare troops--the same Special warfare brigade that has historically always facilitated coups--to the national assembly to prevent legislators from entering signals criminal insurrection.  This was further confirmed by reports that the martial law troops had specific orders to "drag out" legislators from the national assembly chambers to prevent a quorum when a group were able to breach the initial cordon.  War provocations: More recent disclosures have shown that Kim Yong Hyun, the Minister of Defence, had ordered missile or artillery attacks into North Korea just prior to the martial law declaration, and had been responsible for a mysterious earlier drone incursion into North Korean territory.  Likely the joint chiefs had vetoed this rash action, but it suggests that there was an intention to provoke an intra-Korean conflagration to justify the martial law decree, making the claims of actual "North Korean invasion" in Parliament actually credible. Long term preparation:  Contrary to media claims that this was out of the blue and improvised, planning for the insurrection seems to have been months in preparation.  By September, the warning had been sounded in the National Assembly, but recent information seems to suggest that special forces rehearsals for helicopter intrusion into the National Assembly area had begun as early as April, and by the summer, it seems to have been a regular topic of discussion in Yoon's circle.  Why the insurrection failed:   There are a multitude of factors that led to the failure of the insurrection.  Among them:   Flight delay: According to one  military expert,  the 707 special warfare forces brigade, had been ordered to "take the National Assembly building by 11:00 pm at any cost"--thirty minutes after the president's television address.  However, they were delayed when their helicopters did not receive air transit clearance over a critical security corridor.  All of South Korean airspace is tightly monitored and restricted--defended with radar and anti-aircraft batteries--especially in the capital. Yeouido, the area of the National Assembly building, and Yongsan, where the Defense ministry and Presidential residence is located, are especially tightly controlled. This delay in clearance resulted in troops landing at 11:48, rather than 11:00pm, and nearly two hundred speedy legislators were able to beat the special forces to the building, where they entered, barricaded, voted and rescinded the decree in record time.  Despite being equipped to cut electricity to kill the functioning of the legislature--all the forces were equipped with night vision goggles--they arrived too late to stop entry and then were further stymied by aides who frantically improvised barricades with chairs, cabinets, tables, plants, belts and duct tape in a hallucinatory modern day re-enactment of the Paris Commune. Noodle Pitstop: Another keystone cops scenario unrolled at the DCC (Defense Counterintelligence Command; formerly the DSC, an intelligence bureau that had been dismantled by the former president after it was revealed that they had planned an armed coup after the impeachment of Park Geun-Hye).  Fisticuffs flew when a commander refused orders to deploy.  The chastened troops, however, took their priorities in good stead after being dispatched: they took the time to stop and eat ramen noodles at a convenience store, before limping anemically to the electoral commission for their special operation, which was cancelled soon after arrival.  It's also been noted that 7 officers at the DCC opposed the actions as unconstitutional. Spirited opposition : Legislators jumped out of their beds and sprinted to the National Assembly.  Some pushed and cajoled their way past police blockades.  Others vaulted over the fences.  A blind legislator found herself stumbling and stymied when she could not surmount the improvised barriers that had been put up.  Still, she stated that she had voted "one million times "yes" in her heart against martial law".  One woman legislator tussled with a special forces operator, grabbing his rifle and screaming "aren't you ashamed?".  Meanwhile, thousands of citizens rushed out to pressure and obstruct soldiers and police, while aides successfully blockaded and fought back troops.  Sequencing and Timing Failure : The Martial Law planners seem to have cribbed their coup recipe from Chun Doo Hwan's successful 1979 coup: controlling intelligence services, deploying special forces, cordoning off the national assembly, and arresting the opposition, followed by massive troop mobilization.  However, they did not anticipate rapid response through SMS and social media that stop-hit their plans and brought out citizens onto the street.  This failure to shut down the media and internet resulted in an unprecedented civil response.  However, plans show that had the initial steps succeeded, there were plans to follow up with massive troop movements from the regional divisions into the city.  Even after martial law was cancelled, there were attempts in the early morning to bully the Judiciary to go along with the insurrectionists. The Republic of Prosecution:   Yoon's autocratic tendencies were well known even from his campaign promises: a former chief prosecutor, he had threatened to create a "republic of prosecutors"--something he rapidly put into practice using an army of prosecutors to steamroll opponents.  The opposition party leader, Lee Jae Myung, who nearly beat him at the polls, had his personal residence raided hundreds of times, and has been subjected to non-stop political prosecution. And according to aides, apparently, Yoon routinely discussed declaring martial law, almost as if he were ordering a pizza: "Shall we order Martial Law today?". So how did Yoon become touted as a paragon of democratic virtue?  How did he become so despotically out of touch?  What made him think he could get away with declaring himself dictator?  The answer to all questions points in the same direction. Despite being despised by Koreans for his despotic tendencies, Yoon was lionized by the US--the Biden administration at every turn.  He was pumped up as a global leader of "liberal democracy",  the leader of the  "global pivot state"  that "advances freedom, peace, and prosperity through liberal democratic values".  He received this constant stroking from the west, even as he was persecuting, prosecuting, and smashing every democratic and civil institution in sight: the media, the independent press, unions, opposition parties, peace and social service groups.  When unions went on strike, Yoon claimed they were anti-state pro-North seditionists and threatened them with prison and massive fines.  Scientific researchers had their faces smashed in and were dragged out like furniture for daring to protest research budget cuts.  Media institutions and opposition party politicians were endlessly SWAT-raided and arrested as if they were terrorists. Still, he was endlessly praised by the US even as he was smashing institutions and grinding Korean citizens under his boot heel. And when millions protested--most recently, one hundred thousand hit the streets of Seoul to demand his resignation in the week before the coup--the US and western press did a total media blackout.  Yoon may have been a bastard, but he was clearly the US bastard: incapable of any wrong, always to be coddled, protected, and valorized.  He was "Mr American Pie", Washington's own minstrel, "a good ole boy ...from a long, long time ago".   As a result, the Caligula of Yongsan became high on his own supply.  Earlier this year in March,  when Yoon hosted the US Summit of Democracies, even as he was threatening medical workers, South Korean Foreign Minister  Cho Tae-yul  stated without an ounce of irony:  [Our hosting of the summit] signifies our collective resolve to strengthen democracy globally...As President Yoon stated...where political freedom reigns supreme, there prosperity flourished.  Peace is guaranteed when countries that value freedom and human rights come together as one.  Korea’s own journey is a living testament to this truth. Our story showcases the political, economic and cultural potential that is unleashed when embracing the ideals of freedom, human   rights and the rule of law.  As Korea aspires to become a Global Pivotal State, we are committed to standing in solidarity with the international community to safeguard and advance these values.    Anthony Blinken  at the summit , also lauded South Korea   as "one of the strongest, most dynamic democracies in the world, a champion of democracy for the world." Blinken also highlighted South Korea's " commitment to freedom " and its strong ties to the US because of that commitment:  We’ve invested in the foundation of our strength, our democracies, while also deepening ties to our partners who share our commitment to freedom, to equal opportunity, to human rights, to the rule of law...Mr. President [Yoon], your principled leadership has helped bring us even closer together and has made Korea a global pivotal state.   What did the US know, and when did it know it?  This US support, encouragement, investment and deep ties to Yoon begs the obvious question:  What did the US know about the coup, and when did it know it?   The Pentagon refuses to comment on whether it was notified in advance.   However, it's virtually impossible for them not to have known. All previous coups in South Korea have been green-lighted by the US.  This is because the US has de facto control over all troops in South Korea; the Korean military reports to the CFC/UNC command, a joint command led by the USFK general.  The US also maintains "wartime" opcon (meaning it has operational control anytime it wants).  All troop movements have to be reported to and coordinated with the US, if for no other reason than to avoid a friendly fire incident in a densely territorialized area bristling with troops, arms, surveillance, and weapons on hair trigger alert.    And the SK special forces, like the ones at the National Assembly, are the most tightly integrated with the US of any military--it is the only US special operations command in the world where the US and host nation's Special warfare forces merge into a single entity.  From their own website :  Since its inception, SOCKOR (Special Operations Command, Korea) continues to be the only theater SOC (special operations command) in which U.S. and host nation SOF (special operations forces) are institutionally organized for combined operations. SOCKOR and Republic of Korea (ROK) Army Special Warfare Command (SWC) regularly train in their combined roles... ...If the armistice fails, SOCKOR and ROK SWC will combine to establish the Combined Special Operations Component Command Korea (CSOCC-K)...with the SOCKOR Commander as the Special Operations Component Commander. Minus the jargon, it means Korean special operations forces train and coordinate with US special forces almost as a single fighting unit.  It's highly unlikely a detachment could kit up completely without the US asking, "Where are you going at this late hour?".  A teenager's, "Oh, nowhere",  doesn't cut it.  Also, the Korean peninsula is the most densely surveilled place on the planet, and every inch of land and airspace is monitored.  It's surmised that the helicopters ferrying the troops to the National Assembly were delayed in getting air transit clearance because that area is one of the most highly restricted areas for air travel.  That air space surveillance and control is likely directly reported and coordinated with US command. Right now, according to a military watchdog, all military leave in Korea has been cancelled . A second martial law declaration is not completely out of the question. What comes next? It's unclear what comes next.  The only certainty, for the vast majority of Koreans, is that Yoon can no longer govern. Like a drunk driver--drunk in this case with power--the keys to the vehicle have to be wrested away from him.  Traditionally, in Korean politics, the end comes in the form of resignation (Syngman Rhee, 1960), assassination (Park Chung Hee, 1979), Impeachment (Park Geun-hye), usually followed by imprisonment or exile.  If Yoon is successfully impeached, and the impeachment upheld in the Constitutional Court--provided the court can find quorum--or if he resigns, an election and a peaceful transition of power could occur.  Yoon could face prosecution for insurrection, a capital crime, something that he does not have immunity from--and most certainly for other crimes if he is stripped of power.  Those are still distant hypotheticals: South Korea is now a constitutional grayzone of a powder keg with an insurrectionist-who-would-be-dictator as sitting president, a ruling party reluctant to cede power, a thwarted opposition, and a livid, enraged populace.   The stakes are tremendous and the only thing certain is that there will be more twists and turns.    Unbewitching Ourselves:  Only by a stroke of luck--delayed helicopters--and a lot of pluck--angry citizens roused from their beds, e-commerce truck drivers abandoning deliveries, sexagenarian parliamentarians engaging in parkour--was a political catastrophe and democratic meltdown averted this time. This failed coup constitutes a legitimacy crisis in one of the US's most important vassal states, one of an ongoing stream of ongoing crises for the US Empire among its vassals.  Touted as one of the most important leaders   and partners in promoting (US-designated) democracy in a "global fight against autocracies"--Kurt Campbell even nominated for a Nobel Prize--Yoon has shown himself to be a crackpot US-client despot, like generations of tinpot dictators before him.    Yoon's star was in favor only because he was a pliant executor of US geostrategic strategy--greasing US plans for war against China--in the high stakes agenda to maintain US global hegemony.  In fact, without deep US support, it's unlikely that such a profound political dunce--someone who had never held an elected office in his life--would have become president.  Certainly, he received dramatic pre-election support from the US ruling imperial elite, for whom he was a walking fulfillment list.   When he was elected, the champagne corks blew up in Washington.    By reverting to full barbarian-authoritarian-mode, the mask has fallen off this imperial clown show of US propaganda.  This is the real story of South Korea's coup: as the Empire weakens, its forcefield of mystification wanes. Its producers slip up, its hired actors mumble and miss cues, stagehands misplace props, and the extras walk off the set.  And we start to notice things behind the shimmering scrim.  Things break, fall apart, the illusion cannot hold. Yoon's sudden fall from grace is not a symptom of Korea's robust democracy, neither is it a sign that South Korea is stable and resilient.  There are still many dangers lurking as the ship of state struggles to right itself: possibly more emergency decrees, more military action, most certainly more protests and political turmoil.  But the 6 hour coup is certainly an unmasking of Yoon as an incompetent despot of the Empire, and the fraudulence of the Empire managers who sold him as a paragon of political virtue. Breaking the propaganda trance, is the place to start to break the hold of the Empire, as a full blown legitimacy crisis rages all around the world.  Courageous Koreans smashed that trance.  Will others join them?    K.J. Noh is a scholar and peace activist focused on the geopolitics of the Asian continent. He writes for Counterpunch  and Dissident Voice , and reports for local and international media.

By Paul Liem  | December 4, 2024 On December 4, 2024, hundreds of activists rallied in New York, Los Angeles and San Franciso in support of the Korean peoples struggle to demand the resignation of President Yoon Suk Yeol after his failed attempt to suppress the opposition parties in the National Assembly by declaring Martial, December 2. The rallies were organized by the U.S. Out of Korea Campaign which was launched by Nodutdol for Community Development. The following is a solidarity statement delivered by KPI board member, Paul Liem, at the San Francisco rally. The Korea Policy Institute stands in solidarity with the struggle of the South Korean people to oust the dictator Yoon Suk Yeol from power and to make way for a leadership that will represent their true interests - to place prosperity for the common good over profits for the few; to demand sincere apology and just compensation from Japan for its crimes against the Korean people during WWII; to establish a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and a framework within which separated families can be reunited. For his crime of insurrection, Yoon and those who plotted with him should be punished swiftly, but we must prepare for protracted struggle. Yoon has shown no remorse for his actions, nor any sign that he will resign voluntarily. Impeachment can only succeed with a National Assembly vote of two thirds, in favor. For this to happen at least 8 members of Yoon’s Peoples Power Party will have to defect. I hope they will, but we cannot count on it. Until now and the day when Korea will be free from the scourge of Yoon and the self-entitled First Lady, Kim Keon Hee, we in the US must work tirelessly to support the Korean people’s struggle against fascism until victory, even as we struggle against fascism here. This is a dangerous time for Korea, but not because of any threat posed by the DPRK, and not because of the developing alliance between the DPRK and Russia. It is dangerous because the neoliberal social order upon which US global hegemony rests is in political and economic crisis everywhere; in South Korea, Japan, Europe, Middle East, and even in the US. As a result, the US is going to desperate lengths to preserve its global hegemony at the cost of war in Ukraine, genocide in Palestine, war against Iran, regime change in Venezuela, and threatening war against China and the DPRK, to name a few. Yoon must go, not only because he is, in essence, a dictator in the same vein as Chun Du Hwan, Park Geun Hye, Park Chung Hee and Syngman Rhee. But because like them, he willingly places the interests of the U.S. ahead of the interests of the Korean people, and as a consequence Korea has been a divided country since liberation from Japan in 1945, in a state of war for the past 70 years, and today is the linchpin in a US/Japan/SK trilateral military alliance preparing to go to war with China and the DPRK, both nuclear armed countries. The peace-loving people of the ROK have no such interests in war with China and/or threatening the DPRK with regime change. For these reasons, and for his crime of insurrection against the democratic institutions of the ROK, the dictator, Yoon, Must Go. Paul Liem is the Chair of the Korea Policy Institute Board of Directors.